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
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


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# MIDDLE EAST: THE STRATEGIC HUB.

*a bibliographic survey of literature*



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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REPLY TO  
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FOREWORD

The October 1973 war and subsequent oil crisis increased the intensity of US and Western interest in the Middle East. The Sinai agreements of 1974 and 1975 between Egypt and Israel were preludes to Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. This visit, and the subsequent direct talks between Arabs and Israelis for the first time in 30 years, have continued the deep involvement of the US in the search for peace in this vital region. A comprehensive understanding of the Middle East is essential in dealing with the challenges in this strategic area.

The Middle East, at the crossroads of the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, is the center of the three major monotheistic religions of the world--Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and has 80 percent of the known oil resources of the free world. Some of its countries play a dominant role in the Third World and have major financial and economic influence in other international fora. The rapidly increasing international role of Middle East states has caused dynamic social and economic changes. These changes, combined with an emphasis toward nonalignment, have increased the global importance of this strategic area.

This 1978 bibliographic survey of literature on the Middle East has been prepared by research analysts of the US Army Library. Last published in 1973, this fourth edition updates previous lists of reference materials. It should provide a useful tool for contemporary research on the Middle East and its peoples.

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Lieutenant General, GS  
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for Operations and Plans

Topics include: War and Peace in the Middle East; Unsettled Issues between Arabs and Israelis; Middle East Regional Aspects; The States of the Middle East--National perspectives, <sup>and</sup> Israel.



#### ANALYSTS' NOTE

This unclassified bibliographic survey was prepared at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. The last edition was issued in May 1973 as DA PAM 550-16.

As in the past the publications included in the new pamphlet are available on the open shelves of The Army Library, Pentagon. Selections of materials were made from several thousand periodical articles, books, studies, and reports, both friendly and unfriendly. No effort has been made to delete or exclude references by reason of their controversial nature. On the other hand, inclusion of entries does not represent an official endorsement of the views expressed. The Research Analysts gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of various specialists in the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the Department of the Army. Special acknowledgment is extended to the Central Intelligence Agency, and to the US Defense Mapping Agency, Topographic Center for their excellent maps.

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HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C., 15 December 1978

## MIDDLE EAST: THE STRATEGIC HUB

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(See also Chapter II, and Chapter VI)

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### APPENDIX I

#### BACKGROUND NOTES

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| C. Sovereignty Issues in the Persian Gulf Area ..... | BACK COVER |

Maps are inclosed in a pocket on the back cover of this volume.



## MIDDLE EAST: THE STRATEGIC HUB

### CHAPTER I

#### WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(See also Chapter II, and Chapter VI)

##### A. Prospects for Peace: The Search and the Initiatives

###### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT; PEACE OR ARMAGEDDON IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Mohamed Sid-Ahmed. New York, St. Martins Press, 1976. 144 p.

The author until recently was in charge of the editorial page on Al-Ahram, Egypt's principal newspaper. He is a marxist and a leading figure in the Egyptian left. He argues that for the first time a "settlement is now possible" but that if this opportunity is missed the "conflict may soon erupt in excess more bloody battle than the October war."

DOOMED TO PEACE, by Bechin Ben Yahmed, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.1 (October 1975) 127-133.

The publisher and editor in chief of *Jeune Afrique*, Paris, France presents his view as to a possible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. "The new, perhaps decisive situation, arising from the 1973 October war, is that now the Arabs are in a position to negotiate; the Israelis are no longer in a position to refuse negotiations, and the Jews of the world have a great stake in such a negotiating process." The Arabs, furthermore, "no longer need an intermediary or external pressure upon Israel. They themselves are the most effective instrument of pressure." It is the author's "firm belief that once the main obstacle—the complicating factor of Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations—is removed, the great historic day of Jewish-Arab negotiations concerning a solution to the Palestine problem will not be far off."

SINAI II: IN RETROSPECT, by Waldo H. Dubberstein, vol.5, no.2 (Spring 1977) 22-33.

The Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia in the Defense Intelligence Agency writes: "The Sinai II Accord of September 1, 1975 between Egypt and Israel was an important step toward cooperation between the two countries . . . The brutal civil war in Lebanon largely diverted Arab attention from Sinai II and from any move toward Arab-Israeli peace. Now as the Lebanese conflict is being dampened down . . . Egypt,

Syria and the Soviet Union have been promoting a general peace conference in Geneva with the Palestine Liberation Organization participating. The Arabs would have the conference . . . address itself to a return of all the 'occupied lands.' On its side Israel does not accept a Palestinian presence at any peace conference. The two sides are far apart; if they do not make progress toward settlements, war will become a distinct possibility."

THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by Nadav Safran, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.52, n.2 (January 1974) 215-236.

Examines the impact of the 1973 War on the "complex of factors that enter into the Arab-Israeli conflict." These factors include the military lessons learned from the 1973 War, the "changing pattern of antagonism and association that makes up inter-Arab relations, the fluctuating rivalries among the big powers with interests in the area, and many features of the internal life of the antagonistic countries." The author concludes that "a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has at last become a real possibility for the parties directly concerned, and an imperative necessity for all the outsiders that have been involved in it."

WAR OR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?, by Lawrence L. Whetten, in *World Today*, v.30, no.12 (December 1974) 504-512.

"Given that neither Arabs nor Jews can now expect to gain a military advantage on the scale of Israel's victory in 1967, there is some reason to hope that both sides will reassess more soberly the realities and risks of renewed war."

###### 2. Search for Peace: Historical Aspects

THE ELUSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ed. by Malcolm H. Kerr. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1975. 347p. (published under the auspices of the Arab-Israeli Research and Relations Project, a program of the international peace academy).

United Nations peace efforts; Israel and Jewish-Arab peace: Governmental and nongovernmental approaches. Arab peace efforts and the solution of the Arab-Israeli problems; American Efforts



for Peace. Notes that . . . "Not only has the oil crisis drawn in the industrialized and underdeveloped nations of the world alike into the web of the Middle East conflict, but the course of violence itself has charted an ominous upward pattern. Each war comes sooner, kills more people, and costs more money; in between, terror and counterterror have increasingly become part of the everyday scene. The net result is that the conflict has become too dangerous and costly for many nations of the world to tolerate. No doubt even the most comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement that we might imagine today would leave room for a long train of difficulties in future years. Yet the overriding fact is that both the new possibilities of success and the risks of failure are too great to ignore." With map of UNEF Deployment situation as of 1200 GMT 27 March 1974; Also Map of UNDOF Deployment 14 November 1974.

**ISRAEL AND THE ROGERS PEACE INITIATIVES**, by Michael Brecher, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.2 (Summer 1974) 402-426.

Examines in detail Israel's "strategic decision to accept Rogers Plan 'B' and the accompanying cease-fire." This decision "was preceded by more than a year of pre-decisional events, decisive inputs . . . and two important tactical decisions." The results of this decision in Israel were: "renewed disdain for the United Nations . . . ; a priori rejection of Arab statements affirming a willingness to make peace; and concern about possible abandonment by the United States . . . That decision in essence implied a crumbling of three pillars of Israel's policy from 1967 to June 1970: (1) a reversal of her insistent demand for direct negotiations; (2) an acceptance of the term 'withdrawal' from occupied territories; and (3) an official commitment to carry out all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 . . ."

3. Henry Kissinger's "Initiatives" (See also III-A-10)

**BEYOND THE SINAI AGREEMENT**, J. W. Fulbright, in *Worldview*, v.18, no.12 (December 1975) 9-15.

Addresses "what I believe to be the central, crucial interests of the United States in the Middle East," and comments on potential problems with the Sinai Agreement. "The Sinai agreement can be represented as no more than a modest gain at best, purchased at an exceptionally high cost . . . My . . . serious apprehensions are directed toward two basic and potentially dangerous shortcomings in the overall agreement. One is the excessive, sweeping United States commitment to Israeli military, energy, and economic needs as these are perceived by Israel. The other is what could be a de facto American acquiescence in the new status quo for an indefinite period, masked behind several less-than-

constructive ambiguities . . . Though not inconsistent in a purely technical way, the American assurances to Egypt and to Israel regarding Syria are scarcely reconcilable in substance. Behind the artful diplomatic language we seem to have come perilously close to having promised one thing to one side, something quite different to the other." Senator Fulbright concludes: "The key to peace in the Middle East is in the internal politics of the United States . . . In the Middle East there is more than a conflict to be ended and confrontations to be avoided. Great benefits are waiting to be reaped from a peaceful Middle East, and they can benefit the whole world."

**ENGAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Nadav Safran, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.53, n.1 (October 1974) 45-63.

Secretary of State Kissinger's "two campaigns of negotiations . . . have produced two disengagement accords . . . between Israel and Egypt, then between Israel and Syria . . . But there is a price to be paid for these achievements and prospects which the American people may not be aware of. The disengagement process in the Middle East has been accompanied by a process of engagement of American responsibility, which bids fair to increase . . . At the end of the road, the United States may well find out that it has extended to the Middle East the kind of commitment it assumed toward Europe after 1947." The author concludes that if the American Congress and people are "to accept a similar commitment in the Middle East and not confuse it with other recent tragic involvements of the United States, they must be apprised of the true interests and prospects at stake there, and must be frankly informed of the real obligations they are called upon to assume in order to advance them."

**HOW KISSINGER DID IT: STEP BY STEP IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Edward R. F. Sheehan, in *Foreign Policy*, no.22 (Spring 1976) 3-70.

A "comprehensive account" of Kissinger's efforts in the Middle East. "Based on extensive talks with American, Arab, and Israeli officials . . ." Includes many quotations from participants in these efforts. The author concludes that "Kissinger is like a lumberjack leaping from log to log, wishing that the river will lead him somewhere else. He suffers, by his own admission, from the syndrome of success; though his tactics have been brilliant and his techniques, too, strategically he has sinned on the side of caution. Perhaps his greatest achievement is to have bought time, prevented war, and erected the foundation for the pursuit of real peace."

**SYRIA'S OPTIONS**, by Stephen Oren, in *World Today*, v.30, no.11 (November 1974) 472-478.

The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement negotiated by Dr. Kissinger "comprises a



time-bomb for the UN force holding the ground between the two armies . . . External and internal constraints on the Syrian regime have produced a situation, which the dissatisfied could exploit to force a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East."

4. *Egyptian Peace Initiatives: Sadat in Israel Addressing the Knesset* (See also IV-B-2)

RUSHING TOWARD CAIRO, in *Time*, v.110, no.25 (19 December 1977) 25-28.

Describes the "Anger, worry and a maelstrom of moves and countermoves," aroused by Sadat's peace initiative. Map, "The divided Arab world." Box inset, "A surge of hope in the U.S." contains results of a survey conducted for *Time* by the opinion-research firm of Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc.

SADAT IN ISRAEL, in *Newsweek*, v.90, n.22 (28 November 1977) 36-46.

Describes the "remarkable and dramatic" visit of Sadat to Israel. "The first official visit to Israel by an Arab leader since the Jewish state was created in 1948. In one stroke, said an Arab diplomat, Sadat has in effect recognized Israel as a state and recognized Jerusalem as its capital, something not even the Americans would do . . . Israel and Egypt had broken their diplomatic stalemate adding a hopeful—if unpredictable—new dimension to the search for peace in the whole Middle East." Accompanying articles: profile the two singular men—Sadat and Begin—who made the trip possible, assess Sadat's domestic troubles and weigh the violent Arab reaction to his overture to Israel."

SADAT'S 'SACRED MISSION', in *Time*, v.110, no.22 (November 28, 1977) 28-47.

An account of President Sadat's visit to Israel and his address before the Knesset. "For the first time, an Arab head of state had discussed the problems for the Middle East with an Israeli leader not in secret but in the open—as equals and partners." Includes an account "Behind Cronkite's Coup" describing how President Sadat and Premier Begin agreed to schedule their historic meeting in Jerusalem while in a conversation with Walter Cronkite on the CBS Evening News.

5. *Christmas Summit (1977): Begin-Sadat Meeting in Ismailia, Egypt*

THE CHRISTMAS SUMMIT, in *Newsweek*, v.91, n.1 (2 January 1978) 12-14.

Prime Minister Menahem Begin's visit to Ismailia Egypt on Christmas day and speculations as to the peace plan he presented to Anwar Sadat.

MIDEAST: PHASE 2, in *Newsweek*, v.91, n.2 (9 January 1978) 28-31.

Sadat and Begin's meeting in Ismailia on Christmas day "did not produce the expected declaration of principles for a Middle East settlement . . . Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and Begin's return call in Ismailia had taken the two countries

as far as they could go on rhetoric and gesture alone. Now they were entering phase two—hard bargaining on the actual issues that divide Arab and Israeli." Map illustrating the "talking points." Box inset on reaction in Israel, "Sniping at Begin."

THE MORNING AFTER ISMAILIA, in *Time*, v.111, no.2 (January 9, 1978) 16-18.

The controversy over the West bank and Gaza as revealed in the proposals made at the Christmas meeting between Sadat and Begin. Includes map illustrating Begin's Sinai plan. Also anecdotes from the meeting—The Summit: Peeks Behind the Scenes.

6. *Response by other Arab Countries to Sadat's Initiatives in Jerusalem*

EDITORIAL—SYRIA AND SADAT, in *Middle East International*, no.79 (January 1978) 3-5.

Sadat's peace initiative has created a dilemma for the Syrians. "So long as Sadat adhered to the agreed objective of the Arab confrontation states . . . it was difficult for them or the PLO convincingly to oppose him without going to the extreme of throwing in their lot with the 'rejectionist' camp led by Iraq and Libya. The meeting in Tripoli at the beginning of December . . . showed that President Assad had no intention of going back on his commitment to the Geneva formula." The Syrians, however, were "genuinely outraged by Sadat's unilateral action, by his open and almost casual disregard . . . of the very principle of Arab solidarity." The writer concludes: "It is not Arab public opinion which is conducting the angry debate, it is the Arab regimes, and they are not arguing about the objective . . . but about the means of achieving it . . . If the Israelis . . . are tempted to take advantage of the split in the Arab world by refusing to match President Sadat's leap into the future, they will be able to cause the Arabs further pain and humiliation; but they will do nothing to further their own cause in the long run . . ."

HABASH: "ISRAEL WILL FALL," by Dean Brelis, in *Time*, v.110, n.25 (19 December 1977) p. 33. (Interview)

Dr. George Habash, head of the "Marxist, pro-Moscow Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," the "second largest commando group" is interviewed at the Tripoli conference. He states: "Our political policy remains to see Israel destroyed." As for Sadat's visit to Israel: "The obstinacy of Israel will not make any solution possible. Sadat's strategy will naturally lead to disaster. It is the strategy of a desperate man . . . I don't believe Sadat can last." As for Geneva and UN resolution 242: "Geneva is in the refrigerator. Geneva and 242 are finished."

LETTER FROM WASHINGTON, by Lawrence Mosher, in *Middle East International*, no.79 (January 1978) 9-11.



Interview with historian Professor Hisham Sharabi of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Dr. Sharabi, a Palestinian by birth and editor of the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, concludes that President Sadat's actions in visiting Israel and addressing the Knesset were "irresponsible even if they eventually succeed." The visit "has created disunity in the Arab side that has slowed down if not altogether deflected the march to Geneva . . . It was too personal an impulse to have political credibility." If Sadat fails then "in order to survive politically, he has to go back and beyond where he was before he undertook this risk . . ."

7. *Yugoslavia's Views on Sadat-Begin's Initiatives for Peace*

THE TWO DAYS THAT SHOOK THE MIDDLE EAST, by Milan Peric, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.28, n.664 (5 December 1977) 16-17.

Comments on President Sadat's visit to Israel. The author concludes: "On no occasion so far has Israel shown a readiness to try peacefully to settle its dispute with its Arab neighbors and to respect the rights of the Palestinian people. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin claim their talks were aimed at peace. Proof that this is correct can only come from the Israeli side."

8. *Other Views and Proposals for Peaceful Solutions*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

PEACE PROPOSALS FOR THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1967-1976: A SURVEY, by Paul Jabber, in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, v.8, no.2 (1977) 153-166.

An inventory of ideas and "significant proposals" by unofficial sources that are not principles to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Discusses the common characteristics of the proposals and identifies major trend changes over the past decade. The author finds that this type of proposal peaked during times of diplomatic stalemate in 1970 and 1975, that the "overwhelming majority of these proposals have been authored by Americans," and that "most proposals agree on the basic principles and broad outlines of a feasible Arab-Israeli peace" along the lines suggested by United Nations resolution 242. Includes two page bibliography.

b. *Other Proposals for a Just Peace: Beyond Step-by-Step Negotiations*

AFTER RABAT: MIDDLE EAST RISKS AND AMERICAN ROLES, by Richard H. Ullman, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.53, no.2 (January 1975) 284-296.

After October's Arab summit conference at Rabat the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) "has emerged . . . as a leading formal actor in the tangled relationships of the Middle East . . ." The author addresses himself to the question of "why the risks of war may now be so much greater, and

what the United States might do to prevent new major warfare from occurring. Its purpose, also is to ask what interests the United States has in the relationship between the Israelis and their Arab enemies, and to ask what U.S. policies might further those interests."

BEYOND STEP-BY-STEP: ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL?, by Richard H. Ullman, in *Foreign Policy*, no.19, (Summer 1975) 18-33.

The Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations proposes that the United States guarantee Israel's security with "contingents of U.S. military forces . . . stationed in Israel." He specifies that these should be "naval and air units—specifically, some units of the Sixth Fleet based permanently at Ashdod or at other port facilities along Israel's Mediterranean coast, and perhaps two or three squadrons of fighter-bombers at air bases in central Israel or the Negev."

BEYOND STEP-BY-STEP: PEACE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Francois Duchene, Kiichi Saeki, in *Foreign Policy*, no.19 (Summer 1975) 3-17.

"Three distinguished public figures, from three different continents, put forward a single proposal that would bring major influences from outside the Middle East into the region to participate in a settlement." The authors suggest that "Soviet involvement in joint guarantees could pave the way toward wider international agreements on controlling exports of arms to the Middle East." They conclude that "the United States, as the only power with the capacity to give long-term solidity to co-existence within the old Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state, must now take the initiative for an international settlement."

AN EXCHANGE ON THE MIDEAST, by S. Avineri, and others, in *Foreign Policy*, no.21, Winter 1975-76, 212-223.

In the Summer 1975 issue of *Foreign Policy* (No. 19) "two major action proposals on a Middle East settlement" were presented in two articles: The first by three men, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Francois Duchene, and Kiichi Saeki; the second by Richard H. Ullman. "Two eminent Israeli professors," one in Washington, D.C. (Amos Perlmutter) and one at Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Shlomo Avineri) react to these two proposals in this article. Brzezinski, Duchene, and Ullman then respond to their comments. Shlomo Avineri finds that "Both articles look at the Arab-Israeli conflict in purely strategic terms, almost totally ignoring the historical context of the conflict . . . No solution in the Middle East will be achieved if Israel's legitimacy is not publicly and unequivocally accepted, and any solution which tries to skirt it or substitute for it the purely strategic convenience of the superpowers will be mere eyewash . . ." International guar-



antees as proposed by the first article are not the answer. Amos Perlmutter addresses himself mainly to Ullman's proposal of a US guarantee of the peace backed by US military forces in Israel. He questions its "premise" that only a few troops would be required, and his "unsubstantiated assumptions": that Terrorism would be likely to diminish, that U.S. forces sent to Israel would most likely never have to engage in combat, and that the United States has leverage over the Arab states.

**HOW TO SAVE ISRAEL IN SPITE OF HERSELF**, by George W. Ball, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.3 (April 1977) 453-471.

Former U.S. Under Secretary of State, 1961-66, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1968, George W. Ball recommends that the United States "insist that both sides (in the Arab-Israeli dispute) carry out the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (affirmed in Resolution 338) . . ." Also "to make progress possible at the Geneva Conference, the United States should translate these principles into a comprehensive plan of settlement . . . The principal powers supporting the proposal—the United States, Great Britain, France and, one may hope, the Soviet Union—would guarantee to both sides the inviolability of the boundaries as finally determined . . ." The author concludes: "Today the issues are sharply drawn and the omens auspicious for a major initiative—a conjunction that confronts the President with an acid test of political courage and decisiveness. If America should permit Israel to continue to reject inflexibly any suggestion of a return to earlier boundaries and the creation of a Palestinian state and to refuse even to negotiate about Jerusalem, we would be acquiescing in a policy hazardous not only for Israel but for America and the rest of the world."

**IT'S TIME FOR AMERICA TO BITE A REAL BULLET IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Edward Bernard Glick, in *Military Review*, v.57, no.10 (October 1977) 40-42.

Presents several proposals for an American policy in the Middle East that will "put our military muscle where our political mouth is." "When," the author asks, "will we take risks for peace?"

**PALESTINE: AN ALGERIAN SOLUTION**, by Gidon Gottlieb, in *Foreign Policy*, no.21, (Winter 1975-76) 198-211.

A Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the New York University School of Law proposes that: "the Evian agreement of 1962 which ended the war between France and the Algerians is a model that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) could follow if they can be prevailed upon to meet." He then presents a series of excerpts from this agreement "adapted

for a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians."

**PALESTINE AND EVIAN**, by Jacques Soustelle, Gidon Gottlieb, Peter Grose, in *Foreign Policy*, no.23 (Summer 1976) 64 plus.

"An exchange among Jacques Soustelle, former governor-general of Algeria, Gottlieb, and Peter Grose, former Jerusalem bureau chief of the New York Times." The exchange is based on Gidon Gottlieb's proposed Palestinian agreement patterned after the 1962 Evian agreements that ended the Algerian war. This proposal appeared in *FOREIGN POLICY*, no.21 (Winter 1975-76).

**TOWARD A JUST PEACE: A FORMULA THAT OFFERS ATTAINABLE GOALS**, in *Time*, v.110, no.23 (5 December 1977) 49-50.

A "detailed plan" for a "just settlement" is offered by Time magazine. The plan "assumes that both the Israelis and the confrontation Arab states are . . . willing to end all hostile acts . . .; and that the antagonists are ready for a peace that would be followed by the beginning of normal, neighborly relations . . . It assumes further that both sides will see the need for international guarantees . . ." The plan discusses: The Sinai, The Golan Heights, The West Bank, Gaza, the refugees, Jerusalem and possible guarantees.

**TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP**, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1975. 25p.

The study group reached five main conclusions.

1. *U.S. interests.* The United States has a strong moral, political, and economic interest in a stable peace in the Middle East. It is concerned for the security, independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area and for the friendship of both. Renewed hostilities would have far-reaching and perilous consequences which would threaten those interests.

2. *Urgency.* Whatever the merits of the interim agreement on Sinai, it still leaves the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli dispute substantially untouched. Unless these elements are soon addressed, rising tensions in the area will generate increased risk of violence. We believe that the best way to address these issues is by the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement.

3. *Process.* We believe that the time has come to begin the process of negotiating such a settlement among the parties, either at a general conference or at more informal multilateral meetings. While no useful interim step toward settlement should be overlooked or ignored, none seems promising at the present time and most have inherent disadvantages.

4. *Settlement.* A fair and enduring settlement should contain at least these elements as an integrated package:

(a) *Security.* All parties to the settlement commit themselves to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the others and to refrain from the threat or use of force against them.

(b) *Stages.* Withdrawal to agreed boundaries and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented.

(c) *Peaceful relations.* The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations.



(d) *Boundaries.* Israel undertakes to withdraw by agreed stages to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. Boundaries will probably need to be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by UN forces.

(e) *Palestine.* There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestine state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.

(f) *Jerusalem.* The report suggests no specific solution for the particularly difficult problem of Jerusalem but recommends that, whatever the solution may be, it meet as a minimum the following criteria:

—there should be unimpeded access to all of the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith;

—there should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it; and

—each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

(g) *Guarantees.* It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreements provide. In addition, there may well be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures.

5. *US role.* The governments directly concerned bear the responsibility of negotiation and agreement, but they are unlikely to be able to reach agreement alone. Initiative, impetus, and inducement may well have to come from outside. The United States, because it enjoys a measure of confidence of parties on both sides and has the means to assist them economically and militarily, remains the great power best fitted to work actively with them in bringing about a settlement. Over and above helping to provide a framework for negotiation and submitting concrete proposals from time to time, the United States must be prepared to take other constructive steps, such as offering aid and providing guarantees where desired and needed. In all of this, the United States should work with the USSR to the degree that Soviet willingness to play a constructive role will permit.

**WHAT ROLE FOR U.S. IN MIDEAST?**, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.25 (19 December 1977) 11-12.

Diplomats in the Middle East cite four main objectives for the US in its new role in the Middle East Peace negotiations. These objectives are: "Win support of Saudi Arabia for the Cairo talks that were scheduled to begin on December 14 . . . ; Persuade Syria's President Hafez Assad and Jordan's King Hussein to keep their options open . . . ; Deter the Soviets from engaging in further mischief-making aimed at wrecking the Sadat-Begin initiative; Provide an incentive for Israel to make the concessions that Sadat says are essential for success at Cairo . . . America's new role may require military, economic and political guarantees by the US to underwrite any settlement that eventually emerges." The article also describes Secretary of State Vance's visit to Mideast prior to the Cairo conference. There is also a list of examples of Arab disunity during the last two decades.

9. *UN Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East*  
**COUNCIL INFORMED OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN**

**LEBANON**, in *UN Chronicle*, v.15, no.4 (April 1978) 75-76.

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's report (S/12611) on 19 March 1978 to the Security Council on implementation of resolution 425 (1978) which sets up a United Nations Force in Lebanon, under its authority. A two stage operation for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is proposed. In the first stage the Force "will confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international borders. Once this is achieved, it will establish and maintain an area of operation as defined . . . The Force is being established on the assumption that it represents an interim measure until the Government of Lebanon assumes its full responsibilities in southern Lebanon." UNIFIL "shall not use force except in Self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council." A preliminary estimate based upon current experience and rates is that it will cost "approximately \$68 million for a Force of 4,000 all ranks for a period of six months." This "Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council."

**UN PEACEKEEPING AND THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**, by N. A. Pelcovits, in *Orbis*, v.19, no.1 (Spring 1975) 145-165.

Assesses the effectiveness of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Middle East following the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The author concludes: "Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the Middle East experience is that a peacekeeping mission, especially when linked to a disengagement plan, has a short half-life. It is most useful and acceptable in the early stages. Time wears down the consensus, erodes the enthusiasm of troop contributors, shifts the power balance . . . The peacekeeping mechanism that may serve to police a truce or an interim disengagement plan does not warrant use as a model for a permanent or semi-permanent force to guarantee a settlement."

**UNITED NATIONS: PEACEKEEPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Sydney D. Bailey, in *Middle East International*, no.77 (November 1977) 12-14.

Leaving aside Cyprus and Lebanon, there are now four peace-keeping operations in the Middle East: The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), UN Emergency Force (UNEF), UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the US Sinai Field Mission (SFM). Mr. Bailey describes their role and composition.



## **B. Arab-Israeli Tensions, Confrontations and Wars**

### **1. The First Palestine War (1948)**

THE EGYPTIAN ADVANCE, by David Nicolle, in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.105, no.4 (October 1975) 440-456.

Part I. The Faluja Pocket, describes the sequence of events at the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war that led up to the creation of the 'Faluja Pocket,' and the subsequent "ferocious Israeli attempts to overcome Egyptian forces besieged in this relatively small area."

MEMOIRS OF THE FIRST PALESTINE WAR, by Gamal Abdul Nasser, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.2 (Winter 1973) 3-32.

Translated and annotated by Walid Khalidi from the Arabic version which first appeared in the Egyptian weekly *Akher Sa'a* in the spring of 1955. The translator states that: "To the best of my knowledge this is the first English translation of them to be published. The memoirs were never finished . . . But, unfinished as they are, these memoirs are of great interest: they are a rare source on the late President's military thinking from the professional point of view, touching on such questions as the role of reconnaissance and of logistical and air support. They throw intimate light on the strength, organization, morale and performance of the Egyptian army in 1948, as well as on the Palestinian environment in which the revolutionary ideas of the Egyptian officers matured on the eve of the downfall of the monarchy . . . These memoirs reflect the President's attitudes to peace and war in general, and to the specific question of the intersection of political and military responsibility. This last aspect is significant considering that the memoirs were written immediately after (and most probably in reaction to) the massive Israeli raid in Gaza on February 28, 1955."

### **2. Arab-Israeli War, 1973 (also Yom Kippur War; also October War)**

#### **a. Miscellaneous Aspects**

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 1973-74, in *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Record*, v.33, n.36 (6 September 1975) 1908-1911.

Developments since 1974 affecting Israel and Egypt. "For a more detailed chronology of events between 1945 and 1973, see CQ paperback book, *The Middle East*, p.77." Outline maps show borders from 1947 to September 4, 1975.

CONFRONTATION: THE MIDDLE EAST AND WORLD POLITICS, by Walter Laquer. New York, The New York Times Book Co. 1974. 380p.

The book starts with preliminary of the war of Yom Kippur (10 Ramadau) and ends with the signing of a first accord between Israeli and Egyptian representatives on November 11, 1975. Deals

with both a local conflict and world politics, with military, political, and economic warfare.

DIARY OF THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.104, no.2 (January 1974) 172-184.

A day-to-day account of the fighting and the political movement which accompanied it. "The reports comprising the account are all taken from British newspapers often published only hours after receiving telephoned or cabled despatches from the different fronts. The result is a feeling of immediacy . . . Reports are taken from both sides of the two main fronts. . . The claims made by the opposing factions have been included without any attempt to criticize, justify or confirm them, apart from occasional references to a third party source published at the same time."

#### **b. Arab-Israeli War 1973: Lessons Learned**

THE BLITZKRIEG: A PREMATURE BURIAL?, by Colin S. Gray, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.10 (October 1976) 15-18.

A reply by a member of the Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York to Jeffrey Record's article in the April 1976, *Military Review*. He agrees "It is true to claim that a qualitative change is being wrought by precision guided munition (PGM) technologies, but one cannot yet assert that high-speed armored offensives are no longer possible in . . . Central Europe." He notes that Dr. Record did not address the question of how Soviet military thinking was adjusting itself to these new realities. The Soviets have several alternatives: "nuclear precursor strikes, artillery terrain-blanketing fire and high-speed, preemptive 'spoiling' maneuvers." Mr. Gray does not find that the power of the defense in the 1973 October War is explained as solely due to a new technology. Other factors such as "casual staff work", "piecemeal commitment of forces" and the successful use of older technologies must be considered . . . The efficacy of the blitzkrieg has been greatly overrated. Blitzkriegs have succeeded only against the monumentally incompetent and/or the grossly overmatched . . . PGMs serve to reinforce what already should have been clear . . . victory is obtained by combined arms action. The independent armor aberration of Israeli military thought and practice . . . spoke to the deficiencies in Arab prowess (and in Soviet military equipment) in the mid-1960's . . . With a view to the current defense debate in NATO, it is appropriate to maintain not only that blitzkriegs should fail, but also that against poorly designed defenses blitzkriegs succeed."

DID ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE FAIL?: THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR, by Colonel Bill C. Powell, in *MI Magazine*, v.4, no.2 (Summer 1976) 22-28.

Addresses the question of whether Israeli intelligence failed to predict the Arab attack or



whether it was the "scapegoat" for someone else's failure. The writer concludes: "The logical assumption is that Israeli intelligence did not fail the Israeli leadership. Rather, it is assumed that the leadership failed Israeli intelligence." Includes Bibliography with thirty-five references.

**THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR**, by Lt. General Ira C. Eaker, in *Strategic Review*, v.2, no.1 (Winter 1974) 18-25.

Considers the Fourth Arab-Israeli War under the following headings: "its origin, the forces involved, the four phases of the combat, some lessons learned, the chances for peace, and its probable results for the combatant nations and for their sponsors, the US and the USSR." The author concludes: "The war has had far-reaching economic and political effects on both sides, with the Soviet Union the big winner and the United States the big loser."

**ISRAEL'S FOURTH WAR, OCTOBER 1973: POLITICAL AND MILITARY MISPERCEPTIONS**, by Amos Perlmutter, in *Orbis*, v.19, no.2 (Summer 1975) 434-460.

Examines the "actions and policies of the national security inner circle" of Israel, in order to understand "their misjudgment of developments leading to the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent strategic and tactical conduct of the war . . ." The author states that "this article is designed to raise a number of crucial points, offer some acute and perhaps controversial observations, and provide 'inside' information and critical analysis."

**MILITARY LESSONS OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR**, by Lawrence Whetten and Michael Johnson, in *World Today*, v.30, no.3 (March 1974) 101-109.

Arab innovations in "tactics and adaptations of Soviet equipment were significant contributions to the school of thought arguing that localized wars are governed by concepts which are often independent of general standards and should be studied in a separate context . . . New constraints on the use of airpower were apparent and the infantryman regained some of his historic importance. The entire doctrine for localized warfare must now be re-examined."

**THE OCTOBER WAR: BURYING THE BLITZKRIEG**, by Jeffrey Record, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.4 (April 1976) 19-21.

A research associate at The Brookings Institution, presents the case that "the single most important instruction of the war was the conclusive restoration of the superiority of tactical defense over tactical offense . . . The supremacy of defense stems from the enormous increase in recent years in firepower at the expense of mobility and protection." The lessons that follow are: "For offensive operations . . . greater reliance on strategic maneuver along external lines with the aim of forcing

the defender to abandon his prepared positions and assume the tactical offensive; . . . victory . . . will depend less on the ability to inflict losses . . . than it will on the capacity to absorb them . . . ; . . . a waning contribution of armor and tactical aviation to the land battle. . ."

**THE OCTOBER WAR: A POSTWAR ASSESSMENT**, by LTC Roger L. Crump, in *Military Review*, v.54, no.8 (August 1974) 12-26.

Assessing the impact of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War on the Arab World, Israel, USSR, and the United States from a broad Political-military viewpoint, the author highlights the "political, economic and psychological ramifications of the war that should also be of interest to the military strategist." In the Arab World the author finds evidence of a "new pride, self-respect and confidence." Egypt and Sadat emerged with an expanded base of support that includes Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and most of Africa. The Arab oil-producing nations demonstrated that they could "unite to use their oil resources as a tool for political goals." The resulting oil crisis led some industrial countries to a "bilateral competition" . . . that . . . "impacts drastically on all aspects of the Middle East political military equation . . . the future portends a situation in which there will be no broad political design guiding weapons supplies . . . the Arab nations . . . now have alternative sources of arms . . ." For Israel the effect of the October War was "traumatic." The factors that contributed to the trauma include: "the effectiveness of Arab use of modern weapons, the cost of the war in blood and treasure, increased isolation as Israel's position with Western Europe and black Africa deteriorated, the power of the oil lever, destruction of the theory that post-1967 borders provided the degree of security Israel needed, and severe self-criticism as to what went wrong." The Soviet Union at the end of the war "still has no really reliable friends in the Middle East." They have, however "gained from the tension that was generated between the United States and Europe." "Detente has been 'set back' and the Soviet Union 'faces the prospect of reduced influence in the Middle East.'" The United States found that its resupply effort during the October War "impacted adversely" on its own readiness. The oil embargo brought about the deepest dissension in the NATO alliance since its creation. "Lastly it became clear that the 'political interests' of the United States in the Arab-Israeli dispute and its 'economic interests' in the Persian Gulf were linked and could not be separated. On the positive side the United States 'proved capable of dealing effectively with both sides . . . The United States did not lose friends in the Middle East as it did after the 1967 war. Instead it emerged with renewed diplomatic relationships



with Egypt and Syria and a predominant leadership role in the search for peaceful resolution of differences." The author concludes that "The future of the United States in the Middle East will depend largely on how it plays out its role as peace-maker . . . The manner of leadership the United States provides in confronting the problems associated with the Middle East region will be the determining factor in the role the region plays in the international arena in the future."

**TANKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Jac Weller, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.5, (May 1976) 11-23.

Detailed description of the Arab and Israeli tanks used in the 1973 war. Includes many black and white photos. The author, "well-known as a weapons expert, historian and military commentator," concludes that . . . "tanks, when properly employed, give the best chance of winning battles quickly and with minimum casualties. The effectiveness of the IDF tanks and fighter-bombers combination is not likely to be so great again as it was in 1967 because of the new Soviet SAM devices, but an expanded artillery can carry part of the old tactical air support load. Mechanized infantry will be more important too . . . but most Israelis, including General Israel Tal, maintain that 'The tank is still queen of battle in our area'."

**THE YOM KIPPUR WAR**, by Kenneth S. Brower, in *Military Review*, v.54, no.3 (March 1974) 25-33.

The Yom Kippur war which began on 6 October 1973 and lasted 18 days does not as "some pundits are asserting . . ." show . . . "that the blitzkrieg . . . is dead . . . having been stopped permanently by surface-to-air missiles and antitank guided missiles." Instead the statistics show that the Israeli Air Force loss rate per thousand sorties was less in 1973 than in 1967. The large losses of tanks reported in the press were totals for all armored vehicles hit not for main battle tanks destroyed. "The ratio of Israeli dead to Arab tank losses was nearly the same as in 1956 and 1967." The sea battles . . . "certainly question the survivability of intermediate-size warships, such as destroyers, in the face of the proven guided missile craft concept." In conclusion the author notes that the war . . . "showed that small countries no more populous than an American or Soviet city have proven capable of . . . fielding several corps and flying thousands of sorties daily. This should provoke . . . thought . . . concerning the role of superpowers in a nonnuclear environment."

**THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND THE INEVITABILITY OF SURPRISE**, by Michael I. Handel, in *International Studies Quarterly*, v.21, n.3 (September 1977) 461-503.

A two part article. The first part is a "the-

oretical discussion of some of the problems facing intelligence communities and decision makers in their efforts to guard against a surprise attack." The second part beginning on page 484 is a case study of the "conditions and perceptions of Israeli decision makers which made surprise inevitable at the outbreak of the war." The author concludes: "In the final analysis, the Israelis deceived themselves. Their doctrine (rigid adherence to the 'concept'), their faith in their military deterrence power, their unwillingness to believe that the Arabs would take so great a risk, and their wishful thinking—all of these, rather than deception, contributed to the shattering surprise." Further materials on the subject are noted at the end of the article.

c. *Arab-Israeli War 1973: Egyptian Perceptions of the Conflict*

**THE EGYPTIAN STAFF SOLUTION**, by Charles Wakebridge, in *Military Review*, v.55, no.3 (March 1975) 3-11.

Describes in detail how President Sadat, Ahmed Ismail, his Defense Minister and Commander in Chief, and General Saad Shazli, Chief of Staff, planned the offensive against Israel that became known as Operation Badr. The 6th of October, 1973 was selected because it was the 10th day of Ramadan and the Anniversary of the Battle of Badr, one of Prophet Muhammad's first victories in Arabia. "The Arabs refer to this war as the war of the Tenth of Ramadan. The Egyptian planners deny that they were influenced by the fact that the 6th was also Yom Kippur . . ."

**NATIONAL CHARACTER AND MILITARY STRATEGY: THE EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE, OCTOBER 1973**, by Dr. J. Bowyer Bell, in *Parameters*, The Journal of the US Army War College, v.5, no.1 (1975) 6-16.

In developing Egypt's strategy for the 1973 war "Sadat recognized that the Egyptian army had two cardinal virtues; first, the men fought well from set, defensive positions, and second the best service was the artillery . . . Arab conduct in the Yom Kippur War by no means indicated a radical transformation in the Arab mind or even in the competence of the Egyptian army . . . The old Arab under the new missile umbrella had been used in congenial ways, in ways determined by the art of the possible. All that was new about Egyptian military strategy was the exploitation of the real rather than ideal virtues of the army—and that was very new indeed."

**THE RAMADAN WAR, 1973**, by Maj. Gen. Hassan el Badri, Maj. Gen. Taha el Magdoub, and Maj. Gen. Hohammed Dia el Din Zohdy. Dunn Loring, Virginia T.N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., 1978. 239p.

"A comprehensive military analysis of the war between the Arab nations and Israel in October 1973 written by three senior officers who held important



staff positions in the Egyptian high command during the war. Though the authors discuss the planning in the various stages of the preparations for the war, their emphasis is on actual military operations, which are described in great detail from the Egyptian point of view. The operations themselves are seen in the context both of tactical and strategic planning and of the evolution of an activist military doctrine favoring the commitment of enormous resources to a massive surprise attack." With 9 photographs and 6 maps. Originally published in Arabic in 1974 as *Harb Ramadan*. Foreword by Col. Trevor N. Dupuy. Appendix "Dissociation and Integration Processes in Israeli Society," by El Sayyed Yassin, pp.231-236.

WHY THIS WAR . . . , by Donna Robinson Divine, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, n.4 (October 1976) 523-543.

Examines the decision-making process of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in regard to the launching of the October war in 1973. Relying "heavily upon the speeches and essays of Egyptian political leaders" the author examines Sadat's decision-making process from three points-of-view; as rational choice between "immediate but partial negotiations with the Israelis" and "continued military preparations for reconquering all of the territory lost" in 1967; as accommodation between those who favored "immediate economic gains predicated upon a resolution of the Israeli conflict and those who favored a deferred but decisive military resolution of that conflict;" as the output of governmental institutions particularly the army.

d. *Arab-Israeli War 1973: Syrian Perceptions of the Conflict*

THE SYRIAN SIDE OF THE HILL, by Charles Wakebridge, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.2 (February 1976) 20-30.

Reports on military operations on the Golan front during the October 1973 war. The author only considers the Syrian front and includes some excerpts from an interview with General Tlass, the Syrian Defense Minister. While problems with armor and infantry appeared on the ground, the Syrian air defense screen around Damascus was "a great success." The author states that much of the success must have been due to active help from the 2,000 Russian Military and advisors in Syria at the time. The greatest disadvantage of the Syrian Armed Forces was "a professional weakness in the ranks from major upward." This weakness derives from the political motivation and orientation of the military leadership. Other problems were an adherence to "Soviet military doctrines . . . made for the plains of Eastern Europe or Asia . . ." and not suited to the Golan Plateau. "The fact that the Golan Plateau is . . . too small for armored warfare . . .

and the whole operation had been planned around armor." As for mountain warfare a senior Syrian officer told the author that they had never been taught anything about it. "One of the main unanswered questions of the war was why the Syrians halted at 1700 on the 7th, when some of their thrusts might have succeeded in reaching the Jordan River." The author states that the most feasible reason was "the specter of 1967 when, without air cover . . . They were badly mauled." The two main reasons for this concern being the theory that "Major General Naji Jamil, Commander of the Syrian Air Force, said he could not guarantee close air support" . . . and the fact that . . . "the Syrian infantry completely failed to materialize." In conclusion the author says "that it was the courage and fortitude of the Syrian soldiers . . . that stabilized a desperate situation and, . . . held the Sasa Line. The blame must rest with the senior leadership, and a final thought must be that political leadership of an army in battle is no substitute for sound generalship."

e. *Arab-Israeli War 1973: Israeli Perceptions of the Conflict*

PRESS BRIEFING BY DEFENCE MINISTER DAYAN, 9 October 1973, in *Survival*, v.16, no.3 (May/June 1974) 141-144.

Text of a briefing given to Israeli editors by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan on 9 October, the fourth day of the war, published by the Jerusalem Post on 15 February 1974. "The military problems raised in the briefing will continue to concern Israeli policy and influence its attitude to proposals of military disengagement and new borders."

TANK WARRIOR IN THE GOLAN, by Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.1, (January 1976) 3-12.

An eyewitness account of Israeli tank warfare during the 1973 war. This article is based on an interview with an officer who was part of a Centurion equipped tank battalion. The author notes . . . "it is candid eyewitness staff on the boobos of the battlefield, and . . . to my knowledge, it is the only thing yet written of Jordanian and Iraqi participation."

WHEN GOD JUDGED AND MEN DIED: A BATTLE REPORT OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, by Arnold Sherman. New York, Bantam Books, 1973. 148 p.

"A passionate, eyewitness account of the fighting—from Mount Hermon to the Suez Canal" during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Includes a 64 page picture portfolio edited by Micha Bar-Am. The author was an Israeli Public Information Officer in the Sinai, mobilized the first day of the Yom Kippur War, and responsible for gathering and forwarding information to Tel Aviv.



f. *Egypt and Israel: Agreement on the Suez Canal and the Sinai Strategic Passes*

DOCUMENTATION: *THE MIDDLE EAST*, in *Survival*, v.17, no.6 (November/December 1975)

The text of three documents giving the details of the accord which provided for the "Israeli withdrawal from strategic passes in the Sinai, joint pledges to resolve conflicts by peaceful means and promises of American arms and economic support for both parties." Includes a map indicating the new buffer zone in the Sinai. The three documents are: Agreement between Egypt and Israel, 1 September 1975; Annex to Egypt-Israel Agreement 1 September 1975; and Early Warning System Proposal 1 September 1975.

EGYPT-ISRAEL: AGREEMENT ON THE SINAI AND SUEZ CANAL (DONE AT GENEVA, September 4, 1975), in *International Materials*, v.14, n.6 (November 1975) 1450-1469. (Document)

Reproduced from UN Security Council Document S/11818/Add.1 of September 2, 1976. "The agreement contains an annex which sets forth the guiding principles for the preparation of the Protocol to implement the Agreement, a U.S. Proposal for an early-warning, and the map referred to in Article IV. All of these are integral parts of the Agreement. The map, which appears on page 1457, was reproduced from U.N. Security Council Document S/11818/Add.3 of September 8, 1975. The Protocol to the Agreement, which entered into force October 10, 1975, appears at page 1458. Various memoranda and assurances negotiated at the time of the Agreement begin at page 1468. Interpretations of these memoranda and assurances by the US Senate Legislative Counsel and the Department of State Legal Adviser appear respectively at pages 1585 and 1593. The United States Law implementing the proposal for an early warning system appears at page 1482, together with the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations." MAPS A,C,D,R, attached to the Egypt-Israeli Military Protocol of September 22, 1975 bound in back of periodical.

MIDEAST ACCORD: CONGRESS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY, in *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, v.33, n.36 (6 September 1975) 1903-1911.

Congressional attitudes toward the parts of the Sinai agreement of 1975 relating to the U.S. civilian monitoring team and foreign assistance. This issue includes a Chronology of Events, of developments since 1974 affecting Israel and Egypt. The chronology includes outline maps showing the borders at various points in time from 1947 to September 4, 1975. Also included is the text of the United States proposal "as made available by the White House September 1 for an early-warning sys-

tem in the Sinai operated by U.S. Civilian personnel."

g. *Syria and Israel: Agreement on Disengagement, 1973*

ISRAEL-SYRIA: AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT (DONE AT GENEVA, JUNE 5, 1974), United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, in *International Legal Materials*, v.13, n.4 (July 1974) 880-887.

Includes the text of U.N. Document S/11302/Add.1-3 which consists of the "Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces"; the "Protocol . . . Concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," the "Disengagement Plan: Areas and time-table" and a map showing the different phases of disengagement.

h. *Arab-Israeli War, 1973: Actions and Resolutions of the UN*

RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, OCTOBER 22, 23 AND 25, 1973, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.4 (Autumn 1973) 534.

Resolutions 338, 339 and 340 calling for a cease-fire and setting up a United Nations emergency force to enforce the cease-fire after the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

i. *Arab-Israeli War, 1973: Soviet Propaganda*

THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESS AND THE OCTOBER WAR, by Col. Martin J. Slominski, in *Military Review*, v.54, no.5 (May 1974) 39-47.

"The role of the USSR is the key in determining whether or not there is relaxation or heightening of international tensions. It is interesting to note what the official voice of the Soviet Armed Forces, Red Star, and other Soviet news media had to say about the hostilities in the Middle East which began 6 October 1973. Americans could have identified eight categories of information on this war from reading their papers and watching TV. These are advance warnings, daily situation reports, the role of Palestinian partisans, military aid to Israel, military aid to Arab countries, oil as a political weapon, NATO country reactions and the alert of US Armed Forces. The manner in which information on these same topics was presented to the Soviet soldier provides insights, albeit limited, into official Soviet attitudes."

SOVIET PROPAGANDA: A CASE STUDY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, by Baruch A. Hazan. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1976. 293 p.

Describes and analyzes Soviet propaganda as it relates to the Middle East conflict. Chapter One: The Definition; Chapter Two: The Formation of Opinion. Chapter Three: The Development of the Soviet Propaganda Apparatus; The Instruments; Chapter Four: The Impregnational Propaganda of



the Soviet Union; Chapter Five: Soviet Operational Propagandas: The Themes; Chapter Six: Means and Techniques of Soviet Propaganda. Statistical tables. Illustrations.

j. *US Interests in the Arab-Israeli War, 1973: Politico-Military Aspects* (See also III-A-10)

THOSE STORM-BEATEN SHIPS, UPON WHICH THE ARAB ARMIES NEVER LOOKED, by Lt. F.C. Miller, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.101, no.3/865 (March 1975) 19-25.

Recounts the role played by the Sixth Fleet from Mid-October 1973 to mid-December 1973 during the Yom Kippur war. The author concludes that "the eventual outcome of the war, and the avoidance of direct Great Power participation in it, was brought about in part by the decisive and intelligent exercise of American sea power . . . The ability of the United States to act in a manner similar to last October's may be seriously diminished in the future as Soviet naval capability continues to grow."

THE VIOLATION OF THE "LIBERTY," by Richard K. Smith, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.104, no.6, 904 (June 1978) 62-70.

"The savage Israeli attack on the U.S. intelligence ship Liberty in 1967 was described at the time as an 'accident.' A detailed account suggests it was anything but accidental." Information for this article is drawn primarily from the Liberty's court of inquiry, and the deck logs of the various ships involved. Includes map "Generalized Limits of Cruising Station."

k. *Arab-Israeli War, 1973: US Mass Media and Public Opinion*

AMERICAN DOMESTIC FORCES AND THE OCTOBER WAR, by Saad Ibrahim, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.1 (Autumn 1974) 55-81.

Considers the major domestic inputs in shaping US foreign policy in the Middle East during and after the October War: "American public opinion, interest groups, the mass media and the general economic situation."

1973 US PRESS COVERAGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, by Janice Terry in collaboration with Gordon Mendenhall, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.1 (Autumn 1974) 120-133.

An investigation of the attitudes of three United States newspapers: The New York Times, the Washington Post and the Detroit Free Press, in 1973, with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Results are summarized in sixteen tables of statistics that accompany the article. These results are compared to a previous study which covered the same newspapers over a twenty year period from 1948 to 1968. The results of the study "again reveal a rather consistent pro-Israeli and anti-Arab bias in the three US newspapers studies; this bias is particularly evident in editorials and, to a lesser

extent, in feature stories . . . The most striking difference in US press coverage has been the emergence of the Palestinians as a separate and clearly defined entity. This emergence is clear not only in editorials and features, but in news coverage as well . . . It also appears that the newspapers are attempting to publish more articles, particularly features, concerning the Arab nations and their policies."

l. *Arab-Israeli War 1973: NATO and the Lessons Learned*

LESSONS FOR NATO FROM THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, Squadron Leader B. Latter, in *Royal Air Forces Quarterly*, v.16, no.4 (Winter 1976) 380-385.

Reappraises, in the light of experience gained during the Yom Kippur War, "how modern air defence weapons could affect NATO's plans to employ its conventional air power and, in particular, its counter air philosophy, in central Europe."

STRATEGIC FORUM: THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 1973, THE MILITARY LESSONS, by Kenneth Hunt, in *Survival*, v.16, no.1 (January/February 1974) 4-7.

Brigadier Hunt, Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, draws some strategic and tactical lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly as they might relate to a war in Europe.

TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED . . . BUT WHERE TO APPLY THEM?, by Col. John W. Burbery, Jr., in *Military Review*, v.56, no. 7 (July 1976) 25-28.

The lessons of recent Mid-East wars have little applicability to operations in Western Europe in the 1976-86 time frame. Colonel Burbery presents a "concept of how the potential Western European battlefield can be viewed tactically in relation to mission-enemy-troops-terrain (METT), a conceptual formula for analysis of that battlefield and, . . . the tactical questions and considerations flowing from the conclusions . . ." He emphasizes that "Urbanization has changed both mission and terrain factors," in Western Europe.

THE WAR OF ATONEMENT-AND ITS LESSONS, Major T.P. Toyne Sewell, in *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.106, no.1 (January 1976) 67-71.

Drawing on the points made by Major-General Chaim Herzog in his book *The War of Atonement*, the author concludes that "questions are raised which if applied to N.A.T.O., would be difficult to answer satisfactorily. . ."

m. *Soviet Interests in Arab-Israeli War, 1973: Politico-Military Aspects*

NEW SOVIET WEAPONS UNVEILED IN MIDEAST, by Robert Hotz, in *Aviation Week*, (24 March 1975) 25.



"Soviet Union has developed a new generation of armored weapons designed for swift offensive blitzkrieg-type thrust through battlefields contaminated by nuclear or chemical warfare. This is evident from a detailed examination of a large array of new Soviet-manufactured weapons captured by the Israeli Defense Forces from the Egyptian and Syrian armies during the October 1973, war. The new generation of weapons includes not only a family of armored fighting vehicles but also a wide variety of motorized support vehicles including trench diggers, automatic mine-laying machines, motorized bridging equipment, specially designed missile transporters, mobile missile simulator trainers and a gyro-equipped command vehicle with a moving map display."

**SOVIET AIMS AND THE MIDDLE EAST WAR**, by Galia Golan, in *Survival*, v.16, no.3 (May/June 1974) 106-114.

"The Soviet Union knew in advance about the impending Egyptian and Syrian attacks on Israeli forces on 6 October 1973, but there is still no certainty as to whether she was fully informed or, and a party to, the actual preparations for the 1973 Middle East war. In a general sense one may say that the Soviet Union prepared both the Egyptians and Syrians for war, insofar as she had been the major supplier of arms, equipment, advisers, training and military guidance—particularly since the war of 1967—and one may assume that Soviet advisers played a significant role in the exercises conducted with the amphibious equipment the Soviet Union supplied, especially since 1970. In fact, however, the overall strategy employed by the unified Egyptian and Syrian command in the October war was somewhat different from classical Soviet military strategy."

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR. I.**, by William B. Quandt, in *International Affairs*, v.53, no.3 (July 1977) 377-389. (London)

Describes Soviet policy during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 "as accurately as possible" and analyses it "as far as evidence allows." This study was "originally prepared as a report for the RAND Corporation, R-1864, under a contract from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs."

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR. II.** by William B. Quandt, in William B. Quandt, in *International Affairs*, v.53, no.4 (October 1977) 587-603. (London)

Continuation of Part I above. The author concludes: "The basic rule governing Soviet policy-making in an acute crisis would seem to be use enough force to retain credibility with one's friends and clients; to engage in enough diplomacy to ensure that the crisis does not lead to super-power

confrontation. The proper balance of these two key ingredients will be determined by the behaviour of the United States, internal Soviet politics and very importantly, by the actual course of events in the crisis area." Tables illustrating the total Soviet airlift and sealift to the Middle East during the crisis are included on pages 591 and 593.

**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OCTOBER 1973 MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DETENTE** by Froy D. Kobler and others. University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies 1974. 130p.

I. The problem and the setting; II. The Soviet view of Detente; III The Soviet view of the Middle East in the Global "Anti-Imperialist" Struggle; IV. Soviet Policies and Actions leading up to The October War. V. Soviet Actions During the October War; VI. Soviet Oil policy in The Middle East and the October War; VII. Soviet Behavior Toward The United States During the October War; VIII. The Soviet Position on a post-war negotiated settlement; IX. The Longer Turn Prospects.

n. *Arab-Israeli War, 1973: Coverage by Arab Media*

**ARAB MEDIA AND POLITICS DURING THE OCTOBER WAR**, by William A. Rugh, \*in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.3 (Summer 1975) 310-328.

Daily newspapers published during the October war, daily monitoring reports of Arab radio stations by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and interviews with participants and observers are the basis for "some contrasting examples of politically-motivated media bias . . . from Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt." The author concludes that "there were instances of distortion and fabrication of the news for political purposes, but . . . the vast majority of the news copy in Arab media . . . was devoted to 'straight' reporting of information acquired." The different Arab nations varied in their treatment of the news. The "Iraqis tended to exploit opportunities to the maximum to gain political advantage from the media, while others were somewhat more concerned than that with credibility, and tended to deviate from independent journalism only when very sensitive political issues were at stake." As for the Soviet Russian media, it "echoed the Arab perceptions of the course of the war, but did not incite or amplify Arab sentiments, or even promote the more militant Arab views. Moscow's media treatment of the United States throughout the war was, by and large, circumspect."

\*The author is Deputy Assistant Director for Near East and North Africa of the United States Information Agency.



3. *Arab-Israeli Confrontations in Retrospect: Readings and Documents* (See also Chapter VI)

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by Gerald Kurland. Charlottesville, N.Y. SamHar Press, 1973. 32 p.

Background and evolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, as well as the prospects for peace as of early 1973. Bibliography.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by John N. Moore, ed. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1974.

A three-volume compilation of readings and documents on the Arab-Israeli conflict sponsored by the American Society of International Law. Volume one includes readings on the relevance of international law, and the underlying issues. Volume Two covers: The six-day war and continued hostilities, the role of the United Nations, and official and unofficial "Thoughts on Settlement." Volume three is devoted to documents relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict from its origins in 1897 thru the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Volume Three concludes with a "Selected Bibliography on the Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law," prepared by Mrs. Helen Philos, Librarian of the American Society of International Law, pp.1200-1224.

THE ARABS: THEIR HISTORY, AIMS AND CHALLENGE TO THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, by Thomas Kiernan. Boston, Little Brown, 1975. 449 p.

With an overview of Arab-Israeli problems written from the Arab point of view.

CRESCENT AND STAR; ARAB & ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, ed. by Yonah Alexander and Nicholas N. Kittrie. New York, Ams Press, 1973. 486 p.

Among the Contents: Nationalism and Statehood; Religious and Ethnical Conflict; Arab Refugees; The Status of Jerusalem; The Gulf of Aqaba; Economic Warfare; Guerrilla Activities; Negotiation and Peace. Includes: Multilateral, Bilateral, and Unilateral Documents; Maps; and Selected Bibliography.

4. *Open and Subtle Attitudes that Contribute to Arab-Israeli Tensions*

ANTI-ZIONISM—ANTI-SEMITISM: FACT OR FABLE?, by John T. Pawlikowski, in *Worldview*, v.19, n.1-2 (January/February 1976) 15-19.

The author, an Associate Professor of Social Ethics at Catholic Theological Union, Chicago states: "A close scrutiny of Arab religious and political literature reveals two major strains of anti-Semitism. The first is what may be called the classical form of anti-Semitism. To some extent it constitutes a foreign intrusion from the West, France in particular . . . One of the difficulties in dealing with these instances of classical anti-Semitism is that West-

erners are rarely exposed to the flood of such materials produced for the masses in the Arab world and broadcast over the airwaves . . . One must be aware of this widespread use . . . within popular Arab culture to appreciate the so-called paranoia exhibited by Israelis . . . The second form of anti-Semitism in the Muslim world is more subtle, yet in many ways far more directly relevant to the anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism equation . . . Muslim hostility toward the Jews was woven into the Koran itself . . . the modern State of Israel insults important facets of traditional Muslim belief." Professor Pawlikowski concludes: "I am not claiming that anti-Semitism is the only issue in the dispute . . . Yet to deny its influence is also to distort seriously the reality of Middle East politics today and to fail to understand why Jews so frequently raise the issue of 'survival' in debates over Israel."

BEHIND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: THE REAL IMPASSE BETWEEN ARAB AND JEW, by Gil Carl Alroy. New York, Putman's Sons, 1975. 317 p.

On the Sociology and psychology of the knowledge of the Middle East in the West; Zionist perceptions; Evolving Israeli orientations; what the Arabs are saying; Arabs and Modern History; Jews and Moslems. Bibliography.

THE ISOLATION OF ISRAEL, by Alan R. Taylor, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.1 (Autumn 1974) 82-93.

"Why is it that a state founded by Jews with a strong sense of ancestral ties to the Middle East is an alien entity in its immediate environment? There is more to Israel's isolation than the political repercussions of its claims to sovereignty within Palestine . . ." Its isolation also comes from an aspect of "Zionist thought, . . . an idea of exclusiveness, of separateness from the region, which was foreign in its very essence to the society and culture of the Middle East."

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by Alon Ben-Meir, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 25-27 plus.

Mr. Ben-Meir after reviewing the Arab-Israeli conflict concludes: "The inherent contradiction between the national aspirations of Arabs and Israelis over the years stemmed from an ignorance of Arab needs on the part of the Israelis and from a lack of understanding of Israeli nationalism on the part of the Arabs . . . Twenty-eight years of Arab-Israel confrontation have introduced psychological, social, economic, political and military changes in the region. A new equilibrium has been shaped, based not necessarily on military forces but rather on mutual needs and mutual vulnerability. This fragile balance offers an opportunity that the antagonists in the drama should not let pass by."



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE, by Nahum Goldmann, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.1 (October 1975) 113-126.

The President of the World Jewish Congress presents the view that the major aspect of the Arab-Israeli problems is the psychological one. A step-by-step policy as conducted by Secretary of State Kissinger cannot succeed: "As neither party in the Israeli-Arab conflict is very flexible, as both approach their problems not with cold rationality but with passionate emotions, they react with every little step with nearly the same violence as they would a total solution." "Diplomacy," the author states, "may best be defined as the art of delaying inevitable decisions as long as possible." Furthermore, "time works in the Arabs favor." Despite this the author believes that "the present leadership of the major Arab powers . . . are ready for an agreement which naturally presupposes full recognition of Israel and the signing of a formal peace . . . If there is no peace in the next few years nobody can foresee what Arab power will mean in another decade."

5. *Arab-Israeli Military Balance* (See also VI-F-3)

a. *Arab-Israeli Military Balance: Miscellaneous Aspects*

ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A SPECIAL REPORT, in *Moment*, v.2, no.3 (December 1976) 15-20.

Includes: Arms in the Middle East by W. Seth Carus; Mideast Arms Balance: Tilting in favor of the Arabs? by Edward N. Luttwak. "The data for this study have been compiled by W. Seth Carus of Johns Hopkins University on the basis of a very wide survey of all available unclassified literature, notably Congressional documents and the specialist journals."

IMPLICATIONS OF 1976 ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY STATUS, by Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 49 p.

1. Targets and weapons in the next round of Middle East War; 2. Likely uses of weapons in the Middle East; Appended: Weapons inventories in the Middle East.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT, ed. by Louis Williams. TEL-AVIV, University Publishing Projects, 1975. 265 p. (International Symposium October 12-17, 1975).

International Symposium in Jerusalem, October 12-17, 1975, and the patronage of the Minister of Defense Mr. Shimon Peres. Among the contents: The Art of War East and West; Seapower Competition in The Middle East; Military Balance of Power in the Middle East; The Yom Kippur War:

A Review of the Battles in Retrospect—and their Lessons.

THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by W. Seth Carus, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 29-32 plus.

Examines the Military Balance of power in the Middle East in relation to Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The author's emphasis is on the strategic doctrines of the participants in order to determine the "nature of the latent capabilities that their equipment provides." He concludes: "The Israeli military is now superior to the Arab militaries, but the extent of that superiority is totally dependent on the ability of the Arab armies to correct qualitative deficiencies and to implement new strategies to meet the altered situation."

NOT BY WAR ALONE: CURBING THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE, by Fuad Jabber, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 233-247.

Military power has been relied on by both the Arabs and Israelis "as the best guarantee of security and the optimal means for attaining their political objectives." The author states that "in default of a true peace . . . arms control is a principal arena where . . . steps can be taken to moderate the effects of 'forcible constraint' and foster the emergence of conditions that would encourage . . . less violent avenues for the resolution of critical issues." In this article he examines: how the October 1973 war has affected the "broad strategic environment." The course that military competition will be likely to take in the near future; and the political prerequisites of successful control over the instruments of war in the conflict. He concludes that "under present conditions only two areas directly related to the arms race are open to some form of control: local acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the transfer of conventional armaments from outside the region." As for the first area, "it can be safely predicted that further progress towards nuclear arms control in the Middle East will depend almost exclusively on Israeli policy." In regard to the second area the problem is "to whose advantage would increased stability work? . . . missing is that commitment by both sides to deemphasizing military means in the conduct of their mutual relations . . . only a qualitative change in this state of relations . . . can open up significant prospects of achieving arms limitations . . ."

WHAT THE NEXT ARAB-ISRAELI WAR MIGHT LOOK LIKE, by Steven J. Rosen, in *International Security*, v.2, no.4 (Spring 1978) 149-173.

Presents "a straightforward prediction of a specific future based on a reading of current trends," concerning the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli war. The most likely context of a fifth war, though



not the only conceivable one, would be a situation in which the current search for a diplomatic settlement reaches an impasse and one or more Arab states feels it necessary to resort to the war option to break a no-war, no-peace stalemate. "Another possibility is that the Israelis will observe that their own position is deteriorating rapidly because of their adversaries' mounting accumulation of weapons, and that they will choose to resort to preventative war before their margin of superiority is eroded completely. Mr. Rosen fixes the time frame of a fifth war "no earlier than the end of 1979 and no later than 1982-83." After reviewing the probable course of the war from its beginning, through the battle in the air, on the ground and at sea, the author concludes that the "war will be short and decisive." Thus "direct superpower involvement is unlikely." The military outcome "will clear within three to six days, and will be an unambiguous Israeli victory closer to the model of 1967 than to 1973." Politically, "the war will be a disaster for the Arabs . . . The newfound confidence of the Arabs and the myth that time is inevitably on their side will have been dealt a severe blow . . . But all of these losses for the Arabs will not necessarily add up to net gains for the Israelis." There is, Mr. Rosen finds, little possibility "that both sides will anticipate this no-win outcome in advance, and bargain realistically on the basis of a commonly assumed outcome . . . Before the war, there is little that the Israelis can do to convince the Arabs of the futility of fighting. The Arab belief that they have a viable military option appears at the present time to be unshakeable, particularly as it does not rest on the assumption of military victory in the conventional sense."

b. *Arab-Israeli Military Balance: Effect of U.S. Arms Supplies* (See also III-A-10)

THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE: HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?, by Anthony H. Cordesman, in *Armed Forces Journal, International*, v.115, no.2 (October 1977) 32-39.

The author, a former Civilian Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth and a former Secretary of the Defense Intelligence Board, states that "Israel is . . . a militaristic state whose military buildup has gone far beyond the requirements of defense." Many statistical tables from Abraham R. Wagner's *The Middle East Force Balance and Israeli Assistance Requirements*, Analytical Assessments Corporation, 1976 and Colonel Trevor Dupuy's new book, *Elusive Victory*; The Arab-Israeli force goals, that he states were first set forth in a 1974 request for aid, in a plan called 'Matmon B.' He concludes that the election of Menachem Begin "may well have turned U.S. willingness to supply armament to Israel into a major national security problem." Yet, "mortality, his-

tory and domestic politics" prevent the U.S. from reversing its policies and cutting its aid.

ARABESQUE: UNTANGLING THE PATTERNS OF SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY ON SUPPLY OF "LETHAL" WEAPONS TO EGYPT, by Lewis W. Snider. University of Denver, Colorado Seminary, 1977. 151 p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, v.15, Book 1, 1977-1978 Series).

Addresses the pattern of arms acquisitions in the Middle East "in order to gain insight into the possible consequences of a decision by the United States to provide Egypt with 'lethal' (armor and aircraft) weapons. The problem is approached as "one of maintaining supplier control over end-use of the weapon systems transferred to the recipient. A secondary purpose is to demonstrate how quantitative methods can be applied to the analysis of substantive foreign policy questions." The author concludes that "there is evidence of an arms race between Israel and Egypt, but not between Israel and any other Arab country . . . The United States may be able to use a position of common supplier of dominant weapon systems to both Egypt and Israel to begin reducing the demand and supply of both parties and to reduce the possibility of a successful surprise attack by either side . . ." Thirty-two statistical tables and seven figures are included in the text. The majority of these are related to the construction of capability indices for armor and aircraft. An appendix on pages 149-151 presents the "Results of Runs showing effects of assumed non-linkages on Arab and Israeli Arms Acquisitions."

WEIGHING THE MIDDLE EAST BALANCE ON A DIFFERENT SET OF SCALES, by Dr. Joseph Churba, in *Armed Forces Journal International*, v.115, no.4 (December 1977) 17-21.

A reply to Anthony H. Cordesman's article on the Arab-Israel military balance which appeared in the *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1977. Dr. Churba finds that Mr. Cordesman's "revisionist view of history and Middle East politics, aided by some questionable and pseudo 'official' statistics, advanced several . . . questionable theses . . ."

c. *Soviet Arms Aid Policy: Successes and Shortcomings* (See also III-B-5)

SOVIET ARMS AID IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Roger F. Pajak. Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1976. 45 p.

An analysis of Soviet successes and shortcomings in arms aid policy in The Middle East. The aid program during the past twenty years amounts to 7 billion dollars. Under review: The Soviet Arms and Program in Egypt; Syria; Iraq; Libya; also the future of the program.



6. Arab-Israeli Mutual Nuclear Deterrence (See also V-3)

A STABLE SYSTEM OF MUTUAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by Steven J. Rosen, in *The American Political Science Review*, v.71, no.4 (December 1977) 1367-1383.

Explores the consequences of the establishment of a regional "mini balance of terror" in the Middle East. "The central hypothesis is that apocalyptic images and doomsday visions have been ac-

cepted too readily and out of proportion to the arguments that are given, and that a stable system of mutual deterrence may be viable in the Middle East and may make a positive contribution to the process of political settlement. Problems of rationality, credibility, second-strike force survivability, escalation, tactical nuclear weapons, accidents, permissive action links, terrorism, preventive war, and the disclosure of nuclear weapons possession are discussed." Extensive references to other publications are given in informative footnotes.



## CHAPTER II

### UNSETTLED ISSUES BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS

(See also Chapters I, V, and VI)

#### A. The Occupied Territories as a Source of Arab-Israeli Tensions (See also V-A-3 and V-E)

##### 1. Territorial Question and the Arab-Israeli War (1973)

THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AND THE OCTOBER WAR, by Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.1 (Autumn 1974) 43-54.

Ibrahim F. I. Shihata is a Professor of International Law at Ain-Shams University in Cairo and the Legal Adviser of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. He examines the main "arguments" of "partisan writers" who "have attempted . . . to find legal bases for Israel's political claims to the occupation and even to the annexation of territories of neighbouring Arab states." He concludes that the legitimacy of the Egyptian-Syrian action of October 1973 "is tied . . . to the illegitimacy of the Israeli military presence" in the Sinai Peninsula and on the Golan Heights. Furthermore: "Israel has not denied the sovereignty of Egypt over the Sinai Peninsula or that of Syria over the Golan Heights. Both territories were outside the international boundaries of 'Palestine' before the establishment of Israel . . . Israel's claim to their occupation has thus been 'justified' only by alleged considerations of security and less overtly by the desire to gain territorial advantages in future negotiations. Such considerations are obviously of a political, not legal character."

##### 2. UN Security Council Resolution 242

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: THE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE, by Glenn Perry, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.4 (Autumn 1977) 413-433.

A study of the question of the "proper interpretation of Resolution 242, particularly the phrase 'Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' (Article 1 (i))." This Security Council Resolution adopted on November 22, 1967, "remains the United Nations blueprint for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." The author concludes: "The rules of international law applicable to the interpretation of treaties—and, by analogy, other documents—heavily confirm that the phrase 'withdrawal . . . from territories' cannot be construed as meaning anything other than with-

drawal from all territories occupied in 1967." The issue has been controversial as "Arab governments and their supporters interpret the word 'territories' to mean all of the territories, while Israel and its supporters point to the omission of the definite article ('the') in the English version to argue that the resolution calls for withdrawal from some, but not necessarily all, of the occupied territories."

##### 3. Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories

ISRAELI REGIONAL PLANNING POLICY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, by Abdul-Ilan Abu-Ayyash, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.5, no.3 and 4 (Spring/Summer 1976) 83-103.

An Assistant Professor of Geography at Kuwait University investigates how Israeli regional planning has applied the concept of "integration" in the "occupied areas." The author places this policy "within the theoretical framework in which Zionist policies have been formulated," and discusses "the way in which these objectives have been implemented."

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, by Dr. Mohammed Mehdi, in *Middle East International*, no.19 (January 1973) 21-26.

Describes "some of the physical and population changes that the Israeli occupation authorities have effected in the conquered areas since 1967." Map illustrating the "Allon plan." List of "The New Jewish Settlements in the Occupied Arab Lands." Lists name, year of founding, settlement form, organizational affiliation and location.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, in *Middle East International*, no.72 (June 1977) 17-20.

Clear black and white outline maps showing Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights, the West Bank and The Gaza Strip and Sinai. Text of the UN security council consensus statement on the situation in the Israeli occupied Arab territories, November 11, 1976, page 18.

ISRAELIS COME TO STAY, by G.H. Blake and W.W. Harris, in *Geographical Magazine*, November 1977. 83-86.

"Israeli policy towards her settlements in



territory occupied during the 1967 six-day war must be a contentious issue at any peace conference. The authors comment on the progress of her settlements in Gaza, Sinai, Golan and the West Bank." In conclusion they state: "The total number of Jews permanently settled in the eighty-four villages outside the Jerusalem area is probably no more than 9,000-10,000. Few settlements have more than 200 inhabitants and none exceed 1200. These figures may be compared with an estimated Arab population of 1,180,000 in the occupied territories. Militarily the settlements are of limited value. Politically they provide evidence of Israel's determination to achieve security by retaining certain parts of the Arab lands taken in 1967. On the face of it peace negotiations with the Arabs, who understandably insist on the return of all conquered territory and the disbandment of Jewish settlements, will be a grievous waste of time." Map of "Israeli settlements in occupied territory at the end of Labour rule, June 1977."

4. *Contentions over Control of Jerusalem and The Holy Places* (See also V-8-d, and VI-G-11)

THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF JERUSALEM, by Nafez Nazzal, in *Middle East International*, no.80 (February 1978) 18-20.

The writer, an Associate professor of History and Political Science at Birzeit University, the West Bank, describes the progress of the "Israeli plan . . . to establish in Jerusalem and its surroundings a physical and demographic reality that will make the division of the city according to population impossible." These settlements on the West Bank near Jerusalem are "supposed to create, together with the so-called 'united' Jerusalem, a greater Jerusalem dividing the West Bank into two isolated districts, north and south, without any link between them.

JERUSALEM, by Teddy Kollek, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.4 (July 1977) 701-716.

The Mayor of Jerusalem since 1965 writes of Jerusalem's special place in the history of Israel and the Middle East. Within the two premises "with which virtually everyone in Israel agrees . . . that Jerusalem shall remain undivided and that it shall remain the capital of Israel" progress is being made "towards a city of tolerant coexistence." Four of the principles "that make continuing progress possible . . . are: (1) There shall be free access to all the Holy Places and they shall be administered by their adherents. (2) Everything possible shall be done to ensure unhindered development of the Arab way of life in the Arab sections of the city . . . The same . . . for the various Christian communities. (3) Everything possible should be done to ensure equal governmental, municipal and social services in all parts of the city. (4) Continuing efforts should be made to increase . . . contacts among the various

elements of Jerusalem's population." As for Jerusalem's place in Israel the author concludes: . . . "I do not think you can find any Israelis who are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This beautiful golden city is the heart and the soul of the Jewish people. You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one simple word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that word would be Jerusalem."

JERUSALEM: A FACTUAL BACKGROUND, by Anthony S. Reyner and Jane Philips, in *World Affairs*, v.137, n.4 (Spring 1975) 326-335.

A brief review of "some basic facts of Jerusalem's physical setting and history which must be considered in thinking about solutions to its problems." Map: "Israel-Jordan: Jerusalem Administration." Bibliography and extensive references in notes at the end of the article.

JERUSALEM: ISRAEL'S POLITICAL DECISIONS, 1947-1977, by Michael Brecher, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.32, no.1 (Winter 1978) 13-34.

How the decisions concerning Jerusalem's place in Israel were made, from the decision in 1949 to make Jerusalem the seat of Israel's government, thru the implementing decisions in 1949 and 1950, to the controversial decision of June 14, 1967 when Israel annexed East Jerusalem and surrounding areas. Negative reactions to this last decision are discussed. The main ideas proposed to solve the questions of Jerusalem's sovereignty, municipal government and the access to and control of the Holy Places are outlined. The author concludes: Israel's "policy acts, and especially the decisions of 1949 and 1967, flowed directly from a dual Israeli perception of Jerusalem's external marginality and her internal centrality. The latter image was immensely strengthened by a visible and articulate national consensus on Jerusalem."

JERUSALEM: THE TORN CITY by Meron Benvenisti. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1976. 407 p.

The Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, describes the struggle between the Jews and the Arabs who both call Jerusalem their home. Part I: Jerusalem divided; Part II: Jerusalem united (including: the search for a political solution). Map of Jerusalem and photos.

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM IN THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 1948-1967, by Naim Sofer, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, n.1 (January 1976) 73-94.

How Jordan, the Jerusalemites, and the Arab world reacted to the annexation of Jerusalem by Jordan in 1948, and to Jordan's subsequent exercise of control over the city.

5. *Issues Relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (See also V-E-2, and VI-G-12)



**THE BEGIN PLAN: A STEP BACKWARDS?**, by Noah Lucas, in *Middle East International*, no.82, April 1978. 13-14.

Analyzes Begin's 26-point peace plan for the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The author finds that the "key proposal" . . . is contained in the 24th Clause in which the Israeli government, "for the first time since the establishment of the state in 1948, asserts a formal claim to Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip." The other clauses of the plan are then reviewed as they relate to clause 24. The author concludes that "The Israeli peace plan in response to President Sadat's initiative . . . represents a major enlargement of Israeli claims rather than an offer of important concessions."

**CHANGES IN THE SETTLEMENT PATTERN OF THE GAZA STRIP: 1945-1975**, by Elisha Efrat, in *Asian Affairs*, v.63 (New Series v.7), Part 2 (June 1976) 168-177.

An Israeli geographer describes the geographical background of the development of the Gaza strip settlement pattern, the distribution of its population and the influence on it of economic factors. He gives "particular attention" to the town of Gaza. He concludes: "In Gaza, as well as in other towns of the Strip and the West Bank, the refugee population has not been integrated within any municipal framework, and there has been practically no absorption in the local population." Maps showing the distribution of settlements in 1945 and 1975, and the Urban development of Gaza.

**SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND ECONOMIC CHANGES OF THE GAZA STRIP 1947-1977**, by Elisha Efrat, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 349-356.

The author, a professor of geography at Tel Aviv University, describes "the spatial background of the development of the Gaza Strip settlement pattern, the distribution of its population and the influence on it of economic factors." He describes the Gaza Strip as an "unusual geographic region distinguished by a high population density, a high rate of refugees, a high rate of urban dwellers and a low level of economic development." The over 200,000 refugees who migrated to the Gaza Strip increased the population density but did not alter the settlement pattern. This is despite the fact that the refugees living in camps number about 60 per cent of the entire population of the strip. The economic change initiated by the Israeli government after the Six Day War has resulted in a tremendous improvement in the standard of living. The slow decrease in Israel's economic activity during the last two years had moderated the economic advance of the Gaza strip. As a result, the factors listed above, have combined to produce, "a situation of such complexity that it will not be easy to find a

solution." Sketch maps of Agricultural land use pattern and the distribution of towns and villages as of 1977 are included.

**UNITED STATES: DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO DEVELOP NEW OIL FIELDS IN SINAI AND THE GULF OF SUEZ**, by Monroe Leigh, U.S. Department of State, in *International Legal Materials*, v.16, n.3 (May 1977) 733-753.

Reproduced from the text provided by the U.S. Department of State, dated October 1, 1976. The memorandum concludes that: "Israel's oil development plans in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez are contrary to international law, even if the latter area were 'occupied territory.' An occupant's rights under international law do not include the right to develop a new oil field, to use the oil resources of occupied territory for the general benefit of the home economy or to grant oil concessions."

**THE WEST BANK: IS IT VIABLE?** by Vivian A. Bull. Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1975. 170 p.

Chapter 1. Some Concepts of Development Theory and Their Bearing on The Economic Prospects of The West Bank Territory; Chapter 2. The West Bank Territory: History, Geography, and Cultural Development; Chapter 3. General Economic Development of the West Bank Territory; Chapter 4. Agricultural Sector; Chapter 5. The Industrial Sector; Chapter 6. Human Resources and the Labor Force; Chapter 7. Some Sociological Problems of the West Bank Territory. Bibliography.

**THE WEST BANK: PALESTINIAN OR ISRAELI?**, by Elizabeth Monroe, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.4 (Autumn 1977) 397-412.

The author concludes: "the chances of peace under Begin's Likud government, claiming as it does historical, religious and security reasons for dominion over the whole of Palestine, are little different from those under the governments that preceded it. For the policy of the Peres, Rabin and Meir governments, all of which had small majorities was dependent on the support of religious parties that wanted the whole country. All of these governments therefore played for time, and meanwhile practiced 'creeping annexation . . . ' "Maps of the Israeli Settlements on the West Bank and of Jerusalem.

**WEST BANK—WHERE PEACE HOPES COULD WITHER**, by David B. Richardson, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.84, n.3 (23 January 1978) 37-38.

Interviews with Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan River. Here the questions of the Palestinian homeland and of Israeli settlements are centers of concern. The writer found that: "On



no other subject are people of the West Bank more united than in their support for the PLO and its leader, Yassir Arafat . . . The PLO is regarded as the only organization that represents interests of all Palestinian Arabs." As to what West Bankers want: "They insist on nothing less than the total withdrawal of Israeli troops and a plebiscite on their own political future." Map: "Israel's controversial Settlements."

**WHO OWNS THE WEST BANK?**, by Amnon Kapeliouk, in *Middle East International*, n.78 (December 1977) 18-19.

Reviews the history of the ownership and control of the West Bank since 1948. The author concludes that the West Bank should either go to its Palestinian inhabitants according to the principle of the right to self-determination or to Jordan as part of a peace agreement . . . "If one is going by the Scriptures, the Jewish state would go well beyond the 'Greater Israel' which came into being on the morrow of the 1967 war." Map of West Bank showing boundary lines, armistice lines, and settlements.

**WHOSE WEST BANK?**, by David Schnall, in *Moment*, v.2, n.6 (April 1977) 22-25.

The Gush Emunim movement and its settlement Elon Moreh at the periphery of the Kadum military base a few miles from Nablus. "The trailer-camp village, which houses some 30 families, contradicts the policy of the Israeli government, and has become the focus of intense debate on West Bank settlement. Approximately 30,000 supporters of the Gush Emunim movement took part in a march from Beth-El to Jericho just one year ago to press for retention of the occupied West Bank Territory." The Gush position is that: "There is no Palestinian problem beyond that which is created by Arab propaganda. The territories taken during the 1967 War were not occupied, they were liberated."

## **B. The "Palestinian" Problem**

### **1. *The Palestinian Problem: Miscellaneous Aspects***

**PALESTINIAN IMPASSE: ARAB GUERRILLAS & INTERNATIONAL TERROR**, ed. by Lester A. Sobel. New York, Facts on File, 1977. 282 p.

Conflict of Rights; Pressure on Israel; Both Sides Face Mounting Problems; 1973 War and Aftermath; Postwar Negotiations and Pressures; Palestinian Support Grows; Increasing Pressures (War in Lebanon; Entebbe Hostages Rescued; Other Terrorism; Palestinians and Arab Views and Policies).

**A SENTENCE OF EXILE: THE PALESTINE/ISRAEL CONFLICT 1897-1977**, by David Waines, Wilmette, Illinois, the Medina Press, 1977. 226 p.

A revised, enlarged and updated version of "The Unholy War," published six years ago. The author states: "From the Arab perspective the Palestine Problem is simply the displacement of the inhabitants of Palestine under conditions of British colonial rule by another people, Zionists, who were fired with a political ideology which threatened the status of the Arab community. After 1948 and the creation of the State of Israel, the conflict remained essentially 'the struggle of an indigenous population against the occupation of part of its normal territory by foreigners.' This is the substance of the Arab position, and it is cast strictly in terms of the fate and the struggle of the people of Palestine. All other elements of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict stem from this . . . The Palestinians are what the problem is all about. And this book is about the problem of Palestine." Bibliography and Notes, pp. 213-222.

### **2. *The Palestinian Problem: Historical Aspects***

**PALESTINE PAPERS 1917-1922: SEED OF CONFLICT**, Comp. by Doreen Ingrams. New York, George Brazziller, 1973. 198p.

Traces the origins of the Arab Israeli Conflict through the memoranda, letters and official minutes of those involved in formulating policy and making decisions. The Balfour Declaration; Palestine 1918; The King-Crane Commission; The San Remo Conference, 1920; Civil Administration in Palestine 1921-1922; the first white paper; appended. The British mandate, 1922. Biographical notes.

**THE POLITICS OF THE ARAB REBELLION IN PALESTINE 1936-39**, by Tom Bowden, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.11, no.2 (May 1975) 147-174.

The Arab revolt in Palestine, 1936 to 1939 was a "racial, religious, colonial, familial and peasant struggle intermingled." The author concentrates on the "military components of the revolt and especially the Arab guerillas, their tactics, motives and personnel." The revolt stands as an "interesting halfway house in the development of anti-state, politico-military disobedience from the base of primitive banditry to sophisticated peoples' revolutionary war." Tables showing the "Incidence of Terrorism in Palestine 1937." and "1938 Incidents of Violence." Appendix: "The escalation of successful strikes against the Arab guerrillas by the British Military—November 1938 to March 1939." p. 171-172.

**SECRET DIPLOMACY AND REBELLION IN PALESTINE, 1936-1939**, by Michael J. Cohen, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.3 (July 1977) p. 379-404.

Britains refusal to grant the three demands first put by the Arab leadership of Palestine to the Mandatory in November, 1935 led to the Arab Re-



bellion in Palestine "which began with sporadic outbursts of terrorism on April 19, 1936." The three demands were: "(a) total cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine; (b) prohibition of all sales of Arab land to Jews; and (c) the granting of independence to Palestine and the ending of the Mandate." The "unofficial negotiations" that took place between 1936 and 1938 between the Zionists and the Arab leadership were "more the result of tactical approaches made under pressure than genuine efforts at compromise . . . Nevertheless, the records of various meetings that did take place are of value for the historian of the Arab-Jewish conflict. They illustrate the advanced stage reached by each side in its political ideology. They show the often cynical motives behind attempted political dentures, and they are also significant in that the various schemes discussed were in fact the antecedents of the British White Paper of 1939, a document that laid down British policy in Palestine . . ."

3. *The Palestinian Problem: Jurisdictional Aspects*

THE JURIDICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE: AND APPRAISAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, by W.T. Mallison, Jr. and S.V. Mallison, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.2 (Winter 1973) 64-78.

Evaluates the juridical status of the Palestinian military resistance under the criteria of the international law of war. In addition the authors discuss how status in law can be obtained for viable entities and their accompanying political institution. The resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in regard to the rights of the people of Palestine are described. The authors conclude that they "provide the recognition of Palestinian rights and the basis in legal authority to take steps toward implementation." This paper was presented at the meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in Palestine of the Second World Conference of Christians for Palestine.

4. *The Arab Palestinians*

THE ARAB PALESTINIANS, by Alon Ben-Meir, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 24-28 plus.

The author states that "it is necessary to distinguish between the Palestinians as a people and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political organization . . ." After reviewing the creation of the Palestinian problem, the PLO, the reactions of the international community, and the relations between the U.S. and the Palestinians the author concludes: "While peace may be negotiated with or without the PLO, no peace can be negotiated without Israel and the Palestinian people . . . Israel and the Palestinians are the central components in the Middle East dilemma, neither of whom can benefit from a lasting peace if it is achieved at the expense of the other."

5. *Palestinian Refugees (See also under Jordan)*

EDUCATING A COMMUNITY IN EXILE: THE PALESTINIAN EXPERIENCE, by Ibrahim Abu Lughod, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.3 (Spring 1973) 94-111.

Examines the available statistics and studies concerning the education of the Palestinians in the Arab countries. The author concentrates on the impact of the Arab curriculum on the future life and attitudes of the Palestinians. He does not deal with the "dilemmas" of the education of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. The author concludes: "The Palestinians require education in the context of the needs and aspirations of their own society, yet the socializing function of Arab educational systems is clearly carried out in the light of the needs of the particular countries involved and it is obvious that the needs of a stable or developing society differ considerably from the needs of a community in exile committed to a goal of national liberation . . . Within less than a decade, Palestinians will constitute a highly urban community predominantly engaged in middle class occupations, and this will strongly affect the type of struggle they can wage. These are some of the implications responsible Palestinian and Arab leadership will have to examine closely." Text includes five statistical tables.

FOR THE RECORD: UNRWA ANNUAL REPORT, in *Middle East International*, no.78 (December 1977) 29-31.

Highlights from the latest annual report of UNRWA to the UN General Assembly, August 22, 1977. Programs for the Palestinian refugees in education and training, health, and relief services are described. The section on the problems caused by the conflict in Lebanon is quoted in full. The financial difficulties of the organization are also discussed.

6. *Palestinian Quest for their Own State*

THE ARAB REGIMES AND THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION, 1967-1971, by Fuad Jabber, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.2 (Winter 1973) 79-101.

"Perhaps the fundamental conclusion to be drawn not merely from the Jordanian civil war and its aftermath, but from the entire history of the resistance and its relations with the Arab regimes, is that the factor of dependence has been the main impediment to the growth of the movement into a military as well as political force able to pursue its goals with the possibility of success. Some causes of this dependence—the smallness of the conflict area, the military power of the enemy, the lack of any real 'sanctuaries,' the hostility of most Arab governments—are admittedly beyond the control of the fedayeen organizations. Others, mainly of an internal nature, are not. Primary among these have been the plurality of organizations and ideological



differences . . . The Palestinian national movement is likely to remain at the mercy of the dynamics of inter-Arab politics—as it has been since its inception—for as long as it lacks a substantial degree of structural unity and ideological cohesion.”

THE PALESTINIAN QUEST, By Eric Rouleau, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.53, no.2 (January 1975) 264–283.

Growth and development of Palestinian Nationalism, from the early 1900's to the end of 1974. The author concludes that Israelis and Palestinians should consent, “whether they like it or not, to recognize one another's legitimate national rights whose nature and scope they would work out before studying the question of mutual cooperation indispensable to the flowering of the two peoples.”

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: A SOVEREIGN PALESTINIAN STATE, by Walid Khalidi, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.56, no.4 (July 1978) 695–713.

Addresses the components that would be needed to establish a sovereign, independent Palestinian state which would be a viable part of an overall settlement of the Palestine Problem. Components discussed are: The proposed States juridical status, frontiers, foreign relations, armed forces, internal politics, refugees, and its relationship to Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Arguments against the establishment of such a State: its low economic viability, its absorptive capacity in relation to the Palestinian refugees, and its potential danger as a military threat to Israel are also discussed.

7. *Israel's Response to Palestinian Quest for their Own State*

ISRAEL AND THE FEDAYEEN: PERSISTENCE OR TRANSFORMATION, Major Bard E. O'Neill, *Strategic Review*, Vol.4, No.2 (Spring 1976) 89–101.

“The dramatic political resurgence of the fedayeen in the fall of 1974 has complicated the search for a peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict . . . A detailed examination of the positions of both sides indicates that it is conceivable that the seeds of accommodation may have been sown. Whether they will bear any fruit is uncertain and will depend on their being carefully nurtured in a bleak, uncertain climate.”

SHOULD ISRAEL TALK TO THE PLO?, in *Moment*, v.1, no.8 (March 1976) 33–48.

The editors of *Moment* solicited the opinions of eleven people concerning the following questions: “Should Israel talk with the PLO? Should there be a Palestinian state? Should Israel take any initiatives toward peace?” The people selected were those “whose familiarity with these problems is evident, and whose opinions we value, regarding the actions which Israel might now take.” Statements

were submitted by: Shulamit Aloni, Gil Carl Alroy, George E. Assousa, Shlomo Avineri, Arie Eliav, Yair Evron, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Moshe Ma'oz, Yuval Ne'eman, Trudy Rubin and Arthur Waskow. The editors conclude: “First, there seems to be unanimous agreement that Israel must act . . . Most of the respondents agree that Israel should talk with the PLO, generally with the proviso that the PLO would first have to recognize Israel's legitimacy and national sovereignty . . . Most of the participants favor a national homeland for the Palestinians, and the Israelis in particular express the hope that this might come about in some conjunction with Jordan.”

A TIME FOR PEACE, by Scott Sullivan and Nicholas Proffitt, in *Newsweek*, v.90, n.16 (17 October 1977) p. 33.

Interview with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan following his meeting with President Carter. On the question of a Palestinian state: “I think that any Israeli Government would reject it. And if we have to make the choice tomorrow of what to do—have a breach with the U.S. . . . or accept a Palestinian state—we would rather have these problems with the U.S. than agree to a Palestinian state, which we seriously think would eventually bring the destruction of Israel.”

8. *The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) LIBERATION OR SETTLEMENT: THE DIALECTICS OF PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE*, by Hisham Sharabi, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.2 (Winter 1973) 33–48.

The editor of the *Journal of Palestine Studies* concludes that the Palestinians “must choose liberation.” They must choose it for the following reasons: “the absence of any alternative, . . . the movement of liberation throughout the world, . . . the potential of transformation in Arab society, the possibility of mobilizing Arab power.” In order to accomplish this “the Palestinian movement, then, must become a real and credible military, political and ideological force . . . In the final analysis only armed struggle can prevent the established fact of Zionist occupation from becoming an acknowledged reality.”

MODERATES AND REJECTIONISTS WITHIN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, by Muhammad Y. Muslin, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.2 (Spring 1976) 127–140.

An examination of the political views of the moderate and the rejectionist groups of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) “from the standpoint of their leading organizations, namely Fath and the PFLP.” This study is “mainly based on primary sources published by different Palestinian organizations, most of the source consulted are in Arabic; translations . . . are the author's, unless;



otherwise indicated." The author concludes: the division in the PLO "reflects the various political trends which exist among the Palestinians; ideology has mattered more to the PFLP, a relatively small commando organization, than to Fath, the largest of the resistance organizations; moderates within the PLO are prepared to accept an interim agreement for the Palestine problem. Should this group fail to achieve the establishment of a Palestinian state, the prospects are that it will either be overtaken by the radicals, or perhaps it would turn to radicalism."

**NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Capt. Augustus R. Norton, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.4 (April 1976) 3-11.

Considers the procurement conditions and tactical considerations that must be dealt with by any subnational grouping that wishes to use nuclear terror. The author discusses how nuclear terror could be used in the Middle East by some Palestinian Organizations. He also discusses the utility of nuclear vis-a-vis chemical or biological weapons. The author concludes that "the prospect of successful nuclear terrorism . . . appears far less likely . . . than the alarmists have led the public to believe."

**PALESTINIANS: STILL NO.1 BLOCK TO MIDEAST HARMONY**, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, n.23 (5 December 1977) 20-21.

"Yassir Arafat and his PLO make their stand clear; Give the Palestinians a nation of their own, or there will be turmoil for years to come . . . The growing strength of the PLO and its adverse response to Sadat's trip to Israel disturb diplomats who fear that peace is far down the line." Map: "Palestinians' Contending Factions". Brief description of the "Six Major Groups": Al Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Saiqa, Arab Liberation Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command.

**PEACE AND THE PALESTINIANS**, by Michael Adams, in *Middle East International*, no.77 (November 1977) 28-31.

A summary by Michael Adams of the main points made in discussions at an international Seminar in London September 29 to October 1 under the auspices of the British Section of the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Co-operation. Includes list of participants mentioned in the summary. The main subjects of discussion were: The PLO in the next stage, the responsibility of the United States, and Europe's role.

**THE PLO AFTER CAIRO**, by Godfrey Jansen, in *Middle East International*, v.71, (May 1977) 8-11. Describes the Palestine National Council Meeting in Cairo. What the Western media predicted for the meeting is compared with what occurred. The two

"over-arching factors" when the conference opened were the survival of the Palestinian national movement despite the "battering" it had received in the Lebanese civil war; and the fact that Fateh, "by doing almost all the fighting in Lebanon, had become the leading group." "The secular democratic state in all of Palestine remains the ultimate goal of the Palestine national movement . . . The Palestine Liberation organization "believes that . . . Israel will not concede even the 18 1/2% state" (Gaza and the West Bank), and "the US shows no signs of willingness to apply the . . . pressure . . . to get Israel to give anything more . . . The general Palestinian opinion is that at least one more Arab-Israeli war will have to be fought before Israel is ready to accept the conditions for a really just and lasting peace."

**SINCE JORDAN: THE PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN**, in *Conflict Studies*, n.38 (September 1973) 18p.

Discusses the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); The Palestine National Council (Or Congress) (PNC) and its "five major fedayeen organizations: Al Fatah, Black September, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Saiqa (Vanguard of Popular Revolution)." Includes chart: "Command Structure of the Palestine Resistance Movement," and a map illustrating the guerrilla bases and the retaliation by the Jordanian army. Select annotated bibliography of six items.

**THE VOICES OF PALESTINE: A BROADCASTING HOUSE DIVIDED**, by Donald R. Browne, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.2 (Spring 1975) 133-150.

The origin and development of the broadcasting services of the Palestinian resistance movement are viewed as "a microcosm of exile radio activities in general, while the nature of their specific organizational problems and the content of their broadcasts should furnish a better understanding of the Palestinian problem in a larger sense." The first voice of the Palestinian Liberation organization to broadcast with its own station was the voice of Palestine which began in March 1965. The station "owed its existence to the Egyptians" who had trained their staff and on whose soil the stations studios and transmitter were located. After an initial period where stations were established in other Arab nations, unity turned to division. There are indications that the various "Palestinian broadcast services . . . have some impact upon . . . Palestinian audiences: chiefly those living in refugee camps." Their impact is limited because of the short hours they broadcast, "certain stylistic aspects . . .," and frequent shifts in broadcast times. The author concludes that: "The present



situation of the Palestinian radio stations remains, then, much as it has been ever since more than one station was on the air—torn by internal divisions, pressured by external forces (usually those of the host governments . . .) However, because of the factional nature of the Palestinian movement, and because of widespread differences of political opinion throughout the Arab world, it is perhaps inevitable that most . . . will remain on the air for some time to come . . .”

a. *Yasir Arafat*

ARAFAT: THE MAN AND THE MYTH, by Thomas Kiernan. New York, Norton, 1976. 281 p.

Based on a series of interviews with relatives, acquaintances and former acquaintances of Yasir Arafat. The author describes the early life and development of Arafat, his training and activities on behalf of Palestinian liberation.

YASIR ARAFAT: FRAUD, by Thomas Kiernan, in *Moment*, v.1, n.10 (May-June 1976) 16-20 plus.

Based on a series of interviews with members of Yasir Arafat's "family, childhood acquaintances, early political-activist colleagues and functionaries of various Arab governments who have contact with Arafat." The author concludes: Arafat "speaks, and has spoken since 1967, for the government of Syria. He does not represent the Palestinians in general, or even any specific segment of Palestinians."

9. *The Palestinian Problem and the UN*

A FIGHTING IRISHMAN AT THE U.N., in *Time*, v.107, no.4 (26 January 1976) 26-28 plus.

How Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations carries out his duties in the interest of the United States. Among other things, the article reports that just previously he was in a sharp debate at the U.N. with his Russian counterpart concerning the admission of the P.L.O. delegation. The admission of the P.L.O., he maintained, "showed a 'totalitarian' disregard for due process that threatened to turn the U.N. into 'an empty shell'."

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF AFRICA, by Patrick J. Travers, in *Harvard International Law Journal*, v.17, n.3 (Summer 1976) 561-580.

Reviews the major forms which United Nations activities in support of the African movements and PLO have taken. "Emphasis is placed upon the extent to which activities favoring the PLO have been modeled upon those supporting the African movements. The legal effects of each of these frequently intertwined series of activities are then compared in the light of the proposition that such

measures can be a mechanism for the formation of binding rules of customary international law. It is finally concluded that, although United Nations activities in support of the African movements have given rise to rules of international law requiring similar support for those movements by individual states, the recent activities in favor of the PLO have not been the source of any such legal obligations."

PALESTINE AT THE UNITED NATIONS: THE SPEECH OF YASSER ARAFAT, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.2 (Winter 1975) 181-192.

Yasser Arafat, as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, addressed the United Nations General Assembly on November 13, 1974, during the debate on Palestine. This is a translation of the speech, originally delivered in Arabic. The translation is from the United Nations official English text and compared with the Arabic text printed in al-Hahar (Beirut), November 14, 1974.

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION IN EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, in *International Legal Documents*, v.14, no.6 (November 1975) 1516-1517. (Document)

Text of UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/3375 of November 13, 1975. "The Resolution was adopted on November 10, 1975, by a vote of 101 in favor to 8 against (Costa Rica, Federal Republic of Germany, Honduras, Israel, Netherlands, Nicaragua, United Kingdom, United States) with 25 abstentions."

WHEN THE UN DROPPED THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, by George J. Tomah, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, No.1 (Autumn 1974) 15-30.

"The placing of the Palestine Question on the Agenda on the United Nations General Assembly was recently the cause of considerable publicity throughout the world. It is, however, important to note that what occurred was the reinsertion of the Palestine Question upon an Agenda on which it once existed as a fully recognized item. This was the case in the United Nations General Assembly until 1952 and the Security Council until 1967. The purpose of this article will be to examine the very questionable process by which the item was eliminated in each case from the attention of the United Nations until recent events forced it once again to the forefront." The author was Syrian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1965-72. The same issue discussed above was "raised by the author in a series of articles in al-Nahar (Beirut) in June 1974."



10. *The Palestinians and Moscow*

**MOSCOW AND THE PALESTINIANS: A NEW TOOL OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Augustus R. Norton. Coral Gables, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 26 p.

"Based on an analysis of recent Soviet statements and actions dealing with the Middle East, Norton notes an improved Soviet relationship with the Palestinians, indicating a possible intent to use the Palestinian issue as an instrument of policy in

the Middle East. Furthermore, Norton suggests, this closer Soviet identification with, and support of, the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 'has been facilitated by indications of, in at least overt terms, a less extremist stance by the latter on immediate objectives and strategies.' Although Moscow continued to seek to erode US influence while strengthening its own in the Middle East negotiations, it now appears to be preparing for more long-term influence among revolutionary Arab elements and a possible Palestinian state."



## CHAPTER III

### MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL ASPECTS

#### A. Middle East and Foreign Interests (See also by Country)

##### 1. Middle East and Africa

BLACK AFRICA AND THE ARABS, by Ali A. Mazrui, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.53, no.4 (July 1975) 725-742.

"Black Africa and the Arab world have been linked by a fluctuating pattern of economic and cultural connections for at least 12 centuries. In the secular field the Arabs have up to this time played two major roles in black Africa: first as accomplices in African enslavement, and then in the twentieth century as allies in African liberation. In the past several years they have built this alliance into a comprehensive political partnership, aimed at maintaining a solid front, particularly with regard to the Middle East and Southern Africa. The critical question for the future is whether the Arabs will also become partners in African development."

THE ILLUSION OF AFRO-ARAB SOLIDARITY, by Sammy Kum Buo, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.5 (September-October 1975) 45-48.

"Since the November 1973 Middle East war, when most African states hurriedly and dramatically severed ties with Israel and rallied to the diplomatic support of their Arab 'brothers,' the world has heard claims of 'Afro-Arab brotherhood' as part of a larger myth of 'Third World solidarity.' Many Westerners who erroneously and flatteringly regarded the Third World as a monolithic bloc, united against the industrialized world, were taken in by some of the sensational declarations of Afro-Arab friendship and co-operation. This friendship, if it exists at all, is a paper one which thrives mainly during diplomatic encounters. The Black African refusal to support the Arabs in their proposals to expel Israel from the United Nations is not based upon any Black African love for Israel, which extensively trades and co-operates militarily with Black Africa's enemy South Africa. Rather it is a demonstration of Black Africa's dissatisfaction with the manner in which she has generally been treated or mistreated by the Arabs. Even more important is Black Africa's realization that she would be the greater loser should Israel be expelled from the UN."

**QADHAFI: USING OIL RICHES TO FUEL**

MIDEAST FLAMES, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.8 (23 August 1976) 57.

"To terrorists the world over, Libya's President Muammar Qadhafi is a generous patron who gives them money, arms and, when necessary, a safe refuge. To most of his fellow rulers in the Arab world, however, Qadhafi is a dangerous, erratic troublemaker who uses Libya's vast oil wealth to keep the Middle East in turmoil."

##### 2. Middle East and Asia

CHANGING POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, by Howard Wriggins, in *Orbis*, v.20, no.3 (Fall 1976) 785-804.

Explores the evolution of the relationship between the Middle East and South Asia particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia's relations with India and Pakistan. "It first recalls the changing patterns of relationship and flows of influence between the two areas in recent centuries. The sources of the Middle East states' changed capabilities are reviewed. It then considers the newer patterns of dependency that are developing and speculates on the likely direction of the new influences from the Middle East will take in efforts to affect developments and relationships in South Asia." The author concludes: "The dependence of both India and Pakistan on Teheran and the latter's ambitions to play a role in this area of historic Iranian influence suggest that Iran will place more emphasis on its South Asian policy than it has over past decades."

##### 3. Middle East and Cento

A CENTO FOR THE 1970s, by Col. Sammy J. Cannon, in *Military Review*, v.55, no.3 (March 1975) 36-42.

Colonel Cannon has been a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) staff in Turkey. Since 1959 when it was formed by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, Cento has concentrated on political and economic issues. The United States has been active only as an observer. The author suggests that now is the time for the United States to encourage the development of the military side of the alliance by providing a supreme commander along the lines of NATO, and by committing naval forces to CENTO. He concludes this



would "provide a credible balance to the expanding Soviet presence" in the Middle East.

#### 4. *Middle East and China*

CHINESE POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Lillian Craig Harris, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 10-14 plus.

Emphasizing China's relations with the Palestinian Organizations from 1965 on the author concludes: "The principle of pragmatism will be a component of Chinese policy in the Middle East as long as China continues to support strategic contradictions in the area . . . China supports a low level of people's revolutionary war against Israel, but desires an overall peace settlement to eliminate Soviet influence."

#### 5. *Middle East and Great Britain*

THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND THE MIDDLE EAST, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977) 23-25.

Reports the results of a poll of the British public's attitude toward the Middle East. The poll was commissioned by Middle East International and carried out by Opinion Research Centre between the 27th of June and the 4th of July. The results are based on 1,103 personal interviews with a "representative sample of the population." The "most striking discovery is the extent of public ignorance of simple facts . . . 27% thought that Israel was an Arab country . . . Secondly, . . . the poll suggests that the British people is . . . pro-Jewish but . . . anti-zionist . . . In general the survey shows . . . that Israel remains the most favoured Middle Eastern country with the British public."

#### 6. *Middle East and Great Powers*

THE BIG THREE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, by R. M. Paone, in *Sea Power*, v.18, no.8 (August 1975) 28-34.

"PRC, USSR Fight for Supremacy While US Seeks 'Reasonable Balance' . . . The objectives and the nature of the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC in the Indian Ocean Heartland, as well as the interaction of their policies, are of particular interest in today's shrinking world, and are likely to thoroughly test the probability of the old adage that neither the 'West' wind nor the 'East' wind (China) shall prevail over the East African peripheral."

GREAT POWER INTERESTS AND CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—MIDDLE EAST—PERSIAN GULF REGION, by R.M. Burrell, Alvin J. Cottrell and others. Menlo Park, California, Stanford Research Institute, December 1974, 135 p.

(Strategic Studies Center. SRI Project 3115). Prepared for office. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army). PART I—Background Studies—contains a collection of background papers prepared by recognized experts on subjects

pertinent to the Middle East situation. Among the Contents: The foreign policies of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia; Western Europe, The Middle East, and Transatlantic Relations; The Middle East and The Arab-Israeli Problem; The Arab-Israeli Conflict and The Military Balance in Arabia and Central Asia.

THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST, in *Survival*, v.16, no.1 (January/February 1974) 28-39. (Documents)

Reprints statements by Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger (25 October 1973), President Nixon (26 October 1973), excerpts from the speech by Secretary-General Brezhnev at the World Congress of Peace Forces (26 October 1973), the text of the UN cease-fire resolution (No.338-22 October 1973), the resolution of the Arab oil producing countries (17 October 1973), and the statement of the European Community states, in order to illustrate the impact of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War on the major powers.

THE SUPER-POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Ian Smart, in *World Today*, v.30, no.1 (January 1974) 4-15.

"For the United States and the Soviet Union, the balance between competition and co-operation has shifted since 1967; but unresolved dilemmas in their relationships with Israel and the Arabs still challenge their detente, as well as their ability to manage crises." This article is based upon a talk given at Chatham House, and has also appeared in German in Europa-Archiv and in Dutch in Internationale Spectator.

#### 7. *Middle East and Nato (See also IV-A-2)*

DRAMA IN CYPRUS: NEW TEST FOR THE MAJOR POWERS, in *US News & World Report*, v.78, no.5 (29 July 1974) 29-30.

"Suddenly Cyprus has become a cockpit of crisis. Greece and Turkey, U.S. and Russia, all have a big stake in a coup in a dangerous part of the world . . . Main interest of the Soviet Union was to ensure that Cyprus, less than 65 miles off the coast of Soviet-armed Syria, did not abandon the policy of 'nonalignment' practiced by Makarias."

NATO, TURKEY AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS, by American Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, D.C., American Foreign Policy Institute, 1978. 47 p. (Studies on NATO Defense Policies)

Six articles: "NATO, Turkey and United States Strategy," by Z. Michael Szaz; "The United States and Turkey: The Disintegration of a Twenty-Five Year Alliance," by Ambassador Parker T. Hart; "Turkey—A Loyal United States and NATO Ally," by Bernard Lewis; "The Defense of the Southeastern Flank of NATO and Turkish Arms Embargo," by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer; "The Strategic Importance of Turkey and the Arms Embargo," by Albert Wohlstetter; and "The Cyprus



Question and Turkey's Role in NATO," by Congressman Stephen Solarz.

**NATO'S SOUTHERN FRONT—WHERE SOVIETS SHOW BIG GAINS.** Interview with ADM. Means Johnston, Jr., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, In *U.S. News and World Report*, v.73, no.22 (2 June 1975) 22-23.

Includes comments on Soviet activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

**NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v.18, no.4 (August—September 1973) 58-62 plus.

"The emergence of the Soviet Union as a sea-power has brought the Warsaw Pact and NATO into competition in the Mediterranean in terms of this historic statement of mission . . . The combatant strength of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force is numerically inferior to the Italian Fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet combined. That disparity is even more evident since NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean include not only the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the entire Italian Fleet, but the Greek Navy and elements of the Turkish and British navies as well. Thus on a numerical basis, there is no question that NATO enjoys superiority in the Mediterranean . . . The major difference, and perhaps the most significant one, between NATO naval power and Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean rests in the assignment to NATO of STRIKFORSOUTH's carrier task groups. These powerful forces provide tactical naval air power, capable of maintaining local air supremacy in any area of the Mediterranean. Their operations, lacking the presence of substantial air composition, could be decisive in neutralizing the Soviet naval surface ships in a relatively short period. STRIKFORSOUTH is the major naval combatant force in the Mediterranean and is the core of NATO naval power."

**THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO: PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTHERN REGION IN THE POST-1973 OCTOBER WAR PERIOD**, by Admiral Means Johnston, Jr., in *Military Review*, v.56, no.4 (April 1976) 22-29.

A discussion of the redirection of the Soviet threat from Europe "to concentrate on the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, and "the enervating malaise which beleaguers the NATO Alliance." Emphases is placed on the Balkans, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus and the Aegean. The author hopes to enlist the reader in "promoting a reinvigorated and reunified North Atlantic Alliance."

8. *Middle East Soviet-American Rivalry* (See also III-A-II)

**(LI)—THE SOVIET VERSUS U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN**, by Lt. Comdr. James T. Eilertsen. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 56 p. (Research Study).

"This paper explores and analyzes the power struggle between the Soviet and US navies in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet objectives which relate to her activities and influences in the Indian Ocean are discussed. U.S. and Afro-Asian efforts and national interests in this vital region are specified. With the British withdrawal 'East of Suez,' Soviet naval power has been predominant. Soviets use their naval influence to obtain the maximum political and psychological advantages. U.S. efforts at Diego Garcia and Bahrain, and employment of Seventh Fleet ships are noted. Present U.S. policy should be continued with emphasis on negotiations "

**U.S. AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1957-66**, ed. by John Donovan. New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1974. 218 p.

This book presents a "journalistic narrative of U.S. and Soviet involvement in the Middle East during the policy-forming years 1957-66." Contents: Eisenhower Doctrine (1957); Suez, Sinai and Gaza (1957); Jordanian Crisis (1957); Syria under Leftist Control (1957); U.S. Marines in Lebanon (1958); Iraqi Army Coup (1958) and Aftermath; Baghdad Pact Developments (1958-60); Nasser's Relations with U.S. and USSR (1957-63); U.S. and Soviet Policies Develop (1959-63); U.S. and Soviet Policies Harden (1964-6).

9. *Soviet Penetration into the Middle East: Interests, Policies and Capabilities* (See also I-B-5, and by Country)

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

**ARMS FOR THE ARABS: THE SOVIET UNION AND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Jon D. Glassman. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 243 p.

Detente and Local Conflict. The 1956 Suez war: The Soviet political-military role; The Soviet Union and the six-day war; prelude to Yom Kippur; The "War of Attrition" and its Aftermath; The October War. The Soviet Union and three wars in The Middle East. Appendixes. Selected bibliography.

**THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SIXTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY EAST OF SUEZ**, in *Australian Outlook*, v.31, no.1 (April 1977) 124-213.

Includes the following papers: Soviet-US Relations: Has Detente a Future?—by William E. Griffith; Soviet Policy Considerations & the Indian Ocean—by Igor A. Lebedev; Iran & The Persian Gulf—by Majmoud Foroughi; Autonomy & Dependence in Recent Indo-Soviet Relations—by Ian Clarke; The North Asia-Pacific Region; Soviet Interests—by Malcolm Mackintosh; The Soviet Union & Southeast Asia—by Geoffrey Jukes; Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean—by Hon. W.G. Hayden; Soviet Naval Activity—by D.O. Verrall.



ISRAELI—SOVIET RELATIONS, by Surendra Bhutani, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v.6, no.1 (July 1973) 125–151.

"There is something unique about the relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. One can hardly think of a parallel or even something similar in the relations of either of these two countries with other countries. Israel came into existence with the help of the Great Powers including the USSR. Hence the survival of Israel depends to a large extent either on a consensus among the Great Powers or on the commitment of either of the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its establishment Israel has itself been involved in, and affected by, the competition of the Great Powers for supremacy in West Asia. In the post World War II era no Great Power, which aspired to play a major role in international affairs could afford to dispense with an active interest in West Asia and the Soviet Union was no exception to this. However, the Soviet relations with Israel were not determined solely by its policy towards the Arab—Israeli conflict, but by the Soviet domestic policy in regard to its Jewish population and by its desire to appear in a favourable light before world opinion in regard to its treatments of Jews. On the other hand, because of its Zionist ideology, Israel has been deeply concerned about the Jewish community everywhere in the world and particularly about the Soviet Jewry."

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974: NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY—THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, APRIL 9, MAY 7, 14, 23, and JUNE 27, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 202 p.

With statements on: Soviet—Egyptian Relations and Soviet Involvement in the Middle East.

MOSCOW AND THE PALESTINIANS: A NEW TOOL OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Augustus R. Norton. Coral Gables, University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974. 26 p.

"Based on an analysis of recent Soviet statements and actions dealing with the Middle East, Norton notes an improved Soviet relationship with the Palestinians, indicating a possible intent to use the Palestinian issue as an instrument of policy in the Middle East. Furthermore, Norton suggests, this closer Soviet identification with, and support of, the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 'has been facilitated by indications of, in at least overt terms, a less extremist stance by the latter on immediate objectives and strategies.' Although Moscow continues to seek to

erode US influence while strengthening its own in the Middle East negotiations, it now appears to be preparing for more long—term influence among revolutionary Arab elements and a possible Palestinian state."

THE SHIFTING SANDS OF ARAB COMMUNISM, by John K. Cooley, in *Problems of Communism*, v.24, no.2 (March—April 1975) 22–42.

Explores the "interaction between the political fortunes of the Arab Communists and the ups and downs in the relations between the Arab governments and Moscow." The author focuses on Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon in order to "illustrate different aspects of this interaction." Three conclusions follow from these case studies: "To begin with, friendly relations between the USSR and the governments of specific Arab countries have tended to bring the Communists in the latter lands visible gains in stature . . . At the same time they have imposed inhibitions and restrictions on the activities of the local Communists in ways that have made the Communists exceedingly vulnerable to the caprices of the Arab regimes . . . This situation has produced tension and discord among the local Communists and led to the fragmentation of Communist ranks in most places, the ultimate result being a weakening of the Communists as a political force . . . It should be pointed out, however, that the prospects for the . . . Arab Communists might improve in the event of another major conflict in the Middle East . . ."

SOVIET—MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS by Charles B. McLane. New York, Columbia Press, 1973. 126 p. Volume one of Soviet—Third World Relations (A survey in three volumes).

Regional perspective, also chronologies of relations with: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. Tables deal with Soviet political, economic aid, trade, military relations, and cultural relations. Bibliography.

SOVIET MOTIVES IN THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, 1947–8, by Arnold Krammer, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.2 (Winter 1973) 102–119.

"In May 1947, the Soviet Union . . . astonished the diplomatic world by reversing her three decade support of the Arab world and placing herself on record as a supporter of Zionist aspirations for the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state in Palestine . . . This totally unorthodox reversal in Soviet foreign policy lasted less than two years before it deteriorated into a period of 'indifferent neutrality' and, following a series of anti—Semitic internal Communist Party purges, culminated in the formation of the Czech—Egyptian Arms Agreement of 1955." Dr. Krammer examines



some of the factors that might explain this change of policy. He specifically concentrates on "the activity during the forties of left-wing Palestinian Jews", and on the question of the place of the Middle East in Russian strategy in 1947. He concludes: "The Soviet Union's original decision to sanction the creation of Israel . . . is still not fully comprehensible . . . Soviet strategists, or Stalin alone may have underestimated the degree of Arab resentment for the West and the amount of national unrest in the Moslem World . . . One thing is perfectly clear . . . Soviet Russia's basic impulse was opportunism . . . What was best for the Soviet Union with regard to her support of the Jewish Agency's claims in Palestine was a single, limited objective: to terminate British rule in Palestine, eject the ruling British forces and neutralize the territory by the creation of a small and independent state."

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS**, by Hannes Adomeit, in *Soviet Studies*, v.27, no.2 (April 1975) 288-305.

"The subject matter is complex and vast, not only in geographical terms, embracing a triangle from Libya in the west of Afghanistan in the east and Yemen in the south. It also represents a rich field for inquiry in various other respects. Foremost, the Near and Middle East is a major testing ground for the meaning of detente, the Moscow and Washington agreements of May 1972, June 1973 and July 1974 and the actual mechanism of superpower consultation, cooperation or, as some prefer, 'collusion'. Yet, detente notwithstanding, the area has remained an important focus of political rivalry between the superpowers and, to an increasing degree, between the USSR and China. Conflict in the area sharpens the problem for the political implications of strategic parity and the political utility and potential uses of Soviet military power. This problem is enhanced by increased Soviet intervention capabilities, such as greater airlift capacity and naval deployments, the imminent reopening of the Suez canal and the foreseeable link-up of the Soviet Union's eskadra in the Mediterranean with its naval presence in the Indian Ocean."

**SOVIET UNION—ALL THE SHIPS AT SEA**, in *Time*, v.105, no.18 (5 May 1975) 45 plus.

"Around the world last week, ships of the Soviet navy were under full steam . . . At least 200 surface ships and 100 submarines, along with land-based aircraft, were involved in a massive naval exercise . . . The Soviets dubbed the maneuvers 'Spring'; the West called them 'Okean 1975'."

**SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL OBSTACLES HINDER PLANS FOR INCREASED TRADE**, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.37 (16 September 1977) 11-12, plus.

"The Soviet Union needs increased exports

to the Middle East to help it reduce its trade deficit and hard currency debts with other areas . . . But figures published at the end of August show that in the first half of the year Soviet trade with the region, as a proportion of the total, continued to decline . . . Russia's waning influence since 1970 has been largely the result of its troubled relations with Egypt and the powerful opposition of Saudi Arabia . . . Better commercial relations depend on improved political relations and, as Soviet support for Libya and Ethiopia increases, this is unlikely." Tables: "Soviet crude oil imports from the Middle East, 1973-76"; "Soviet imports of Cotton Lint from the Middle East, 1973-76" Also on page 49. An additional Table: "Soviet Trade With the Middle East," covering the period 1972-June 1977 appears on page 49.

(\*)—**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV**, by Oles M. Smolansky. Lewisburg, Penn., Bucknell University Press, 1974. 326 p.

"Professor Smolansky has written a . . . book on Nikita Khrushchev's policy in the Arab world. He traces the evolution of Soviet policy and its adaptation to key developments in the Arab world, showing the interaction between Soviet policy and Arab domestic politics. The Suez crisis of 1956, the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the creation and dissolution of the United Arab Republic, and Khrushchev's conflicts with Nasser are . . . analyzed."

**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: THE POST—WORLD WAR II ERA**, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1974. 302 p.

"Individual scholars take up separately Soviet relations with Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab states. One of the editors, Vucinich, adds a comprehensive survey of Soviet writing on the Middle East."

b. *Soviet Point of View on Events in The Middle East*

**DANGEROUS UNION**, by V. Dmitrovsky, in *Soviet Military Review*, no.1 (January 1977) 44-45.

Israel and the Republic of South Africa are "playing the role of imperialist gendarmes in Africa and the Middle East . . . Ideologically the ruling circles of Israel and the Republic of South Africa are drawn together with the imperialist forces by vehement anticommunism and racialism. The racialists of the Republic of South Africa proceed from the fact that Israel's expansionist aggressive policy is weakening the Arab liberation movement, which negatively affects the struggle of the Africans for their independence . . . During the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars scores of millions of dollars of 'donations' of South-African Zionists were forwarded from the Republic of South Africa to Israel with the aid of Vorster's government . . . The Is-



raeli Zionists enjoy the support of the Jewish community of the Republic of South Africa, which is not only one of the largest (about 120,000 people), but also one of the richest in the world." After commenting on other evidence of Israeli and South African cooperation the author concludes: "The Soviet people express their profound solidarity with those who are apprehensive of the consolidation of the criminal alliance of the racials, the increase in armaments and the escalation of the American military presence in the Middle East and the south of Africa. Consolidated with the aid of the capitalist West the racist-Zionist alliance is part of the imperialist conspiracy against the national-liberation movements and progressive regimes in the African and Arab countries."

**EGYPT CANCELS FRIENDSHIP TREATY**, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.28, no.11 (14 April 1976) 7.

Tass statement in pravda 16 March, p. 4 (complete text): On Soviet reaction to Sadat's cancellation of the treaty. Also comment in *Izvestia* of 18 March, p. 4, saying that cancellation of friendship treaty was "contrary to Arab's vital interests."

**FIRST TASS REPORT ON ISRAEL'S ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID**, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v.28, no.27 (4 August 1976) 14.

Complete Text. Pravda, July 5, p. 3. Some details of damages suffered by Uganda.

**HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE REGION**, by B. Rodionov, V. Dmitriyev, in *Soviet Military Review*, no.8 (August 1977) 46-47.

Comments on NATO and US attempts "to strengthen their political influence and military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean." These attempts are "evidenced in particular by the trip C. Clifford, special envoy of the US President, made to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in March 1977 . . . It is still further confirmed by the policy of 'special relations' between the US and Israel recently proclaimed by the new American administration." American diplomacy, according to the authors, is seeking to construct an "Athens-Ankara-Nicosia triangle" in order "to achieve an aim which is highly important from the standpoint of the interests of the Pentagon and NATO, namely to fortify the southeastern flank of NATO which has been weakened as a result of the conflicts that have broken out in the last few years . . . The NATO leaders are eager to draw Cyprus into the military sphere of the bloc, to turn the island into a jumping-off ground in the immediate proximity of the Arab countries and their abundant sources of oil . . ." Further: "Washington is helping Israel delay the elimination of the consequences of its aggression against the Arab countries. US policy in the Middle East is designed to split the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world and to afford sup-

port to the Israeli aggressors." The authors conclude: "The Soviet Union's stand with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is totally different. It has been persistently working for the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries . . . It goes without saying that the solution of the crisis in the Middle East on a just basis like this would help relax the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is still a highly explosive region."

**ISRAEL VERSUS THE ARAB STATES**, by E. Primakov, in *International Affairs*, no.11, (November 1976) 44-52. (Moscow)

Reviews "historically, the conflict in the Middle East," which "arose as a result of the Israelis ousting the indigenous Arab population of Palestine from their lands." The author concludes: "The Soviet Union has indicated the only possible way out of the current dangerous situation. It consists in the elimination of the entire range of causes underlying the Middle East conflict: Israel's withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967; guarantees of the right of the Arab people of Palestine to create their own national state, guaranteed conditions for genuine security for all states in the region, including Israel. This 'triple' formula, and it alone, could provide the key to a just, curable and stable peace in the Middle East."

**THE MIDDLE EAST: AN IMPORTANT INITIATIVE**, by Y. Potomov, in *International Affairs*, no.2 (February 1976) 120-123. (Moscow)

"As broad international opinion sees it, the Soviet Union's message to the US Government on the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East has given the peace forces a fresh impetus in their efforts to eradicate the effects of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and achieve a just political settlement of the Middle East conflict. This important Soviet initiative was dictated by developments in the Middle East which the aggressors and their patrons have converted into an ominous flashpoint not only threatening peace in that area but also largely prejudicing the improvement of the international climate as a whole . . . The Soviet Union continues to demand the resumption of the Geneva Conference insisting on an all-embracing and just political settlement of the Middle East conflict through the collective efforts of all the sides directly involved . . . These are Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the Arab people of Palestine as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and Israel, and also the USSR and the USA as co-chairmen of the Conference. The constructive character of the Soviet initiative is further corroborated by the fact that it indicates a real foundation on which a cardinal settlement of the Mid-East conflict should be reached—the UN decisions, primarily the Security



Council Resolution 338 and the General Assembly Resolution 3236."

NEW HORIZONS OF SOVIET-SYRIAN FRIENDSHIP, by R. Vasilyev, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no.7 (July 1974) 85-88.

"The official visit to the Soviet Union (April 11-16) by a Syrian Party and Government delegation, led by Secretary General of the Baath Party and President of the Republic Hafiz al Acad, was a major event in the development of Soviet-Syrian relations which was closely watched by world public opinion. The negotiations were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and were frank and friendly. The joint Soviet-Syrian statement notes that in the course of a constructive exchange of opinion 'the common stand of both parties on the key international problems, and their solidarity in the struggle for freedom, independence, social progress and lasting peace were reaffirmed.' It was natural that the Soviet-Syrian talks devoted much attention to the Middle East crisis. The situation in the Middle East remains tense. Despite the profound crisis resulting from the failure of its aggressive annexationist foreign policy line, Israel has continued to refuse to abide by the relevant UN decisions. It still hopes through manoeuvring to keep the occupied Arab territories and avoid a radical and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. In order to intensify pressure on the Arab countries, Israel has been committing aggressive acts against the Lebanon."

PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN, A. Chernyshov, in *International Affairs*, no.12 (December 1976) 42-50. (Moscow)

"Progressives the world over are deeply worried over US imperialism militarising the Persian Gulf countries. Neighbouring states, including the Soviet Union, cannot remain indifferent to such action . . . The importance the Soviet Union attaches to the problems of the Indian Ocean, notably its being turned into a zone of peace, is evidenced in the stand set forth in the speech delivered at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly by Andrei Gromyko, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Foreign Minister of the USSR. The main thing, Gromyko stressed, is that the region should have no foreign military bases which comprise the main element of a permanent military presence. For the Indian Ocean to become a zone of genuine peace, it is necessary that the bases set up there should be dismantled and no new ones created. If the question of the bases is approached from that angle, the Soviet Union is prepared, together with the other powers, to seek mutual reduction of military activity of the non-lit-toral states in the Indian Ocean and in adjacent regions."

SINISTER ALLIANCE, in *Current Digest of*

*the Soviet Press*, v.28, no.33 (15 September 1976) 3 plus.

Pravda's comment (17 August p. 5) on the growing cooperation in the military field between Pretoria and Tel-Aviv. Also accuses U.S. of "giving aid to the Vorster regime through Tel-Aviv."

SOME SOVIET WORKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, no.3 (October 1976) 187-191.

"A few recent examples from the vast amount of Soviet publications" on the "economy, finances and commerce in the contemporary Middle East." The author finds that: "Many of the Soviet publications on the economy . . . are based on sound research." Topics of "more than passing interest" include "the production and export of oil and natural gas; the metallurgical industries; agrarian reform; rural co-operatives; the economic role of the public sector; and co-operation between the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern countries."

SOVIET POLICY CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Professor Igor A. Lebedev, in *Australian Outlook*, v.31, no.1 (April 1977) 133-141.

Professor Lebedev, of the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations, describes "Soviet foreign policy concepts regarding the Indian Ocean, its place in the global policy of the USSR and the aims of Soviet policy in this region." This presentation was part of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sixth National Conference at Sydney University Law School from 27-29 August 1976. The conference topic was—Soviet Policies East of Suez.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST, by N. Yakubov, in *International Affairs*, Moscow, no.9 (September 1974) 26-36.

"For over half a century, since its formation, the Soviet Union has unswervingly supported the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism, for freedom and national independence, for the consolidation of their sovereignty, for economic independence and social progress. This support has never been dictated by tactical considerations. Its source has always been the class character of the Soviet state. 'In keeping with Lenin's behests,' Leonid Brezhnev declared at a reception given for a Syrian Government delegation, 'the Soviet Union shall consistently continue, as it has always done, to support the liberation struggle of the peoples . . . Our policy has been and will be to undeviatingly oppose aggression and support the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples'."

c. *The Middle East in Soviet Strategy*

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET POLICY, by R. D. McLaurin. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975. 206 p.

Soviet Policy in the Middle East (Soviet For-



eign Objectives—Framework for a Middle East Policy; Soviet Regional Objectives in the Middle East; Constraints on Soviet Policy in the Middle East; Soviet Activities in the Middle East (Political, Economic, Military, and Cultural Activities); Conclusions and Implications. With bibliography.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET STRATEGY, by Wynfred Joshua, in *Strategic Review*, v.2, no.2 (Spring 1974) 61-67.

"Ancient Russian dreams of hegemony in the Mediterranean and the Middle East approach fulfillment in the Soviet presence and influence in the area. Aside from the ideological struggle and the goal of removing U.S. influence from the region, the Soviet Union had more immediate needs for oil, for liberation from the restraints imposed by British imperial policy and for opening a new naval strategy with world-wide horizons. The Arab-Israeli conflict has provided a basis for expanding Soviet influence in the Arab states. Soviet aid to the Arab states and influence on U.S. policy made new gains in the October 1973 war. Despite the brilliant diplomatic success of Secretary Kissinger's mediation, strategic success lay with the Soviet Union."

(LI)—SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ, by Maj. Max R. Pierce. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 53 p. (Research Study.)

"The purpose of this study is twofold: to ascertain the objectives underlying Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and to determine the general nature of Soviet military and economic activities in the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The study covers the factors that tend to impede the growth of Soviet power in the region and provides an analysis of the general military and economic threat posed by the Soviet Union to the West in the Middle East."

SOVIET-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS, by Charles B. McLane. London, Central Asian Research Center, 1973. 126 p.

"Prof. McLane provides a chronology and a written summary of the Soviet Union's relations with each of 16 Middle Eastern nations, as well as a chapter, from which this summary is drawn, devoted to the regional trends of Soviet involvement in the area. This work, he notes, is a record of ties rather than an interpretive study . . . The period he covers stops prior to the Egyptian expulsion of the Soviet advisors in 1972. However, he concludes by categorizing the Soviet objective in the Middle East as an attempt to 'cultivate progressive partners who might one day remake the entire Middle East in the Soviet image'."

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST MEDITERRANEAN FRONTIER: EXPANSION AND SECURITY, by Col. William M. Stokes, III. Cambridge,

Massachusetts, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, May 1977. 37p. (Unpublished Manuscript)

Using the literature of political geography, the author analyzes Soviet political, military, economic and ideological activity in the Middle-East-Mediterranean region. This region is identified as one of the frontier zones of the Soviet strategic frontier. These frontier zones "support Soviet objectives where neither a buffer zone nor assimilation of territory is desirable or feasible." As a frontier zone the region serves both Soviet security and Soviet expansion functions. Colonel Stokes concludes: "There is little indication that frontier zones are being prepared for formal integration." The Soviets have, nevertheless, increased their activity in the Middle East-Mediterranean region "in terms of presence and space." As a result "NATO forces have had less flexibility since Soviet military capabilities in the region took on a permanent character. But the price of forward deployment in the region has been high in political and economic terms as well as its potential for conflict . . . As things stand now, Soviet expansion in the region has not conveyed a substantial measure of power nor increased Soviet security to a significant degree; by some measures Soviet security may even have been reduced." (Bibliography pp. 35-37.)

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1970-73, by Ilana Dimant-Kass, in *Soviet Studies*, v.26, no.4 (October 1974) 502-521.

"This article attempts a case-study in the relations between the party and the military in the USSR. The Soviet press material for the study turned out to be fairly rich, to the extent of indicating that basic policy differences in the USSR may be strongly expressed in the publications of particular institutions or interest-groups. A brief recapitulation of relevant aspects of the field of policy concerned, namely the Middle East, may be needed as an introduction."

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. London, Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1974. 27 p.

An ISC Special Report on: pressure on Iran and Turkey; Moscow's role in the 1973 (Middle East) War; 'Detente' and crisis management; Subversion and espionage. Graphs, tables, maps.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by M.E. Yapp, in *Asian Affairs*, v.63 (New Series v.7), Part 1 (February 1976) 7-18.

Russia's view of the Middle East is different from the West's. "To the Soviet Union the Middle East consists not of a series of concentric rings of states centering on Jerusalem but of two parallel belts of states, the inner, consisting of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, being an area with which Russia



has had long and intimate contact, and the outer, comprising the Arab countries, being an area with which historically Russia has had very little to do." After discussing the motives "adduced by commentators in their efforts to explain Soviet policy in the Middle East," the author concludes: "In fact, Soviet policy in the Middle East is very much in line with the real historical tradition. It is primarily defensive . . . ; it is concentrated on the northern part of the Middle East, and sees operations in the Arab world as subordinate to that region; and it comes some way below Eastern Europe in Soviet priorities."

**THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by John C. Campbell, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.32, no.1 (Winter 1978) 1-12.

What is the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East? Sadat's initiative in Jerusalem and Begin's response show "an impatience with both the superpowers." However, "it was apparent that Egypt and Israel still needed America to make peace." It was also clear that "the shocks Sadat's moves had given to the Arab world had strengthened the Soviet Union's ties with two important Arab parties to the conflict, Syria and the PLO, to say nothing of the more radical rejectionists like Libya and Iraq." The USSR is in the Middle East "by virtue of a legal position, as a party to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and co-chairman of the Geneva conference; by virtue of the global relationship with the other superpower . . . ; by virtue of the Middle East's own continuing conflicts. . . , and by virtue of its own raw power which casts a shadow over the entire region." The author concludes that: The Soviet Union, however, has been unable "to manage the internal politics and international relations of a host of Middle East states towards ends (including, in the last analysis, domination) which those peoples do not share. The alternative to such attempts at management through political and other means is force. The international situation, including the global military balance, appears to have ruled out that option in the minds of the Soviet leaders. But, in a shifting international situation that they or their successors judged differently, that might not always be so. The deterrent military posture of the United States, strategic and conventional, thus remains essential in setting the limits within which the game of competitive coexistence is played."

**THE U.S.S.R. AND THE MIDDLE EAST**, ed. by Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir. New York, John Wiley, 1973. 436 p.

Part One: The Soviet Thrust. Part Two: Middle Eastern Repercussions with Information on Communism in The Fertile Crescent.

**THE USSR AND THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET DE-**

**CISION-MAKING PROCESS**, by Uri Ra'anani, in *Orbis*, v.17, no.3 (Fall 1973) 946-977.

The author attempts to analyze the "decision-making patterns in general and to examine a previous Soviet policy episode toward the Middle East in particular—a period for which, to use election jargon, 'all the returns were in' some time prior to the October War. In this way, it may be possible to reconstruct enough of the mold within which Soviet policy has been, and continues to be, shaped to make current Soviet behavior in the Middle East more readily comprehensible."

d. *Soviet Oil Interests in the Middle East*

**SOVIET OIL AND THE THIRD WORLD**, by Biplab Dasgupta, in *World Development*, v.3, no.5 (May 1975) 345-360.

"The paper explores various aspects of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries in the field of the oil industry. It begins with a historical account of the growth of the Soviet oil industry, and its ownership pattern. But the core of the essay is the role played by the 'Soviet oil offensive' in the 1960s and its successes in weakening the grip of the oil oligarchy of the seven major vertically-integrated international corporations on the world oil trade, in the disintegration of the world-parity-pricing system, and in the emergence of OPEC as a powerful factor in the political economy of world oil. In the final section, the paper assesses the role of Soviet oil exports in the present world context and in the future."

**SOVIET OIL EXPORTS: A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS?**, by R. M. Burrell, in *Soviet Analyst*, v.3, no.8 (11 April 1974) 3-5.

"The Soviet oil export drive has formerly fallen neatly into two parts: trade with eastern European satellites and other communist states, which was primarily strategic in its motivation; and the trade conducted with other European states as a means of earning hard currencies. Indeed the export of crude oil and petroleum products has been the Soviet Union's largest single source of hard currencies for many years. In the light of the recent spectacular increase in world oil prices—a trend which Soviet broadcasts in Arabic to the Middle East have commended—there is some evidence that the USSR may be beginning to look for new markets among the oil-deficient countries of the Third World. These are the countries which will suffer most from rising oil prices because their reserves of foreign exchange are already under strain while their development plans demand larger oil imports. The quantities involved, however, are comparatively small, and to meet at least a significant percentage of them is well within Soviet capabilities. The price rise may therefore provide Moscow with an opportunity to widen its trading patterns and, indirectly, increase its political influ-



ence in certain carefully selected Third World countries. An analysis of recent Soviet activity in India would seem to confirm that this idea has attractive possibilities for Moscow."

**SOVIET OIL POLITICS AND THE SUEZ CANAL**, by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, in *World Today*, v.31, no.10 (October 1975) 397-405.

"The reopening of the Canal favours Soviet interests in the short term, but America's reaction to her strategic disadvantage may lead to a new confrontation with the Soviet Union east of Suez." The Soviet's main objective is "to reduce Arab reliance on Western oil companies and thereby to render ineffective what the Soviet Union perceives as the West's main lever of power in the area."

**USSR—ENERGY POLICY AND MIDDLE EAST CRISIS**, by Werner Gumpel, in *Aussen Politik*, (1st Quarter 1974) 31-41.

"The Soviet Union faces problems stemming from the Middle East war and the world-wide energy crisis, although according to Dr. Gumpel, while it will have to alter its energy policies, it stands to gain, as well. . . The political repercussions of the world energy crisis for the USSR seem as advantageous as the economic ones are, says Gumpel. Not only in its relations with the COMECON, but also through its arms sales to the Arabs, Russia has gained influence. In addition, the effects on the West of the Arab use of oil as an economic weapon point up the fact that the Soviets are "economically and politically the biggest beneficiary from the world energy crisis'."

e. *Soviet Influence in the Middle East: Losses and Gains*

**THE EGYPTIAN EXPULSION OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN JULY 1972—CAUSES AND IMPACT**. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 39 p. (ASDIRS 4353.)

"On 18 July 1972, Egypt's President Sadat announced that the functions of the Soviet military advisers in Egypt were terminated. Among the chief reasons were the friction between the Russians and the Egyptians arising over their respective adviser-advice roles and the Soviet refusal to provide offensive weapons in response to Egypt's requests. The expulsion impact's reached far beyond the immediate area and may still be spreading. The Soviets suffered at least a temporary setback in their Middle East expansionistic policy. The hopes for a meaningful peace in the area have probably been favored since there is a decreased possibility of a big power confrontation and the military balance is so strongly in Israel's favor that Egypt cannot soon undertake a precipitate action. There now exists a perhaps fleeting opportunity for the US to peacefully establish a presence in Egypt, the traditional head of the Arab world, which is believed to be in our interests."

**SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by William E. Griffith, in *Survival*, vol.18, no.1 (January/February 1976) 2-9.

A revised version of 'The Decline of Soviet Influence in the Middle East' MIT Center for International Studies, C/75-23. This paper is "primarily based on travels in the Middle East in July and August 1975." The author concludes that the decline of Soviet influence in the Middle East since July of 1972 was the result of: "Soviet arrogance, blunders and technological backwardness, higher oil prices and the post-1973 shift in American policy . . ." The Soviet Union is counting on "the ultimate failure of American Middle Eastern policy" to recoup her losses.

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Oles M. Smolansky, in *Current History*, v.65, no.386 (October 1973) 155-157 plus.

" . . The Soviet government is not likely, in the near future, to resurrect its former 'activist' policy in the Middle East. Instead, the area, including its Arab-Israeli sector, will probably enjoy the Kremlin's 'benign neglect,' much to the joy of Jerusalem and to the regret and indignation of the Arabs."

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by O.M Smolansky, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 5-9 plus.

The Soviet Union has attempted to offset reverses in Egypt and to stem the erosion of its influence in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia by strengthening its ties with Libya and Ethiopia. However "Soviet leaders have encountered serious problems, magnified by their failure to assert themselves forcefully in the Arab-Israeli dispute." After discussing recent Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Arab states the author concludes: "It is . . unlikely that meaningful peace can be established in the Middle East without Soviet cooperation—the mere availability of a super-power hostile to the peace settlement will prove an almost irresistible temptation to those Arabs who, for whatever reason, believe that their interests are not being adequately considered."

**SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, FROM THE EXODUS OF 1972 TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR**, by Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v.27, no.4 (January-February 1975) 32-53.

"Soviet policy in the Middle East—complicated, expensive, and often frustrating—met perhaps its greatest setback on 18 July 1972 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced the termination of the mission of the Soviet military advisers and experts in Egypt. Undaunted however, Kremlin planners continued to pursue their goal of an 'anti-imperialist' Arab union dependent on Russian arms and amenable to Russian influ-



ence. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 apparently rewarded their efforts with success, but the long-sought prize of Arab sympathy was taken, if only temporarily by their archrival, the United States, via the diplomatic efforts of Henry Kissinger."

**SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1970**, by Robert O. Freedman. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975. 198 p.

Chapters: From World War II to the Death of Nasser; From Nasser's Death to the Soviet Exodus from Egypt; from the 1972 Exodus to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War; The Soviet Union and The October War. Bibliography.

**(LI)—THE SOVIET SEARCH FOR INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST**, by Maj. William E. Ellington. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 78 p. (Research Study.)

"The Middle East War of 1973 showed that a clearer understanding of Soviet objectives in the region is needed by US analysts, policymakers, and contingency planners. This study reviews the historical Russian interest in the area. Soviet-Arab relations since 1955, and the probable long and mid-term Soviet objectives. The estimate is made that the primary Soviet short-term objective in early 1974 was to maintain and enhance Soviet influence in Egypt. Thus, the Egyptian-American reapproachment represents a major defeat for Soviet policy, and the Soviets will probably attempt to offset the defeat with gains in Syria and Lybia."

**THE USSR AND THE ARABS-BIG INVESTMENT, LOW RETURN**, by Lord Trevelyan, in *Middle East International*, no.70 (April 1977) 10-11.

"Lord Trevelyan, who served as British ambassador to Egypt (1955-56), Iraq (1958-61), and Moscow (1962-65) looks at Soviet policy in the Arab world."

10. *Middle East and the United States* (See also I-A, I-B-2, III-B-7 and by Country)

a. *Middle East: Role of U.S. Arms* (See also I-B-5, and IV-H-6)

**AMERICA'S BALANCING ACT**, by Roger Owen, in *Middle East International*, no.82, April 1978. 9-10.

Addresses a "major difficulty" in American Middle East policy. This is the problem of preventing the Arab-Israeli conflict from spilling over and disrupting one or other of "its two basic Middle Eastern alliances, the one with Israel, the other with Saudi Arabia." The recent interest of Saudi Arabia in acquiring modern weapons of a type which the Israelis find directly threatening has increased "the problems faced by the Americans in keeping the two alliances apart." The "American government has occasionally attempted to suggest that what the Saudis are really doing is to build up to

a position which would allow them to withstand a joint attack from Iraq and South Yemen . . . it must be clear to everyone that Riyadh's real fears for the future centre on the possibility of a raid on its oil fields by some well-armed adversary like the Iranians or even, in its darker moments, by the Israelis or the Americans themselves." Saudi requests will continue: "for sophisticated arms, for American military training missions for American assistance in building bases along the country's northern borders, and for American involvement in the expansion of the Saudi navy and the construction of naval bases not only in the Gulf but along the Red Sea coast." The author concludes that America: "will have to find ways of persuading the Saudis to moderate their demands. It will have to continue to stress the vital importance of the Saudi alliance to America's national security. And it will have to try to persuade Israel and its supporters that, as of old, its alliance with Saudi Arabia can and should be isolated from the rest of its Middle Eastern commitments . . . It goes without saying that this . . . will be even more difficult if there is no Middle East peace settlement."

**THE CASE FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN AMERICAN PERSIAN GULF STRATEGY**, by Commander William C. Remick, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.103, no.1/887 (January 1977) 18-26.

After a brief review of the Importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States and the role of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program in the region, the author concludes: "our military exports to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula serve the U.S. national interest in several important ways: Support for the vital interests of the nations of the region is an integral part of the overall U.S. policy of encouraging friendly and mutually productive relations with those nations . . . To the degree that these nations are able and willing to assume responsibility for their own security, . . . our own worldwide security posture is strengthened because we and they share many of the same strategic goals . . . Conversely, our refusal to meet requests for assistance in the vital area of national defense . . . would seriously jeopardize our larger political and economic objectives in the region . . . Finally, such exports do bring economic benefit to the United States. Their cessation would be damaging to the domestic economy in terms of unemployment, the cost of military supplies for U.S. Forces and our own level of military preparedness . . ."

**EAGLES, DOVES, AND HAWKS**, by Tom Gervasi, in *Harpers*, v.256, no.1536 (May 1978) 19-22.

Discusses the capabilities of the F-15 Eagle and the reasons why it was selected for sale to Saudi



Arabia. Mr. Gervasi finds that the sale would create "a change in the balance of power". This is because "for the first time, Israel's air supremacy in the Middle East, the crucial factor in her ability to conduct a successful defense of her territory, would be challenged." After reviewing the possible reasons for the selection of the F-15 over the F-16 or some other warplane Mr. Gervasi concludes: "It appears that the Saudis did not select the aircraft. We did." It was selected because: "In order, with limited, funds to acquire the number of F-15s we need, we must do all we can to reduce their unit cost. In the case of this aircraft it is already clear that this will mean producing far more F-15s than our Air Force plans for itself . . . Without the Saudi sale, our own procurement schedule for the F-15 would fall even farther behind . . . In order to arm ourselves, we must arm the world."

**JETS FOR SAUDIS: MIDDLE EAST PLANE SALES BACKED BY SENATE VOTE IN MAJOR CARTER VICTORY**, by David Maxfield, in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, v.36, no.20 (20 May 1978) 1263-1265.

Describes the debate in the Senate concerning the Carter's administration's "controversial plan" to sell \$4.8 billion worth of jet fighters to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. "In one of those odd voting patterns, where liberals oppose liberals, conservatives split with conservatives, it was Republican support that was the key to Carter's victory." While "Sales critics objected to linking Israel's supplies to the Saudi contracts and asserted that the Carter policy would 'sap the morale' of the Jewish state. Contract supporters argued that the United States now must be 'evenhanded' in relations with both Israel and Arab states because of the complex weave of U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle East." In reply to Sen. Ribicoff's statement that "without a stable, predictable supply of oil from Saudi Arabia . . . the West would face the worst depression in the industrial era;" Sen. Moynihan said: "In essence, the aircraft sale is a rationalization of American nervelessness in the area of international economic policy as well as political and military policy." Text includes table of the Senate role call vote by name and by party.

**MIDEAST JET SALE CLEARED: FIRST DELIVERIES IN FALL**, in Aviation Week & Space Technology, v.108, no.21 (22 May 1978) p.20.

Details Defense Secretary Harold Brown's assurances on the Saudi Arabian sale in a letter to committee chairman, Sen. John Sparkman prior to the vote on the arms sale. The 54-44 Senate vote cleared the way for the jet fighter sales package to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt to begin deliveries in the fall. Deliveries scheduled are: eight Northrop F-5E fighters originally scheduled for sale to Ethio-

pia which "will now be included in the 50 F-5E's Egypt is to receive." 75 General Dynamics F-16 fighters for Israel "will begin delivery in late 1981, and is to be completed by the end of 1983." While delivery of 15 McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters will begin in mid-1981, to be completed in early 1982. Saudi Arabia also will begin receiving the first of its 60 F-15s in mid-1981, with delivery to be completed by mid-1984."

**MORE THAN JETS AT STAKE IN CARTER'S SENATE VICTORY**, in National Journal, v.10, no.20 (20 May 1978) p.813.

Details the Senate vote on resolution (S ConRes 86) to disapprove the President's proposal to sell warplanes to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. The roll call of the vote is given. "The vote was not so much the Jewish Lobby's first major defeat as it was a renunciation of a bilateral U.S.—Israeli approach to diplomacy in the Mideast in favor of a new, regional strategy."

**THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT**, by R.D. McLaurin with Suhaila Haddad. Washington, D.C., American Institutes for Research, July 1977. various paging. (Abbot Associates, Inc. AIR 50400-7/77 FR.

"This study used a rigorous content analysis/events data system to evaluate the impact of events relating to broadly defined U.S. force. Arab media seem to see the United States and the Soviet Union in a situation of mutual deterrence. The press is relatively inattentive to strategic weapons development and arms control, but follow technology and weapons development relevant to the Middle East. Deployment changes attract very little attention, and visits are generally noncontroversial and insignificant in media coverage. All the newspapers surveyed depended heavily on Western sources—particularly AP, UPI, AFP, and Reuters—for their news. Even on issues such as the global balance, Western news is the dominant source. The primary subject of the newspapers is military assistance and arms transfers in and to the Middle East. This area accounts for over one third of the total coverage of force events. American and Soviet weapons are both highly regarded. Soviet weapons are viewed more favorably than overall Soviet technology. In general, U.S. high technology is greatly respected, as is advanced American military technology. Soviet air defense and ATGMs received particularly favorable treatment. American 'commitment' to Israel is seen to be in terms of Israel's existence only, not support of any particular Israeli policy. The United States is also viewed to owe its regional 'friends' something, as well. These are seen to include most prominently Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sadat's Egypt, and, in a different sense, Lebanon."

**PROPOSED FOREIGN MILITARY SALES**



TO MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES—1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 100 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on International Political and Military Affairs to consider Administration notifications of proposed arms sales to Iran, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Discussion considers impact of proposed sale on U.S. national security interests and the military balance of power in the Middle East, focusing on \$4.4 billion in foreign military sales (FMS) request of Saudi government for FY 76."

b. *Middle East and U.S. Media* (See also I-B-2) AMERICA'S MID'EAST POLICY: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE, by Barry Rubin, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.3 (Spring 1973) 51-67.

An analysis of the goals and actions of the United States in the Middle East, by the Foreign Editor of the Guardian (New York). The author discusses US interests and strategy, the US as Peace-maker and the future prospects for US policy.

MID-EAST PERSPECTIVES FROM THE AMERICAN LEFT, by Karen Farsoun, Samih Farsoun, and Alex Ajay, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.1 (Autumn 1974) 94-119.

Based on a content analysis of the "publications—party organs, position papers and responses to written inquiries" of the "self-defined left organizations in the United States." The authors, members of the Middle East Research and Information Project, Washington, D.C., "analyse the positions and actions taken" by these organizations toward the Middle East conflict.

NOT THE WHOLE TRUTH: US MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Edmund Ghareeb, in *Middle East International*, n.65 (November 1976) 15-17.

An Arab journalist writing from Washington cites numerous examples from the U.S. media to show its "failure . . . to cover the Middle East conflict fairly and objectively."

PUBLISH IT NOT: THE MIDDLE EAST COVER-UP, by Michael Adams and Christopher May. London, Longman Group, 1975. 193 p.

Claim that over the past half-century, and particularly since 1967, a deliberate and generally successful attempt has been made to cover up the truth about problems with damaging consequences for the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East. "The argument of this book is that . . . crucial facts were deliberately disguised or suppressed in western countries by pro-Israeli pressure and propaganda; and that the purpose was to perpetuate the imbalance of power in the Middle East in the interest, not of peace or international harmony, and certainly not of justice, but of the one country that

stood to gain from the status quo: Israel. Bias in the media; The failure of the churches; The October War and its consequences; can Israel change direction?

c. *U.S. Policy on the Middle East: Historical and Contemporary Aspects*

ARAB LOBBY: OPENING PREVIOUSLY CLOSED DOORS, in *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, v.33, n.36 (6 September 1975) 1912-1916.

"Since the 'Yom Kippur' war of 1973 and the ensuing oil embargo, American supporters of the Arab cause have enjoyed new-found leverage with Congress." This article examines the membership and success of this "new lobbying force." Emphasis is given to the National Association of Arab-Americans, Arab Information Center, and Palestinian Assistance Groups.

BEHIND THE SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY ON MIDEAST, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.84, no.21 (29 May 1978) 20-21.

The 54-to-44 Senate vote on May 15, approving the sale of 60 F-15 warplanes to Saudi Arabia, marks "a profound shift in U.S. policy in the Mideast." This shift "stems from a reassessment of American interests in the Mideast in the light of growing dependence on imported Persian Gulf oil." President Carter now "faces a double challenge in his Mideast peacemaking effort: He must convince the Arabs that Senate endorsement of the shift in policy does not mean that he can extract endless concessions from Israel. And he must persuade the Israelis to avoid increasing intransigence out of a sense of insecurity."

CARTER'S LONG MIDEAST ORDEAL, by Stanley Karnow, in *The New York Times Magazine*, Section 6 (15 January 1978) 8-11 plus.

Stanley Karnow interviews "Administration officials, members of Congress, American-Jewish activists, academic experts and Israeli and Arab diplomats in an effort . . . to trace the roots and calculate the possibilities for success of Carter's Middle East policy." He concludes: "Jimmy Carter has been trying to perform two incompatible roles. Mindful of the nation's global imperatives, he has sought to act as the honest broker between Israel and the Arabs. But domestic sentiment, the Government's commitments and his own feelings have consecrated him to the preservation of Israel's security."

DECADE OF DECISIONS: AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967-1976, by William B. Quandt. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. 313 p.

The Office Director for Middle Eastern Affairs on the National Security Council Staff since January 1977 describes the various stages in the United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli con-



flict from the June 1967 war thru the October 1973 war. Events are described from the perspective of the President and his key advisers. The policymaking process is described and analyzed, with "special emphasis" given to the role of crises in shaping the perceptions held by top-level officials. Bibliography pp. 301-304.

GENEVA: PUSH COMES TO SHOVE, in *Time*, v.110, n.16 (17 October 1977) 25-33.

"Zigs, Zags and surprises in the administration's peace drive". Box insets on "Those catchy code words", the "special shorthand" of the Arab-Israeli dispute; "Ups and Downs of the Special Relationship", a time chart; "Governing from Intensive Care", comments on Begin in the hospital.

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Stephen D. Hayes, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.1 (Winter 1977) 16-30.

Since 1974 The United has established seven joint economic commissions with other nations, and is considering establishing several more. Six of the seven commissions were established in the Middle East with the nations of: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Iran and Tunisia. The author, a Foreign Affairs officer with the US Treasury Department, examines US government documents, speeches and press conference statements by US government officials in order "to determine both the true motives and of official rationale given on the US side for the establishment of these commissions." He briefly describes each of the seven commissions organization and their activities. Their objectives include the economic: "trade, development and investment," as well as political goals connected with US foreign policy. The record of the commissions is "mixed—ranging from very solid accomplishments . . . to virtually no accomplishments . . ." "The author concludes, however, "that the concept of 'joint' in the sense of cooperation between two equals, is probably here to stay."

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974: NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, APRIL 9, MAY 7, 14, 23, AND JUNE 27, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 202 p.

With statements on: Soviet-Egyptian Relations and Soviet Involvement in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST: 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, April 1976. 25 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Report by Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III (D-III), on Feb. 10-25, 1976, study mission to Egypt,

Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Israel. Contains political and economic evaluations of and information on each country and the area as a whole. Includes partial list of persons visited (p.22)."

THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, CONFLICT & HOPE, CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS, vol.10, ed. by A.L. Udovitch. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976. 557 p.

A collection of studies on the individual states of the Middle East and on the region as a whole. These essays analyze the basic factors at work and help identify the problems America "should be concerned with and the policy options available to us." The editor concludes that there are three basic problems that should guide an effective American foreign policy in this region: "The formulation and adherence to a realistic, broadminded U.S. policy tied to . . . maintaining America's position in the area's balance of power; A stable and reliable arrangement with respect to the availability of oil . . . ; Providing impetus and expertise which will enhance prospects for . . . development in face of the overwhelming demographic problems the Middle East will have to contend with in the next two decades." Table of contents: Population Growth in the Middle East and North Africa: Selected Policy Issues, by Allan G. Hill; The Economy of the Middle East and North Africa: An Overview, by Charles Issawi; The Accumulation of Financial Capital by Middle East Oil Exporters: Problems and Policies, by Bent Hansen; Middle Eastern Leadership, by Morroe Berger; Inter-Arab Relations, by P.J. Vatikiotis; Religion and Secular Nationalism in the Arab World, by Elie Kedourie; The Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Shimon Shamir; The Arab Response to the Challenge of Israel, by Boutros Boutros-Ghali; The Middle East, the United States, the USSR, and Europe, by Walter Laqueur; Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, by Albert H. Hourani; Egypt: The Wages of Dependency, by John Waterbury; The Social Structure of Israeli Politics, by Ben Halpern; Political and Economic Trends in North Africa, by Malcolm H. Kerr; Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, by John B. Kelly; Iran: The Making of a Regional Power, by Ali Banuazizi; Turkey: Problems and Prospects, by Talat S. Halman. The text includes twenty-seven statistical tables mainly concerning population growth and economic conditions.

THE MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY, ISRAEL, OIL AND THE ARABS, Third Edition, edited by Mark A. Bruzonsky. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., September 1977. 196p.

Presents an analysis of the issues and disputes involving the countries of the Middle East with emphasis on United States involvement in the region. Includes country-by-country profiles of Is-



rael, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States. Part II provides an analyses of major issues: Middle East diplomacy, U.S. Middle East policy, Middle East oil, the Palestinian problem, chapters on the Arab and Israeli lobbies in Washington, and a background chapter on the Arab-Israeli wars during the past three decades. Part III is a three section appendix. It includes: biographies of leading figures from Middle East history during the 20th century; a detailed chronology of major Middle East events from 1945 through August 1977; and a bibliography noting books, articles, reference sources and Congressional documents. The text includes many outline maps, black and white photos of personalities, and quotations.

**THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES: A PROBLEM OF "BRAIN DRAIN"**, by Hossein G. Askari and John Thomas Cummings, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.1 (January 1977) p.65-90.

Presents data concerning recent emigration from the Middle East to the United States. Includes many statistical tables concerning the numbers, countries of origin and specialties of the migrants. The author then discusses "the merit of various policy options which could reverse the talent flow, with some reference to what is known about motivations related to previous movements." He concludes that the "shortage of human capital could be at least partly alleviated by the return of citizens or former citizens to their country of origin . . ."

**1967-1977: AMERICA'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**, by Georgiana G. Stevens, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.1 (Winter 1977) 1-15.

Review of the official lines of policy followed by American diplomacy in the Middle East since 1967. President Johnson set forth the principles of peaceful settlement ". . . the end of belligerence and Israeli withdrawals from occupied territories, . . . permanent boundaries to be defined by those involved." American response to events since 1967 have been "cautious and consistent." The main aim "has been to prevent Soviet dominance there. Regional disputes had to be dealt with without direct military action." Now in 1977 "new teams of negotiators start with strong assets." Future peace-making involves: "Safety for Israel, fewer weapons all around, and a base which Palestinians can call home . . ."

**THE PALESTINE PAPERS, 1943-47**, by Evan M. Wilson, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.4 (Summer 1973) 33-54.

A discussion of the evolution of the policy of the United States towards Palestine in the "critical years 1943-47, as reflected in the published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States"

for those years. This period "coincided with the writer's service in the Near East Division of the State Department, first as Palestine desk officer and later as Assistant Chief." After discussing some of the main themes found in the papers, the author offers "some personal interpretation with a view to providing a rounded picture." The author concludes: "The documents for 1943-47 give an accurate picture of how our Palestine policy evolved from 'full consultation with both Arabs and Jews' to support for partition . . . Although we came down eventually on the side of the Zionists, our attitude did not please them fully, nor could we afford to antagonize completely either the Arabs or the British . . . We really had no policy beyond one of expediency . . . The papers confirm without any doubt that those who made the decisions respecting Palestine during these years had ample warning of the complex nature of the issues involved and the dangers of the course on which the United States was embarking."

**REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FY 1976 AND TRANSITION BUDGETS, FY 1977 AUTHORIZATION REQUEST, AND FY 1976-1978 DEFENSE PROGRAMS.** Washington, Department of Defense, 5 February 1975. Various paging.

In this annual report and posture statement the Secretary of Defense discusses, among many other things, the Russian military posture, and how it affects the various elements of US posture in the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions.

**TAQARUB THROUGH EDUCATION**, by Daniel Oliver Newberry, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1976) 311-321.

Highlights in the history of "educational interchange" between the United States and the Middle East. The author, who is the Director of Egyptian Affairs, Department of State, then presents "an illustrative pastiche of what governments and private organizations are doing today . . ."

**UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Ann T. Schulz, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) p.1-4 plus.

Discusses basic U.S. interest, U.S. objectives, the question of whether there is a U.S. policy in the Middle East and the impact of arms transfers on these issues. The author concludes: "In the Middle East the United States is more than a diplomatic mediator; it is also a political scapegoat, a military supplier, and a trade and aid partner . . . United States security interests are so intertwined with the interests of opposing parties in the conflict that United States policy has been very nearly immobilized and the initiatives it can propose are limited to a fairly narrow spectrum."



UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE 1970 JORDANIAN CRISIS. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 57 p. (ASDIPS 4377.)

"Covers the period January through September 1970, but concentrates on events in Jordan and US-USSR military and diplomatic moves during September 1970. No attempt has been made to consider the tactical plan for the deployment of US forces. Research consisted primarily of examination of daily news accounts and periodicals for the period of time involved. The action taken by the United States in an effort to preclude broadening the scope of the conflict in the Middle East was the only feasible course to pursue."

11. *Middle East Strategic Waterways* (See also III-A-8)

a. *Aegean Sea*

THE AEGEAN SEA DISPUTE, by Capt. Thomas J. McCormick, Jr., in *Military Review*, v.56, no.3 (March 1976) 90-96.

The dispute between Greece and Turkey over the status of the Aegean sea focuses on four issues: "the presence of military forces on the islands located in the eastern Aegean; the exploitation of subsurface mineral rights in the eastern Aegean area; air space control over the eastern Aegean; and the extent of territorial seas in the Aegean." The author reviews the factual background of these issues and discusses the resultant positions of both Greece and Turkey. In conclusion the author finds that "The Aegean Sea controversy . . . will remain a central issue in relations between Turkey and Greece."

b. *Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal* (See also I-B-2, and IV-B-5)

GULF OF SUEZ: ON TACK WITH COURAGE, by Captain P. Studenikin, in *Soviet Military Review*, no.2 (February 1975) 49-50.

"On July 14, 1974, a detachment of Soviet warships under the command of Captain 1st Rank A. Apollonov arrived in Hurghada from Vladivostok. At the request of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Soviet sailors started clearing the Gulf of Suez of mines so as to open the southern entrance of the Suez Canal to international shipping. On November 14, this difficult and dangerous work was successfully completed." In this article Captain P. Studenikin, a military journalist, records his impressions of a visit to the detachment of Soviet ships at the concluding stage of their assignment in the gulf.

NIMROD SPAR: CLEARING THE SUEZ CANAL, by Captain J. Huntly Boyd, Jr., in *Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.102, no.2/876 (February 1976) 18-26.

Describes the salvage operation directed by the US Navy which reopened the Suez Canal by removing the ten wrecks that had blocked the

waterway since the Six-Day War of 1967. Captain Boyd, the Navy's Supervisor of Salvage, was assigned to this task in 1974. The project was completed "on schedule in less than seven months . . . despite many unexpected problems." Text includes black and white photos of the salvage operation and an outline map locating the ten wrecks.

SUEZ AND THE SOVIETS, by Shlomo Slonim, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.101, no.4/866 (April 1975) 37-41.

After the Yom Kippur War "the strategic importance of the Canal was now generally seen as one of the consequences of the war, its role as a motivating factor of superpower conduct prior to, and during, the hostilities was less readily perceived. Yet, an analysis of events during the Yom Kippur War lends considerable plausibility to the thesis that the Canal was a major . . . goal of the Soviets in the recent conflict, and correspondingly a major focus of American countermoves, in particular the worldwide alert of U.S. armed forces on 24 October 1973."

SUEZ IN RETROSPECT, by Sir Anthony Nutting, in *Middle East International*, n.64 (October 1976) 16-18.

Describes how the repercussions, direct and indirect, of the British, French, Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956 continue to the present day. The author concludes: "after the waters of this cataclysm had receded, our client-regimes such as the Iraqi monarchy were washed away . . . We found ourselves taking a back seat, while Russia, India and Tito's Yugoslavia took over as principal allies, suppliers and consultants . . . Worse still, Britain thereafter abdicated all further responsibility for seeking a just settlement of the Palestine conflict to the United States, the power least capable of resisting those Zionist influences which oppose any justice for the Palestinians." He further states: "Arab and British opinion are today more ready and willing than at any stage in the past twenty years to see the British Government come out from hiding behind America's skirts and, in concert with their European partners, play a positive part in the search for a Middle East settlement."

c. *Indian Ocean* (See also IV-D-2, and IV-H-8)

ARMS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: INTERESTS AND CHALLENGES, by Dale R. Tahtinen with the assistance of John Lenczowski. Washington, D.C., American Institute for Policy Research, 1977. 84 p.

Assesses the military strength of the littoral states and the military presence of external powers particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Conflicts that could erupt in the region are identified and discussed. The authors conclude: "any number of conflicts might erupt among the Indian Ocean littoral states, and the huge amounts of weapons



needed to conduct hostilities are already in the hands of those countries . . . This disconcerting situation could be immensely complicated by superpower involvement in any local conflict . . . Consequently, it would appear to be advantageous for the superpowers to discuss establishing a zone of peace . . . Some have contended that the region is destined to be a chessboard for superpower rivalry, but, just because the chessmen are poised, the game need not be played." Tables, derived from various publications of *Janes* and from *The military Balance*, give "specific details on the weapons inventories of the Indian Ocean states."

**THE BIG THREE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN**, by R. M. Paone, in *Sea Power*, v.18, no.8 (August 1975) 28-34.

"PRC, USSR Fight for Supremacy While U.S. Seeks 'Reasonable Balance' . . . The objectives and the nature of the policies of the United States, the USSR, and the PRC in the Indian Ocean Heartland, as well as the interaction of their policies, are of particular interest in today's shrinking world, and are likely to thoroughly test the probability of the old adage that neither the 'West' wind nor the 'East' wind (China) shall prevail over the East African peripheral."

**DATeline DIEGO GARCIA: PAVED OVER PARADISE**, by Jack Fuller, in *Foreign Policy*, no.28 (Fall 1977) 175-186.

. . . "disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have snagged on the question of what Diego Garcia really is. Opened at the urging of President Carter, the talks on 'demilitarization' of the Indian Ocean began formally in June in Moscow . . . The Soviets contended, that Diego Garcia is an imperialist United States Naval base and that the Soviet Union itself has no bases on the Indian Ocean. The United States, conversely, . . . declared that the Soviet installation at Berbera, Somalia, is a naval base, but that Diego Garcia is not a base at all, merely an austere, limited communication-and-support facility. While the Soviets did not persist in their old assertion that Berbera is nothing but a meat-packing plant, they minimized its military significance." The author concludes that . . . "Judging from published estimates of Berbera's capabilities and from . . . construction on Diego Garcia, the two facilities appear to be generally equivalent, whether they are called bases or not." He reports that . . . "a visit to Diego Garcia earlier this year provided a better sense of its military potential . . ." He notes that it is the assessment of the Carter administration . . . "that final, mutual settlement of the fate of Diego Garcia and general naval arms control in the Indian Ocean, while by no means impossible, remains a remote goal."

**INDIAN OCEAN ATLAS**, Central Intelligence Agency. August 1976. 80p.

Maps, graphics, photographs and some text concerning the Indian Ocean and littoral countries. Subjects covered include: Natural Environment; Resources; Shipping; Political Relationships: "Zone of Peace"?, Law of the Sea, Waterway Issues concerning the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Malacca-Singapore Straits; Islands in the Sea: including the Arabian Sea Islands, Seychelles and British Indian Ocean Territory with Diego Garcia; Air Access to Indian Ocean Islands." Reference Map to the Indian Ocean Area dated 8/76 is inserted in the publication.

**POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL NAVAL CONFLICT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN**, by Robert M. Bruch, Vienna, Virginia, Delex Systems, Inc, September 1977. 38 p. (Prepared under contract MDA 903-77-C0035, for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs)

Examines the existing potential for a regional naval conflict in the Indian Ocean during the next decade. "The analytical framework rests on three considerations: (1) the Indian Ocean as a conflict-promoting entity, (2) South Asian political relationships and threat perceptions, and (3) naval ambitions, capabilities, and shortcomings." The naval postures and political interests of India and Iran are emphasized. The author concludes that "nothing in their present or planned naval postures suggests a predestined clash." The best course for U.S. policy is to encourage the "elements of convergence" between India and Iran and to get them to "define clearly their security perimeters to demonstrate that the Indian Ocean interests of each need not threaten the other."

**SOUTH ARABIA: VIOLENCE AND REVOLT**, by J. Bowyer Bell, in *Conflict Studies*, n.40 (November 1973) 14p.

Discusses: Southern Yemen, Northern Yemen, Saudi and Soviet influences. The author concludes: "The critical geographical position of the two small Yemen states astride vital waterways and on the flank of the great Gulf oil reserves, and Soviet and Chinese presence in and around the Gulf of Aden focus attention on two vital strategic interests—Arabian oil and the north-west Indian Ocean."

**THE SOVIET NAVY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN**, by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, in *Strategic Review*, v.2, no.4 (Fall 1974) 25-35.

"Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean is the extension of an old Czarist thrust for an outlet to the south, dating from the time of Peter the Great. That interest is overlaid with the ideological drive for a worldwide Soviet hegemony. Increasing Soviet military power and decline of the European



powers impel the present Soviet drive to replace Britain as the dominant power in the littoral states. Soviet naval power has been aggressive in grasping the opportunity. In Iraq, in Bangladesh, in South Yemen and in the Somali Republic, Soviet base-building has been active. Reopening of the Suez Canal will greatly benefit the Soviet naval presence, both military and commercial. Soviet dominance serves both to protect its own interests in the area and to threaten the vital oil supplies of Europe and the United States. In extension to Africa, the Soviet build-up threatens to outflank Europe. Because the littoral states are accustomed to a Great Power presence, the United States is called to provide a balancing naval presence to reassure friendly powers and discourage Soviet-inspired expansion."

(LI)—THE SOVIET VERSUS U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Lt. Comdr. James T. Eilertsen. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 56 p. (Research Study.)

"This paper explores and analyzes the power struggle between the Soviet and U.S. navies in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet objectives which relate to her activities and influences in the Indian Ocean are discussed. U.S. and Afro-Asian efforts and national interests in this vital region are specified. With the British withdrawal 'East of Suez,' Soviet naval power has been predominant. Soviets use their naval influence to obtain the maximum political and psychological advantages. U.S. efforts at Diego Garcia and Bahrain, and employment of Seventh Fleet ships are noted. Present U.S. policy should be continued with emphasis on negotiations."

#### d. Mediterranean

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, by Milivoje Zagajac, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.28, no.644 (5 February 1977) 24-26. (Belgrade)

The Declaration on the Mediterranean adopted by the Helsinki conference has shown results that "are meagre indeed." Cyprus, the Aegean sea controversy and the Middle East crisis which is "intertwined with the Cyprus crisis" are causes of concern. These concerns are important as the "peace and security of the European continent are indissolubly linked with questions of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean . . ."

NATO'S SOUTHERN FRONT—WHERE SOVIETS SHOW BIG GAINS. Interview with ADM. Means Johnston, Jr., Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.73, no.22 (2 June 1975) 22-23.

Includes comments on Soviet activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

NAVAL CHALLENGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, in *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, v.18, no.4 (August-September 1973) 58-62 plus.

"The emergence of the Soviet Union as a sea-power has brought the Warsaw Pact and NATO into competition in the Mediterranean in terms of this historic statement of mission . . . The combatant strength of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force is numerically inferior to the Italian Fleet and the U.S. Sixth Fleet combined. That disparity is even more evident since NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean include not only the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the entire Italian Fleet, but the Greek Navy and elements of the Turkish and British navies as well. Thus on a numerical basis, there is no question that NATO enjoys superiority in the Mediterranean . . . The major difference, and perhaps the most significant one, between NATO naval power and Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean rests in the assignment to NATO of STRIKFORSOUTH's carrier task groups. These powerful forces provide tactical naval air power, capable of maintaining local air supremacy in any area of the Mediterranean. Their operations, lacking the presence of substantial air opposition, could be decisive in neutralizing the Soviet naval surface ships in a relatively short period. STRIKFORSOUTH is the major naval combatant force in the Mediterranean and is the core of NATO naval power."

e. *Persian Gulf* (See also IV-D-5, and IV-H-8)

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF, edited by Mohammed Mughisuddin. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977. 192 p.

Collection of articles by a group of Persian Gulf and Middle East specialists which "analyze the three levels of cooperation and conflict in the Persian Gulf: the domestic, the subsystemic and systemic levels. Looking at the Gulf as a subsystem, they focus their attention on the areas of intraregional and interregional interactions, and on superpower conflicts." Articles include: "The Persian Gulf as a Regional Subsystem," by William D. Anderson; "The Gulf, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean," by Ann Schulz; "Iran as a Regional Power: Flexibility and Constraints," by Onkar Marwah; "Interregional Cooperation: Arab Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," by Elias Sam'o; "Oil Policies of the Gulf Countries," by William D. Anderson; "Assessing Policy Options of Oil-Importing and Oil-Exporting Countries," by Richard Van Atta and Leo Hazelwood; "Ethnic Conflict: A Framework of Analysis and its Relevance to the Gulf Region," by Abdul Aziz Said; "Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf," by R.D. McLaurin; "Arab Reaction to Communism and Soviet Policies," by Mohammed Mughisuddin; "U.S. Policies in the Persian Gulf," by Robert Kubal; "A Future Global Order and Its Implications



For Formulating U.S. Foreign Policy," by Edward E. Azar.

**THE PERSIAN GULF: ARMS RACE OR ARMS CONTROL?**, by Edward M. Kennedy, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.1 (October 1975) 14-35.

The Persian Gulf region is important to outside powers: "it is the major source of oil for Europe and Japan (and increasingly the United States); close to the borders of the Soviet Union; hard by the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors; and a center of growing wealth, nationalism and self-awareness. But Senator Kennedy finds it "an area where America's interests are not well-defined, her policies even less so, and her vision of the future hardly at all." As the result of a May 1975 visit to the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, the author proposes that the United States take a new look at its policies and "check our present course of wide-open arms sales in the Gulf." Senator Kennedy offers seven guidelines for U.S. actions while we try to find answers to more basic questions about the future of the Gulf. The author concludes that U.S. relations in the Gulf should be based primarily on "mutual economic interests." We should see "economic cooperation, as an essential security objective in the Gulf.

**THE POLITICAL BALANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF**, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *Strategic Review*, (Winter 1974) 32-38.

"Since 1968, when the British announced their intention to withdraw 'east of the Suez' by 1971, the future security and stability of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf have been unsure . . . because for so many years Britain was the dominant power in the area—an area where no great power is a littoral state. The recent mid-east war and its effects on US oil interests have heightened the importance of the area. Both external and internal forces are trying to fill the power vacuum as the British withdraw; the USSR, the US and Iran are the present contenders." Cottrell provides some details of the power play.

**US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF: THE MIDEAST FORCE SINCE WORLD WAR II**, by Lt. Cmdr. Peter W. DeForth, in *Naval War College Review*, v.28, no.1 sequence number 256 (Summer 1975) 28-38.

In response to the United States policy of "conflict avoidance" as the "primary emphasis of our national strategy . . . the Navy has given the presence role a far higher priority in its consideration of the four principal mission areas. One example of the success of this role is the small and relatively weak force in the Persian Gulf—ill-equipped for a major combat role, but nonetheless a model of presence which can be useful in planning future U.S. strategy."

#### f. Red Sea

**THE CONCEPT OF ISRAEL AS A MAJOR RED SEA POWER**, by Gregory Copley, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, v.3, 1977. 12-18.

The Red Sea is a "lifeline" for Israel, the Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan and Ethiopia, without it "the countries would stagnate and wither." Countries bordering on the Red Sea, or with a "direct and dependent interest in it" are: South Yemen (PDRY), Somalia, North Yemen (YAR), Ethiopia, Afars & Issas (TAI), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, The Sudan, Egypt and Israel. In addition the fact that "an estimated 20 percent of the oil going out of the Persian Gulf flows to its destinations via the Red Sea" makes the zone of "critical" importance to Iran, Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. "The realization of the obvious—that Israel is a Red Sea power, and Saudi Arabia is becoming one—has come only in 1977." The author examines the defense capabilities of Israel in the light of her Red Sea interests. Israel Aircraft Industries and Israel Military Industries contributions to this capability are emphasized. The author concludes: "what is certain is that a blockade of the Red Sea, aimed against Israel, would receive a prompt retaliatory gesture, and not necessarily at the point of delivery of the blockade."

**FOCUS OF THE '70S: THE RED SEA**, by Leigh Johnson, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, v.3, 1977. 26-31.

Discusses the Red Sea region where the regions problems "promise to split the littorals into two even more distinct and antagonistic camps than they presently are. Those countries tied to Saudi Arabia and hence to the West will seek tacit alliance against those countries which look to the USSR and its communist allies for moral-strategic-military backing . . . The eventual outcome depends on who moves with the most long-term skill." Saudi Arabia, "which has traditionally perceived the Red Sea as its 'Arabian Lake', initially expressed its regional concerns last year with economic assistance and diplomatic recognition to South Yemen and economic-military assistance to North Yemen." The author concludes: "Slowly Saudi Arabia is making progress in securing the stability of the Red Sea. However, the war in Ethiopia, the uncertain future of Djibouti after independence and the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war insert new variables into the situation. Would a new Middle East War "distract Saudi Arabia's Red Sea focus sufficiently for the communist states to score a victory in Ethiopia and Djibouti?"

**THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE NEED FOR AN AFRICAN STRATEGY**, by Yassin El Ayouti, in *Africa Report*, v.20, no.6 (November-December 1975) 15-18.

"The Mediterranean and the Red Sea are



African waters regarding which the continent has not yet developed a common strategy, either for commercial or defense purposes. This lack of geopolitical perception of the importance of these seas to Africa became more apparent with the reopening of the Suez Canal on June 5, 1975 after eight years of closure. No discussion of the Mediterranean and Red Sea to Africa could be complete or comprehensible without regarding these two seas along with the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean as integral components of one theater of action."

g. *Turkish Straits*

**SOVIET-AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE TURKISH STRAITS**, by Anthony R. De Luca, in *Political Science Quarterly*, v.92, n.3 (Fall 1977) 503-524.

Traces the development and significance of the "postwar Soviet-American rivalry over the Turkish Straits and the impact this rivalry had upon the formative stages of the Cold War." The author concludes: "Turkey's participation in the Western alliance dwarfs the subsequent history of the Straits question . . . Moscow, however, has continued to express concern over the visits of American and British naval units to Istanbul as well as the annual entry of two United States destroyers into the Black Sea in accordance with the rights of passage guaranteed under the Montreux Convention. And there can be no doubt that the Soviets . . . continue to look with apprehension upon Turkish possession of the keys to their house."

**B. Middle East-Political-Economic Factors: Development, Resources and Power (See also Chapter VI, and by Country)**

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

**CONSTRUCTION: MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, Special Report, 5 August 1977, 28 p.

"Articles in this Special Report are abstracted from papers presented at the Conference on 'Middle East Construction and Development '77: Business Strategies in a Changing Environment,' co-sponsored by MEED and AMR International and held in London on 10-11 May 1977. Proceedings of that conference will be published by MEED at the beginning of September . . ." The summaries are preceded by an analysis of construction activity and the plant and equipment market in the Middle East, by W.J. Richter, managing director of Plantecon (Overseas) Research Limited (POR), a "UK marketing consultancy which keeps an extensive data bank on the Middle East construction markets." Statistical tables on: Sources of new construction equipment shipped to Middle East by 1975, The Middle East construction plant and equipment market 1976 with 1981 forecast, breakdown of Middle

East construction budgets into 12 items (including Military), Abstracts cover: Prospects-Emphasis Increases on Local Involvement, by Abdel-Latif Kahoo, under-secretary in the Bahrain Ministry of Housing; Saudi Arabia-Guarantee Requirements Raise Contractors Stakes, by James A. Nelson, vice-president of Bank of America in charge of construction section for . . . Middle East . . .; Iran-Housing Boom Raises Costs as Well as Prospects, by Ahmad Kooros, Iranian vice minister for economic affairs; Finance-Few Building Schemes Pay Their Own Way, by Roger F. Azar, director general of the Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissements (BAII) of Paris; Joint Ventures-Co-operation Takes Many Forms in the Region, and Problems-Inflation and Delays Top List of Worries, by Kevork G. Toroyan of Consolidated Contractors Company.

**THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Z.Y. Hershlag. Leiden, Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1975. 347 p. (With 64 folding tables, 19 charts, 1 folding map in color showing location of natural resources).

The Human Spectrum; The Structure of National Product, Finances and Security Burden; The International Sector; The Growth Process in the Middle East. Appendices. Bibliography.

**THE ECONOMIES OF THE ARAB WORLD: DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1945**, by Yusif A. Sayigh. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1978. 726 p.

The author sets forth three broad objectives for his study: "to record the developmental achievements, and failings, of the twelve countries encompassed; to examine the main issues arising in the drive for development; and to assess the future outlook for development via the examination of the major determinants identified in the course of the study." Countries covered are: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. This study is based on field research that was funded by a grant from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

**FINANCE: WORLD BANK GIVES PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE AND TRANSPORT**, by Atef Sultan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.43 (28 October 1977) p. 7,43.

"Thirteen Middle East states borrowed 1106.8 million from the bank and IDA in fiscal 1977, nearly 16 per cent more than the previous year figure . . . The World Bank and IDA contributed to 84 agricultural and rural development projects . . . The largest borrower in fiscal 1977 was Egypt." More funds are being provided by the Middle Eastern countries themselves. Statistical tables: World Bank loans and IDA credits to the Middle East by sector 1976/77. p. 42,43.

**THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD**, by Hossein



Askari and John Thomas Cummings, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v, no.3 (July 1977) p.289-315.

Examines the prospects of economic integration in the region from Libya to the "Persian (or Arab) Gulf." A profile of the region's trade-dollar volume, principal commodities, and recent changes up to the increase in oil prices is presented. The authors "then project the data forward to consider the possible benefits and drawbacks of integration for individual nations." In conclusion: "Both oil and non-oil states could reap considerable benefits from an economic union, and given their mutual needs for each other, they all would enter serious negotiations from individual positions of strength." The way in which the "challenge to integrate" is met will determine whether the Arab nations "emerge from the next quarter century as the major world economic power that their numbers, history, and fortunate endowment of natural resources seem to make possible."

HEALTH, MEED SPECIAL REPORT, in *Middle East Economic Digest Special Report* (22 July 1977) 12 p.

Sections entitled: Health Care: Public Services Needed to Fight Lingering Ailments; Construction & Supply: Market for Building and Equipment Expands; Management & Staff: Western Administrators Still have Large Role to Play; Pharmaceuticals: Control of Drug Imports Poses Many Problems.

IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Jahangir Amuzegar, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.1 (Winter 1974) 1-9.

Significant variations can be found in the present political "ideology" of the Middle East's major countries. "Egypt, Syria and Iraq are ideologically committed to what is broadly termed 'Arab Socialism'. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are . . . on the . . . 'capitalist' side. In between, Turkey has been called an 'etatist' regime leaning free enterprise, and Iran's 'positive nationalism' is labeled 'private enterprise, assisted by the state'." The author examines each of these countries in relation to the "growth-through-ideology" thesis. He concludes that "In contrast to the difficulties of detecting a link between ideology and growth from the Middle Eastern experience, one is struck by the close correlation which national differences in growth rate seem to bear with domestic economic structures and policies-irrespective of ideological identification or involvement. He identifies "two specific factors: (1) sustained political stability, and (2) pragmatism in internal socio-economic policies."

LRPING IN THE ARAB WORLD, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universi-

ties Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 18 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.1.)

"The economically disparate Arab states must choose between autonomous national development, favored by the oil-rich, and integrated regional development, the only hope for the majority states. The Cairo Joint Symposium on Long-Range Planning in January 1976 was a tentative and inconclusive step toward increased economic cooperation among Arab states."

2. *Middle East: Foreign Trade and Economic Relations*

BELGIUM AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1977, by John Whelan, in *Meed Special Report*, November 1977, 24 p.

Current economic relations between Belgium and the Middle East. Includes sections on: Trade-Diversification Will Take Time; Saudi Arabia-Hospital Contract is a Test Case; The Gulf-Iraq Compensates for Disappointments; Algeria-Good Results Encourage Exporters, Finance-Bankers Open Local Offices; Company Profile-Six Construct A Belgium Trailblazer; Construction-Contractors Seek Protection Against Inflation; Transport-Antwerp is a Leading Entrepot; Petrochemicals-Overseas Markets Sought; Cargo-Air Freight Growth Predicted; Statistics: Belgo-Luxembourg Trade with the Middle East 1973-76.

CANADA: MIDDLE EAST TRADE DEVELOPS BUT STILL OF LIMITED VALUE, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.40 (7 October 1977) p.11 plus.

Canada's search for markets in the Middle East is described. Exports "are gathering momentum, but it will be some time before it catches up with even the smaller European countries in its volume of trade." Statistical tables: Canada's Trade with the Middle East 1972-76; on p.45; and Canada's Domestic Exports by Commodity to the Middle East 1975-76, on p.46.

FRENCH TRADE: STRUGGLING EXPORTERS RECEIVE HEAVY BLOW FROM NEW LAW, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.26 (1 July 1977) 6-7 plus.

"In 1973 France lost its leadership in trade with the Arab world. Now it ranks fourth, after the US, Japan and West Germany." A new law opposing trade discrimination on religious or racial grounds makes acceptance of the Arab boycott of Israel an offence liable to fines or imprisonment and further threatens their trading position. Detailed statistics of France's trade with the Middle East by country and by commodity appear on pages 38-40.

ITALY AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1977, in *Meed Special Report*, September 1977, 32 p.

Italy's current economic relations with the Middle East. Sections on: Trade Initiatives-Government drives to win bigger market; Trade Anal-



ysis-Trade Gap Widens Despite Oil Cuts; Petromoney-Oil States Cautious Over Investment of Funds; Energy-The Search For Alternatives Could Pay Dividends; Contracts Awarded in the Past Year; Recent Trade Indicators; Statistics: Trade with the Middle East 1972-76.

**JAPAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1977**, in *MEED Special Report*, October 1977, 39 p.

Current economic relations between Japan and the Middle East. Sections on: Trade and Investment-Middle East Deficit Contrasts with Overall Trading Picture; Trade Analysis-Japan Scores with Cheaper Goods Delivered Faster; Trade Strategy-Istanbul Conference Gives Impetus to New Approach; Company Profile-Chiyoda Sets the Pace For Japan in the Middle East; Joint Ventures-Ajman Dry Dock Investment Pays Off for Mitsui Group; Credit and Aid-Japanese Firms Enjoy Wide Range of Official Support, Statistics and Tables. Lists of Contracts reported in MEED in the past year.

**NETHERLANDS: TRADE GAP WITH MIDDLE EAST WIDENS DESPITE EXPORT SURGE**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.34 (26 August 1977) 10 plus.

"Dependence on oil for its major exports—refined oil products—and domestic energy needs makes the Netherlands more vulnerable than many western countries to oil price rises and political pressures. But relations with Arab states have improved in the last two years." "Detailed table of Netherlands trade with the Middle East" on page 39.

**SCANDINAVIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1977**, in *Middle East Economic Digest Special Report*, October 1977, 24 p.

Current economic relations between Scandinavia and the Middle East. Sections on: Denmark-Specialisation Pays Dividends; Finland-Package Deals in the Offing; Norway-Turkey Projects Bring Reliable Reputation; Sweden-Construction Spearheads Export Drive; Contracts awarded in the past year. Statistics on Trade with the Middle East and on Recent Scandinavian Trade Indicators.

**SPAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1977**, by Margaret Greenhaigh, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.49 (9 December 1977) 15-19 plus.

Covers the following topics: "Trade-A New Foreign Policy, but Little Export Success; Finance-New Bank Ties Help Bring in Arab Finance; Energy-Dependence on Middle East Oil is Still Rising. Tables: "Spain: Oil Imports From the Middle East, 1974-76", and "Hispanoil's Oil Production, 1969-76." Also on page 63, "Spanish Trade With the Middle East, 1972-76."

**UK TRADE: MIDDLE EAST EXPORTS GROW FAST BUT OUTPACED BY SALES IN**

**WEST**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.33 (19 August 1977) 9-10 plus.

UK exports have risen almost three times as fast as imports from the Middle East during the first six months of 1977. North sea oil and sales of defence equipment in the Gulf and Iran were the mainstays of the UK's ability to halve it's Middle East trade deficit. Table: "UK Trade with the Middle East" on page 44.

**UK ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS: TOUGHER TACTICS NEEDED TO BRING HOME THE CONTRACTS**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.12 (25 March 1977) p.5 plus.

The Association of Consulting Engineers in London reports that "UK is more than holding its own against stiff competition from other European countries and Japan." Others however are saying that "UK consultants appear to be missing out on the concept of consultancy work which is gaining favour with Middle East clients, where a consultant defines the parameters of a project and leaves the design work to a contractor who quotes on a turnkey basis." Detailed tables of UK consulting Engineers work in the Middle East completed in 1976-Part I, p.33-40; Part II-Middle East Economic Digest, v.21, no.13 (1 April 1977) p.33-40.

**US CIVIL AIRCRAFT SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.44 (4 November 1977) p. 18.

Statistical table: Sales in dollars by country, 1974, 1975, 1976.

**US TRADE: COMMERCE WITH MIDDLE EAST CONTINUES STEADY GROWTH**, by Michael Prest, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.23 (10 June 1977) 12-13 plus.

In 1976 the US again showed a deficit in its Middle East Trade. "As in earlier years, it was the cost of oil from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya and the UAW which did the damage. Nevertheless, total US trade with the region grew much faster than US world trade." These figures "are for visible trade only, excluding military goods." Table showing "US: Trade with the Middle East, 1972-77" by country on page 52.

**3. Middle East: Arab Development Aid for Non-Oil Nations**

**AGRICULTURE: ARAB PLANS SHOW IMAGINATION AND VISION**, by Atef Sultan, in *Sudan, A Meed Special Report*, August 1977, 8-12.

The Arab oil states faced with the possibility of world shortages in grains and continuously rising food prices have become "keenly interested in big schemes that could make the region self-sufficient in food production . . . Sudan, with the help of Arab money and western technology, is carrying out a number of large agricultural projects of which the



Rahad irrigation scheme is one of the biggest." Financing is mostly from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, The World Bank and the US Agency for International Development. The Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development has also approved a "detailed programme for the first 10 years" of Sudan's 25 year agricultural development plan.

**THE AID PROGRAMS OF THE OPEC COUNTRIES**, by Maurice J. Williams, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.2 (January 1976) 308-324.

"By pulling together published reports, statements of officials of oil-exporting countries and accounts of developing countries as to their receipts of OPEC aid, it is possible to form a reasonably accurate view. What then are the facts about OPEC aid? How important has it been in helping non-oil developing countries to meet their increased oil bills? What role does aid play in the policies of OPEC governments, and what contribution are they likely to make to the development of the non-oil Third World?"

**ARAB INSTITUTIONALIZED DEVELOPMENT AID: AN EVALUATION**, by Ragaei El Malakh and Mihssen Kadhim, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.4 (Autumn 1976) 471-484.

The Arab oil nations have been expanding Arab aid institutions "designed to channel developmental aid more efficiently and on an on-going basis." The authors provide a brief survey of existing major national and regional development institutions in the Arab world. They are described in terms resources and operations. The objective and quality of the aid they provide is then assessed and the problems resulting from the proliferation of aid extending institutions are noted. Tables illustrating Arab National Development Aid Institutions resources and operations are included in the text. The authors conclude that: "Aid provided by the various Arab Development Funds is of high quality since it contains a substantial grant element, is free from procurement tying a undue emphasis on narrow political concessions." Furthermore, while the bulk of Arab aid is not currently channeled through these institutions but through bilateral agreements, in the future "these institutions . . . can serve increasingly as the prime vehicle for development aid . . ."

4. *Middle East: Arab Oil Power - Domestic and International Aspects*

**THE ARAB OIL WEAPON**, by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein with Adele Higgins. Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications, 1977. 370 p. (Documents)

A compilation of documents and commentaries on the Arab oil embargo, the United States response to it and the legal framework of treaties and United Nations documents. Includes: Historical

chronologies; OPEC resolutions and other documents; Presidential statements; an address "The Energy Crisis: Strategy for Cooperative Action," by Henry Kissinger; Congressional Publications, "Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study," prepared for the Special Subcommittee On Investigations of the Committee On International Relations, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (21 August 1975); and "Data and Analysis: concerning the Possibility of a U.S. Food Embargo as a Response to the Present Arab Oil Boycott," prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (21 November 1973). Commentaries reprinted from various journals include: "The Arab Oil Weapon—A Threat to International Peace, by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein; Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, by Ibrahim F.I. Shihata; the Arab Oil Weapon a Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality, by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein; Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, by Richard B. Lillich; Some Politico-Legal Aspects of Resource Scarcity, by Timothy Stanley; OPEC in the Context of Global Power Equation, by Jahangir Amuzegar; Oil: the Issue of American Intervention, by Robert W. Tucker; War—The Ultimate Antitrust Actions, by Andrew Tobias; The Need for Negotiated Reforms, by John H. Jackson."

**THE ARAB OIL WEAPON: A REPLY AND REAFFIRMATION OF ILLEGALITY**, by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein, in *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, v.15, n.1 (1976) 57-73.

A reply to an article by Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, *Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law*, which appeared in the *American Journal of International Law* in 1974. The authors address the "theory of resource ownership and manipulation", and conclude: "The present era demands awareness of actual patterns of interaction and a cooperative effort toward more inclusive regulation of economic coercion, so as to insure a more rational, fair, and policy-serving utilization of the earth resources for all peoples."

**THE ECONOMICS OF THE OIL CRISIS**, ed. by T.M. Rybczynski. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1976. 202 p. (Trade Policy Research Center, London).

Background to the world oil crisis of October 1973. What precipitated the crisis; lessons learned in facts and figures; and needed reforms for the future. 1. Historical Background to The World Energy Crisis; 2. Framework for Analysing The Implications of the Rise in Oil Prices; 3. Economic Issues for the Oil-Importing Countries; 4. Oil Payments and Oil Debt and The Problem of Adjust-



ment; 5. Trade Prospects for Developing Countries; Impact of the Oil Crisis on The Energy Situation in Western Europe; 6. Capital Requirements for Developing Alternative Sources of Energy; 7. Higher Oil Prices and the International Monetary System; 8. Higher Oil Prices and the Reforms of the International Trading System. Appendixes. Selected Bibliography.

ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS, by Mason Wallrich and Others. New York, The Free Press, 1975. 234 p.

(American Society of International Law).  
". . . This book's purpose is to provide a concise but comprehensive overview of the world energy situation from a political viewpoint. It was written for two reasons: because the most fundamental energy issues are political in nature and international in scope and because these basic issues have received little political analysis from a detached perspective . . . What has been said so far . . . has been uttered by government officials . . . in often apocryphal and always vague generalities. This book is thus intended to help orient and clarify thinking about a vast and amorphous political challenge to the world community . . ." Chapter 1. Energy in the World Context; Chapter 2. The Energy Situation: Intrinsic Forces. Chapter 3. Energy and National Security; Chapter 4. Energy and World Economy; Chapter 5. Energy and Global Environment; Chapter 6. Energy and International Politics. Bibliography.

OIL, THE SUPER-POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST, by Ian Smart, in *International Affairs*, v.53, n.1 (January 1977) 17-35. (London)

Addresses the question: "What effects, if any, have the dramatic events in the world oil market since 1973 had upon conflicts in the Middle East or upon the attitudes of the super-powers to those conflicts? To that, there must eventually be joined a further question about potential effects in a foreseeable future. One object of this paper will be to argue that the impact of the oil factor on the Middle Eastern policies of regional and external powers has possibly been more uneven and, in some respects, less powerful than superficial impressions might indicate. Another object will be to suggest that the future interaction between these two contexts will not only be similarly heterogeneous but may also display features which differ markedly from those readily extrapolated from past experience or current impressions."

OIL MONEY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, by Yoon S. Park Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1976. 205 p.

Examines how the oil crisis of 1973 came about and how it might evolve in the future, then evaluates its serious effects on the world economy. Appendix A: Arab Funds at the End of 1974; Ap-

pendix B: Joint Middle East/OECD Banking Ventures; Appendix C: Financial Bilateral Deals Between OPEC and OECD Countries; Appendix D: Identified Direct Investment Operations by OPEC Countries. Bibliography. Tables.

OIL POWER, by Carl Solberg. New York, Mason/Charter, 1976. 308 p.

PART ONE: On Stream (The force that makes America Go); PART TWO: Upstream (to the Middle East and Back); PART THREE: Downstream (End of the Oil Ride). Makes the observation that "oil probably has had its day" and that the age of petroleum is approaching the end. Bibliography.

OIL, POWER AND POLITICS: CONFLICT IN ARABIA, THE RED SEA AND THE GULF, by Mordechai Abir. London, Frank Cass, 1974. 221 p.

I. Saudi Arabia and The Gulf; II. Crisis in Southern Arabia; III. Red Sea politics; Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Bibliographical note. MAPS.

OIL POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by John C. Campbell, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.56, no.1 (October 1977) 89-110.

Considers Iran and Saudi Arabia in relation to "the practice of independent diplomacy and the knowledge of the relationship of oil to political power." While the economies of the Western nations "have no defense against denial of access to Middle East oil or to a crippling rise in its price, the oil producers on their side, are vulnerable internally, regionally, and internationally. There is an obvious conflict of power, but the constraints are real . . . The author concludes." The period of oil power in the hands of a few oil-exporting nations will not last indefinitely . . . But if this twilight of the oil era is but a brief moment in human history, it is going to seem a long, long time to those of this present generation who have to cope with its problems . . . Lethargy in energy policy puts all the greater burden on diplomacy and international action, on the maintenance of a partnership of producers and consumers that will carry the world through the oil age and beyond."

OPEC AND THE MIDDLE EAST; THE IMPACT OF OIL ON SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT, ed. by Russell A. Stone. New York, Praeger, 1977. 264 p.

"The OPEC countries of the Middle East clearly enjoy a vast and unique resource, and with it a unique opportunity to develop and modernize in a situation where the usual bottleneck in the development process—capital—is not in short supply (for the time being). If successfully exploited this opportunity can result in a position of leadership in the developing world and contributions to the well being of the world system as a whole. Is the challenge being met? How? And with what evidence of



success? This work attempts to trace the outcomes, successes, failures, and problems which have emerged in the first three year experience . . ."

**PART I:** The challenge of Societal Development; political dimensions of change; **PART II:** Economic Development; projects and policies (including development projects in the Middle East: Domestic investments utilizing oil revenues); **PART III:** Country Studies: Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Iran. Biographical sketches of the editor and contributions. Statistical tables. Bibliography.

**OPEC SUCCESS AND PROSPECTS**, by Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno. New York University Press, 1976. 179 p. (A council on foreign relations book).

"There is a logical pattern in OPEC's Strategy and Tactics . . . OPEC has greater strength and hence better prospects, than many observers especially from The United States, have credited it with . . ." Chronology: June 1948-December 1975. Appended OPEC's Declaratory Statement of 1968. Statistical tables.

**POWER PLAY: OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Leonard Mosley. New York, Random House, 1973. 457 p.

Delves into following: Is the West losing in its fight to hold on to its Middle East oil concessions; could the Arabs and Iranians run their own oil fields? and if they did, what difference would it make to the world fuel situation? Can the U.S. be blackmailed by a Middle East threat to stop oil supply? What happens to all the money? The oil companies pay out to the producing countries?. Appended some facts and figures on the oil states of the Middle East. Bibliography.

**RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1947-1974)**, by Tong-Whan Park, Farid Abolfathi, and Michael Ward, in *International Interactions*, v.2, no.4 (1976) 247-262.

Examines the foreign policy behavior of the petroleum exporting countries in the context of resource nationalism. The authors conclude: "The learning of the later oil-exporting countries reflected a quicker progression of issues over the distribution and control of the international petroleum industry than was demonstrated by the older exporters . . . The same learning pattern is likely to be followed by any country that may for the first time discover major oil resources. Consequently, the discovery of new sources of energy will not necessarily result in a decrease in the cost or the availability of oil . . . Of particular interest is the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict upon the unity of Arab oil policies. In each Arab country there was a marked increase in the oil-related activities during and after each Arab-Israeli War." Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria and Libya are particularly sin-

gled out for discussion. Fourteen figures illustrate the interaction of oil and foreign policy during this period. The text also includes a table: "Comparative survey of five petroleum exporting nations."

**STABILITY IN THE GULF: THE OIL REVOLUTION**, by D.L. Price, in *Conflict Studies*, no.71 (May 1976) 17 p.

Discusses: Western interests in the Gulf, the internal and external sources of conflict in the region, Iran's military dominance, the limitations to the oil weapon and the constraints of interdependence. Select bibliography, annotated, of six items.

5. *Middle East Arab Oil Power: Military Aspects MIDDLE EAST OIL AND MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER*, by Col. Irving Heymont, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.7 (July 1976) 70-76.

The implications of Middle East oil power that impinge on the Arab-Israeli military balance. The power of Middle East oil while great is "subject to finite limitations . . . The Arab oil countries cannot attain unlimited affluence nor unlimited flexibility. They will be required to allocate resources . . . There is no certainty that a given course of action will have the expected results."

Reprinted from *Middle East Review*, Winter 1975-76.

6. *Middle East: Arab Oil Power and The Atlantic Alliance*

**THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE ARAB CHALLENGE: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE**, by John A. Cicco, Jr., in *World Affairs*, v.137, no.4 (Spring 1975) 303-325.

Analyzes the domestic, international, and, internal European Economic Alliance pressures that acted on the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany during the Arab embargo. The author concludes: "To the major European members of the Atlantic Alliance, the suddenness, the severity, and subsequently, the endurance of the Arab oil challenge have so aggravated their internal economic disequilibriums that their attentions and energies are now deeply absorbed by their domestic problems. As domestic considerations have overwhelmed each nation's domestic politics, it appears that they are becoming less receptive to the divisive Euro-centric rhetoric which previously threatened to rupture the Alliance . . . In the ensuing years the oil crisis may come to be recognized as having inadvertently provided the environmental change which will have kept the Alliance from destroying itself." Includes ten statistical tables and three figures illustrating linkages of the Atlantic Alliance.

**COPING WITH THE OIL CRISIS: FRENCH AND GERMAN EXPERIENCES**, by Horst Mendershausen. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 110 p.

". . . Explains and Compares the roles which



France and Federal Republic of Germany, have played in the traditional pattern of worldwide oil relations and how during the past two years this pattern has changed." 1. The Breakdown of an Order; 2. Postwar Germany and France in the old Order; 3. The worldwide Search for Oil Security. Statistical tables.

**EFFECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR AND THE ENERGY CRISIS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE, JULY 1974 PANEL VII.** Washington, National War College, February 1975.

The Warsaw Pact - NATO Security Balance; The Role of the U.S. in NATO; Political and Economic Effects of the Middle East War; A New Level of Cooperation in NATO.

7. *Middle East Arab Oil Power: Its Influence on US Policy* (See also III-A-10 and VI-G-5)

**ACCESS TO OIL—THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN**, Prepared by Fern Racine Gold and Melvin A. Conant, at the request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate. Washington, Government Printing Office, December 1977. 113 p. (Pub No. 95-70)

Evaluates the bilateral relationships between the United States, and Iran, and the United States and Saudi Arabia in terms of their contribution to access to oil. Chapters include: Access to Oil; The Franco-Algerian Example, 1962-73; Saudi Arabia; Iran; and Implications for the United States. The authors conclude: "the meaning and durability of the U.S. relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia depend very largely on the continuing political acceptance by either kingdom of the arrangements. Unless this political factor remains secure, and the undertakings of the parties remain harmonious and to their mutual benefit, everything will fall apart in the Gulf. Yet the prospect is one of change, of instability" . . . The U.S. interest in the Gulf is a reflection "both of the vital interests of allies and of its own growing dependence upon Middle East oil . . . A U.S. commitment to the defense of the oil resources of the Gulf and to political stability in the region must constitute one of the most vital and enduring interests of the United States."

**AMERICA'S OIL AND ENERGY GOALS: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS; A Preliminary Appraisal.** Washington, D.C., International Economic Policy Association, 1977. 45 p.

The study considers various scenarios vis-a-vis OPEC's Monopoly Power. Statistical tables.

**THE ENERGY 'CRISIS' AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY** by Robert E. Hunter. New York. Foreign

Policy Association, June 1973. 79 p. (Headline Series no. 216).

Contents: Energy Demand in the United States; The Domestic Supply of Energy; Importing Fossil Fuels; The Role of the Soviet Union; The Arab-Israeli Conflict; Securing Cooperation; Paying the Price; Talking it Over.

**THE FOURTH MIDDLE EAST WAR, THE ENERGY CRISIS, and U.S. POLICY**, by William E. Griffith, in *Orbis*, v.17, no.4 (Winter 1974) 1161-1188.

Reviews the prelude to, the course of, and the aftermath of the October 1973 War in the Middle East. Extensive references to related articles are included in the footnotes. Discusses a possible course for U.S. policy in the Middle East to achieve the following strategic objectives: "to prevent or at least postpone a fifth Middle East war, to contribute to an Arab-Israeli settlement, and to limit Soviet influence; to prevent developments in that theater from worsening U.S. alliance relationships; to ensure adequate Middle East oil supplies to the United States and its allies, while preventing the United States from becoming more than marginally dependent on Arab oil; and to guarantee the independence and security of Israel."

**MIDDLE EAST OIL AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE U.S. ENERGY CRISIS**, by Shositana Klebanoff. New York, Praeger, 1974. 288 p.

In assessing the impact of the external influences on U.S. foreign policy - focuses on the U.S. position in the international and markets in terms of production, transportation, refining and distribution, as well as the U.S. political and military states in the Middle East and their implications vis-a-vis Soviet trade expansion east of the Suez Canal. Bibliography.

**OIL AND AMERICAN POWER—THREE YEARS LATER**, by Robert W. Tucker, in *Commentary*, v.63, no.1 (January 1977) 29-36.

"The broader significance of the actions taken by the oil-producing countries in the fall and winter of 1973-74 is that they called into question the issue of Western (and Japanese) security of access to an indispensable source of energy . . . It is in the Middle East . . . that the political price paid for the actions of the oil cartel has been the most striking. For it is here that the loss of American power and the compromise of American interests have been greatest . . . It is only one side of the conflict—the Arab side—that can shift its political attachments should it feel dissatisfied enough. So long as American policy places a very high premium on preventing this shift, it will inevitably be driven to pressure only the Israeli side into making concessions." The author concludes: "What was once widely known as the oil crisis is . . . far from over."



It may even be that we have yet to face the most serious effects of the actions initially taken by the oil cartel in the winter of 1973-74."

**THE OIL WEAPON AND AMERICAN POLICY**, by Dr. Joseph S. Szylowicz and Major Bard E. O'Neill, in *Air University Review*, v.28, no.3 (March-April 1977) 42-52.

Examines the 1973 oil embargo and concludes that: "the situation today is very different . . . In the new context it will be far more difficult for OPEC to reach an embargo decision or to make an embargo an effective weapon. Since a new embargo would hardly benefit anyone, especially the conservative Arab states, wisdom counsels a realistic assessment of the limited potential benefits and high cost attached to a renewed use of the oil weapon."

**THE US ENERGY CRISIS AND THE MIDDLE EAST**, by David G. Nes, in *Military Review*, v.53, no.3 (March 1973) 3-7.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are facing an end to their self-sufficiency in petroleum products. The author describes some of the actions being taken by each nation to protect its position in the Middle East and therefore ensure its future oil supply.

**WHY OIL PRICES GO UP**, in *Foreign Policy*, no.25 (Winter 1976-77) includes **THE PAST: WE PUSHED THEM**, by V.H. Oppenheim, 24-57 and **THE FUTURE: OPEC WANTS THEM**, by Theodore C. Moran, 58-77.

Mr. Oppenheim on the basis of "an examination of public State Department documents, congressional testimony, and printed source material—along with interviews of policy-makers no longer with the government" concludes that: "Since 1971, The United States has encouraged Middle East oil-producing states to raise the price of oil and keep it up." Mr. Moran, however, in his article "drawn from a study sponsored by Resources for the Future" concludes: "constant prices will produce insufficient revenues to support even drastically reduced development and security budgets for the major OPEC countries . . . The most rational way for OPEC to deal with the internal scramble for revenues will be to assign explicit production quotas with steeply rising oil prices as the reward necessary for agreement on who must accept idle facilities."

#### 8. *Middle East: Arab Banking and Finance*

**BANKING AND FINANCE, A MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, by *Middle East Economic Digest*, December 1977. 26 p.

Covers the following subjects: "Money Flow to Main Centres Marks Shift of Emphasis; The Gulf-Middle East Gets a New Financial Centre; Banking Abroad-Arab Capital looks Far Afield for Investment Outlets; Share Trading-Kuwait Stock Market

is One of World's Top Ten; Construction Finance-Middle East Contractors Need Specialised Bank Services; Financial Services-Money manager's Role Changes With Investment Trends; Euromarkets-Activity of OPEC Lenders Points to Eventual Inter-Arab market. Table of: "Middle East Banks in London."

**CAPITAL SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE**, by Ragaei El Mallakh and Mihsen Kadhim, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.2 (April 1977) p.183-193.

An examination of the size of capital surpluses at the disposal of major Arab oil-based economies in the Middle East. Estimates of the capital requirements of the other Arab countries in the region during 1975-1980 are provided. In addition the regional capital requirements of the capital-deficit Arab countries is contrasted with the capital surplus of the major oil procedures, and the policy implications for the two groups of countries are outlined. The authors conclude that the "basic constraint on absorptive capacity" in the Arab non-oil countries is a "dearth of available capital resources." Whereas, the absorptive capacity of the oil exporters is restrained by "acute labor shortage." As a result "these countries can hardly realistically hope to achieve their full economic potential without extensive regional cooperation."

**OPEC INVESTMENT: LIQUID ASSETS STILL PREFERRED TO CORPORATE STOCK**, by Michael Prest, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.41 (14 October 1977), p.14 plus.

"The belief that the ratio of liquid assets to others in the investments of oil revenue surplus countries is falling seems to be unfounded . . . As long as the major industrial countries' economic growth remains slow . . . the chances are that most oil producers' investment will be in financial assets in a few countries." Statistical tables are included showing: Distribution of reserves 1950-1976, and the estimated deployment of oil exporters' surpluses.

#### 9. *Middle East: Land Reform*

**LAND REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Hossein Askari, John Thomas Cummings and Bassam Harik, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.4 (October 1977) 437-451.

Analyzes the output of major crops in Egypt, Syria and Iraq—"countries which have seen major land reform efforts in the post-war era." Their post-reform responsiveness was compared with that of earlier periods and with that of cultivators in two neighboring countries, Jordan and Lebanon, which underwent "little reform." In order to isolate the effect of price on output from the effect of the reform programs the author has used the Nerlove supply model. Six statistical tables are presented



which "indicate that Egyptian and Syrian agricultural producers show a reasonably consistent shift toward greater market responsiveness in the post-land reform era. The Iraqi case is not so clear, but . . . there was no consistent indication of a post-reform decline in responsiveness." On the other hand, Jordan and Lebanon show "rather indifferent price sensitivity."

**NEW PATTERNS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**, by Robert Springborg, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.2 (Spring 1977) 127-142.

Newly independent nations in the Middle East and North Africa expropriated large estates and redistributed the land in small plots to peasants. This was a politically popular action which was also expected to result in a great increase in agricultural production. "The growth rate of agricultural production," however, "has been far from spectacular." Currently these governments are reappraising the value of family farms versus "agribusiness." The availability of money from oil is allowing them to consider capital as opposed to labor intensive farming. In addition, the large scale reclamation projects, many of which are just now coming into production, present the governments with large blocs of land to which no group can claim right of ownership through prior residence. "Who is to own the land has once again become a subject of hot debate." The issues are complex and the positions of the traditional left and right have become confused "by the infatuation both by the West and by the communist world with economies to scale in agriculture." After describing recent proposals in the area for land tenure and utilization, the patterns of conflict over land tenure, and their implications for the future, the author concludes that "It is highly unlikely that one land tenure pattern, be it family farms, agribusiness, state farms, cooperatives or whatever, will in the foreseeable future gain ascendancy throughout the area." This is because of the number of people with entrenched interests in specific forms of tenure, the reluctance of the governments to alienate the peasantry, and the usefulness of various tenure patterns as "bait for aid and assistance programs" from conflicting donors. The economics of agricultural production will reinforce this heterogeneity as there are too many variables "for one pattern . . . to be universally successful."

10. *Middle East Manpower: Education and Training*

**ENGINEERING EDUCATION IN THE ARAB WORLD**, by M. Ali Kettani, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.4 (Autumn 1974) 441-450.

The Arab countries have "no unified engineering educational system", but "have generally copied the engineering system of their former col-

onizing powers." This is the source of the major problems faced by Arab engineering schools; these are: "should engineering education be encouraged at all in the Arab world;" what should the role of the engineering schools be; providing employment for graduates in a "market geared to regional competition rather than regional cooperation; and "problems of cultural identity and language." The author, who is chairman of the Electrical Engineering Department of the College Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, concludes that: Arabic should be used as the principal language of instruction in order to "encourage engineering education at home." Cooperation between governments "is a necessity" in order to allow free movement of engineering talent between Arab states. The colleges of engineering "should be centers of research." Furthermore, qualified Arab engineers "should be given priority of employment in Arab countries." The text includes statistical tables concerning the Arab engineering colleges and engineering enrollment in 1971-72.

**TRAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT**, by Frank Clements, in *Middle East International*, no.76 (October 1977) 19-20.

In order to reduce their dependence on the sale of crude oil the Arab states have been making "an effort . . . to establish petrochemical industries." The author concludes that the main problems facing the petrochemical industry in the Arab world is "one of manpower shortages, together with the other general problems of shortage of fresh water and difficulties in effecting co-operative efforts. All of the ingredients for an efficient industry are there . . ." if the problems can be solved.

11. *Middle East Resources: Nuclear Energy*

**ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: A MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.20 (20 May 1977) i-xi.

Articles: "Resources: New Sources are Tapped as Energy Gap Looms; Solar Energy: Middle East Well-disposed to Exploit the Sun; Geothermal Energy: Hot Springs Held Promise for Developing Countries; Nuclear Energy: Economic and Safety Factors May Limit Development."

**THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND NUCLEAR ENERGY**, by Radmile Trojanovic, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, no.624 (5 April 1976) 31-33.

After reviewing nuclear developments in the Arab countries the author concludes: "Given the present development of their atomic science, it is obvious that the Arabs are in no position to produce atomic weapons for some time yet. Consequently, it is clear that the fundamental efforts of the Arab countries are directed at utilizing atomic energy for the production of electricity, for converting sea water into drinking water, for industrial develop-



ment . . . and simultaneous to this at training their own personnel to ensure their subsequent independence in the development of this science and field of production."

**NUCLEAR POWER: POLITICS AND COSTS CHECK ATOMIC AMBITIONS**, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.40 (7 October 1977) p. 9 plus.

Countries, such as Kuwait, that can afford a nuclear power program have recently showed some hesitation as a result of the following considerations: "President Carter's stand on limiting the spread of nuclear technology to the developing world, the environmental controversy surrounding nuclear power and cost considerations . . ." In the Middle East "only Iran . . . has committed itself to a nuclear reactor, but has ordered an Osiris training reactor from France. Saudi Arabia initially expressed interest in nuclear-powered desalination plants, but has deferred going ahead . . . Egypt is seeking a nuclear power capability . . . but lack of finance and the tough US stand on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are frustrating attempts to start the programme . . . Turkey's problem like Egypt's is with finance and NPT considerations . . . Kuwait's . . . programme is not troubled by financial difficulties, but by the dubious feasibility of using such technology to serve so small a market."

12. *Middle East: Oil Industries (Including Petrochemicals)*

**AVAILABILITY OF WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES**, by D.C. Ion. London, Graham & Trotman, 1975. 234 p.

Provides a background of the energy resource industries and problems. Among the tables: proved reserves of crude oil in Middle East; proved reserves of natural gas in Middle East. References.

**MAJOR OIL AND GAS FIELDS OF THE FREE WORLD**. Washington, D.C., Central Intelligence Agency, June 1977. 30 p. (ER 77-10313).

With maps in color, including the Middle East region.

**MIDDLE EAST: THE BOOM CONTINUES**, in *World Oil, International Outlook Issue*, vol.183, no.3 (Aug. 15, 1976) 157-178.

"31st annual issue on major country-by-country gas/oil search and development." Summarizes the years search, drilling and production activity in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Divided Neutral Zone, Iraq, Qatar, Oman, Syria, Bahrain, Israel, Turkey with shorter mention of Jordan, Lebanon, South Yemen and Yemen. Maps locating gas and oil fields and their associated companies are included for Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Divided Neutral Zone, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain.

**MIDDLE EAST REPORT: MIDEAST**

**SOLVES PROBLEMS**, by John L. Kennedy, in *Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, no.20 (16 May 1977) 79-137.

How petroleum technology is being applied to solve the engineering-operating problems of an expanding Middle East Industry. Includes: "Producers Stick to Long-term Goals; Berri NGL Plant Nearly Complete; Expansion Strains Saudi Resources Unique Well Completion Offers Producing Flexibility; Emphasis on Water Injection Still Growing in the Middle East; Ahwaz No.2 Typical of Big Production Units in S. Iran; Water Flows, Lost Circulation Common in Middle East Drilling; Refining, Petrochemical Plans Keep Iran Busy; Project Begun to Gather, Process Offshore Dubai Gas.

**OIL: THE BIGGEST BUSINESS**, by Christopher Tugendhat and Adrien Hamilton. London, Eyre Methuen. 1975. 404 p.

The Story of international oil industry. PART I: How the Industry Grew Up 1859-1960; PART II: How the Industry Works Today. Appended: Tables showing oil reserves around the world at end of 1973; the main oil-producing area around the world; the main oil-consuming areas world-wide. Photos, diagrammatic illustrations. Bibliography.

**PETROCHEMICALS, A MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, by *Middle East Economic Digest*, (December 1977) 11 p.

Two articles by David Tash: "Survey-Region at Opening of Era in Chemicals Development;" and "Production-Vast Resources, Small Market Distinguish Middle East." Also a table from Chemical Age, London, 25 November 1977 showing "Capacities of Production of Selected Chemicals; and an organization chart entitled: "Structure of the Iranian Chemical Industry."

13. *Middle East: Arab Oil Tankers and other Shipping*

**ARAB TANKERS MOVE DOWNSTREAM**, by V.H. Oppenheim, in *Foreign Policy*, no.23 (Summer 1976) 117-130.

Examines the implications of the "expansion of the Arab tanker fleet" for any future embargo. The author concludes that "The next embargo, if it comes, will be more effective than the last."

**DRY CARGO FLEETS MAY BECOME KEY TO MIDDLE EAST SHIPPING PLANS**, by Brian Beckett, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.20, no.9 (17 February 1976) 5-8 plus.

Discusses plans in various Middle East countries to expand their dry cargo fleets. At present orders for dry-cargo vessels by Middle Eastern interests account for "something like 10 per cent of the world total." They are also beginning to train their own manpower. "Most experts in the field do not expect the shipping concerns, specially the 'host countries', to alter the current world patterns in the industry for some time to come . . . The proj-



ects discussed are . . . long range attempts to build effective locally based industries—in most cases almost from nothing.” Statistical tables: “Middle East Merchant Fleets,” and “Other Middle East Tonnage” (General Cargo, fishing, tugs, miscellaneous).

**SHIPPING: GULF SHIPPING COMPANY TAKES OVER KUWAIT LINER SERVICES**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.12 (1 April 1977) p. 9 plus.

“The United Arab Shipping Company “went into business on 1 April with the takeover of the Kuwait Shipping Company’s 37 vessel fleet.” Shareholders in this new cooperative venture among the Arab Gulf states are: Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The “UASC probably owes something to a desire on the part of the Gulf governments to match the shipping power of Iran. What points to it being something more than just a profitable Kuwait venture in which other governments have invested money is the calibre of the . . . board. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are represented by ministers . . . UASC obviously hopes to match at sea the success of Gulf air in aviation. The company also hopes to expand.” Includes list of board of directors, their position and occupation.

14. *Middle East: Congestion in Arab Ports*

**GULF PORTS: CONGESTION EASES BUT HANDLING REMAINS THE MAIN PROBLEM**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.28 (15 July 1977) 3-4.

Delays have been cut “sharply, particularly at Dammam, Bahrain and Muscat, and the growth of imports by Gulf countries . . . shows some signs of slowing . . . The significant exceptions include Dubai, a transshipment and re-export terminal of regional significance.” Table: “Existing & proposed commercial berths for principal Gulf Ports”.

**WAITING TIME AT MIDDLE EAST PORTS**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.43 (28 October 1977) p. 14.

Lists port, date of report, delay in days, number of vessels. Source: Lloyd’s list, London. This is a monthly feature of The Middle East Economic Digest.

15. *Middle East Transportation: Vehicular, Rail and Air.* (See also VI-F)

**AVIATION: MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 1978. 26 p.

Survey of current developments in civil aviation in the Middle East. Sections on air freight, general aviation, airports, planning and supply, manpower and contracts reported in 1977. In addition there is a directory which presents a guide of 38 Middle East-based airlines.

**CIVIL AVIATION: MIDDLE EAST STATES MUST CLOSE RANKS AND TAKE A SHARE**

**OF WORLD TRAFFIC**, by Bill Sweetman, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.20, no.15 (9 April 1976) 7-13.

In the Middle East an economic boom has brought a growth in air travel “up to 50 per cent and even beyond.” The author discusses the reasons that the “region’s airlines are not going to benefit in full from the traffic boom.”

**HIGH-CAPACITY RAIL LINKS URGENTLY NEEDED TO REPLACE OUTMODED NETWORKS**, by Martin Rudolph, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.20, no.17 (23 April 1976) p. 7 plus.

From a paper given at the recent MEED/AMR conference on Middle East Transport: Construction and use. Describes current problems in getting cargo to the Middle East that could be solved by improving the rail lines.

**LAND TRANSPORT-MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.16 (22 April 1977) 15-19.

Includes the following articles: “Saudi Arabia: Clearing of Ports Reduces Role of Overland Services; Iran: Cuts in Spending Decrease Road Traffic Demand;” and “UAE: Haulers Await Completion of Last Part of Through Road.

**1976 MIDDLE EAST VEHICLE IMPORTS**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.42 (21 October 1977) p. 16.

Statistical tables: total number of vehicles imported into the Middle East by importing country. Includes cars, trucks and buses.

16. *Middle East: Population and Self-sufficiency*  
**THE BEDOUIN AND ‘PROGRESS’**, by W.O. Lancaster, in *Middle East International*, no. 79 (January 1978) 26-27.

The role of the camel in Bedouin life and the effect of the drought of 1958-62 which turned them away from camels and toward sheep. The author finds that the sheep have been destructive of the environment whereas the camel was in harmony with it. He concludes: “Camel herding is the only sort of development which offers the Bedu what they want and at the same time has none of the major disruptions associated with other types of development.”

**CAN THE ARABS BE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD?**, by John Thomas Cummings, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977) 18-20.

The author discusses the prospects for the Middle East to achieve “at least self-sufficiency” in food by the end of the twentieth century. He addresses three major questions: “First, to what extent is the Middle East able, in 1977, to supply its current needs? Second, what population will it have to support . . . in the year 2000 . . . ? Third, on average, how deficient is the Middle East in terms of daily nutrition, as defined in acceptable per capita



levels?" He concludes that self-sufficiency can be achieved with the existing technology if "population control programs" are effective and if "regional agricultural development" is emphasized in the "investment spending of the oil exporters."

A LIVING FROM THE DESERT, by Ibrahim Oweiss, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977) 20-22.

The Director of the Institute of Arab Development at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. suggests that the "agricultural potential" of the Arab world is "very considerable . . . from the available evidence it is clear that guayule and jojoba and other useful desert plants may open up new uncharted horizons for the . . . development of the Arab world."

POPULATION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, by Elias H. Tuma, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.4 (Autumn 1974) 381-395.

There is a "need to maintain a viable balance between population growth and material output, especially in agriculture." This article explores "the interdependence between population and agriculture under various demographic and agricultural conditions which are relevant to the Arab countries." It also addresses: "the policies dealing with population control and family planning in these countries; . . . the policies affecting agriculture and its ability to remain in a viable balance with population change . . .; and . . . areas of priority for research and policy implementation." The author concludes that "a viable balance may be difficult to attain on a country by country basis, but it should be more feasible to attain it on a regional basis. Mobility of inputs and outputs across boundaries needs serious consideration on a level that provides security and permanence of settlement."

#### 17. *Middle East: Water Resources*

WATER: SPECIAL REPORT, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.17 (29 April 1977) 11-20.

Articles: "Water Resources-Growing Shortages-Some Middle East Solutions; Oman: When Desalination alone is Not the Whole Answer; Sewerage: Pioneering Local Answers to Local Problems in the UAE; Exploration: Looking for Water-From 570 Miles in Space; Contracts: Reported in MEED 1976-77." Includes Tables: "Main Rivers in the ECWA Region; Capacity of Desalination Plants in Operation & Under Construction (1976); Water Use in Agriculture; Average Annual Precipitation in Western Asia; Annual Surface Water Potential; Water Resources & Needs." "Kuwait already supplies almost its entire needs from desalination, while Saudi Arabia is considering an even more novel solution—using icebergs."

#### C. Sociological Aspects (See also by Country)

##### 1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

EGYPT'S FELLAHIM. PART I: BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS OF KAF, by Richard Critchfield. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 17 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.6.)

"Nowhere do the past and present collide so emphatically as in Upper Egypt, along the Nile between Cairo and Aswan. There Egyptians feel subject, not master, to fate. The scientific and material power represented by the Aswan Dam has introduced a psychological and social turbulence new to village life."

EGYPT'S FELLAHIN. PART II: THE ANT AND THE GRASSHOPPER, by Richard Critchfield. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 18 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.7)

"Upper Egyptian and Delta villages exhibit strikingly different ways of life, as illustrated by Shahhat (the grasshopper) and Faith (the ant). While there are many reasons for the differences, none is more convincing than the century's gap in development, the 100 years that separated the two regions shifts from flood to perennial irrigation."

MEANING AND SOCIETY IN THE NEAR EAST: EXAMPLES FROM THE BLACK SEA TURKS AND THE LEVANTINE ARABS, Part 1 and Part 2, by Michael E. Meeker, in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v.7, no.2 (April 1976) 243-270, and v.7, no.3 (July 1976) 383-422.

Compares the concept of honor among the Black Sea Turks with the concept of honor among clans of Levantine Arabs. "The system of meaning among the Arabs is similar to that among the Black Sea Turks, but the cultural structuring of this system of meaning is different." After explaining the differences in the cultural structuring, the author, shows how this provides an "understanding of a number of contrasts between the two societies with regard to "marriage" and affinal and maternal relationships."

##### 2. *Middle East: Shifting Arab Political Patterns*

ARAB GUERRILLA POWER, 1967-1972, by Edgar O'Ballance. Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1973. 246 p.

"This is a comprehensive account of the use, expansion, principal activities and general decline of Arab Guerrilla Power . . . between 1965 and 1972 . . ." Maps.

ARAB POLITICS, PEACE AND WAR, by Nadav Safran, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.2 (Summer 1974) 377-401.

Addresses the question of "whether the united Arab front is enduringly united for purposes of war or peace." This "essay" examines the atti-



tude of the various Arab states and forces by reference to the dynamics of inter-Arab politics.

**ARAB POLITICS: THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY**, by Michael C. Hudson. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 434 p.

A comparative analysis of eighteen Arab political systems from Morocco to Kuwait emphasizing the problem of legitimacy. The author, executive director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, first discusses the "pervasive elements" of the Arab world: identity, ethnic and religious minorities, the crisis of authority, the effects of Western imperialism, and modernization. He then presents case studies of the Arab countries and the Palestinian community. "Classifying them as modernizing monarchies, republics of the pan-Arab core, and republics of the Arab periphery, he shows how the different types of systems have tried to cope with the problem of legitimacy . . . He concludes that the basic requirement for legitimacy—meaningful political participation—has not been met anywhere in the Arab world, nor is it likely to be met in the near future." Various tables and figures; Map showing "Population Density" in the Arab world. Appendix: "Political Event Data Plots for Selected Arab Countries, 1948-1967", p. 405-410. (Source: *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, 1972)

**ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS: A SURVEY OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD**, by Fred Halliday. New York, Vintage Books, 1975. 539 p.

Part One: Peninsular Politics; Part Two: North Yemen; Part Three: South Yemen; Part Four: Oman; Part Five: The Gulf With Appended data.

**BETWEEN CAIRO AND DAMASCUS: THE ARAB WORLD AND THE NEW STALEMATE**, by Fouad Ajami, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.3 (April 1976) 444-461.

Examines four sources of "malaise" in the Arab world of which Sadat and the Sinai Accord are the immediate targets. The four sources are: "lessons learned about U.S.—Israeli relations; re-emergent and new frictions between Arab states and groups; resentment that the costs and benefits of the October War were inequitably shared within and among Arab countries; and finally, a general concern about the thrust of a de-Nasserized Egypt." In conclusion the author explores "what the politics of stalemate are likely to mean for competing political choices and rival leaders in the Arab world."

**NEW ATTEMPTS AT ARAB COOPERATION: THE FEDERATION OF ARAB REPUBLICS, 1971-?**, by Paul K. Bechtold, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.2 (Spring 1973) 152-172.

A revision of a paper delivered at the 1972

Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association. The paper is based largely on data collected during field research in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Sudan during 1971/72 when the author was Senior Fulbright-Hayes Research Professor to Egypt. This article sketches some historical antecedents to the Federation of Arab Republics which was promulgated on September 2, 1971 between Egypt, Syria and Libya. It also attempts to "assess the major issues and policy considerations . . . of the . . . members, and the viability of the new alignment . . ." The text includes a chronology of . . . "not only high level meetings and decisions . . . but also actual and attempted measures of functional cooperation among cross-national partners."

**ON THE RISE AND FALL OF ARAB ISMS**, by Robert Springborg, in *Australian Outlook*, v.31, no.1 (April 1977) 92-109.

"Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, Nasserism, and positive neutralism now evoke thoughts of dust covered anthologies on library shelves, whereas less than a decade ago they were provocative Arab battle cries . . . The center of gravity of newly emerging isms may be labelled, depending in part on the observer's normative evaluation, as conservatism, liberalism, pragmatism, realism, or, what to some may not have an entirely pejorative connotation, opportunism . . . The contemporary trend of middlism, like that of radical nationalism before it and possibly like several isms yet to come, will likely end up on the library shelves of Arab history before Arab political systems become sufficiently cohesive . . . to be permanently and accurately depicted as embodying . . . this or that political ideology."

**POLITICAL ELITES IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, ed. by George Lenczowski. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute for public policy research, 1975. 227 p.

Describes and analyzes the political elites in seven countries in The Middle East: Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel. With conclusions.

**WHO IS AN ARAB?**, By W. Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, in *Worldview*, v.19, nos. 1-2 (January/February 1976) 20-22.

"The Arabs are not a distinct ethnic group, since there are both white Arabs and black Arabs . . . Nor is language a sufficient criterion of Arabness, since there are many Arabic-speaking Jews who are not normally called Arabs . . . For membership in the Arab League the primary criterion appears to be language; but despite the presence of Lebanon, which is half Christian, this tends to be coupled with the acceptance of Arab-Islamic culture." The authors conclude: "For many centuries the basis of cultural affinity has been primarily religious . . . Within the community of Muslims,



however, there was the still stronger bond of the Arabic language." This is now challenged by a "secularism" that downplays the religious bond in favor of Arab nationalism and that encourages the use of the colloquial. "Pan-Arabism is unlikely to override local interests or established regional nationalisms, but it is by no means powerless."

### 3. *Middle East: Historical Aspects*

**THE ARAB WORLD; A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY**, by Peter Mansfield. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1976. 572 p.

See particularly Part Two - The Arab World Today (Sudan - The Loose-Limbed Grant; Egypt - The Center of Gravity; Libya - The Radical Right; Tunisia - The Dogmatic Moderate; Algeria - Austere Revolutionary; and Morocco - Kingdom of the Far West).

**CAPTAIN MAHAN, GENERAL GORDON, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE TERM "MIDDLE EAST"**, by Clayton R. Koppes, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, no.1 (January 1976) 95-98.

Presents evidence from a "newly-discovered source" that the term Middle East which was thought to have originated with an American, Captain Mahan, in 1902 was used as early as 1900 by the Englishman, General Sir Thomas Edward Gordon. In fact, "Gordon's casual reference" to the term in his article "The Problem of the Middle East", "implies an earlier, more general, use of the term than has previously been assumed."

**THE STUDY OF THE MIDDLE EAST: RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP IN THE HUMANITIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**, edited by Leonard Binder, New York, John Wiley & Son, 1976. 648 p.

Reviews research and intellectual trends in ten fields of Middle East Studies. Contemporary scholarship is surveyed and new work is evaluated. "This comprehensive state-of-the-art presentation stresses the importance of identifying areas of research that will require financial and human investment over the next decade." Chapters include: Area Studies: A Critical Reassessment, by Leonard Binder; Islamic Religious Tradition, by Charles J. Adams; History, by Albert Hourani; Anthropology, by Richard T. Antoun and others; Islamic Art and Archaeology, by Oleg Grabar; Political Science, by William Zartman; Philosophy, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr; Linguistics, by Gernot L. Windfuhr; Literature by Roger Allen and others; Sociology, by Georges Sabagh; and Economics, by John Simmons.

### 4. *Middle East Minorities: Kurds, Druzes, Armenians, and Bedouins (See also by Country)*

**THE DERVISHES OF KURDISTAN**, by Andre Singer, in *Asian Affairs*, v.61 (New Series v.5), Part 2 (June 1974) 179-182.

Addresses the importance of the Persian

Qaderi dervishes to the Kurdish village of Baiveh on the Iraq-Irani border. This village is the center for the Persian Qaderi dervishes because living in it is Sheikh Kaka Mohammed Barzani, a spiritual descendant of the founder of the order and head of the order in Iran—his brother holding a similar position in Iraq. The author concludes that the function of the dervishes in this village are: "A demonstration of faith by individuals to their leader and to God; . . . Proof to them of the rightness of the faith by the fact that they suffer no pain or injury and that others cannot do these things; . . . A religious power passed down through the centuries . . . as a reaction against Orthodox Islam; . . . A mechanism to maintain the identity of the Kurds as a unique cultural group; . . . A means for poorer dervishes to gain some status in a society where they have none on an economic or political level . . ."

**THE DRUZES—A COMMUNITY APART**, by Gordon Roberts, in *Middle East International*, no.26 (August 1973) 23-25.

The Druzes are a Levantine Arab community living today in the states of Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Historically they have been distinguished by their "sheer toughness." A short history of their internal conflicts and interaction with other Middle East communities is presented. Includes outline map showing main Druze areas in the Middle East today.

**THE EBB AND FLOW OF THE ARMENIAN MINORITY IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST**, by Richard G. Hovannisian, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.1 (Winter 1974) 19-32.

In the twentieth century there was a "massive influx" of Armenians into the Arab provinces south of the historic Armenian highlands as a result of the "systematic massacres and deportations organized by the Turkish government in World War I . . . by 1925, well over 200,000 exiles had been received into the Arab lands under French or British mandate . . . Syria . . . Lebanon . . . Palestine . . . Transjordan . . . Egypt." The author concludes that the success of the Armenians in dwelling peaceably amongst the Arabs while still maintaining a cultural-linguistic distinctness "has diminished rapidly during the past two decades . . ." Their problem is that "having outmeasured the indigenous populations in economic achievement and having invested . . . millions of dollars and manpower hours in establishments for the perpetuation of their . . . traditions, they have been subjected in recent years to the outpourings of vindictive nationalism and overbearing administrative centralism. The alternatives available . . . seem to be either an accelerated rate of absorption into the Arab-Muslim mainstream or else a new exodus . . ."



There are many statistical footnotes relating to Armenian populations in the Middle East.

EGYPT'S REMAINING NOMADS, by A.R. George, in *Middle East International*, no.37 (July 1974) 26-28.

Only about 55,000 bedouin remain in Egypt today, mainly in the Western desert. The "government policy is to settle the nomads, both because they are regarded as anachronistic in a modern state, and as a means of integrating them . . . into the broader society outside the tribe." The author describes some of the projects designed to encourage the nomads to settle through a policy of "indirect, or initiated settlement". A map illustrates the limits of cultivation and of nomadism in Egypt.

THE KURDISH INSURGENCY, by Dana Adams Schmidt, in *Strategic Review*, v.2, no.3 (Summer 1974) 51-58.

The Kurdish people, some ten million strong, occupy areas of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq and northwestern Iran, with some spillover, in the Soviet Caucasus and in Syria. As a majority in every country, the Kurds have been subject to opposition or persecution of varying intensity under changing regimes . . . They are a tough, fighting people, led now by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, aged seventy-three, the head of a family long dominant in revolts of the past. Barzani looks to the United States to help in his conflict with the Iraqi Government. Kurdish culture and Kurdish nationalism are cultivated in the Soviet Union. Although the USSR must now side with its client Iraq, it holds a potential for "championing Kurdish nationalism if and when that alternative becomes advantageous."

THE KURDS IN SOME SOVIET WORKS, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.11, no.2 (May 1975) 195-198.

Recent Soviet works on the Kurds are described and reviewed. The author concludes: "Perhaps the most salient characteristic of recent Soviet books about the Kurds is the manifest absence of political studies. Quite a few linguistic, literary and historical works dealing with the Kurds have appeared during the 1960's and early 1970's. None has come to hand that treats specifically of the current conflicts between the Kurdish minorities and their neighbors, or of present Soviet policies towards the Kurdish problem. Even standard works on Iraq clearly demonstrate this trend . . ."

5. *Middle East: Religious Aspects* (See also II-A-4 and V-D-8)

THE FAMILY AS A DEVELOPING SOCIAL GROUP IN ISLAM, by H.S. Karmi, in *Asian Affairs*, v.62 (New Series v.6), Part 1 (February 1975) 61-68.

The position of the family in the Arab world before and after the introduction of Islam. The author identifies three phases in the history of the

family in the Arab world: "(1) the tribal phase, with strong kinship ties and prevalent polygamy; (2) the extended family phase, after the first century of Islam, with loose kinship ties and with polygamy mainly among the heads of the extended families; and (3) the nuclear family phase, with loss of kinship ties on a large scale and with monogamy . . . The ideal Islamic family."

ISLAM AND STATE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFRICA, by Gabriel Abdelsayed, in *Africa Report*, v.21, n.2 (March-April 1976) 42-45.

Islam and the State of Egypt; Islam and the Libyan Arab Republic; Islam and The Islamic Arab Republic; Islam between The Socialist Experimental in Algeria and the Monarchical System in Morocco; and Islamic Law and Secularization.

ISLAMIC SUMMIT DECLARATION AND ISLAMIC SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.2 (Spring 1974) 171-176.

Texts of: the "Declaration of Lahore" adopted by the Second Islamic Summit Conference and released on February 25, 1974; and the resolutions unanimously adopted by the Islamic Summit.

6. *Middle East: Modernization of Muslim Society*

THE ARAB WORLD, INC., by John J. Putnam, with Photographs by Winfield Parks, in *National Geographic*, v.148, no.4 (October 1975) 494-533.

"How much has the flood of oil-bought money affected the Arabian Peninsula?" The authors report on a visit to the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Their report concentrates on the people they encountered. They conclude: "The motives of the Arabs are easy to discern. As one Arab minister said: Nobody cared about us before the oil came, nobody will care about us when it is gone."

THE ARABIAN ETHOS, by Peter A. Iseman, in *Harper's*, v.256, no.1533, (February 1978) 37-56.

"Of oil, Islam, desert, and development . . . Allah's gift of wealth magnifies the paradoxes in a puritan society." An account based on a recent four month visit to the Arabian Peninsula by an Arabic speaking American. A second part of this article will appear in a subsequent issue of *Harper's*.

CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF MODERN AND MODERNIZING SOCIETIES: INDICATIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURING OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES, by S.N. Eisenstadt, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.1 (January 1977) 1-27.

Do modernizing societies tend to become similar? Dr. Eisenstadt finds that studies of social hierarchies in the Middle East are beginning to point out a group basis and structuring that "differ



greatly from those assumed in the classical literature on stratification. The group basis of hierarchization is here much more variegated; it is composed of tribal, regional, sectional (e.g. different types of economic sectors), religious, and ethnic groups, which do not coalesce into countrywide strata based on a high degree of status-association among occupationally close groups." Characteristics of 'traditional' Middle Eastern societies which have persisted with modernization are: "The predominance of the political over the economic sphere; . . . a multiplicity of group bases of social hierarchies; . . . a strong emphasis on the combination of 'closed' restricted prestige and of 'power' as the major social orientations of elites and groups alike. . . ." Further research may help "identify in greater detail and in systematic ways the mechanisms through which different societies, similar in terms of socio-demographic, technological and structural characteristics may yet differ greatly in their institutional contours and dynamics."

**EDUCATION AND FEMALE MODERNISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD**, by Nadia H. Youssef, in *Journal of International Affairs*, v.30, no.2 (Fall/Winter 1976-77) 191-209.

Assesses the current educational status of women in a number of Middle Eastern, North African and Asian countries that are part of the "Muslim world." Focus is on certain educational measures that are considered to be indicators of this status: "the literacy rates for populations aged 15 and above; the discrepancy between male and female literacy levels; sex differentials by age in current levels of school attendance; and sex ratios in student enrollment in secondary and higher education." These indicators are compared to those in other developing nations experiencing modernization. Text includes six statistical tables.

**MODERNIZATION IN THE MUSLIM EAST: THE ROLE OF SCRIPT AND LANGUAGE REFORM**, by Geoffrey Wheeler, in *Asian Affairs*, v.61 (New Series v.5), Part 2 (June 1974) 157-164.

Until 1928 most Muslim communities shared the Arabic script. After the Roman, the Arabic alphabet is the "most generally used in the world today, being the accepted method of writing the Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Urdu, Pashto and Sindhi languages, whose speakers amount to about 350 million." The question has arisen, however, whether modernization on Western lines can be achieved without the "convenience characteristic of every modern industrial state in the world except Japan, namely, a national language using a script which permits of the ready assimilation of the ever-growing international vocabulary of technical terms." For it is the Arabic script rather than the language itself "which hampers the absorption of . . . terminology which is part . . . of the modern industrial

state." The author examines the "effect of script reform in the only instances where it has been carried out - Turkey and the Muslim territories of the USSR." He then discusses the "nature of the arguments against the abandonment of the Arabic script." He concludes: Practical alternatives to the convenience of new technical terms "have not yet been devised by any country still using the Arabic script, but this, of course, is not to say that they never will be."

7. *The Characteristics of the Arab Personality (The "Arab Mind")*

**THE ARAB BASIC PERSONALITY: A CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE**, by Fouad M. Moughrabi, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.9, no.1 (February 1978) 99-112.

Assesses recent social-psychological studies dealing with the Arab world which explain the 'Arab basic personality', or 'the Arab mind'. The purpose of these studies is to understand the 'psychology of the Arabs', the underlying motivations of their behavior, and the reasons for their underdevelopment. The author concludes that these studies are "inadequate" in their attempts to explain the nature of Arab collective behavior. Terms such as the 'Arab mind', are "unscientific and demeaning to the subject of research," and reveal "a dangerous and misleading tendency toward categorical and sweeping generalizations which are not conducive to an enlightened search for better understanding of collective behavior."

**ARAB CONTEMPORARIES: THE ROLE OF PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS**, by Majid Khadduri. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 255 p.

Explores the role of representative leaders-how they were drawn into the political scene, their endeavors to formulate goals, and the methods they pursued to achieve their goals by participation in politics.

**THE ARAB MIND**, by Raphael Patai. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. 376 p.

The Arabs and the World; The Group Aspects of the Mind; Arab Child-Bearing Practices; The Bedouin Mind; The Bedouin Substratum of The Arab Personality; Bedouin Values; The Realm of Sex; The Islamic Component of the Arab Personality; Art, Music, and Literature; Unity and Conflict; The Question of Arab Stagnation.

**THE ARAB MIND CONSIDERED: A NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING**, by John Laffin. New York, Taplinger Publishing Company. 1975. 190 p.

The Torments of History; Mohammad and the Koran; The Child of Customs; Language and Literature; The Shame Society; As Arab men See Women; Violence - 'The most positive form of prayer'; Arab speaking of Arabs; Rule by Army



Officers. Attitudes to Israel and the West; The Inner Conflict.

POLITICAL CULTURE APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST POLITICS, by Gabriel Ben-Dor, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.1 (January 1977) p. 43-63.

The political attitudes that underlie political life in the Middle East are of "long-standing and of extreme importance . . . Since the study of such political attitudes in the mainstream of political sci-

ence has had some systematic, theoretically oriented beginnings, and since such study helps place cases in the Middle East in a general, comparative, and theoretically significant perspective, the fruitfulness of the approach," (applying the insights of social psychology to the study of comparative politics), "I have argued, ought to be recognized and acted upon." Includes a review of the major writing that has used a "political culture" approach to the study of the Middle East, and points out useful subjects for future study.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (FOR ISRAEL SEE CHAPTER V)

#### A. Cyprus (See Chapter VI, and Appendixes)

##### 1. History

ARCHIVAL MATERIALS AND RESEARCH FACILITIES IN THE CYPRUS TURKISH FEDERATED STATE: OTTOMAN EMPIRE, BRITISH EMPIRE, CYPRUS REPUBLIC, by Mustafa Hasim Altan, James A. McHenry, Jr. and Ronald C. Jennings, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.1 (January 1977) p. 29-42.

Presents location, hours, conditions for use and descriptions of the holdings for 6 research facilities in the Cyprus Turkish Federated State.

##### 2. Cyprus Dispute

###### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

CYPRUS: THE RIGHT TO EXIST, by Dr. V. Lyssarides, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, n.627 (20 May 1976) 21-22. (Belgrade)

The President of the Socialist Party of Cyprus (EDEK) writes: "An independent, non-aligned Republic of Cyprus was not compatible with the designs of US political and military circles, and they decided to bring Cyprus under their strategic control. To achieve this, they used as proxies the Athens junta regime and the Turkish government, taking advantage of the ethnic structure of the country." He concludes: "The short-term prospects are gloomy. But I am hopeful that through the insistence of our people, our efforts for economic survival, our unrelenting struggle for freedom and independence and international solidarity we shall succeed in establishing a free Cyprus for all its citizens, irrespective of their religious or ethnic origin. The myth that it is a question of a feud between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be exposed. What is at issue is the right of the people, as whole, to live freely versus foreign domination and occupation. Errol Mehmen, a Turk and member of the Central Committee of our socialist youth, expressed the opinion of all of us when he declared . . . "Cyprus is for the Cypriots."

CYPRUS: THE UNFINISHED AGONY, by P.N. VANEZIS. London, Abelard-Schuman, 1977. 141 p.

The author is a Greek Cypriot himself and is concerned with the issues of realistic co-existence

in Cyprus. PART A: The Birth of the Republic; The years of Adjustments; Intercommunal Friction. PART B: The Greek Coup and its repercussions on Cyprus; International Power Politics and Cyprus; The invasion and Drama of Cyprus. PART C: Economic, Social and Political Consequences; Solution or Dissolution; Analysis of The Most Recent Events. Bibliography. U.N. Security Council Resolutions and other documents. Cyprus in history and chronology of events in recent times.

THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME, by Malvern Lumsden, in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.17, no.1 (March 1973) 7-32.

"One hundred thirty-four Greek Cypriot and 51 Turkish Cypriot student teachers evaluated Cyprus now and in five years' time under four contingencies (peace, war, Enosis, and Taksim) on self-anchoring scales. Presentation of the resulting measures of utility in matrix form shows that of the 78 possible nonequivalent 2X2 games, the Cyprus conflict may be regarded as a Prisoner's Dilemma game where war is not seen as the worst possibility by either side, and peace offers a Pareto-optimal solution. Measures to resolve such conflicts suggested by the experimental literature are discussed." Forty references.

RINGED WITH A LAKE OF FIRE: CYPRUS 1976, by Penelope Tremayne, in *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.106, no.1 (January 1976) 101-107.

"The present Cyprus problem remains intractable because the will to solve it is lacking. Those who understand what the problem is have not had the handling of it, apart from a few who have sought to solve personal or national problems rather than the island's own . . . It is therefore intended in this article to look briefly at the real needs of the situation, to distinguish some of the red herrings, and to suggest a possible way forward in the interest of all." The author concludes that the needs of Cyprus could be met "if-and only if- Britain, the U.S.A., and N.A.T.O. had the will to see the matter through . . ."



**THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS**, by Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1975. 193 p.

Covers the years 1951 to 1974. Partial Contents: Grivas Lands in Cyprus; The Revolt begins; Collision with Britain; The mountain guerrillas; Makarios is exiled Grivas goes underground; The road to independence; split between Grivas and Makarios; Civil War; Makarios becomes President; Cyprus and (the Greek) Junta; Greek versus Greek. In the epilogue the events which led Turkey to invade Cyprus on July 20, 1974 are described. Bibliography.

**SURVEY ESSAY: ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION**, by George A. Kourvetaris, in JPMS; *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, v.4, n.1 (Spring 1976) 151-164.

Reviews five recent books on Cyprus to answer the following questions: "What is the Cyprus question? Who are the major protagonists. . . What was the political and constitutional basis of Cyprus prior to the Turkish intervention, . . . the role of the UN peacekeeping forces . . . and the consequences of the Turkish invasion . . . ?" Books reviewed are: *The Struggle for Cyprus*, by Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie; *Peace Soldiers*; *The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, by Charles C. Moskos; *Crisis on Cyprus, A Report Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees for the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States*; *Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge*, by Polyvios G. Polyviou; *The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and Legal Problems Arising Therefrom*, by Criton G. Tornaritis. The author concludes: "If the present situation is defined as peace and stability in the area and it is in our national interest to condone aggression, then there is something fundamentally wrong with our foreign policy . . . We cannot stand for democracy, self-determination, and majority rule for some nations but not for others." Selected Bibliography, p. 161-164.

b. *Cyprus Dispute and the UN*

**THE CRISIS OVER CYPRUS**, in *Survival*, v.16, no.6 (November/December 1974) 299-302. (Documents)

Reprints the texts of: The UN Security Council Resolution 353, 20 July 1974; the Declaration by Greece, Turkey and Britain, 30 July 1974; and the Statement by The Soviet Union, 22 August 1974, concerning the landing of Turkish forces on Cyprus 20 July 1974.

**CYPRUS AS A UNITED NATIONS PROBLEM**, by Sir Laurence McIntyre, in *Australian Outlook*, v.30, no.1 (April 1976) 16-34.

Describes in detail the Security Council's handling of the Cyprus question throughout 1973 and 1974 with which the author was personally in-

involved, as Australia's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

**UNITED NATIONS: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING CYPRUS (JULY 20-AUGUST 30, 1974)**, in *International Legal Materials*, v.13, n.5 (September 1974) 1275-1291.

Presents in chronological order United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Reports of the Secretary-General and joint statements by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, concerning the Cyprus question.

c. *Cyprus After Makarios*

**CYPRUS: THE LEGACY OF MAKARIOS**, by G.M. Bowder, in *Middle International*, no.75 (September 1977) 12-14.

"The death of Archbishop Makarios, the first president of Cyprus, marks the end of an era on the island and heralds a period of uncertainty leading up to the next presidential election . . . earlier hopes for a settlement of the Cyprus problems . . . have proved illusory and the de facto partition of the island grows firmer each day." The author summarizes the development of the Cyprus problem. The text includes an inset on the Turkish announcement that they will "reactivate" the town of Varosha and the Greek reaction to this announcement.

**CYPRUS AFTER MAKARIOS**, by Nikola Mandic, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.28, n.660 (5 October 1977) 24-26. (Belgrade)

"With the death of Makarios, Cyprus lost an exceptionally gifted statesman, and the nonaligned movement lost one of its most outstanding and sincere champions . . . Yugoslavia, together with the other nonaligned countries, wants to see the . . . preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and nonalignment of Cyprus, and the settlement of the Cypriot crisis through talks on equal footing between the two Cypriot communities, free from any outside interference."

d. *Cyprus Dispute: Impact on Nato (See also III-A-7)*

**NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK**, by General Melvin Zais, in *Strategic Review*, vol.5, no.2 (Spring 1977) 22-33.

The former Commander of Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe from 1973 to 1976 recounts the effects of the 1974 "Turkish invasion" of Cyprus on the stability of the eastern Mediterranean region. In assessing the Turkish response to the coup that established a "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus" the author concludes: "In reviewing the respective positions of all parties, I can see the merits of each. That the Samson coup was directed by elements in Athens and was designed to achieve enosis seems clear from the record. That by virtue of the 1960 Accords, the Turkish government as a co-guarantor to Cypriot independence has a legal right to pre-



serve that independence through military intervention (which has all too frequently been mistakenly characterized as an attack against a NATO ally) seems equally clear. At the same time, the Turkish resumption of hostilities in August 1974 was a reaction in excess of that which was required to fulfill her obligations, and her present attitude casts doubts on her future intentions . . . I believe . . . both governments should be amenable to restoration of an independent Cyprus . . . given an environment free from external pressure . . ." In regard to the US arms embargo against Turkey he concludes: "The character of the people is such that unveiled coercion in the form of an embargo is probably contributing more than any other factor to the inability of the U.S. to influence the Cyprus settlement . . . The weakening of the Turkish military might further exacerbate the already difficult defense of NATO'S Southeastern Flank. The embargo if continued will result in the loss of vital U.S. intelligence collection activities. Our access to airfields in the eastern Mediterranean, already severely constricted, will be denied . . . In the worst case, I could envision a not too unlikely scenario which would see Turkey's withdrawal from NATO, realignment with non-Western power blocs, and a collapse of the entire European Southern Flank . . . The growing Soviet involvement in the Middle East is cause for grave concern within NATO regarding defense of its Southeastern Flank . . . A solid structure in this area will, to a great extent, prevent the Soviets from a full projection of their power into the area around the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf . . . In the interest of U.S. security as well as restoration of a credible NATO deterrent on the Southern Flank, the U.S. Congress should quickly move to ratify the new Aid and Base Rights treaties with Turkey and Greece."

**NATO'S STILL SMOLDERING SOUTHERN FLANK**, by L. Edgar Prina, in *Sea Power*, v.20, no.11 (November 1977) 13-17.

"Sea Power editor Emeritus L. Edgar Prina offers a firsthand report on Nato's southern flank, focussing on the political/military situations in Greece and Turkey and the current status of their conflict over Cyprus."

*e. Cyprus Dispute and The Soviet Union*

**SOME SOVIET WORKS ON CYPRUS**, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.11, no.3 (October 1975) 302-305.

Describes the approach to Cyprus taken by several recent Soviet publications. The author concludes: "Soviet writing about Cyprus seems to show several characteristics. Firstly, it is much more limited in scale than that of other small Middle Eastern states . . . Secondly, it is markedly affected by a partisan approach, as if . . . the Soviet Union had decided to make of Cyprus a special issue, dem-

onstrating the dangers of imperialist designs, on the one hand, and the good intentions of the Soviets, on the other. Thirdly, Soviet works have, as a rule, circumspectly steered clear of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus . . . However, there is no gain-saying that these publications have concentrated on the Greeks . . ."

*f. Cyprus Dispute and the United States*

**BITTER LESSONS: HOW WE FAILED IN CYPRUS**, by Laurence Stern, in *Foreign Policy*, no.19 (Summer 1975) 34-78.

Examines "three major turning points" in the crisis in Cyprus in 1974. "These were the Sampson coup that overthrew Makarios, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the resumption of hostilities on August 15 by the Turks to consolidate their hold over nearly half the island. The story is . . . of still-unresolved impact upon both a region of crucial strategic importance and upon the domestic political underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. He concludes that "the profile of U.S. policy in the Cyprus tragedy was one of vacillation, impotence, and indifference to legal and constitutional principle."

*g. Cyprus Dispute and Britain*

**THE MIRACLE OF CYPRUS: FOUR WEEKS IN SUMMER**, by Onslow Dent, in *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, v.105, no.1 (January 1975) 30-40.

Outlines the efforts of Britain's three Services in evacuating thousands of Service families, residents and tourists of many nationalities from the war zones of Cyprus immediately following the Turkish invasion.

*h. Cyprus Dispute and the Major Powers*

**DRAMA IN CYPRUS: NEW TEST FOR THE MAJOR POWERS**, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.78, no.5 (29 July 1974) 29-30.

"Suddenly Cyprus has become a cockpit of crisis. Greece and Turkey, U.S. and Russia, all have a big stake in a coup in a dangerous part of the world. . . Main interest of the Soviet Union was to ensure that Cyprus, less than 65 miles off the coast of Soviet-armed Syria, did not abandon the policy of 'nonalignment' practiced by Makarios."

*3. Cyprus: The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus*

**NORTHERN CYPRUS: AMBIGUOUS STATUS HINDERS DEVELOPMENT**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.16 (22 April 1977) 3-5.

"The self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus faces many obstructions to its development, a major one being its inability to attract international recognition.

"WE NEED A SETTLEMENT OR WE MUST HIT OUT AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY", by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.16 (22 April 1977), 4-5.



The President of the "self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus," Rauf Denktaş, spells out the aims of his state in an interview with UK businessmen. "To survive we need either a settlement or we must hit out as an independent country."

#### 4. Cyprus: Economic Aspects

CYPRUS: EEC STILL REFUSES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON PRODUCE, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.42 (21 October 1977) p. 13.

France and Italy are taking a "tough line" on the admission of Cypriot agricultural produce to the European Economic Community. "The UK is by far the biggest export market in the EEC, taking no less than 83.8 per cent of Cyprus's . . . exports to the EEC. Nearly all these exports are of agricultural produce . . . Until June this year, Cyprus benefited from Commonwealth preference which gave it tariff-free entry into the UK market . . . If the EEC introduces heavy duties . . . they will have a disastrous effect on the island's agriculture . . . it is beginning to look increasingly unlikely that an agreement can be reached this year. The existing agreement will once again have to be extended." Tables of import and exports by main country grouping.

CYPRUS: GREEK CYPRIOT FLEXIBILITY HELPS IN ECONOMIC RESURGENCE, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.31 (5 August 1977) p. 10 plus.

International aid "has played a major role in speeding Cyprus's economic recovery. . . A wages explosion and the new European economic community duties are the main threats to economic expansion." Evidence of rapid recovery is seen in the fact that: "all refugees should be rehoused by the middle of 1978;" and "by the end of 1976 gross domestic product about equalled the 1973 Greek Cypriot GDP." Tables: Domestic Exports 1973-76; Value of Imports by Commodity 1973-76; and Trade With Principal Partners, 1976 (p. 45).

#### 5. Demise of Egyptian Commandos at Larnaca Airport, Nicosia, Cyprus in February 1978

DEBACLE IN CYPRUS, in *Newsweek*, v.91, no.10 (6 March 1978) 33-34.

Aftermath of the assassination in a Nicosia hotel of Yusef el Sebai, editor-in-chief of Cairo's semiofficial daily Al Abram. Sebai, "a personal friend of Sadat's, was apparently slain because he had accompanied the Egyptian President on his historic journey to Jerusalem." As other nations refused asylum to the assassins their plane with their hostages returned to Larnaca Airport, Cyprus. Here "overeager Egyptian commandos tried to free hostages by force—after the radical Palestinians who held them had already agreed to surrender." The result was a "debacle". Cypriot

President Kyprianou declared, "Egypt bears the responsibility for this tragedy." While Egyptian President Sadat "denounced Kyprianou as a 'dwarf' and broke diplomatic relations with Cyprus." Now Kyprianou has the problem of what to do with the two captured terrorists.

THE STRANGE AFFAIR AT LARNACA AIRPORT, in the *Economist*, (25 February 1978) 51-52.

Describes the Egyptian Commando attack on the two terrorists who were holding hostages at Larnaca Airport Cyprus, after they had killed Mr. Yousef Sibai of Egypt, in Nicosia on February 18. The writer comments on the general confusion of both the terrorists and the Egyptian commandos. He writes: "That the hostages, crew and gunmen escaped unhurt is a manifest miracle. The behaviour of the commandos (15 of whom were killed) and the military attache suggests that they were determined to execute orders given to them in Cairo. If the ambassador ever tried to get these order countermanded he failed to do so—perhaps because he could not get through to Cairo on the telephone."

#### B. Egypt (See also Chapter VI, and Appendixes)

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. 3rd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. 454 p. (DA PAM 550-43.)

Country Summary: Social Aspects; Political Aspects; Economic Aspects; National Security Aspects; Bibliography; Glossary; Illustrations; and Tables.

EGYPT: FEASIBILITY TESTS BEGIN ON LONG-TERM ENERGY SCHEMES, by Alan Mackie in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.38, p.10.

"Generating power by flooding the Qattara depression was first considered in the 1930's, but not taken seriously until 1964. The feasibility of the project, which could take 40 years to complete, depends on the availability of cheaper energy and on the growth of the economy." The project involves building an 80-kilometre canal to link the depression and the Mediterranean. This would be done by a series of nuclear explosions. "There are now few technical difficulties . . . but there are many political and environmental obstacles." The Preliminary tests will start next year . . . "16 months behind schedule."

EGYPT: MEED SPECIAL REPORT, by *Middle East Economic Digest*, May 1978. 72 p.

Current status of the Egyptian economy. Subjects covered include: Oil and Minerals, Suez Canal, Communications, US Aid, Agriculture, Power, Health and Population, Manpower, Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Defense, 1977 Con-



tracts, Statistics. Map of Egypt. City Map of Central Cairo and Garden City.

**INFORMATION AND THE ARAB CAUSE**, by M. Abdel-Kader Hatem. London, Longman Group Ltd, 1974. 320 p.

Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Culture and Information 1971-74 discusses the "character and dissemination of information needed for the encouragement of international peace . . . in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Part One addresses the basic characteristics of information: the concepts, components and the Media which form public opinion. Part Two considers the "major developments in attitudes involving the Arab World." These include: "Steps towards Recognition of the Arab Cause before 1952; Beginnings of an Information Response, 1952-1956; The Lessons of Suez, 1956-1967; The Six-Day War and after, 1967-1973; and Onwards from 6 October 1973." Dr. Hatem concludes: "The first major achievement of the Arab media was to instill a deep conviction among the Arab nations as to their common identity and the rightness of their claims. . . There is now a good prospect for consolidating and extending the global Arab image. The Arabs can do this by . . . preserving their reputation for reliability, by continuing to radiate a quiet confidence and unity founded on real achievements . . . It is upon these facts . . . that we justify our cautious optimism that the Middle East may look forward eventually to the just peace which has too long eluded it."

2. *Anwar Sadat* (See also I-A-4)

**CABINET RESHUFFLE DOES LITTLE TO ENCOURAGE CONFIDENCE**, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.22, no.19 (12 May 1978) 3-5.

Comments on the significance of the latest cabinet changes in Egypt under the Sadat government. "The loss of Abdel-Moneim al-Qaisouni from the cabinet raises serious doubts about the direction and execution of economic policies. Administrative reform may also suffer from the splitting up of ministries and the expansion of the cabinet." Sadat "has developed his presidential position much on the French system, and climbs in and out of the political arena when it suits him. What is at stake is a whole style of government. In his May Day speech, Sadat laid great stress on the fact that he had established rule by law. It has yet to be seen if he is prepared to put that above his own political self-interest." Table shows the Cabinet formed on 7 May 1978.

**THE EGYPT OF ANWAR SADAT**, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 19-21 plus.

Reviews how "to a large extent, Sadat's foreign policy has been shaped by economic considerations." The author concludes that "in 1977, the

economic indicators will tell us a great deal about the political condition of Sadat's Egypt. Meanwhile, however, Sadat . . . controls the instruments of power and enjoys widespread popularity."

**IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY**, by Anwar el-Sadat, New York, Harper and Row, 1978. 360 p.

The President of Egypt tells the story of his life and the story of Egypt since 1918. Chapters include: "From Mit Abul-Kim to the Aliens' Jail; The Struggle for the Liberation of Egypt; The Liberation of 'Self'-Cell 54; The July 1952 Revolution; Revolutionaries in Power; The Powerlessness of Power: Egypt under Nasser from July 1956 to June 1967; Interlude: A Struggle for Survival; The Second Revolution (May 15, 1971); The October War; The Road to Peace." Appendixes: (I) Text of Message from President Sadat to President Brezhnev on August 30, 1972; (II) Directive from President Sadat to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on October 1, 1973; (III) Strategic Directive from President Sadat to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on October 5, 1973; (IV) Telegram from President Sadat to President Hafez al-Assad of Syria on October 20, 1973; (V) Speech to the Israeli Knesset on November 20, 1977.

**MAN OF THE YEAR: ANWAR SADAT: ARCHITECT OF A NEW MIDEAST**, in *Time*, v.111, no.1 (January 2, 1978) 11-17.

"By the trajectory of his 28-minute flight from a base in the Canal Zone to Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat changed the course of Middle Eastern events for generations to come . . . Not in three decades had the dream of a real peace seemed more probable. For his willingness to seize upon a fresh approach, for his display of personal and political courage, for his unshakable resolve to restore a momentum for peace in the Middle East, Anwar Sadat is Time's Man of the Year." In the same issue under the Man of the Year heading are the following articles: Actor with a Will of Iron—A portrait by Time correspondent Robert Ajemian (22-27); Reflections from Cell 54—Anwar Sadat on the power of "inward success" and the politics of freedom. An excerpt from his forthcoming autobiography "In Search of Identity" (28-29); Anatomy of a 'Bold Action'—an interview with Sadat on how and why he decided to visit Israel (30-32); Four Crises: A Wife's View—an interview with Jihan Sadat (p. 33); They are Fated to Succeed—a commentary by Henry Kissinger - "The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously" (34-35); There is also a profile of Egypt—The Gift of the Nile (18-21).

3. *Egypt: Nasserism*

**EGYPTIANS DEBATE NASSERISM**, by Desmond Stewart, in *Middle East International*, n.78 (December 1977) 20-22.



The question of Nasser and Nasserism has been the "prime intellectual movement in the Egypt of the last four years . . . This political scrutiny may, to those who believe in the Hegelian dialectic, be important for the future, should Nasserism and anti-Nasserism blend in a new synthesis." The author discusses some of the primary writings by Egyptians in this debate.

NASIR, DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES IN ARABIC, by Fawzi Abdulrazak, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.4 (Autumn 1976) 545-550.

"A bibliography of Nasir's written and spoken works and the sources on Nasir available to the student doing research." The author is with the Middle Eastern Department of the Harvard College Library. He concentrates on two kinds of sources: "primary sources, which include Nasir's speeches, declarations, and a list of his collected papers, and . . . the major imprints in Arabic about Nasir." Included is a brief comment on each work and an indication of whether it favors Nasir or is critical of him. More than half of the 107 titles on the list were published in Egypt, mostly by Egyptian writers. The author concludes that: "in spite of the intention of the authors to remain objective, I found most of the works emotional . . . there is still a large empty shelf in the library of Nasir to be filled in the future with more thoughtful, responsible research on Nasir's career in public life."

NASIR'S ROLE AND LEGACY I AND II: CHARISMA, WEBER AND NASIR, by Leland Bowie; and MARX, WEBER AND THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION, by R. Hrair Dekmejian, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.2 (Spring 1976) 141-172.

Is the concept of charisma useful in analyzing political leadership? These two studies use President Nasir of Egypt as a reference for examining this question. Leland Bowie presents "a consideration of Weber's concept of charisma, and the criticisms thereof." He then examines "the manner in which the term has been applied to President Nasir of Egypt." He concludes that "whereas it has been asserted that Nasir was perceived as a charismatic figure by the Egyptian people and that he brought about certain value transformations, one must be extremely cautious in making such claims in the absence of more refined techniques of political analysis. His popularity was genuine, at least for some, but if charisma is merely a synonym for popularity, that does not tell us much." Professor Dekmejian's article examines "the criticisms of Leland Bowie and John Entelis concerning the leadership attributes of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir generally and my depiction of the Nasirite political system specifically." Both of the above studies contain extensive references in footnotes to related publications on the subject of charisma, Egypt and Nasir.

THE 'NASSERIZATION' OF EGYPT AND ITS REVERSAL UNDER SADAT, by Irene Beeson, in *International Perspectives*, (July/August 1975) 23-28.

"When the late Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers came to power on July 23, 1952, one of the trickiest among the many tasks facing them was that of dealing with Egypt's political structure. . . Ten days after Nasser's death, the ASU unanimously approved the selection of Sadat as its nominee for the Presidency, and on November 12 he was unanimously elected President of the ASU."

NASSER'S EGYPT: THE FAILURE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP, by John P. Entelis, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.2 (Summer 1974) 451-464.

"This article seeks to evaluate the attempt of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the Third World's most charismatic leaders, to institutionalize and legitimize, via both personal and party charisma, Egypt's post-revolutionary system of rule. The assessment will be made at two levels corresponding to the levels of analysis presented in each of two books under review: local-national and national-international."

4. *Egyptian Army: Organization, Weapons, and Equipment*

THE EGYPTIAN ARMY TODAY, by Romolo Cichero, in *Armies and Weapons*, v.4, no.19 (September 1975) 30-34.

The author has "tried to put together" this description of the Egyptian Army with the "not inconsiderable assistance of the Egyptian Armed Forces Office of Public Relations." The organization, weapons and equipment, and men of the army are described. The author concludes: "The Egyptian Army is a force which at least up to the beginning of the Seventies—clearly showed its British origins, on which had been superimposed an organization based on the Soviet model. It can be said that only in the last few years has this force started to find its own identity, resulting from a higher level of training and preparation of personnel of all ranks." Black and white photos.

5. *Economic Aspects*

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ARAB SOCIALISM IN EGYPT, by Bent Hansen, in *World Development*, v.3, no.4 (April 1975) 201-211.

"The characteristic feature of 'Arab socialism,' as practiced in Egypt, is public ownership of the modern sectors, including finance and trade. Efficiency, in these sectors, and perhaps in agriculture, however, has suffered. Despite some improvement in distribution, following confiscation of larger businesses and rural estates. Egyptian society cannot be considered egalitarian. Egypt's system of agrarian co-operatives is perhaps the only feature of Arab socialism worth unitating."



THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVERTIBLE EGYPTIAN POUND, by L. Donald Fixler, Robert L. Ferrar, and Earl Sullivan, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.19, no.4 (Autumn 1975) 451-460.

Egypt, which since 1957 has had "severe exchange controls" on its currency, is considering changing this policy. The authors present the "economic, political and social consequences of convertibility" for Egyptian currency. The immediate, short and long run implications of this change in policy are considered. The authors conclude that convertibility would be followed by "the advent of foreign capital" which will present Egypt "with an unparalleled opportunity" to increase per capital real income.

EGYPT: CHANGE COMES TO A CHANGE-LESS LAND, by Thomas J. Abercrombie, in *National Geographic*, v.151, no.3 (March 1977) 312-343.

"Looking back to an age of glory that produced the . . . Pyramids of Giza, Egypt now seeks renewal in the promise of a new era. Celebrating 25 years of independence, the still largely agricultural nation turns to industry for a higher standard of living."

THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY, 1952-1972, by Robert Mabro. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974. 254 p.

"A . . . survey covering the efforts of the revolutionary regime in land reform, construction of the High Dam, and industrialization. The author expresses pessimism as to Egypt's future, largely because of population pressure."

PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 26 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.5)

"Egyptians are debating major policy shifts in the economy. Critics of the Nasserist system want to back away from the public enterprise system; defenders want to move forward, intensifying the socialist experiment. The reality is that the public sector still dominates—unchallenged by foreign competition—while the private sector is sharpening its teeth."

b. *Egypt: Economic Outlook*

EGYPT'S TEN YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN: 1973-1982, by Albert L. Gray, Jr., in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.1 (Winter 1976) 36-48.

Reviews the goals of Egypt's second ten year plan or "National Action Program". After reviewing the achievements of the first ten year plan of 1960-1970, the author discusses the prospects for the second ten year economic plan in terms of the outlook for achieving its goals for savings, investment, balance of payments, and employment. He

concludes that "If . . . national pride can be directed toward economic development and away from military adventures, and if population growth can be controlled, and if Sadat has not promised too much too soon, then, with massive foreign assistance, many of the goals of the Second Ten Year Plan will be achieved."

THE OPENING (IN EGYPT), by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1975. 4 pts. (Northeast Africa Series, v.20, nos. 2,3,4, and 5.)

Part I-Egypt's Economic New Look; Part II-Luring Foreign Capital; Part III-De-Nasserization?; Part IV-The Suez Canal.

WHY PEACE DOESN'T BUY PROSPERITY FOR EGYPT, in *U.S. News & World Report*, v.81, no.8 (23 August 1976) 53-59.

"President Sadat needs an 'economic revolution'—but that's easier said than done. Dennis Mullin of [the magazines'] International Staff sizes up what's bright, what's dismal inside Egypt."

c. *Egypt: Economic Impact of Suez Canal Opening* (See also III-A-11)

THE OPENING. PART IV: THE SUEZ CANAL, by John Waterbury, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1975. 21 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.20, no.5)

"The opening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 is a linchpin of Egypt's development, as crucial to the nation's economic and diplomatic hopes as was the crossing of 1973. Yet it too could be rendered irrelevant by continued hostilities." Tables showing "Population of Canal Zone Cities and Environs before and after the June War", the passage of ships, tonnage and passengers through the canal from 1910 to 1966 and the canals share of the oil trade from 1970 to 1980. The text also includes on page 19 a "Suez canal cross section" showing the current dimensions and plans for expansion from 1975 to 1981.

d. *Egypt Economy: Impact on Foreign Policy* EGYPT 1976, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 11 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.21, no.3.)

"More than any other Arab country Egypt's regional and international policies have been determined by the state of her economy, in crisis for at least the last 15 years. A momentous turning-point occurred in spring 1976, as Egypt cast its economic, diplomatic, and to some extent military lot with the 'West'."

FOREIGN FINANCE AND DOMESTIC REFORMS BRIGHTEN EGYPT'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.19 (13 May 1977) 3-6.

Alan Mackie interviewed Deputy Premier for Financial & Economic Affairs Abdel-Moneim al-Qaisouni and Minister of Planning Ali Abdel-Ma-



guid in London before they went to the May 11 Advisor Group for Egypt meeting in Paris. In answer to a question concerning the effect of a peace settlement on their economic forecasts Abdel-Maguid stated: "I think a peace settlement would increase the momentum for the type of economic atmosphere that is being built up now; increasing confidence, accelerating the flow of foreign funds and above all of funds from Arabs working abroad."

e. *Egypt Population Pressures*

1. *Riots of January 1977*

SADAT RUNNING OUT OF TIME, by Anthony McDermott, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977) 8-9.

The riots on January 18-19 of 1977 were the "most serious challenge" to President Sadat's authority since he succeeded Nasser in 1970. "Sadat's overall strategy for this year is based on a successful Geneva conference, which would enable him to turn more attention to his economic problems and reduce the enormous expenditure on defence . . . In 1971, . . . Sadat . . . survived, against the predictions of the political analysts. This time, the domestic strains are more profound than before and Sadat's survival depends on the gamble that a Pax Americana in the Middle East has been the right card to play."

SADAT'S DARKEST HOUR, in *Newsweek*, v.89, no.5 (31 January 1977) 51-52.

"Egypt's worst riots in a quarter-century were touched off last week when Sadat's government raised the price of such staples as rice, sugar, and cooking gas, as part of a general belt-tightening. Even before the price increases were announced, ordinary Egyptians were fuming over their country's chronic poverty, the swelling corruption of its managerial class and the flaunted wealth of the foreigners who have poured into Cairo recently. Quickly, the government backed down, rescinding the increases and thereby deepening its economic quandary. But the riots posed a serious challenge to Sadat's six-year-old government, weakening him gravely just as he was leading the campaign by moderate Arabs for an overall peace settlement in the Middle East. And although the armed forces stood firm this time, some observers wondered whether the army's ranks contained another young Nasser, poised to overthrow Egypt's current ruler."

2. *Food Crisis*

'AISH: EGYPT'S GROWING FOOD CRISIS, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 13 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, no.3)

"For Egyptians, bread is 'aish, life, the gift of the Nile. Traditionally, Egyptians have relied upon grain as their major food source, but despite introduction of high yield varieties, improved irri-

gation techniques, and more systematic use of fertilizer, per capita food grain production is declining. The nation's future strategy involves regional agricultural integration, increased sale of manufactured goods to finance food imports, and continued attention to domestic production."

3. *Agricultural Resources*

THE BALANCE OF PEOPLE, LAND, AND WATER IN MODERN EGYPT, by John Waterbury. Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1974. 27 p. (Northeast Africa Series, v.19, no.1.)

"Egypt has undertaken ambitious programs of land and water management to make maximum use of the country's agricultural resources. Ultimately, the solution to intensifying pressure in the land/man/water relationship may depend on the success of the industrialization effort which is currently dependent on improvements in the agricultural sector."

EGYPT: GROWING POPULATION STRAINS FARM AND CITY RESOURCES, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.36 (9 September 1977) 10-11.

Egypt's cultivable area is "shrinking". Egypt's recently announced "plans to expand the area of cultivable land and to provide sites for new cities" are described. It is hoped that implementation of these plans will "contain the serious pressures arising from a large and fast growing population." Two small outline maps are included in the text: Centres for regional development projects planned to 2,000; and "New cities planned to relieve pressure on Cairo."

f. *The Search for Oil*

DREAM OF WORLD-CLASS OIL ROLE ON THE LINE IN EGYPT, in the *Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, n.17 (25 April 1977) 67-71.

"Describes the various companies involved in the search for oil in Egypt. The article concludes: "Onshore wildcat drilling hasn't been encouraging. But the Gulf of Suez appears to have potential for a considerable increase in reserves and ultimate production . . . Egypt has drawn a heavy concentration of foreign operators in spite of the risks and the stiff contract terms." Maps: "Who's Exploring and Where in Egypt"; "Gulf of Suez Action."

THE GULF OF SUEZ: WHERE THE ACTION IS IN EGYPT, by R.W. Scott, editor, in *World Oil*, v.182, no.1 (January 1976) 75-79.

Reports on a visit by World Oil Editor R. W. Scott to the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Co. shore base at Ras Shukheir and the company's offshore facilities and drilling wells in the Gulf. "Additional visits were made to onshore Gulf of Suez basin fields operated by (Egyptian) General Petroleum Co. at Um El Yosr and Ros Gahrib. Photos . . . illustrating operations in the area" are included.



**OIL DISCOVERIES HIGHLIGHT EGYPT'S EXPLORATION EFFORT: AN INTERVIEW WITH EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF PETROLEUM AHMAN EZZ-ELDIN HILAL**, by R.W. Scott and T.J. Stewart-Gordon, in *World Oil*, v.182, no.6 (May 1976) 70-72.

"Egypt is becoming one of the Middle East's leaders in exploratory activity. A large number of international oil companies have recently signed production sharing agreements . . . Egypt's plan to fully assess its petroleum potential and boost production to near 1 million bpd by 1980 includes an extensive exploratory drilling and seismic program . . . much of Egyptian offshore area has never been subjected to seismic surveys using modern techniques . . . in this . . . interview . . . the Minister of Petroleum of Egypt, Ahmad Ezz-Eldin Hilal, comments on new oil finds in the Gulf of Suez . . . ; the return of the Egyptian Sinai oil fields which—until last December—had been under Israeli control for the past eight years; and other topics of interest related to the Egyptian petroleum industry."

*g. Industrial Development and Manpower*

**THE CHIMERA OF EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ROLES OF UNIVERSITY GRADUATES**, by Mahmud A. Faksh, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.13, no.2 (May 1977) 229-240.

"The findings of this study suggest that educational expansion in modern Egypt thus far has not been conducive to development . . . The 'absorptive capacity' of the economy to accommodate new and improperly trained graduates is very limited, the aspirations and desires of the educated have been inflated to exceedingly unrealistic proportions, and the middle range of technical manpower remains undermanned while the non-productive bulge swells towards the upper limits of professional status. The post-revolutionary government in Egypt has failed to initiate an educational policy which will fulfil the country's basic needs while also being economically feasible. And it seems fair to conclude that such a policy will not be adopted until the present regime is willing to brave political unpopularity by initiating an educational programme geared to the nation's best interest." Includes 6 statistical tables illustrating the authors conclusions.

**EGYPT'S AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY**, by David Nicolle, in *Middle East International*, n.56 (February 1976) 30-32.

A brief review of the development of an aircraft industry in Egypt. The author concludes: "Egypt is an Arab country, and the Arab world, which is now in a phase of rapid development, is likely to need Egypt's growing expertise in the field of aviation."

**THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF EGYPT**

1939-1973, by Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1976. 279 p.

"Based on extensive primary data this is above all a book for economists; but the historical evolution of industrial policy against a setting of changing political-economic systems provides a case study in development of more than local significance."

**INTERNAL MIGRATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN EGYPT**, by Mostafa H. Nagi, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 261-282.

Examines the "patterns and trends of internal migration in Egypt between 1937 and 1965 and discusses their determinants." The effects of these population movements on urbanization and labor force changes is discussed. Such effects are then reviewed as they "pertain to the need for a conceptual distinction between urbanization and industrialization in Egypt." The author after identifying a number of "migration streams" concludes that "in terms of size and number of streams, population mobility in Egypt . . . is relatively advanced in relation to the labor market situation in terms of differentiation and structural features." He states that "urbanization as a form of structural change is in a stage quite advanced from urbanism as a way of life. This explains why urbanization fails to produce instant modernization." Nine tables illustrating internal population shifts are included in the text.

**6. Foreign Relations (See also Chapters I, II, and IV-L-2)**

*a. Aswan Dam: An Evaluation of Soviet and American Interests*

**EGYPT TURNS TO U.S. FOR HELP AT TROUBLED ASWAN, A RUSSIAN-BUILT DAM**, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.81, no.10 (6 September 1976) 37-38.

"A grandiose project that was to power industries and give millions a better diet is in disarray. Solving the problems will test American skills."

**THE NILE STOPS AT ASWAN**, by John Waterbury, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1977. (*Northeast Africa Series*, v.22, nos.1,2,3)

Part I: The development of the Nile River System; Part II: International Hydropolitics; Part III: Domestic Hydropolitics. Part I examines the topography and hydrology of the river. It includes statistical tables, graphs and an outline map of the "Sudanese Nile System and Waterworks." Part II addresses the question of why the Aswan dam was built and concludes that "the dam has not been notably less successful in fulfilling its objectives than many other hydraulic projects . . ." Text includes photos, an outline map of the proposed Jonglei Canal, a cross section drawing of the Aswan High Dam and related statistics. Part III: on domestic



hydropolitics concludes: "The domestic and international assessment of the technical performance of the High Dam has never remotely approached the dispassionate and scientific neutrality that alone would provide the basis for a balanced accounting." Map, "Areas of Reclaimed Land", and Tables of statistics and figures illustrating the performance of the dam.

b. *Egypt and Stresses in Arab Politics*

EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY, by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.56, no.4 (July 1978) 714-727.

Egyptian foreign policy has been steered by the constants of history and geography toward two fronts: "south and east." The southern front is concerned with securing its access to the waters of the Nile. The eastern front focuses on the land bridge between Africa and Asia. Since 1952 two rival systems have struggled to predominate in the area and Egyptian foreign policy has fluctuated between them. These two systems are: "The Middle Eastern System, first advocated by Britain, France, the United States and Turkey . . . This system saw the Middle East in geographical terms, as a vulnerable land mass lying close to the Soviet Union." The second system is "The Arab System" which saw the Middle East "as one nation having common interests and security priorities distinct from those of the west . . . And the main threat, as the advocates of this system saw it, came from Israel, not only because it cut across the African-Asian land bridge but also because, with its seizure of the Auja area demilitarized under the Rhodes armistice agreement, it was clear that it harbored expansionist aims." After 1973 Egypt began to move toward the first system and away from the second system as a result of internal, regional and global changes. The author concludes: "In spite of the temporary advantages chalked up by the Middle Eastern system, the Arab system has important assets that can well turn the tide in its favor once again. But not . . . before a great many vicissitudes and convulsions afflict the region."

STRESS IN THE ARAB TRIANGLE, by Fouad Ajami, in *Foreign Policy*, no.29, (Winter 1977-78) 90-108.

"A trilateral order has come to prevail in Arab politics. The three nations that launched the military and economic assault of October 1973—Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia—won the legitimacy and the spoils of that chapter in Arab history . . . The goals of Arab trilateralism, however, are not expressed in ideological terms. Indeed, ideology is downplayed in favor of a limited commitment to stability and political order . . . Arab trilateralism is based on an equitable imbalance," of wealth, military strength and large populations split among different members of the triangle. The

author concludes: "The managers of Arab trilateralism have the power and the resources that tempt them to assert control over a highly turbulent and troubled area." However, "deep-seated forces at work in the Arab world . . . elude their capacity: alienation of the youth, declining faith in dominant men and institutions, a growing gap between rich and poor, and collective frustration in the midst of wealth. The split between official policy and popular consciousness is more acute than ever."

c. *Moscow's Influence in Cairo and other Arab countries* (See also III-A-9).

EGYPT'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, by Robert Mabro, in *World Development*, v.3, no.5 (May 1975) 299-313.

"The economic relations between Egypt and the socialist countries (1948-73) are discussed and appraised in the context of the political, economic and historical factors which brought them about and maintained them. It is argued that, because of special circumstances, Egypt had little choice but to develop close economic ties with the Soviet bloc. Bilateral trade has known disadvantages; the USSR, however, links trade with generous credit—an attractive feature for LDCs suffering from chronic balance-of-payments deficits. Other advantages and costs of bilateral trade are also discussed. The paper includes comments on Soviet development assistance. A main theme is that Egypt, considering the restrictions imposed on her options by the polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, fared well in the relationship. Export and import prices in bilateral agreements seem to have corresponded to world prices often with a premium in Egypt's favour. Egypt also benefited from a large inflow of resources and from a significant contribution to domestic capital formation."

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974: NEW HOPES, NEW CHALLENGES. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, APRIL 9, MAY 7, 14, 23, AND JUNE 27, 1974. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1974. 202 p.

With statements on: Soviet-Egyptian Relations and Soviet Involvement in the Middle East.

MOSCOW AND CAIRO: CURRENTS OF INFLUENCE, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, in *Problems of Communism*, v.23, no.4 (July-August 1974) 17-23.

Egypt has been one of the two central targets (with India) of Soviet efforts to cultivate influence in the Third World. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has persistently supported Egypt for a changing combination of strategic, diplomatic, ideological,



and Soviet domestic political reasons. By the late 1950's, the USSR had already become Egypt's mainstay among the great powers, and Egypt's dependence on Soviet help was only accentuated by Cairo's crushing defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 against Israel. Even Anwar Sadat's precipitate and humiliating expulsion of the bulk of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 did not cause Moscow to terminate the relationship. Soviet military aid programs continued, and from early 1973 on, Egypt—apparently with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia—was able to purchase all the weaponry it needed from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in October 1973 the USSR went along with Sadat's decision to go to war again against Israel and resupplied Egypt and Syria with massive quantities of arms at considerable jeopardy to other major Soviet policy pursuits. Finally, even though Cairo has since improved its relations with the United States dramatically, there are still no indications that Moscow is prepared to cut off the flow of arms supplies to Egypt despite its irritation over Cairo's shift. In light of this history, it is reasonable to presume that a consensus exists in the Kremlin concerning the desirability of the Soviet Union's Egyptian connection. But, one may ask, has the game been worth the candle? We have no way of knowing how the Soviet leaders feel about this matter—they are not saying. What we can investigate, however, is the extent to which Soviet inputs into Egypt have, in fact, brought tangible returns. What have the last seven years of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship—the period of greatest Soviet investment—brought the Kremlin in terms of influence?"

**RED STAR ON THE NILE; THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THE JUNE WAR**, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 383 p.

"The Soviet-Egyptian relationship after the June War of 1967 was a new one for both centuries, and its consequences were of global importance. Drawing on all available Soviet and Arab materials, Alvin Rubinstein develops the concept of influence as an analytical tool and explores in comprehensive fashion the diplomatic, military, political, and economic aspects of the influence relationship between the two nations in recent years. The author's approach is chronological, analytical, and oriented toward the issues. He finds that the relationship has been fundamentally asymmetrical in aims and accomplishments. Egypt's remarkable comeback after the June War would not have been possible without Soviet aid, but Moscow benefited primarily in the context of the Soviet-American strategic rivalry in the Middle East, and only peripherally in terms of influence over Egypt. Considering broader Soviet-

Third World relationships, the author shows that there is no demonstrable correlation between intensified interactions and influence, that an extensive presence is no assurance of influence and that Soviet influence can seldom be exercised at will in the absence of an ability to project Soviet military power directly." With selected bibliography.

**SADAT: WHY RUSSIA BALKS AT PEACE: INTERVIEW WITH EGYPT'S PRESIDENT**, by David B. Richardson, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no. 25 (19 December 1977) p. 13

President Sadat discusses how Soviet opposition is affecting his peace efforts, his expectations for the Cairo meetings and what will happen if a comprehensive agreement between Israel and Egypt is not reached. President Sadat states: "Moscow hasn't liked me or my Government for years now. The Russians do not like anybody who rejects their control . . . Moscow still has leverage in some other Arab nations to which it is a heavy arms supplier—Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq and South Yemen . . . these same nations showed up at the recent Tripoli conference of the so-called Rejection Front along with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is armed from Moscow, to attack my plan and make a common front against it." In response to the question of what would happen if a comprehensive agreement between Egypt and Cairo is not reached Sadat replied: "I must make myself very clear on this. I consider the present moment in the history of the Middle East a crucial one. Either we achieve a real peace this time, or everything will develop for the worse because of our failure to do so." As for whether he would accept a more limited Israeli-Egyptian agreement to avert a new war: "Absolutely not."

**(LI)—SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EGYPT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ**, by Maj. Max R. Pierce. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1973. 53 p. (Research Study.)

"The purpose of this study is twofold: to ascertain the objectives underlying Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and to determine the general nature of Soviet military and economic activities in the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The study covers the factors that tend to impede the growth of Soviet power in the region and provides an analysis of the general military and economic threat posed by the Soviet Union to the West in the Middle East."

**SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SADAT'S EGYPT, FROM THE DEATH OF NASSER TO THE FALL OF GENERAL SADEK**, by Robert O. Freedman, in *Naval War College Review*, v.26, no.3 (November-December 1973) 63-79.

"With the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle



East received a severe blow. Begun in the early 1960's, the program had been predicated on the sale and finance of arms to a volatile leader in a hostile environment. Indeed, shortly after the succession of Anwar Sadat to power, this expensive attempt at influencing Arab politics became something of a nightmare for the Soviets. Internal Arab power struggles, an increasingly hostile Arab press, and ever more demanding requests on the part of Sadat culminated in the expulsion of Soviet forces from the U.A.R. in July of 1972. The lessons of this long-term fiasco are apparent, for when a state seeks to 'purchase' allies the question of mutual exploitation is bound to lead to enmity."

d. *Cairo's 1972 Expulsion of Soviet Military Personnel*

THE EGYPTIAN EXPULSION OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN JULY 1972—CAUSES AND IMPACT. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 1973. 39 p. (ASDIRS 4353.)

"On 18 July 1972, Egypt's President Sadat announced that the functions of the Soviet military advisers in Egypt were terminated. Among the chief reasons were the friction between the Russians and the Egyptians arising over their respective adviser-advice roles and the Soviet refusal to provide offensive weapons in response to Egypt's requests. The expulsion impact's reached far beyond the immediate area and may still be spreading. The Soviets suffered at least a temporary setback in their Middle East expansionistic policy. The hopes for a meaningful peace in the area have probably been favored since there is a decreased possibility of a big power confrontation and the military balance is so strongly in Israel's favour that Egypt cannot soon undertake a precipitate action. There now exists a perhaps fleeting opportunity for the US to peacefully establish a presence in Egypt, the traditional head of the Arab world, which is believed to be in our interests."

e. *Egypt and the U.S.: American Economic and Military Assistance*

AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN REAPPROCHEMENT, by Shlomo Slonim, in *The World Today*, v.31, no.2 (February 1975) 47-57.

"The real turning point in US-Egyptian relations was the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt in July 1972. The Yom Kippur was simply accelerated a process already under way and the world-wide alert of US forces in October 1973 was not so much to rescue Israel as to save Egypt from a Soviet occupation that would have radically upset the balance of power."

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE US TO EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT, by Charles W. Hostler, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.4 (Autumn 1976) 539-544.

Text of an address given by Dr. Charles W.

Hostler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Commerce, before the *Financial Times* "Middle East Development Conference," Cairo, Egypt, June 8, 1976. Concentrating on the period since 1974 Dr. Hostler reviews the major efforts of the joint government-to-government commission, US Aid, US business and private foundations in providing assistance to the Egyptian economy.

MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE; COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 April 1976. 2 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Document 94-444.)

"Expresses objections to Senate approved additional transition quarter funding for foreign military sales and security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria."

MIDEAST JET SALE CLEARED: FIRST DELIVERIES IN FALL, in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, v.108, no.21 (22 May 1978) p. 20.

Details Defense Secretary Harold Brown's assurances on the Saudi Arabian sale in a letter to committee chairman, Sen. John Sparkman prior to the vote on the arms sale. The 54-44 Senate vote cleared the way for the jet fighter sales package to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt to begin deliveries in the fall. Deliveries scheduled are: eight Northrop F-5E fighters originally scheduled for sale to Ethiopia which "will now be included in the 50 F-5E's Egypt is to receive." 75 General Dynamics F-16 fighters for Israel "will begin delivery in late 1981, and is to be completed by the end of 1983." While delivery of 15 McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters will begin in mid-1981; to be completed in early 1982. Saudi Arabia also will begin receiving the first of its 60 F-15s in mid-1981, with delivery to be completed by mid-1984."

PROPOSED SALE OF C-130'S TO EGYPT. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. 121 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate.)

"Hearings before the Subcom on Foreign Assistance to examine effects of proposed cash sales to Egypt of six C-130 aircraft and training of Egyptian personnel on existing relationships in the Middle East. Hearings also appraise the probability and extent of future U.S. military assistance to Egypt. Includes news articles (p. 78-85)."

f. *Egypt and the USSR: Soviet Arms Aid*

SOVIET ARMS AND EGYPT, by Robert F. Pajak, in *Survival*, v.17, no.4 (July/August 1975) 165-173.

Dr. Pajak, Foreign Affairs Adviser with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reviews the history of Soviet Arms aid to Egypt. He concludes: "Despite some setbacks and frustrations experienced during the course of the programme, the Soviet leaders on balance probably still regard



military assistance as their most effective instrument for implementing their policy towards Egypt. Although that key Arab country remains as far as ever from being a convert to Soviet ideology, the Soviet Union has acquired a considerable reservoir of good will among elements of the Egyptian military and government . . . it is virtually certain that the situation will not result in an irrevocable split between the two countries. Both sides simply have too much at stake."

g. *Egyptian-Libyan Military Clashes*

LIBYA-EGYPT CLASH-LATEST THREAT TO MIDEAST PEACE, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.83, no.6 (8 Aug 1977) 36-38.

. . . "How the fighting began or who started it is obscured by mutual charges of aggression. What is clear is that a series of incidents culminated on July 19 in full-scale battles, with both sides using tanks, heavy artillery and jet fighters. A cease-fire was negotiated by Algerian President Houari Boumedienne and Yassir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . "The text includes an interview with Col. Oudhafi shortly before the outbreak of fighting.

MAXI-PLOTS BEHIND A STRANGE MINI-WAR, in *Time*, v.110, no.6 (8 August 1977) 33-34.

"Publicly Egypt insisted that its bitter four-day mini-war with Libya had been nothing more than a minor Border skirmish . . . Privately, Egyptian spokesman conceded that there was a serious Political purpose behind the armored assaults . . . The Egyptian's hit Libyan airfields at Al Adem, near Tobruk, Al Kufra and Umm Alayan, as well as a training camp for African 'volunteers' near Al Jaqhub . . . According to Egyptian intelligence, reports Time Cairo Bureau Chief Milton Wynn, Gaddafi-in cooperation with Ethiopia and with Soviet support-planned to launch attack on moderate governments all across northeast Africa . . ."

h. *Egyptian-Cypriot Clash 1978: The Demise of Egyptian Commandos at Larnaca Airport, Nicosia, Cyprus.*

DEBACLE IN CYPRUS, in *Newsweek*, v.91, no.10 (6 March 1978) 33-34.

Aftermath of the assassination in a Nicosia hotel of Yusef el Sebai, editor-in-chief of Cairo's semiofficial daily Al Abram. Sebai, "a personal friend of Sadat's, was apparently slain because he had accompanied the Egyptian President on his historic journey to Jerusalem." As other nations refused asylum to the assassins their plane with their hostages returned to Larnaca Airport, Cyprus. Here "over-eager Egyptian commandos tried to free hostages by force—after the radical Palestinians who held them had already agreed to surrender." The result was a "debacle". Cypriot President Kyprianou declared, "Egypt bears the responsibility for this tragedy." While Egyptian

President Sadat "denounced Kyprianou as a 'dwarf' and broke diplomatic relations with Cyprus." Now Kyprianou has the problem of what to do with the two captured terrorists.

THE STRANGE AFFAIR AT LARNACA AIRPORT, in the *Economist*, (25 February 1978) 51-52.

Describes the Egyptian Commando attack on the two terrorists who were holding hostages at Larnaca Airport Cyprus after they had killed Mr. Yousef Sibai of Egypt in Nicosia on February 18. The writer comments on the general confusion of both the terrorists and the Egyptian commandos. He writes: "That the hostages, crew and gunmen escaped unhurt is a manifest miracle. The behaviour of the commandos (15 of whom were killed) and the military attache suggests that they were determined to execute orders given to them in Cairo. If the ambassador ever tried to get these orders countermanded he failed to do so—perhaps because he could not get through to Cairo on the telephone."

7. *Sociological Aspects (See under Middle East Sociological Aspects)*

C. *The Gulf States (See also Chapter VI, and Appendixes)*

1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, by Mihssen Kadhim and Barry Poulson, in *Journal of Energy and Development*, v.1, n.2 (Spring 1976) 249-261.

Examines the effects of regional integration and industrialization in the Arab states of the Gulf on their absorptive capacity. The authors "provide a critical appraisal of potential investment avenues in these oil-based economies, and assess the role of natural resources, oil, and gas, in delineating efficient patterns of industrialization." In conclusion they explore the implications of these developments for the West. They find that "the emergence of the Arab states of the Gulf as major world producers of mature petrochemicals, is, in fact, in line with the basic interests of the West . . . because of the ensuing greater efficiency in the allocation of global resources."

ARAB STATES OF THE LOWER GULF: PEOPLE, POLITICS, PETROLEUM, by Joan Duke Anthony. Washington, D.C. THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, 1975. 273 p.

(The James Terry Duce Memorial Series; Volume III) "An attempt to provide both insight and information for an understanding of the way of the Society of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf function politically at a key turning point in history—their emergence onto international stage in an area of immense strategic significance of Bahrain and Qatar;



The United Arab Emirates and the individual Emirates; (Ahu Dhabi; Dubai; Sharjah; Ra's al-Khaymak; the three smaller Emirates: Ajman, Umm al-Qaywayn and Fujayrah). Bibliography.

AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, by Rochard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1977. 448 p. (DA PAM 550-185).

Contents: Historical Setting; Religious Life; Social Structure; The Oil Industry in the Persian Gulf States; Kuwait; Bahrain, Qatar; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Bibliography; Glossary. Tables and illustrations include: Abridged genealogies of the ruling families, charts of government structure, tables of armed services rank and insignia, and tables of economic and population statistics.

BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, QATAR AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: OFFICIAL STANDARD NAMES GAZETTEER. Washington, D.C., Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center, March 1976. 145 p.

THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE PERSIAN GULF EMIRATES, by Frederic K. Lundy, Jr. Washington, D.C. Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975. 77 p.

"While the scale of governmental oil revenues in the Persian Gulf has radically altered since the United Kingdom gave up its last special political and military relationships there, the economic problem of the emirates have not been entirely solved. This paper presents a reassessment of their economic prospects."

THE GULF: SHORT-STAY FAR EASTERN WORKERS WIN FAVOUR IN LABOUR MARKET, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.51 (22 December 1977) 4-5.

"Concern at the size of immigrant worker communities, especially those from the Indian subcontinent, has led to tough labour laws in the UAE (United Arab Emirates) and a preference for those workers least likely to stay long." The reluctance of the UAE and Kuwait to allow immigration "now threatens to become the biggest single constraint on future economic activity." Includes Table showing "Percentage of nationals in selected Middle East Countries."

PROGRESS IN THE GULF EMIRATES, by Walter Gunthardt, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.27, no.7 (October 1977) 6-13.

Reviews the current economic position of the United Arab Emirates particularly Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Bahrain. Discusses their interest in making "their own capitals into financial centers of more than just national importance." Black and white photos. Small outline map of Roads on page 6.

TRIBES AND POLITICS IN EASTERN

ARABIA, by J.E. Peterson, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 297-312.

Based on research carried out in al-Bahrayn, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman during 1974-1975. The author describes the evolution of political authority in the area from the decentralized, egalitarian tribe to the present nation or "city states." The tribes have contributed the ruling families of the new states, the concept of the majlis, a public session whereby the individual citizen is granted personal access to the ruler, and the shura, a process of consultation with tribal or community notables. In the 1970's all significant tribal autonomy has disappeared. The only tribes able to conduct their internal business free from government supervision are the few completely nomadic tribes of the desert. Income from oil has allowed the areas rulers to consolidate and delegate political power directly from themselves to the people without using the tribe as an intermediary. The author concludes that the ruling families "will undoubtedly remain paramount for some time to come." Furthermore, "successful pressure for broader political participation is likely to come from . . . professional groups, social clubs and organized labor", not from the tribes.

## 2. Bahrain (See also Chapter VI and Appendixes)

BAHRAIN, by Middle East Economic Digest Staff, MEED Special Report, March 1978, 68 p.

Contents include brief articles on: Banking and Finance; Oil and Gas; Industry; Construction and Property; Housing; Manpower; Trade; Utilities; Mina Sulman Port; Food; Telecommunications; Social Affairs; Expatriate Life; Basic Data; and Statistics. Also included are maps of Bahrain and of the city of Manama locating major facilities of interest.

BAHRAIN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN A MODERNIZING SOCIETY, by Emile A. Nakhleh. Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company. 1976. 191 p.

A case study of political development in Bahrain based on three years of field research. Addresses the principal agents of political socialization: the education system, the Arabic-language press, and the clubs, "which . . . are viewed as a substitute for political parties." Includes chapters on: Labor, Foreign policy, the first national election and the development of a democratic structure. The author concludes with a description of a possible "functional model of urban tribalism" based on his study of Bahrain. Thirty-four statistical tables. Bibliography pp. 179-187.

INTERVIEW: BAHRAIN'S FUTURE LIES IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.22 (3 June 1977) 6-7.



John Whelan, in Bahrain, interviews Minister of Development and Industry, Youssef Ahmad al-Shirawi. Shirawi said; "The government has no intention of rushing into any more major industries, and sees that Bahrain's future lies in service industries . . . The Gulf had almost become the victim of the world's industrial complexes, which were, at one time, interested in 'selling junk to the Gulf.' Shirawi said the US legislation under preparation to undermine the Arab boycott of Israel caused him no concern because the Arabs would continue to buy US products and services they valued." Shirawi also commented on the social implications of development. "If you want to understand the social factors that will be at work in Saudi Arabia in 1988-90, understand the social factors at work in Bahrain in 1975-77. They (the Saudis) are still in the takeoff period. We have an oil industry in Bahrain. We have aluminum. We are beginning to worry about the social implications of it, not only the financial side. You can build a hospital in one day but you cannot build a generation in a day."

**LABOR MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP IN BAHRAYN AND QATAR**, by Emile A. Nakhlen, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.2 (Spring 1977) 143-156.

Newly independent, the Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar have been forced to deal with numerous labor problems: a shortage of indigenous skilled manpower, expatriate labor, a lack of manpower planning, and "highly restrictive citizenship laws." In Bahrain and also in Qatar, the presence of foreign labor has encouraged indigenous workers to call for more government programs to train nationals. The author discusses labor and citizenship laws and ordinances in the two countries and presents a statistical profile of the manpower available in Bahrain based on 1971 data and in Qatar based on 1970 data. He concludes that they "must rely on foreign expertise and manpower in their development process." Therefore he suggests that their citizenship laws should be liberalized, their long range planning improved, and better statistical data should be developed.

### 3. *Kuwait (See also Appendixes)*

**CONTINUITY IN CHANGE**, by Richard Johns, in *Middle East International*, no.82, April 1978. 15-16.

Discusses the "smooth" re-ordering of the Kuwait ruling hierarchy and the formation of a new administration within two months of the death New Years day of Emir. Sheikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah. Chart illustrates the relationships of the ruling Sabah family.

**THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF KUWAIT**, by Radmile Trojanovic, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, n.629 (20 June 1976) 30-32. (Belgrade)

Kuwait "has recorded exceptional progress in its internal development, primarily by the sale of petroleum, as well as by the correct internal policy of the Al Sabah dynasty and other political factors in Kuwait . . . Relations between Yugoslavia and Kuwait have been improving, especially recently. They are particularly active in the domain of foreign policy and economic cooperation . . . These relations are characterized by mutual understanding, and close or identical views concerning most international problems, as well as by regular high level contacts . . . The volume of business done by Yugoslav companies in Kuwait amounts to around 500 million dollars, while Kuwait has allocated around 250 million dollars of financial credit to Yugoslavia, of which 125 million dollars are intended for financing the construction of the Yugoslav oil pipeline."

**KUWAIT**, a MEED Special Report, by Alan Mackie, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, Special Report, August 1977, 44 p.

Current status of the economy of Kuwait. Includes sections on: Economy, Banking and Finance, Co-operation, Investment, Oil and Gas, Industry, Trade, Ports and Transport, Housing, Education and Health, Manpower, Foreign Policy and Defence, Expatriate Life, Statistics. Map on inside front cover. Black and white photos in text. Basic data summary sheet. Many tables of statistics including: State budget for 1977/78 expenditure by department, investments under the current five year plan, Government revenue, Kuwait fund projects under consideration or signed since 1 July 1976, some public sector petrochemical projects 1977-81, crude oil and gas production and exports, imports and housing projects.

**THE KUWAIT CONFRONTATION OF 1961**, by Commander Charles W. Koburger, Jr., in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.100, no.1/851 (January 1974) 42-49.

Examines the British deployment to Kuwait in 1961 as "an example of . . . an employment of military power." Concludes that, "gunboat diplomacy is not dead . . . military power can sometimes be used quite effectively in such situations to maintain the status quo."

**MAPPING ARABIA**, by John Leatherdale and Roy Kennedy, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.141, Part 2 (July 1975) 240-251.

John Leatherdale, Mapping Manager and Roy Kennedy, Superintendent Surveyor with Hunting Surveys Limited have both led geodetic traversing parties in Arabia. This paper is based on a lecture given to the Geographical Society on 16 December 1974. The authors describe surveying techniques and methods of operation in the desert with particular reference to the contributions being made by Hunting Surveys Limited. Countries dis-



cussed include Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Includes drawing showing "most of the geodetic control which now exists throughout the Arabian peninsula."

**POLITICAL EFFICACY, POLITICAL TRUST AND THE ACTION ORIENTATIONS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN KUWAIT**, by Tawfic E. Farah and Faisal S.A. Al-Salem, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.3 (July 1977) p. 317-328.

Part of a larger project on political culture in Kuwait which is being directed by the authors. This paper reports on the results of a survey of 500 male Kuwait University students in 1975. Responses to the thirty-five-item-questionnaire-interview are analyzed under the following headings: "(1) the incidence of trust and efficacy among students; (2) the relationships between interpersonal and political trust; (3) the concept of political competence; (4) the trust-competence relationship; and (5) the relationship between trust, competence, and orientation to action." On the basis of the findings the authors report: "Kuwait students are not alienated from their political system, nor are they more efficacious than the general public . . . Most Kuwaiti students . . . trust the political system and favor 'traditional' methods of influencing it."

4. *Oman* (See also Chapter IV-D-6, Chapter VI and Appendixes)

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

**BACK DOOR TO ARABIA**, by Faris Glubb, in *Middle East International*, no. 15 (March 1975) 11-12.

A report from Beirut "on anxieties about the threat of US military involvement in South Arabia and the Gulf." The concern is based on the agreement in principle reached between President Ford and Oman's Sultan Qabus during the latter's visit to Washington in early 1975. "This agreement involves at least the supply of modern American weapons, including anti-tank missiles, to the Omani armed forces as well as a US request for 'occasional' use of the British-built base facilities on Masira Island, off Oman's south-eastern coast." The author concludes: "Masira is within easy striking distance of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates—in short, it controls the area where nearly half the OPEC states' proven oil reserves are concentrated. A presence in Masira would greatly facilitate the logistics of any military operation on the lines suggested by Robert Tucker in the American Zionist magazine Commentary, involving seizure by US forces of Kuwait, Saudi and Qatari oilfields."

**DEVELOPMENT SURVEYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST**, by W.B. Fisher and H. Bowen-Jones, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.140, Part 3 (October 1974) 454-466.

Describes "the preliminary findings of a four year Durham University research programme now in progress in northern Oman. Details are given of the organization and aims of the project . . . The Durham programme in Oman has . . . three objectives. The first . . . to record as far as possible Oman life zones and a region which will change and disappear forever . . . The Second, is to collect scientifically a coherent mass of observational data . . . which are selected on utilitarian grounds. Thirdly, through our direct official links with the Department of Agriculture and the Ministry of Development Organization in Oman, our aim is . . . to assist in interpretation and application." Text includes Maps of the Batina land system, the project area, and the Ibri region.

**OMAN: THE MAKING OF A MODERN STATE**, by John Townsend, New York, New York, St. Martin's Press. 1977. 212 p.

A first-hand account of the "evolution of the government of Oman from a structure almost feudal in its simplicity and implied relationships into what it is today, a government trying very hard to put a modern image before its own people and the world." The author who worked in Oman for almost seven years was formerly Economic Adviser to the Government of Oman in 1972-1975. Chapters include: The Environment; Sultan Qaboos and the New Order; The Challenge of the Future; Bibliography, Maps, Appendices: The Word of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur; PFLO Policy Intentions for Oman; Oman Law on Economic Development.

**OMAN: WHEN DESALINATION ALONE IS NOT THE WHOLE ANSWER**, by Sean Milno, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.17 (29 April 1977) 13-14.

"Oman's desalination plant has been operating for 18 months now. But the new five-year plan (1976-80) sets out to exploit a more traditional source of water: the 2,000-year-old underground irrigation system.

**OMAN: WINNING THE PEACE**, by Anthony McDermott, in *Middle East International*, no.66 (December 1976) 9-11.

The war in Dhofar is over. Sultan Qabous says: "I don't believe that such a war or fighting as we had in the past will start again." The author after reviewing the measures to consolidate the peace in Dhofar and to develop Oman as a whole concludes: "In the longer term, economic and social development will inevitably bring pressures for a more representative government . . . In the meanwhile, Sultan Qabous' rule will stand or fall by the way the second phase of Oman's more controlled and more tightly planned development works out."

b. *Wars in Oman*

**BRITAIN AND 'THE OMAN WAR': AN ARABIAN ENTANGLEMENT**, by J.E. Peter-



son, in *Asian Affairs*, v.63 (New series v.7) Part III (October 1976) 285-298.

Describes the "minor skirmishes" that followed the death in May 1954 of the Imam of interior Oman. This conflict arose in an atmosphere of "incipient Arab nationalism, amidst Saudi Arabian claims to al-Buraymi oasis, and was compounded by the British-French-Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956. Thus . . . the local nature of the events was distorted into a wider question of Arab-British relations in the Middle East. In Oman, the end result was the total unification of the country . . . In a wider arena, these skirmishes precipitated debate over British presence and objectives in the Arab world . . . The situation made for a tension in Anglo American relations and was almost certainly an important factor in subsequent British withdrawals from Aden and the Persian Gulf." The author describes in some detail the development of the internal skirmishing in Oman during the 1950's and early 1960's and the eventual involvement of the British, Saudis, the Arab League, the world press and the United Nations.

END OF A REBELLION?, by Matthew Salisbury, in *Middle East International*, no.57 (March 1976) 18-20.

Reviews the current status of Oman's armed forces, police and Civil Aid Department in light of the end of the war in Dhofar. "Military defeat, the rapid 'Omanisation' of the Sultan's Armed Forces, and the possibility of Iranian withdrawal all weaken the Popular Front's chances of continued moral or financial support. Faced with the need to reassert itself the obvious alternative to open insurgency is to return to political subversion and sabotage, and to concentrate on building a network of contacts within Omani society."

END OF A TEN YEAR'S WAR, by Penelope Tremayne, in *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, v.122, no.1 (March 1977) 44-48.

The end of the war in Dhofar, Oman "has been very little talked about and still less publicised; yet it was of great significance. A small country with a fighting force built up ad hoc out of nearly nothing, and adapting techniques from those of other wars fought in very different terrains and conditions, has defeated an enemy that has been backed, over 15 years, by China and the USSR. Not only has a leftist insurgency been quelled, once more disproving the propaganda contention that such movements are unstoppable; it has been shown that they can be defeated even when they exist primarily or wholly as part of a major strategic effort by the Eastern bloc." The author who "has had full access to the theatre of operations," concludes: "Oman . . . is faced with the need to heal the scars of the late war while defending herself from a sec-

ond assault; with the need to adjust to a brief, near-boom economic transformation, in the knowledge that the oil-flow and the cash will begin to dry up within two or three years; and the need to adjust relationships with the other Arab states (to which she . . . has . . . had only intermittent and hostile contacts) while retaining the good relations with the West and with Iran which are vital to her survival. It is a program that . . . calls for a steady hand . . ." Text includes Map of Western Dhofar showing Picquet posts.

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: THE REBELLION IN DHUFAR, by J.E. Peterson, in *World Affairs*, v.139, no.4 (Spring 1977) 278-291.

Discusses the beginning and course of the rebellion in Dhufar, the southern province of the Sultanate of Oman. "Although the rebellion in Dhufar began as a tribal insurrection against a reactionary and paternalistic Sultan, it soon resulted in an ideological—as well as military—struggle between leftist guerrillas and an autocratic government. The rebellion also exacerbated relations between Oman and its fellow conservative regimes in the area, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY) along with its supporters. Eventually, what began as a localized conflict also came to exhibit overtones of Great Power rivalry, with members of both blocs extending logistical and moral support to their respective proxies. Oman's strategic location at the entrance of the Persian Gulf combined with varying degrees of outside involvement in the conflagration to focus attention on Dhufar as a political problem affecting the security and stability of the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region." The author concludes: "true success in Dhufar will ultimately be measured by the attitude and allegiance shown by the people of the province. By the time of the virtual cessation of military action in late 1975, the Sultanate's leadership had shown its willingness and determination to attack the social and economic problems of Dhufar . . . Seemingly, not only military victory was within the Sultanate's grasp, but a good deal of progress had been made towards replacing a situation of mistrust and neglect with a spirit of unification and mutual cooperation . . ." Related articles are referenced in footnotes.

5. *Qatar* (See also Chapter VI and Appendixes)

LABOR MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP IN BAHRAYN AND QATAR, by Emile A. Nakhleh, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.2 (Spring 1977) 143-156.

Newly independent, the Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar have been forced to deal with numerous labor problems: a shortage of indigenous skilled manpower, expatriate labor, a lack of man-



power planning, and "highly restrictive citizenship laws." In Bahrain and also in Qatar, the presence of foreign labor has encouraged indigenous workers to call for more government programs to train nationals. The author discusses labor and citizenship laws and ordinances in the two countries and presents a statistical profile of the manpower available in Bahrain based on 1971 data and in Qatar based on 1970 data. He concludes that they "must rely on foreign expertise and manpower in their development process." Therefore he suggests that their citizenship laws should be liberalized, their long range planning improved, and better statistical data should be developed.

**MAPPING ARABIA**, by John Leatherdale and Roy Kennedy, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.141, Part 2 (July 1975) 240-251.

John Leatherdale, Mapping Manager and Roy Kennedy, Superintendent Surveyor with Hunting Surveys Limited have both led geodetic traversing parties in Arabia. This paper is based on a lecture given to the Geographical Society on 16 December 1974. The authors describe surveying techniques and methods of operation in the desert with particular reference to the contributions being made by Hunting Surveys Limited. Countries discussed include Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Includes drawing showing "most of the geodetic control which now exists throughout the Arabian peninsula."

**QATAR, A MEED SPECIAL REPORT**, by Michael Prest, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, Special Report, April 1977, 32 p.

Short reviews of the status of Oil and Gas, Industry, Banking and Finance, Agriculture, Ports and Transport, Telecommunications, Planning and Housing, Education and Health, Expatriate Life, Foreign Relations and The Future. Includes Statistics from IMP international financial statistics, a summary of contracts reported in MEED in 1975-77, import-export statistics from the Qatar, customs department, and a basic data summary page. Outline map on back of front cover, black and white photos in the text. Short select bibliography on p. 26.

**QATAR FIRE: THE BIG ONE EVERYONE WAS AFRAID OF**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.15 (15 April 1977) p. 3.

An explosion and fire destroyed Qatar's Umm Said natural gas liquefaction (NGL) plant on April 3, 1977. This is "the biggest loss of its kind in the history of the industry." The complex was part of a scheme to use gas from the onshore Dukhan oil field. "According to oil industry sources in Kuwait, the fire has set back projects under construction for an indefinite period. Qatar may well want to reassess its gas strategy and could take the

Umm Said loss as an opportunity to cut back rather than diversify."

6. *United Arab Emirates* (See also Chapter VI and Appendixes)

a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

**SEWERAGE: PIONEERING LOCAL ANSWERS TO LOCAL PROBLEMS IN THE UAE**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.17 (29 April 1977) p. 15.

Abu Dhabi's 20-year master plan for sewerage has as its goal an effluent fit to water the city's parks. The major problems in construction are: corrosion from the highly septic sewage produced in the gulf, the salinity of the ground water, Abu Dhabi's flat terrain and high water table.

**SHARJAH; BUILDING ON INVESTMENT—NOT OIL**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.15 (15 April 1977) p.4.

An account of an address given by Dr. Bart Paff, an American advisor to the Ruler, Shaikh Sultan, to a conference organised by the London daily Financial Times. "Paff, in a sharply worded talk, defined the different way business is done and government organised in the UAE. Foreign businessmen were expected to deal directly with the government of Sharjah . . . We want to encourage brain-intensive and capital-intensive industries, and we want foreigners to run them . . . The Ruler wanted as multi-national a business community as possible. This was to avoid domination by any one country . . . Paff gave as examples of Sharjah's faith in western management the decision to hand over the Qasimi hospital to Allied Medical of the UK, the port to Seatrain of the US and the airport to the Frankfurt Airport Authority of West Germany . . . Sharjah is the fastest-growing state in the Middle East, but we are building Sharjah not on oil but on foreign investment."

**UAE: IMMIGRATION POLICY TO GOVERN THE SCALE OF INDUSTRY**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.31 (5 August 1977) p.5 plus.

An "exhaustive survey" of the emirate's potential by the Swiss consultants Elektrowatt Ingenieurunternehmung concludes that "Abu Dhabi's industrial future depends on a political decision by the UAE on population policy . . . It identifies a range of industries in which foreign partners could participate, but makes it clear that these industries could only be supported if the UAE's present population of 656,000 increased to 3 million by 1985." Statistical tables: Population comparisons-% of males, females, nationals, foreigners; contributions to GNP by sector. Document: Opportunities for industrial participation in Abu Dhabi (p.46 plus).

b. *Economic Aspects*

**DEVELOPMENT ANOMALIES IN THE BEDUIN OASES OF AL-LIWA**, by Frauke Heard-



Bey, in *Asian Affairs*, v.61 (New Series v.5), Part 3 (October 1974) 272-286.

Al-Liwa is one of the three "natural centres for settled habitation" in Abu Dhabi. Located in the extreme south, its nearest village is 90 miles from Abu Dhabi town. About 60 solitary date gardens and settlements are spaced out in an east-west lying crescent. "The nature of the country and the economic opportunities it affords dictate that the settlements of the Liwa are seasonal, and always have been. The importance of the Liwa's potable water and its date gardens radiates way beyond the confines of this string of oases. It is the socio-economic centre for the whole of al-Dhafrah, the desert which is bounded by the mountain foreland of the Hajar range in the east, the Subkhat Matti in the west, the Rub' al-Khali in the south and the coastal flats of the Gulf in the north." The author examines the new patterns of life that have come to Liwa focusing on "the reality of daily life throughout the seasons as reflected in the Liwa settlements." The conclusion is a paradox: "Very few changes are actually apparent in the Liwa villages themselves," yet for the "majority of its occasional inhabitants" there has been much change. This is because their "customary seasonal migration" takes them away from their desert home to the new towns in search of work. However, "they are still more at home in their property in the Liwa and their minds are as intently focused on the traditional care of it as ever."

**UAE: ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN EXPECTED TO CONTINUE**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.44 (4 November 1977) p. 11 plus.

The economy of UAE has been slowing down from the "boom of 1976". UAE's ambassador in London "said it had more than a year to run." Abu Dhabi is not "affected as badly by the slump as Sharjah." Abu Dhabi has yet to agree with the other emirates on budget contributions. As a result "the pendulum appears to be swinging back to separatism . . . In this context, the assassination on 25 October of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saif Bin-Said al-Ghobash is a tragedy . . . As one presidential adviser said: The tragedy was that Ghobash had no enemies . . ." Statistical tables showing Abu Dhabi building materials price index, building construction permits and industrial projects completed in 1976.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**, by John Whelan, in *Meed Special Report*, July 1977, 50 p.

Review of current economic conditions in the United Arab Emirates. Includes brief sections on Oil, Gas, Industry, Jabel Ali port, Construction, Infrastructure, Northern Emirates, Commerce, Merchant Elite, Banking, Agriculture, Fisheries, Manpower, Education and Health, Aid and Foreign

Policy, Expatriate Life, Statistics. Also includes a section on How to do Business in the UAE. Outline Map, bibliography, and basic data summary sheet.

**THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY**, 2nd, by K.G. Fenelon. London, Longman, 1976. 164 p.

Dr. Fenelon, Statistical Advisor to the Government of Abu Dhabi, "provides a comprehensive introduction to the United Arab Emirates, concentrating on their extraordinary economic development in recent years." Chapters include: "The Foundation of the United Arab Emirates; Economic Aid and Development; Oil and Natural Gas; Agriculture; Pearling, Fishing, and Seafaring; Trade and Commerce; Industry and Industrial Development; Money, Banking and Finance; Transport and Communications; Education; Health and Housing; Customs and Pastimes; and Archaeology." Statistical Appendix, outline maps, and bibliography.

#### **D. Iran (See also Chapter VI and Appendixes)**

##### **1. Government, Parties, Politics**

**BULLET AND BATON FAIL TO BEAT CYCLE OF RELIGIOUS PROTEST**, by Vahe Petrossian, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.22, no.20 (19 May 1978) p.12

A cycle of protest and government reaction started in Iran 18 months ago with open letters written by intellectuals and former politicians. These protests have taken a "more ominous turn this year, with the entry of the Shi'ite Muslim mosque into the active ranks of the opposition." A newspaper article in January "which attacked the exiled ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the . . . response of the police to the demonstrations it provoked in the religious city of Qom, kindled far more widespread and more dangerous opposition to the regime than had previously existed. Since the Qom demonstrations . . . every 40th day has provided the occasion for the mosque to close bazaars and hold meetings and for security forces to retaliate. The Shah has made it clear . . . that he would continue to apply his own very personal definition of liberalisation . . . But, faced with frustrated economic and political expectations at the same time, the Shah may have to call on all the experience of his 37 years of rule to meet this late challenge to his authority."

**THE CROWNED CANNIBALS: WRITINGS ON REPRESSION IN IRAN**, by Reza Baraheni. New York, Vintage Books, 1977. 279 p.

Terror in Iran; The Strangulation of Iranian Writers; Prison Memoirs; Memoirs of Other Prisoners of the Pahlavi period.

**IRAN: GOVERNMENT CHANGES SIGNIFY MOVE TO PRAGMATISM**, by Nicholas



Cumming-Bruce, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.32 (12 August 1977) p.5 plus.

Iran's new Prime Minister, Jamshid Amouzegar "is expected to take a more hard-headed approach to reconciling the country's economic aspirations with what can be achieved without the severe imbalance between different sectors from which the country is still suffering . . . The change of government is said to have been prompted in part by the acute shortage of electricity . . . The power crisis is, however, just the latest in a series of infrastructural constraints on industry during the last three years . . . At the same time the inflation rate is now about 25 per cent . . . Amouzegar has identified lower prices and more housing as his administration's priorities." New appointments to senior cabinet positions support this. In addition he has brought into his cabinet as Minister of Information and Tourism Darius Homayun, a newspaper proprietor who was himself imprisoned in the 1950's. "That should at least herald a freer flow of information to the public. It may also be part of a long-term strategy to step up the scope of political debate . . ."

**IRAN: TRANSITION AND HEGEMONY**, by Dietrich Kappeler, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.27, no.7 (October 1977) 18-26.

Iran is trying to "develop political, economic and ideological concepts of its own, which differ from those of both the capitalist West and the communist East and which could serve as alternatives for the nations of the Third World . . . It . . . seems as if Iran will one day have to decide whether to join the Arab world, to develop further its problematical relations with its non-Arab neighbors, or to remain in its present position of relative isolation—which in Tehran is generally viewed as being a bridge between civilizations.

**IRAN FINDS A PARTY SYSTEM: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF IRAN NOVIN**, by Marvin G. Weinbaum, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27 no.4 (Autumn 1973) 439-455.

The Iran Novin (New Iran) party led by Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda has been in power longer than any previous Iranian political party. This essay describes the early development of the party from its "origins as a Majlis-centered clique in late 1963" to the ruling government party. "Four measures of institutionalism are used to survey the structure of the party. The author finds that the Iran Novin has responsibilities for spheres "traditionally reserved for the bureaucracy, the security police and the extended family." It's "failure to arouse popular endorsement . . . casts doubt over the party's future role in this rapidly transforming society." In conclusion "It is debatable whether the . . . party is the forerunner of a single

comprehensive party, or . . . the fullest maturation of a cadre party system."

**THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1975**, by Hassan Mohammadi-Nejad, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.1 (January 1977) p.103-116.

Elections in Iran "have played neither a legitimacy nor a commitment role in the political system . . . In the 1975 elections there was a conscious effort "distinguished feature" was its "timing with the institution of a one-party system." The one-party system had been "proposed by the Shahanshah" on March 2, 1975 and was immediately adopted by the four legal parties. 298 candidates were elected for the June 1975 Iranian parliament from an approved slate of 950 candidates. The author describes and analyzes the process of electing these candidates and presents a "rough profile" of the composition of the 24th parliament.

**THE PLASTICITY OF INFORMAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF IRAN**, by James A. Bill, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.2 (Spring 1973) 131-151.

Examines the informal groups which . . . "represent the major social and political decision-making structure . . ." in Iran. "Factions, cliques, coteries and ad hoc collectivities of all sorts are the kinds of group formations that count in Iran." The author finds that "pervasive conflict, mark all levels and systems in Iranian society. The continual shifting balance of forces has led individuals and families to protect their position by maintaining contacts and memberships in as many groups as possible. This "traditional Iranian system is now challenged by the forces of modernization."

#### 2. Military Aspects

**BUILDING A NAVY IN A HURRY**, by Lt. Commander Thomas F. Green, in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.104, no.899 (January 1978) 41-49.

Lt. Commander Green, was the MAAG submarine training advisor to the Imperial Iranian Navy, as part of the ARMISH-MAAG from 1975 until 1977. Here he describes the expansion of the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) "from a coastal force, oriented around patrol boats, to a 'blue-water' navy with some of the most modern and complex weapon systems in existence." The assistance of U.S. Navy advisors in helping overcome recruiting and training problems for a fleet suddenly expanded by the acquisition of 30 ships and 40 helicopters of differing classes, builders, and countries of origin is also discussed. Text includes table: "Ships of the Imperial Iranian Navy", showing ship type, number, displacement, length and weapons.

**IMPROVED CHIEFTAIN FOR IRAN**, in *International Defense Review*, v.9, n.4 (August 1976) 640-642.



Detailed description concerning what is known about the "improved Chieftain tanks" that British has contracted to supply Iran. The tanks will be called Shir Iran, meaning Lion of Iran in Farsi. Over 1,200 tanks are to be fitted with the new armour. Photos and drawings.

3. *Foreign Policy* (See also III-A-11)

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SHAH**, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *Strategic Review*, v.3, no.4 (Fall 1975) 32-44.

"Traditionally, Iran's foreign policy was preoccupied with strictly local issues, particularly with securing freedom from Soviet encroachment on its northern frontier. The Shah's diplomacy now sweeps to the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and beyond to the Indian Ocean, the European Common Market countries and the United States. His foreign policy is based on a careful calculation of national interests and a realistic appraisal of Great Power politics. His concern with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, based largely on Iranian economic interests, has led him to seek to maintain the security of oil resources and sea lines of communication and to insulate the area from becoming involved in the vicissitudes of Great Power rivalry."

**IRANIAN AND SAUDI ARABIAN SECURITY INTERESTS**, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies*, Special Supplement, May 1978. 50-56.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia because of its possible effect on their security interests in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia share several security objectives: "(1) the preservation of their monarchical forms of government, (2) the maintenance of friendly . . . governments in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region, (3) the continuance of the flow of oil to . . . Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, and (4) the prevention of external forces from gaining hegemony in the region . . . Additionally, there is a deep Saudi interest in supporting Somalia, an Islamic state, for religious reasons." Saudi Arabia at present is limited to providing financial and diplomatic support as a means for influencing events in the Horn of Africa. Iran is developing its forces so that they "will be able to counter threats as far south into the Indian Ocean as the 10th degree North Latitude, which crosses the edge of Somalia and passes into the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden." Mt. Cottrell concludes that: "Iranian and Saudi Arabian security policies are tied directly to the need to maintain the status quo in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This, in turn, is related to their new-found economic prosperity which depends on the continued export of oil to the world's industrial nations. Arms build-ups in the area—particularly Iran's—are a reflection of mounting con-

cern that they must fend for themselves rather than depend on the United States or anyone else for maintaining the stability and security of their region."

**IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: STRATEGIC LOCATION, ECONOMIC AMBITION, AND DYNASTIC DETERMINATION**, by R.M. Burrell, in *Journal of International Affairs*, v.29, n.2 (Fall 1975) 129-138.

Addresses the ambitions of the Shah and his attitudes toward the role that Iran should play in foreign affairs. The author concludes: "It must be stressed that Iranian foreign policy is formulated around, and is designed to assist in the achievement of, the Shah's vision of Iran as a major economic power. The preservation of stability is an essential means to that end, and the area in which the Shah seeks stability now extends from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean."

**THE SHAH ON WAR AND PEACE**, by Arnaud de Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.90, n.20 (14 November 1977) 69-71. (Interview)

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran comments on the Middle East, his impressions of the reliability of U.S. support, his need for weapons, Iranian prisoners, oil prices, Iran's nuclear intentions.

4. *Iran's Relations with Iraq*

**IRAN-IRAQ: TREATY ON INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS (DONE AT BAGHDAD, June 13, 1975)**, in *International Legal Materials*, v.14, n.5 (September 1975) 1133-1138. (Document)

Text of agreement from the Baghdad Observer, Nos. 2240-41, Vol. V, of June 23, 1975 and June 24, 1975. Protocols are on pages 1134, 1135 and 1137. An exchange of letters between the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq appears on page 1138. This agreement includes: "Agreement on Navigation in Shatt-ul-Arab; Agreement on grazing rights; Agreement on border rivers; and Agreement on the rights and terms of reference of border commissions."

(LI) **REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1974**, by Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Munoz, *United Nations Document S/11291* (20 May 1974) 11p.

This report by Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Munoz of Mexico to the Secretary-General and the Security Council presents "a detailed account of his activities, observations, talks with leaders, understandings agreed upon, and recommendations" concerning the border disputes between Iraq and Iran. The appendixes contain "a very detailed map showing town locations, fortresses, and the conflicting border claims." The appendixes also contain a



three-page chronological description of all of the incidents from April 10, 1972 to March 6, 1974.

**THE RESOLUTION OF MAJOR CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ**, by Robert D. Tomasek, in *World Affairs*, v.139, n.3 (Winter 1976-77) 206-230.

Examines the "trade-offs" which were "crucial in generating the settlement of March 1975" of the major controversies between Iran and Iraq. The author analyzes the Shatt al-Arab River controversy, the central border dispute, and the Kurdish problem, which were the "three major issues resolved in the settlement." The "emphasis" is on "explaining why Iran in the first and Iraq in the second felt their objectives could be accomplished only by a successful trade-off: Iraq acknowledging that the river boundary should be in the middle and not the eastern bank, and Iran agreeing to end all assistance to the Kurds." The final part of the paper discusses "why both governments realized that a war would be detrimental to their interests. This is especially interrelated to the broader policies of both governments in respect to Persian Gulf issues, attitudes toward Israel, oil wealth, the Iranian desire to be a great power, and connections with the superpowers." Extensive references to supporting publications appear in the notes at the end of the article.

5. *Iran and the Persian Gulf* (See also III-A-11)

**IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF**, by Dr. Mahmoud Foroughi, in *Australian Outlook*, v.31, no.1 (April 1977) 142-146.

The Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Iran presents "As an individual Iranian . . . in real national interests and objectives of Iran in the Persian Gulf which form the bases of Iranian foreign policy in the region. These interests and objectives have been openly proclaimed and are being openly pursued by the Iranian Government." Iran has both political and economic objectives that determine her foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. The political objectives are governed by "two considerations of the utmost vital national interest. First, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman cover the entirety of the southern borders of the country. Second, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman form the very artery through which pass all of Iran's exports as well as most of her key imports." Another area of concern in the Persian Gulf region are the approaches to the south-eastern frontier of the country, the Baluchistan province of Pakistan where a separatist movement would constitute "a threat to the security of the Persian Gulf." Economic, objectives are determined by problems concerned with oil reserves, the delineation of continental shelves and undersea boundaries; and with oil exports, which can only be shipped through the Persian Gulf. Therefore, "Iranian foreign policy is principally directed towards the maintenance of

stability in those waters, and towards the freedom and safety of international commerce and shipping . . ." Iran, however "will not tolerate any subversive activity which would endanger the security of the Straits of Hormuz or the freedom of navigation for international commerce in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This position is unalterable . . ."

**IRAN'S POLICY TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF**, by Sepehr Zabih, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, n.3 (July 1976) 345-358.

Reviews Iran's policy toward the Persian Gulf. The author concludes: "Iran's policy . . . is determined by factors and conditions that are applicable to her general international posture . . . For obvious reasons, over the next few years, the Gulf has literally become the lifeline of Iran, and to a lesser extent, of other littoral states. Consequently, it has become the sharpest focus of Iran's foreign policy. This policy is dynamic and active, while striving to be nonprovocative."

**IRAN'S SEARCH FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION**, by Rouhollah K. Ramazani\*, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.2 (Spring 1976) 173-186.

An exploration of the development of the principle of "regional security by regional powers", which "the leaders of Iran have advocated . . . from the very beginning of Iran's resurgent influence in regional politics." The author traces the origin of this principle to the British decision in 1968 to withdraw from the area "east of Suez". At this time Iran "advocated . . . that the security of the Persian Gulf should be maintained primarily by the littoral states. As a corollary . . . it has also advocated that great powers should keep out of the Gulf area". Gradually this principle has been extended "from the area of the Persian Gulf proper to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean" and further. "The achievement of a regional security system . . ." The author finds that the "two principal issues that Iran should clearly face in its continuing search for regional cooperation" are those of: "the occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, and its military presence in Oman" . . . Settlement of these issues would do much to remove "Arab suspicion of Iranian intentions."

\*Rouhollah K. Ramazani is Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

6. *Iran's Relations with Oman* (See also Chapter IV-C-4)

**IRAN-OMAN; AGREEMENT ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (DONE AT TEHRAN, July 25, 1974)**, in *International Legal Materials*, v.14, n.6 (November 1975) 1478-1479. (Document)

Reproduced from *Oman News, Bulletin* n.6/76 (August 1975), a monthly bulletin issued by the



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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



Embassy of Oman at Washington, D.C. establishes the boundary line.

JOINT IRANI-OMANI COMMUNIQUE, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 303-305.

"Reprinted from *Oman News*, 1/74, March 1974, Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington, D.C." Includes statements calling "for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories;" and "the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries."

7. *Iran's Relations with the Soviet Union*

THE AZERBAIJAN INCIDENT: THE SOVIET UNION IN IRAN, 1941-46, by Major William R. Andrews, in *Military Review*, v.54, no.8 (August 1974) 74-85.

An attempt by the Soviet Union to establish a communist state in the Middle East based on the Iranian Province of Azerbaijan is described. It "was prevented from doing so largely because of a resolute stand by the United States." Throughout World War II, the Soviet Union had used the presence of its troops in Iran to encourage the development of the "Tudeh" Party through its supporter the Iranian Communist Jafar Pishevari. At the conclusion of World War II, instead of withdrawing all of her troops as promised in the 1942 Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, Iran and the Soviet Union, The Soviet Union on 4 March 1946, sent in even more troops. "By the end of the month 15 brigades had arrived in Azerbaijan . . . on 12 March, Soviet armored units fanned out in three columns across the northern provinces held by the Red Army . . . On 21 March 1946, Harry S. Truman wrote to Stalin, stating that the United States expected the Russians to withdraw their forces." A timetable was set and Truman warned that he would use U.S. naval forces and land troops in Iran if it was not met. By 9 May 1946 the Red Army departed from Iran, and the concessions for the existence of the Azerbaijan Republic that favored the Soviet Union were later successfully countered by the Shah of Iran. The author concludes that "The Azerbaijan incident, though often overlooked, constitutes an important milestone in what has become known as the Cold War."

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOVIET-IRANIAN TRADE: AN OVERVIEW OF THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Manoucher Parvin, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.1 (Winter 1977) 31-43.

Reviews Soviet Iran trade flow since 1951 in order to determine from Iran's non-oil trade today what the "developmental pattern of tomorrow" will be once Iran emerges from the "oil generation." The studies purpose is "the identification and classification of motives for, and cause and consequences of, the trade between the two countries. A general historical, conceptual and theoretical re-

view of socialist and non-socialist trade theory and policy is offered . . . "

8. *Iran and The United States*

ACCESS TO OIL—THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, Prepared by Fern Racine Gold and Melvin A. Conant, at the request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate. Washington, Government Printing Office, December 1977. 113p. (Pub No. 95-70)

Evaluates the bilateral relationships between the United States, and Iran, and the United States and Saudi Arabia in terms of their contribution to access to oil. Chapters include: Access to Oil; The Franco-Algerian Example, 1962-73; Saudi Arabia; Iran; and Implications for the United States. The authors conclude: "the meaning and durability of the U.S. relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia depend very largely on the continuing political acceptance by either kingdom of the arrangements. Unless this political factor remains secure, and the undertakings of the parties remain harmonious and to their mutual benefit, everything will fall apart in the Gulf. Yet the prospect is one of change, of instability . . ." The U.S. interest in the Gulf is a reflection "both of the vital interests of allies and of its own growing dependence upon Middle East oil . . . A U.S. commitment to the defense of the oil resources of the Gulf and to political stability in the region must constitute one of the most vital and enduring interests of the United States."

ARMS AND ADVISORS: VIEWS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, by E.A. Bayne and Richard O. Collin, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 21p. (*Southwest Asia Series*, v.9, no.1)

"In considering the mechanics of transferring both military technology and military equipment from the United States to Persian Gulf nations, the authors focus on the pivotal role of the military advisor. They also explore the close relationship between the sales of arms and the sale of information/advice and the development of a coherent arms policy."

ARMS AND THE SHAH, by Leslie M. Pryor,\* in *Foreign Policy*, no.31 (Summer 1978) 56-71.

\*Leslie M. Pryor is the pseudonym of a Western observer who has lived in Iran.

Discusses the contribution of United States arms transfers to the Iranian military build-up. Mr. Pryor concludes that "Iran's military build-up does more to threaten regional tranquility than the allegedly hostile postures of its neighbors." However, "it will not be easy to limit significantly the U.S. role as Iran's primary weapons source, for several factors militate for the present level of arms sales. These include the diplomate leverage that Iran can sometimes exercise over the United States,



the free competition and marketing discretion allowed weapons companies, and the desire on the part of any American administration to maintain the research capabilities and employment opportunities that are provided by the U.S. arms industry."

**IRAN: THE PSYCHOPOLITICS OF ARMS: THE POLITICS OF NEIGHBORLINESS**, by Gregory Copley, Editor; and the Foreign Staff, in *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, n.8-9, (1976) 6-17 plus.

Examines the question of why Iran "has been constantly accused by the Western (and Eastern) press of undertaking a massive and aggressive arms build-up while Iraq has been patently ignored . . ." Quotes extensively from "a recent staff report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled 'US Military Sales to Iran' prepared by Robert Mantel . . . and Geoffrey Kemp . . ." The authors conclude: "The Senate Report shows that balanced analysis is available in Washington; the reaction shows in the press that the public may still refuse to allow the Administration to act upon well-reasoned thinking." Soviet response to "a discernible assertiveness . . . in Iranian diplomacy" is also discussed.

**IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES: AN EXPERIMENT IN ENDURING FRIENDSHIP**, by Rouhollah K. Ramazani\*, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1976) 322-334.

Portrays "in broad strokes the dynamics of Irano-American relations since World War II." There has been a shift in the United States image "that Iran could do no wrong . . .", to a new image "that it does everything wrong." There has been an "important transformation in the relative position of the two countries . . . paralleled nevertheless by an enduring friendship." Stress in the relations between the two nations has occurred as "American ambition has contracted from global to selective involvement while Iran's aspiration has expanded from preservation of its legal independence to regional predominance as it is changing from a small to a medium power."

\*Rouhollah K. Ramazani is Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.

**THE LEGAL STATUS OF AMERICAN FORCES IN IRAN**, by Richard Pfau, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.2 (Spring 1974) 141-154.

Examines the legal status of the American advisors in Iran under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) ratified by Iran in 1964. "Unlike the Status Forces Agreements that govern most American servicemen overseas, the arrangement in Iran allows the United States exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all personnel at all times . . . This kind of extraterritoriality reminds many Iranians of the

earlier 'capitulations' under which foreigners had enjoyed similar privileges." This article describes "the evolution of American thinking concerning extraterritoriality in general, and shows how the Irano-American agreement "resulted from the interaction between the general attitude of the United States and the dynamics of Iran's modernization." The author concludes with suggestions for alternate courses of action: "a treaty similar to the NATO SOFA . . . replacing exclusive American jurisdiction with concurrent Irano-American jurisdiction", with special provisions for the treatment of off-duty traffic accidents.

**U.S. MILITARY SALES TO IRAN; A STAFF REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES-SENATE**. Washington, Government Printing Office, July 1976. 59p.

Chapters include: Evolution of U.S. Military Programs in Iran; The Demand for Arms, Iran's Major Defense Programs; Demographic and Socio-Economic Effects of Iran's Military Programs; The Supply of Arms, and Appendixes concerning High Level Visitors to Iran; Security Assistance Dollar Value, and a List of Contractors and Personnel. The study focuses on the U.S. decision-making process, the U.S. involvement in implementing the arms sales programs to Iran, and on identifying and analyzing future policy and programmatic implications inherent in the U.S.-Iranian military relationship as it has emerged. Includes Map of Iran showing airfields, major ports and roads.

**US STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA**, by Robert Ghobad Irani, in *Parameters; Journal of the US Army War College*, v.7, n.4 (1977) 21-34.

Discusses the development of US national security policies and broadly defined strategic interests with regard to Iran and Saudi Arabia; the changing context of US policy toward them as a result of events in 1973; and the principal issues in US relations with them during the remainder of the 1970's. The author concludes: "Iran will remain the pivotal center of power in this area, followed by Saudi Arabia . . . As long as these two major regional powers remain moderate, pro-Western, and anti-Communist, the balance of power in the Gulf area will also remain favorable to the West. In addition . . . these two countries are pivotal to the maintenance of pro-Western influence in the Middle East, particularly as long as Egypt joins them . . ."

#### 9. Land and the People

**AN ETHNOGRAPHIC AND ECOLOGICAL SURVEY OF LURISTAN, WESTERN PERSIA: MODERNIZATION IN A NOMADIC PASTORAL SOCIETY**, by Jacob Black-Michaud, in



*Middle Eastern Studies*, v.10, no.2 (May 1974) 210-233.

Based on fieldwork in Luristan during 1969. The author spent over a year living in the camp of the Hassanwand tribe. He discusses: "Physical geography, Human geography, History: the effects of forced sedentarization and present day conditions."

THE MAKING OF IRAN, by Basil Booth, in *Geographical Magazine*, January 1977, 243-249.

An "expedition to the Makran coast of southern Iran in spring 1976 was sponsored by the Royal Geographical Society and Imperial College London. Geologists and geomorphologists were able to study the region in detail and to use their findings to reconstruct the movements of sections of the earth's crust in the Indian Ocean region over a period of 200,000,000 years." Maps and Photos of the area are included in the text.

NOMAD-SEDENTARY INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, by Abraham Rosman and Paula G. Rubel, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, n.4 (October 1976) 545-570.

Reports a pilot study on nomad-sedentary relations viewed in terms of exchange. The study was conducted in the Zagros Mountains of Iran and in the central Nazarat of Afghanistan during the summer of 1971. A theoretical framework that links exchange and social structure was applied in a field situation. The authors conclude: "the nature of nomad-sedentary relations is a function of the external political relations."

POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING IN IRAN, by Richard Moore, Khalil Asayesh and Joel Montague, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.4 (Autumn 1974) 396-408.

Iran's current population is estimated to be about 32 million. "About 55 percent of the total is under 20 years of age . . . "At the current rate of growth the Iranian population "might double every 21 years." The authors; Richard Moore, Representative, Management Services for Health, Kabul, Afghanistan; Dr. Khalil Asayesh, Deputy Director General of Family Planning Division, Ministry of Health, Tehran, Iran; and Joel Montague, Regional Director for Near East/Africa, The Population Council, Tehran, Iran; discuss the history of population concerns and policies, the activities begun in response to the problem, and the "possible outcome of such activity." They note that "the problem of rapid population growth is—for Iran and most of the rest of the Middle East—not really a problem of sheer living space as much as it is one of the national investment required, the level of living desired, the non-productivity of most of the population because of its youthfulness, and the pressure on critical resources such as arable land and water."

They conclude that: "the experience of the government program to date indicates the need to place far more emphasis on information and educational activities; . . . and that "the many pronatalist forces will tend to keep fertility far higher in the short run than that desired by economic and social planners."

THREAT TO RURAL IRAN, by Peter Beaumont, in *Geographical Magazine*, (September 1977) 763-765.

"Large areas of Iran are true desert and people living on their fringes have adapted to an arid environment. Peter Beaumont tells how Iran's rapid economic development has had direct and sometimes inadvertent effects on the expansion of the deserts." As the "frontier villages are abandoned, and their traditional water supply systems fall into disuse, it seems unlikely that their lands will ever be cultivated again. The lack of any natural vegetation cover on the formerly ploughed fields will mean that the desert will soon be able to reclaim these lands as its own." Photos. Small inset map showing area "prone to desertification."

#### 10. Water Resources

A BRIGHT FUTURE AFTER OIL: DAMS AND AGRO-INDUSTRY IN KHUZISTAN, by F.R.C. Bagley, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.1 (Winter 1976) 25-35.

Khuzistan, "cradle of the Iranian and Middle East oil industry", may find its present oil wealth gone within 40 years. Happily, the rivers of the Zagros mountains have a unique characteristic found only in the Khuzistan section of the Zagros. "They flow in long parallel stretches and then cut through the ranges at right angles in amazingly deep and narrow gorges" that "offer a unique abundance of dam sites." The author describes the Dez and Karun dam site projects in the province and presents "some particulars of the five agro-industrial units now being developed on 67,570 ha. of the Dez project area". He concludes that "the province is at present uniquely dependent on oil and gas, but has resources which, if developed, can ensure a bright future after the oil and gas are exhausted."

WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN, by Peter Beaumont, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.140, Part 3 (October 1974) 418-431.

Water Resource projects began in Iran with its second seven year development plan. "During the early plans, emphasis was placed on the provision of water for agricultural use with the development of the Khuzistan lowlands receiving high priority. At a later stage more attention was paid to the provision of water supplies to meet the rapidly increasing demands of water for industrial and domestic use. One of the greatest problems faced by Iran so far has been the provision of a satisfactory water supply for the rapidly growing capital,



Tehran. As yet water pollution has not become a major difficulty hindering water resource development." Table: "Dame in Iran"; various figures: "Average annual precipitation in Iran", "Water balance diagram for Iran", "Surface water irrigation system on the Varamin plain, Iran", "The major dams of Iran".

#### 11. *Agricultural Policy*

**AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT POLITICS IN IRAN**, by M.G. Weinbaum, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.4 (Autumn 1977) 434-450.

Discusses the origins of the Iranian government's agricultural policies and their probable consequences over time. The author first "examines the structures and practices that characterize Iran's contemporary agricultural asector . . . A second section introduces the several governmental agencies responsible for agricultural policy planning and implementation, and observes how decisions are shaped by various bureaucratic perspectives and competing interest clienteles. The domestic implications of Iran's growing volume of food imports and their bearing on the nation's foreign policy objectives are the subject of a third section. A concluding discussion considers the hurdles facing the leadership in any effort to plot a viable, economically sound agricultural policy. The essay also points out some advantages that Iran has at present in devising an effective set of development strategies."

#### 12. *Iran: Petroleum*

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ASPECTS**, by Fereidun Fesharaki. New York, Praeger, 1976. 315 p.

Part I: Historical Developments to 1951; Part II: Iran In a World Oil Setting (Iran and Opec); Part III: Domestic Activities of NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company). Statistical Analyses Tables. Bibliography.

**NEW CRUDE-OIL PIPELINE IS READY FOR START-UP IN IRAN**, in *The Oil and Gas Journal*, v.76, no.1 (2 January 1978) 73-77.

"Iran is nearing completion of a new 550,000-b/sd crude-oil pipeline which will supply its new refinery at Esfahan and several other planned refineries. The pipeline crosses extremely difficult terrain, including several major rivers and the Zagros mountains." This Marun-Esfahan pipeline is a joint venture by Snamprogetti-Saipem of Italy. Text includes Map, tables and photos.

**OIL AND WATER SHAPE BIG IRANIAN REFINERY**, by Leo R. Aalund, in *The Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, no.53 (26 December 1977) 193-196.

"National Iranian Oil Co's 200,000-b/d grassroots refinery at Esfahan, Iran, has strong downstream capability and an advanced water conservation system." A "key facility in Iran's drive to

maintain energy independence" this project is "heading for start-up next spring." Details the refineries processing system and construction plans.

**SAUDI AND IRANIAN PETROCHEMICALS AND OIL REFINING: TRADE WARFARE IN THE 1980's?**, by Louis Turner and James Bedore, in *International Affairs*, (London), v.53, no.4 (October 1977) 587-603.

Looks at oil refining and petrochemical production and suggests they "are in the process of joining industries like cars, steel, shipbuilding, textiles and electronics as battlefields on which exporters and importers quarrel over the speed with which non-traditional producers can replace more established ones." This represents the first time that the "oil-producing world will find itself seeking markets for its industrial products . . . The pessimists will note that Western policy makers are increasingly convinced that the balance between the world's supply of, and demand for, oil will become steadily more critical during the 1980's thus raising the spectre of trade and oil diplomacy becoming hopelessly intertwined as far as our two sectors are concerned."

#### 13. *Skilled Labor*

**EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND SKILLED LABOR IN IRAN**, by Walter Elkan, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.2 (Spring 1977) 175-188.

A detailed presentation of labor, employment, education and training in Iran, based on the authors experience in Iran with a World Bank Commission that was engaged in a basic economic survey in 1973-74. The study looks particularly at the supply of people with manual skills and seeks to answer the question "whether a prospective rate of growth of 26 per cent per year which the revised Fifth Development Plan now envisages is likely to be frustrated by manpower shortages." He cautions the reader that though "Iran abounds in statistics," flowing "in almost the same liberality as does the oil from its wells," they are unfortunately not as "dependable and useful." Consequently Professor Elkan has attempted to present only those statistics that he feels are most reliable. He concludes that despite what the statistics related to formal educational training suggest, Iran is a nation with a large pool of skilled manual labor that has become accustomed to continuous and disciplined work through its association with small handicraft industries and workshops that make articles for mass consumption. The "usually quoted" numbers for those in formal training programs, that are used to support the idea of a manpower shortage, include only those schools under the Ministry of Education. If one includes the 120,000 people estimated to be in non-academic vocational training and the approximately 240,000 that are thought to be in traditional apprentice programs one has a large part



of the explanation as to why development has not been stopped by an industrial labor shortage. The text includes seven tables of statistics related to labor, employment, and education in Iran.

#### 14. Education

**THE MULLAH, THE SHAHNAME AND THE MADRASSEH\***, by Brian Street, in *Asian Affairs*, v.62 (New Series v.6), Part 3 (October 1975) 290-306.

Dr. Street first gives the reader a view of the modern education system in Iran as it might be seen through the eyes of the villager, rather than the developer. He then describes in detail his experiences during a nine months stay in the "rich mountain village" of Zooshk in north-east Iran, and the effects of education and literacy there. He concludes: "An understanding of the effects of the modern education system in Iran . . . depends on more than the recitation of statistics for schools and teachers. As the Shah points out, it requires a detailed and detached study of the social and intellectual implications of replacing the Mullah, the Shahname and the Madrasseh with the Teacher, the Text-book and the Technical School."

\*(Note: The Mullah is a religious teacher in a Koranic school; The Shahname or 'Book of Kings' is a tenth century poem by Firdowsi recounting "legends of Persia . . . from before the creation of the world . . . until the Arab invasion," and the Madrasseh is the religious college at which mullahs were trained.)

#### 15. Economic and Industrial Development

**ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AN IRANIAN VILLAGE**, by John Connell, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 309-314.

Giga Sar, a village in the Caspian littoral near the capital of Gilan province, is the focus for this study of the effects of the growth of a "rice economy" in Iran. The author finds that the village is one among several which is moving toward "rice monoculture." This has been more important than land reform in changing relationships in the village. "Small landowners and shopkeepers have been the major beneficiaries of a decade of change." In Giga Sar "the 'white' and 'green revolutions' have come but the arrival of an adequate irrigation system has been more important than either. The rapidity of change that has followed this technological innovation has overcome any outdated concepts of the timeless Middle Eastern village."

**INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN IRAN**, by Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew G. Carey, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.1 (Winter 1975) 1-15.

During the period of Iran's first four development plans (1949-1973) industry became the "fastest growing sector of the economy." The resulting changes reviewed by the author include:

changing types and forms of industry; the rise of private industry; the role of incentives for private industry; the activities of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran; the relationship of the development plans to publicly owned industry, particularly the steel mills; and the petrochemical industry. The author concludes that "the most difficult problems of Iranian industry . . . remain the needs for experienced managers and trained personnel . . ."

**IRAN: AN ECONOMIC PROFILE**, by Jahangir Amuzegar. Washington, D.C. The Middle East Institute, 1977. 280 p.

"Catalogues and classifies the economic forces at work today in Iran. The latest statistics on many facets of the economy are presented for the first time in English; much of the material has never been published-it is from the open files of the various Iranian universities and agencies. The study is a chronicle of the policy and programs responsible for Iran's recent achievements." Part I: Economic Structures and Forces; Part II: Production and Distribution Patterns; Part III: Economic Plans and Policies; Part IV: Performance Statistical tables. Map of Iran. Selected bibliography.

**IRAN 1980-1985: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT**, by Abdol-Majid Majidi, in *The World Today*, v.33, no.7 (July 1977) 267-274.

The Iranian Minister of State in charge of Planning and Budget discusses a development strategy for Iran. He concludes: The "essential challenge" for Iran is "the maintenance of our purchasing power in the international market. On this factor rests much of our ability to meet the challenges of development . . . and to meet them within our own time horizon. The fact that our oil revenues from exports will peak in 1983, and then decline, makes the question of purchasing power all the more crucial . . . We must . . . protect our purchasing power . . . as measured by the goods we import and not as measured by aggregate indices. It is in this light that I must emphasize that a 15 per cent increase in the price of oil is a minimum."

**IRANIAN PROBLEM REGION**, by W.B. Fisher, in *Geographical Magazine*, November 1977, 95-96.

"As Iran raises its living standards the disparity between the affluent north and west and the less well off south-east becomes increasingly apparent. Communications are a first step in development aimed at bringing prosperity to a problem region." Photos in color and black and white.

**IRAN'S FUTURE ECONOMY**, by Kamal A. Hammeed and Margaret N. Bennett, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.4 (Autumn 1975) 418-432.

Iran in the coming 25 years will "almost certainly have the resources to multiply her gross na-



tional product 16-fold . . . , increasing per capita real income eight-fold." The problems in planning and influencing this coming period of growth are considered by the authors "from the angle of the foreign trade sector and the changing structure of and balance between imports and exports." The usefulness of emphasizing trade when discussing long range planning in Iran "arises from two . . . features; First, the rise and eclipse of oil primarily show its impact in the relationship between foreign trade and the rest of the economy. Secondly, foreign trade statistics are probably the most reliable economic data available." After discussing the trend toward a trade balance, import substitution policies and the potentials for diversification, the author concludes that the best way for Iran to use its present oil revenues to produce a viable economy in the future is "by export oriented rather than by protectionist import substitution policies."

**IRAN'S NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE**, by Ann T. Schulz, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 15-18 plus.

"Iran's resources and geographic position continue to make her of great strategic value to other nations. And those same resources have opened up an opportunity to create a new industrial state, organized around the monarchy."

#### E. Iraq (See also Appendixes)

##### 1. Iraqi-British War of 1941

**THE IRAQI-BRITISH WAR OF 1941: A REVIEW ARTICLE**, by Ayad Al-Qazzaz, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, n.4 (October 1976) 591-596. (review)

The events that took place in Iraq in 1941, "commonly called Rashid Ali al-Kaylani on the Revolution of 1941 by the Iraqis, were very important to the subsequent political development of that country. They led Iraq to war with Britain, and most of what happened after that date, including the July 14, 1958, Revolution, can be explained . . . as an extension of what happened in May 1941." The author reviews a recently published memoir in Arabic by Mahmud al-Durah entitled "The Iraqi-British War of 1941." Durah, a participant in the war "discloses many facts kept secret for three decades", and closes a "wide gap in the knowledge of modern Iraqi history, military as well as political." References to related materials many of them in Arabic are included in the footnotes.

##### 2. Government and Politics

**CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MODERN IRAQI HISTORY**, by Elie Kedourie, in *Asian Affairs*, v.62 (New Series v.6), Part 2 (June 1975) 140-146.

Addresses the question of whether the style of rule of the present government of Iraq is something new in Iraqi history or a continuation of pre-

vious trends. Professor Kedourie concludes: "The civil disorders of the period after 1958 are the continuation of disorders which afflicted the monarchy itself. These disorders were an indication of the strain to which an extremely heterogenous society was subjected by a powerful centralizing government . . . Instability, violence and civil disorders characterize Iraq under the monarchy, as does a restless and ambitious foreign policy."

**IRAQ: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY**, by Abbas Kelidar, in *Conflict Studies*, n.59 (July 1975) 24p.

Discusses Iraq in terms of Ethnic diversity, the military's unifying role, Baathist politics, Communists and Kurds and regional tensions. Includes select annotated bibliography of seven items.

**POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN IRAQ AND JORDAN, 1920-1958: THE BRITISH INFLUENCE**, by Mark Heller, in *Armed Forces and Society*, v.4, no.1 (Fall 1977) 75-99.

Despite the similar circumstances attending the emergence of Iraq and Jordan, and the similar influences affecting the development of their armed forces, the political behavior of the armed forces in these two states has been different. The author concludes: the survivability of civilian political institutions "is very much determined by the degree to which officer corps identify with them, and particularly the degree to which the social composition and values of the officers coincide with those of the civilian political elite. In Iraq and Jordan, these factors were shaped by contrasting British policies of officer selection."

**THE TRANSNATIONAL PARTY IN REGIONAL POLITICS: THE ARAB BATH PARTY**, by A.I. Dawisha, in *Asian Affairs*, v.61 (New Series v.5), Part 1 (February 1974) 23-31.

Describes the Ba'th party's history and organization in Iraq and Syria. The author concludes: "The survival of the Ba'thist regimes in Iraq and Syria will ultimately depend upon their ability to change the attitudes of the population. Although, on the whole, the doctrine of Arab unity is particularly attractive to the Arab people, there is no evidence so far to suggest that the majority of the population either in Iraq or in Syria have fully accepted their respective Ba'thist leaderships as the legitimate and authoritative allocators of values . . . Both leaderships have tended to depend on narrow sectarian loyalties to form the backbone of the regime's support . . . The permanency of the Ba'thist regimes will ultimately depend on the sincerity of their liberalization measures and on their commitment to the goal of establishing a grass-roots political organization."

##### 3. Iraq: Economic Development

**IRAQ: AGRICULTURAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY BECOMES FIRST PRIORITY**, by Pa-



trick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.12 (25 March 1977) p.7 plus.

"Iraq is making substantial efforts to propel its farming methods into the twentieth century, but first it has to overcome the inherited problems of past centuries; poor drainage, high salinity and reduced fertility . . . The Government's efforts to make the country self-sufficient in agricultural produce depend mainly on 36 irrigation schemes . . . The whole rural infrastructure of Iraq has to be altered extremely fast to ensure that it keeps pace with urban development. Only then will the skilled manpower stay on the land and ensure that projects . . . are fully successful. So far, The Government is having considerable success, but the very low starting point is proving a major obstacle." Map of the Khalis Agricultural Authority Agricultural Sectors and State Farms.

**IRAQ: COSTLY RAILWAY PROJECT MARKS RETURN TO MAJOR INVESTMENTS**, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.49 (9 December 1977) p.9.

Contracts for the 404-Kilometre railway from Baghdad to Hussaiba, on the Syrian border, "are likely to be awarded by mid-1978." The immediate reason for the railway is to link Baghdad with a phosphate fertiliser plant being built by Sybetra of Belgium at Al-Qaim, near Hussaiba. "Apart from the phosphate plant, there are three long-term reasons for building the railway. The government hopes that it will be linked eventually to the Syrian network, giving Iraq access to Mediterranean ports . . . The railway will also have a military strategic value, with high-speed freight and passenger trains easing logistics problems for forces stationed in the west. The project will play an important role in opening up the west. Contractors will have to build a large number of villages and stations along the line . . . UK and Yugoslav companies appear to be favourites to win the contract . . . which will be among the most expensive schemes carried out in Iraq."

**IRAQ: DEVELOPMENT PLANS DEPEND ON MORE LOCAL SKILL**, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.39 (30 September 1977) p.7 plus.

Iraq "prefers not to bring in foreign labour, "this has meant that educational facilities had to be expanded to meet the need for skilled labour. This lack of educated manpower has been the "most important" problem in preventing the success of Iraq's development plan." The "84 per cent increase . . . in the 1977 investment programme's allocation for education was bigger than for any other sector." Emphasis has been on secondary education. "The trend is towards linking educational facilities as closely as possible with existing or developing agricultural and industrial projects." Statistical tables

for Secondary schools and for schools in general.

**IRAQ: MASSIVE ROAD SCHEME EMERGES IN PUSH FOR INFRASTRUCTURE**, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.51 (22 December 1977) 6-9.

Iraq's recent achievements and future plans for the construction of her secondary and major road infrastructure are described in this article. The author notes that "As the construction of secondary roads eases the immediate transport bottlenecks, attention is also turning to a major highway project, tenders for which may go out in 1978."

4. *Iraq: Kurds and Other Minorities* (See also III-C-4)

**IRAQ AND THE KURDS—THE HARSH REALITIES**, by Gwynne Roberts, in *Middle East International*, no.47 (May 1975) 14-16.

Gwynne Roberts "recently returned from Iraq and Iran, where he covered the Kurdish question for the Financial Times and the New York Times," describes the sudden collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq following the rapprochement between Iran and Iraq. The Kurdish leader General Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 72 "is said to believe . . . that it is only a matter of time before relations between these two former arch enemies deteriorate and his partisans are once again allowed freedom of movement across the Iranian frontier into the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan."

**MINORITIES IN IRAQ**, by Gordon Roberts, in *Middle East International*, no.66 (December 1976) 24-26.

The historic position of the Christian and Jewish communities of Iraq. The bulk of these people emigrated to Israel after 1948 and have now been invited by the Government of Iraq to return.

**MINORITIES IN IRAQ**, by Gordon Roberts, in *Middle East International*, n.65 (November 1976) 23-25.

The Yazidis and the Sabaeans minorities are briefly described.

**WATER DWELLERS IN A DESERT WORLD**, by Gavin Young, Photographs by Nik Wheeler, in *National Geographic*, v.149, n.4 (April 1976) 503-523.

Describes an exploration of the "seldom-visited domain of Iraq's Marsh Arabs." This is an area of about 6,000 square miles of lagoons, reed banks and island villages in southern Iraq between Basra and Bagdad. The approximately 30,000 "buffalo breeders" who dwell here are called by some the Marsh Arabs but their name for themselves is the Ma'dan. The author returning after a previous stay in this area during the 1950's found that "my own paradise, remained intact. More important, the lives of its people have changed—for the better." Includes small map of the area.

5. *Iraq: Foreign Relations*



**IRAQ: DETERMINED TO UPSET U.S. PLAN FOR MIDEAST PEACE**, by Dennis Mullin, in *US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT*, 82, n.19 (16 May 1977) 93-96.

Dennis Mullin reports that "The oil-rich and fanatical Iraqis have different goals—not peace, but revolution in every Arab land and an end to Israel . . . Iraqi Army leaders show unyielding determination to remove what they call 'the imperialist Zionist dagger in the heart of the Arab nation' . . . Haysayn doesn't just talk about preventing peace; he actually works against it. With his approval, the most desperate of Palestinian terrorist squads are training in Iraq under radical guerrilla leader Abu Nidhal, whose 'rejection front' vows total war against Israel and its supporters." The views of Iraq's "strong man" Saddam Haysayn are given in an interview, "Why Iraq Won't Deal with Israel" on page 96. He states: "the impression in Western circles that Iraq is determined to throw the Jews into the sea is incorrect . . . But we will never recognize the right of Israel to live as a separate Zionist state . . . It makes no difference to us who organizes an agreement—the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or both of them."

**IRAQ OF TODAY**, by Radmilo Trojanovic, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, n.636 (5 October 1976) 18-20. (Belgrade)

Discusses Iraq's internal development and foreign relations. "Relations between Yugoslavia and Iraq have traditionally been good . . . Trade between Yugoslavia and Iraq is satisfactory and on the increase. Because of its large oil purchases from Iraq, Yugoslavia has a constant trade deficit with Iraq . . . By sending its experts to Iraq, for the most part to assist in projects carried out by Yugoslav enterprises, Yugoslavia is trying to assist this friendly country to develop more rapidly. At present over 3,000 Yugoslavs are working in Iraq . . . Both Yugoslavia and Iraq are making every effort to promote present bilateral cooperation and to extend it to new areas, because, despite the high level which it has achieved, it still lags behind the needs and possibilities of both sides."

**SHIFTING SANDS IN IRAQ**, by Kenneth Labich and Arnaud de Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.92, no.3 (17 July 1978) 50-51.

On the tenth anniversary of socialist rule in Iraq, "Iraqi strongman" Saddam Hussein, talks with Arnaud de Borchgrave, the first western newsmen he had seen in over a year. In this interview he "issued his first public warning against Soviet machinations in Africa and the Persian Gulf." Other signs of the "shifting sands" in Baghdad include: purchases of weapons from France, Brazil, Spain, West Germany, Belgium and Italy; execution of 21 communist officers in the military and security services; a request that the Soviet embassy

now located near the capital center be moved; and open support of Somalia against "Soviet-backed Ethiopia." The shift in policy is attributed to recent events: "pro-Soviet coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen, the assassination of North Yemen's leader and turmoil in and around Ethiopia," that "threaten to turn the region into a superpower battle zone." Includes a box inset "A Fresh Warning" which gives a detailed account of Arnaud de Borchgrave's interview with Saddam Hussein.

**SOVIET MILITARY AID TO IRAQ AND SYRIA**, by Roger F. Pajak, in *Strategic Review*, vol.4, no.1 (Winter 1976) 51-59.

The author is Foreign Affairs Adviser with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He assesses the record of Soviet military aid to Iraq and Syria delineating the course of the arms aid program in these two countries since the June 1967 War. He finds that; Arms aid has emerged as the most durable instrument of the Soviet drive to gain influence in the Middle East. The Arab states have received about sixty per cent of total Soviet military assistance to the Third World." However, this aid much of it to Syria and Iraq "has not enabled the Soviets to exercise leverage for political concessions in either country, nor have the activities of the Iraq and Syrian Communist parties been facilitated. Furthermore, Moscow has discovered that its material largesse has created risks by identifying the USSR with the actions of client states over which it has little control. On balance, however, the Soviets probably view arms aid to Iraq and Syria as their most effective policy instrument, and it appears that some sort of arms aid relationship with both countries will be maintained by Moscow."

6. *Iraq: Border Disputes* (See also IV-D-4)

(LI) **REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1974**, by Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Munoz, *United Nations Document S/11291* (20 May 1974) 11p.

This report by Ambassador Luis Weckmann-Munoz of Mexico to the Secretary-General and the Security Council presents "a detailed account of his activities, observations, talks with leaders, understandings agreed upon, and recommendations" concerning the border disputes between Iraq and Iran. The appendixes contain "a very detailed map showing town locations, fortresses, and the conflicting border claims." The appendixes also contain a three page chronological description of all of the incidents from April 10, 1972 to March 6, 1974.

**F. Jordan** (See also Appendixes)

1. *Economic Aspects*

**ALIA: JORDAN'S FAST-GROWING AIR-**



LINE, by Brian Davidson, in *Interavia*, v.32, no.10 (October 1977) 1035-1037.

Description of Alia, the Royal Jordanian Airline "one of the world's fastest growing carriers in terms of passengers, network and fleet." The reasons "why such a small country . . . can support a carrier of these dimensions are to be found in a number of factors and events: Firstly, Jordan is booming economically . . . Maximum exploitation of resources such as phosphates and agricultural products, plus a doubling of tourist arrivals in two years has accounted for much of this expansion. Secondly, the country has become a hub for traffic linking the oil-rich Arab states and Europe. Thirdly, the civil war in Lebanon has brought an influx of foreign companies and investment from Beirut to Amman . . . The re-opening of the Suez Canal has also made Aqaba into a major freight port." Text includes diagram of international routes; and table of "Alia traffic and financial results 1974-76."

JORDAN: DEVELOPMENT NEEDS MORE INVESTMENT BANKS, by Harry Turnbull, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.42 (21 October 1977) p.3-7, 46.

"Central Bank governor Said Nabulsi told MEED in Amman that it was official Central Bank Policy not to issue licences for more commercial banks, and the director-general of Amman Financial Market, Hashem Sabbagh, stressed the need for specialised investment banks combining Gulf states' oil revenue surpluses and western banking expertise." Text includes list of banks operating in Jordan, table of Jordans gross national product, excluding the West Bank, 1971-76.

JORDAN: ECONOMY NEEDS TIME TO RECOVER FROM SHARP RISE IN IMPORTS, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.27 (8 July 1977) p.10 plus.

"A serious trade deficit has resulted because spending on imports has more than doubled during the past two years, while exports have not kept pace." Statistics on Jordan's trade by country and commodity on pages 44-45.

JORDAN: EXPORTS OF PROSPHATES INCREASE BUT EARNINGS MAY FALL, by Patrick Cockburn, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.17 (29 April 1977) 7-8.

Jordan's main export is Phosphates, although it is still a small producer in terms of world production. Her five-year development plan (1976-80) was drawn up "on the assumption that the 1974 prices" for phosphates would be maintained. Instead prices have fallen. "Exports of phosphates increased substantially last year . . . but final figures may show a drop in earnings. This casts doubt on assumptions made in the five-year development plan . . . So the massive Jordanian trade deficit will not benefit from phosphate production to anything

like the extent that was predicted in 1975 and early 1976."

## 2. Jordan and the Palestinians

THE EAST GHOR CANAL PROJECT: A CASE STUDY OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, 1961-1966, by Claud R. Sutcliffe, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.4 (Autumn 1973) 147-482.

Based on data collected in 1966 five years after the opening of the canal. The author and his assistants interviewed a sample of project and non-project farmers to compare them in terms of "farming methods, land tenure patterns, productivity, income levels, standard of living and concern with the Palestine problem." As at least 61 per cent of the people in the project area were Palestinian refugees. The author finds it "most surprising result is that project farmers were significantly more concerned with the Palestine problem than nonproject farmers were. This suggest that the project was a political failure as a refugee resettlement project . . . they continued to define themselves as Palestinians rather than Jordanians." After the 1967 war the "Jordan Valley became a major guerrilla staging area for attacks against Israel. After the battle of Karameh, in March of 1968, most of the farmers in the project area fled . . ." The author concludes that "The crucial mistake seems to have been the failure to carry out a real land reform program."

JORDAN AND PALESTINIANS: THE PLO'S PROSPECTS, by D.L. Price, in *Conflict Studies*, n.66 (December 1975) 15p.

Discusses the new balance of forces, the recognition of the PLO, the Soviet dilemma, the West Bank conflict and Sadat's crucial role. "Confirmation at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in October 1974 of the PLO as 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people' was a reverse for King Hussein in his struggle to retain a Jordanian link with the Israeli-occupied West Bank . . . In the view of the author . . . the PLO seems destined to run harder in order to stand still. He adds that it is in danger of being mortally drawn into the Lebanese conflagration and is also vulnerable to inter-Arab and superpower politics."

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM IN THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, 1948-1967, by Naim Sofer, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, n.1 (January 1976) 73-94.

How Jordan, the Jerusalemites, and the Arab world reacted to the annexation of Jerusalem by Jordan in 1948, and to Jordan's subsequent exercise of control over the city.

## 3. Jordanian-U.S. Relations

MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE; COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 April 1976. 2 p.



(94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Document 94-444.)

"Expresses objections to Senate approved additional transition quarter funding for foreign military sales and security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria."

UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE 1970 JORDANIAN CRISIS. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Army War College. 1973. 57 p. (ASDIRS 4377.)

"Covers the period January through September 1970, but concentrates on events in Jordan and US-USSR military and diplomatic moves during September 1970. No attempt has been made to consider the tactical plan for the deployment of US forces. Research consisted primarily of examination of daily news accounts and periodicals for the period of time involved. The action taken by the United States in an effort to preclude broadening the scope of the conflict in the Middle East was the only feasible course to pursue."

#### 4. *Jordan: Agriculture*

PROMISED LAND IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, by M. Haddadin, in *Geographical Magazine*, (May 1976) 469-471.

Describes The Jordan Valley Development Plan, an "integrated rural-urban, physical, economic and social plan for regional agricultural development . . . "By integrating the development of land, water and human resources, the Jordan Valley Commission aims at transforming the valley into one of the world's most intensively developed agricultural areas. Work opportunities created will help to slow the drift from rural to urban centres, ensure a better future for the valley farming community, and have a lasting impact on Jordan's economic and social development." Map illustrates "Development and Rehabilitation Plan for the East Bank of the Jordan."

#### 5. *Jordan: New Opportunities for Women*

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR JORDAN'S WOMEN, by Dr. Charis Waddy, in *Middle East International*, n.73 (July 1977) 29-31.

Describes Jordan's Department of Women's Affairs that was set up in 1976 under the Ministry of Labour. Includes an interview with its Director, Mrs. Inam Mufti.

#### 6. *Jordan History: King Abdallah*

REFLECTIONS ON AN EPILOGUE: AL-TAKMILAH TO THE MEMOIRS OF KING ABDALLAN IBN AL-HUSSEIN, by King Al Hussein Ibn Talal, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.32, no.1 (Winter 1978) 79-86.

An essay by Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, introducing a new English language edition of the Takmilah (My Memoirs Completed) by his grandfather King Abdallah Ibn Al-Hussein. The Takmilah, is a supplement to King Abdallah's memoirs, which could

"best be characterized as a critique of the Arab character and of the environmental factors which formulated its attitudes, behavior and actions in those years." King Hussein discusses three major issues that concerned King Abdallah and which remain unresolved today. These are: First "the cause of Arab unification on a sound realistic and lasting basis." Secondly, "an Arab trait, of frailty," which finds "those who can think only in absolutes, and others who believe that the world is based on relational relativity." Thirdly, "King Abdallah's deep involvement in and concern for the fate of the Palestinian people." Reflecting on these themes King Hussein states: "Since my accession to the Throne . . . I have struggled with all the means at my disposal to continue on the path of Arab unity, in a genuine effort to fulfill the aims and aspirations for which my grandfathers had dedicated their lives. I find myself impelled to state that the same forces of negativism, disarray and selfishness, which had obstructed the efforts of earlier generations, are still very much evident and active . . . As I write these thoughts . . . I draw some consolation from the fact that Jordan and Syria have already embarked upon a process of gradual unification, on realistic and functional foundations." On the problems of the Palestinian people he concludes: "To me, as to King Abdallah, there is a golden rule in evaluating policy and in taking decisions. The first is 'know thyself,' for this is pivotal in assessing your capabilities and your limitations. The second is 'know the enemy,' for failure to do that can spell disaster, and this is precisely what happened to the Palestinian people and their rightful cause."

#### G. *Lebanon* (See also V-A-6, Chapter VI and Appendixes)

##### 1. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

LEBANON: NO CHANGE OF HEART, by Tabitha Petran, in *Middle East International*, no.74 (August 1977) 6-8.

Writing from Beirut the author finds that "life daily becomes more normal," but the crucial problems remain unresolved "because the war settled nothing." There is still inflation, unemployment and "approximately 600,000 displaced persons—20 percent of the total population . . ."

MEXIPAK WHEAT PERFORMANCE IN LEBANON 1970-71, by Brook A. Greene in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.4 (Autumn 1974) 437-440.

"A member of the Agricultural Faculty of the American University of Beirut reports the results of a 20 per cent random sample of the farmers in Lebanon who are growing Mexipak-65 (white Mexipak) and Indus-66 (red Mexipak) which the Ministry of Agriculture introduced into Lebanon in 1967. "Costs and returns" were compared "under



similar management conditions" with that for local wheat varieties grown by the same farmers. The author found that "high yielding Mexipak wheat varieties have given significantly greater net returns than traditional wheat varieties in Lebanon . . . However, . . . significant regional differences occurred . . ." The potential increase in wheat production could help Lebanon reduce its need to import wheat. Includes statistical tables. "Detailed results are available in the following publication: Green, B.A., M. Issi and N. Alami, Production, Importation and Marketing of Wheat in Lebanon 1970-71 (Publication #52, Faculty of Agriculture, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Dec. 1972)."

**PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP LIFE IN LEBANON**, by Bassem Sirhan, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.2 (Winter 1975) 91-107.

Based on information from "UNRWA statistics", an unpublished special manpower survey carried out in June 1971 by the Statistics Department of the Lebanese Ministry of Planning, and on "unstructured participant and non-participant observation of Palestinian camps over several years." This article "seeks to present an up-to-date picture of life in the Lebanese camps today with special regard for physical conditions, demographic, economic, social, political and cultural factors and indications of social change." The period covered extends from 1969 to 1973. Includes nine statistical tables.

## 2. Lebanon: Prospects for Enduring Peace

**AGONY FOR A TROUBLED LAND**, in *Time*, v.112, no.3 (17 July 1978) 23-29.

Reports on Syrian military bombardment of East Beirut and other towns and installations controlled by Phalangist and National Liberal militiamen. The shooting which began July 1st lasted six days and left "more than 200 dead and 500 wounded. "A shaky cease-fire went into effect," but not before the conflict nearly triggered the resignation of President Elias Sarkis and threatened to engulf the region in a confrontation between Israel and Syria. This renewed fighting was "touched off by a bitter feud involving the country's three major Christian factions: Pierre Gemayel's Phalangists, Camille Chamoun's National Liberals, and forces loyal to former President Suleiman Franjijeh, a close ally of Syrian President Hafez Assad. The dispute centers on the fact that Gemayel and Chamoun would like to create a separate Christian state in northern Lebanon, while Franjijeh supports a unified nation . . . Syria's Assad believes the security of his own country is tied directly to that of Lebanon. If the Christian forces . . . successfully turned half of Lebanon into an Israeli-backed mini-state, Israel's forces would be that much closer to Syria by land and sea. For its part, Israel fears that a Syrian-

dominated Lebanon, with leftist Muslims in control, would turn the country into another confrontation state."

**LEBANON: WHO CARES ABOUT THE FUTURE?**, by Charles Glass, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977 10-11.

Lebanon's Christians "have forgotten how close they were to losing power before Syria changed sides to support them . . . to listen to their leaders . . . one would think they had won the war . . . Lebanese Christian leaders, loosely grouped in a coalition called the Lebanese Front, are again trying to postpone the day when they will have to concede reform to the country's Muslims. Before they will even discuss reform . . . they want the Palestinian commandos controlled or eliminated and they want a Lebanese Army created." The problem is that the "new Lebanese Army" is "not yet capable of reassuring the Christians in the South that the Palestinians will be controlled." It "starts out with only 3,000 troops." To raise its strength to the pre-war total of 17,000 "may take five years, according to officers involved in recruiting." The plan to have Lebanese troops replace Syrian troops by the end of 1978 "ignores certain facts: The Army is in danger of becoming a Christian army if officers of the Lebanese Arab Army are excluded, . . . Christian leaders during the war promised Christian officers key posts in a post-war army . . . the Army cannot keep these promises, but it will find it difficult to make an Army without them . . ." Soldiers desired admission to the new Army because of their wartime behaviour "may rejoin one faction or another, taking their arms with them." The author concludes that "it is the attempt to find an answer to Lebanon's problems which rightist leaders . . . are avoiding. While Lebanon's leftists and Muslims feel defeated, they do not accept their defeat. Their demands for fuller participation in the system will assert themselves again if they are ignored . . ."

**LEBANON'S CONTINUING CRISIS**, by Charles W. Waterman, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 19-23 plus.

Discusses recent events in Lebanon, the Lebanese Army, economy, and the future Lebanese "formula". The author concludes: "Most war goals of the domestic parties to the Lebanese civil war have not been reached. The Christians have not regained the security and power in Lebanon they desire; the Muslims have not obtained serious social or political reform; the Palestinians are now restricted and have lost an environment in which they were relatively free to develop and operate as they wished . . . Meanwhile, the Pax Syria remains in effect, but it cannot last forever nor can it by itself resolve Lebanon's agony."



3. *Lebanon: Civil War (Including Casualties and Losses)*

BEIRUT CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY ESTIMATE OF CIVIL WAR LOSSES, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.39 (30 September 1977) p.30.

The BCCI figures are "more conservative than estimates made immediately after of the loss in the Private sector. (Statistics)

BEIRUT PORT: LEBANESE RESOURCEFULNESS IS PUT TO THE TEST, by Johnny Rizq, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.25 (24 June 1977) 4-5.

"Beirut port was reopened officially on 15 December 1976; not a warehouse or piece of equipment was intact . . . The ability to exploit available resources to the full is seeing the port through a difficult period of reconstruction. But political stability is essential to its future prosperity." Tables comparing "Beirut port traffic—1975 & 1977".

DEATH OF A COUNTRY: THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, by John Bulloch. London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977. 197 p.

The observations of the Daily Telegraph Correspondent in Lebanon during 1975 and 1976. Notes that the Civil War was not only a war between people inside Lebanon but that "it was also a struggle for leadership in the Arab world and a realignment of forces in preparation for a general Middle East settlement." With first-hand accounts of the battles in Beirut that destroyed the city. Names of the leading figures in the Civil War.

LEBANON: THE COLLAPSE OF A STATE: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE STRUGGLE, by Abbas Kelidar and Michael Burrell, in *Conflict Studies*, n.74 (August 1976) 19p.

Discusses: Breakdown of the power balance, the guerrillas as catalysts of war, the disintegration of the army, Syrian objectives and partition fears. Includes select annotated bibliography of five items.

LEBANON IN STRIFE: STUDENT PRELUDES TO THE CIVIL WAR, by Halim Barakat. Austin, University of Texas press, 1977. 242 p.

Analyzes student politics in Lebanon and their relationship to The Civil War, PART I: A perspective on Youth and change in a Mosaic Society; PART II: Sources of Radicalism and Political Alienation; The influence of Religion, Family, and Social Class; PART III: The Development of the Student Movement in Lebanon. A Survey Questionnaire of the Students at the American University of Beirut. Bibliography.

THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CAUSES, by Joseph Chamie, in *World Affairs*, v.139, n.3 (Winter 1976/77) 171-188.

Addresses the major causes underlying the Lebanese civil war: "the difference in political ideol-

ogy between the warring groups, the existence of sharp societal cleavages, and the prevalence of significant social, economic, and demographic differences among the various religious groups." Other factors relate to the presence of about 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the Arab-Israel conflict, the economic and military assistance "siphoned into Lebanon", and the "horrible atrocities which have been committed by both sides." The author concludes that: "The physical, social and psychological damage that has occurred practically rules out any chance for reconciliation and stability in the near future . . . Lebanon is unquestionably a country partitioned on a de facto basis. In addition, at this time partition on a de jure basis, while remaining improbable, certainly can no longer realistically be ruled out . . . The chance for a negotiated political solution satisfactory to the major combatants are remote." Many references to supporting publications are contained in the notes at the end of the article. Includes three tables illustrating religious groups in Lebanon.

TRAGEDY IN LEBANON, by Norman F. Howard, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 1-5 plus.

Describes the development of the Civil war in Lebanon which broke out in late 1975. The author concludes: "There were no winners in this civil war: the people Lebanon had lost."

4. *Lebanon: Economic Aspects (1972-1977)*

AN APPRAISAL OF LEBANON'S POST-WAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND A LOOK TO THE FUTURE, by Samir A. Makdisi, in the *Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 267-280.

A "critical assessment" of economic development in Lebanon up to 1974. This is followed by a summary of the impact of the 1975/76 war and a look at the future as the postwar era unfolds. The author identifies the main economic issues as: "the delination of the role the public sector should, in principle assume," and "its transformation from a lagging into an active participant in the development of the country."

AN APPRAISAL OF THE SIX YEAR PLAN OF LEBANON (1972-1977), by Hamdi F. Aly and Nabil Abdun-Nur, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.2 (Spring 1975) 151-164.

Lebanon's second economic plan, "designated by the government as the Six Year Development Plan (1972-1977) was issued in 1972." The author appraises "this indicative plan," and examines the degree to which its "five main objectives" are attained. Evaluation is "made in light of the historical performance of the economy, taking into account expected future changes according to the Six Year Plan." References are made to a macro-economical model "developed by Diab (1970) for the



Lebanese economy." Tables are included on the origin and use of resources, projections of macro-economic variables, investments, current accounts, and share of GPD by sector. The author concludes that the plan: "suffers from both inconsistencies and inabilities to meet its goals . . . with . . . the possible exception of the desired rate of growth of GDP . . . ; the goals of the plan seem to be more or less theoretical in character . . . ;" and "the vulnerability of the Lebanese economy will remain . . ."

**LEBANON: EUROLOAN BRIDGES GAP IN ARAB RECONSTRUCTION AID**, by Johnny Rizq, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.50 (16 December 1977) 3-4. plus.

"The government has shown its impatience and creditworthiness-with the \$150 million loan raised last month, but Arab states are still the most likely source of assistance on the scale needed." Table on page 41 shows "Aid to Lebanon, 1977."

**LEBANON: MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD UP TO 1972, PART I**, by Samir A. Makdisi, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.1 (Winter 1975) 81-92.

The postwar economy of Lebanon contrasts "sharply with the experiences of many other developing economies." Lebanon's economy, "has been and remains an open economy . . . , the private sector . . . remains the dominant economic sector . . . , . . . and . . . Lebanon has experienced relative financial stability and attained a reasonable rate of growth . . ." The author seeks "to trace the major monetary developments in the postwar period and outline the evolution of monetary management, in order to provide "the basis for evaluating monetary performance and indicating required departures." Tables of financial trends, credit ratios, and the "sectoral distribution of gross domestic product are included."

**LEBANON: MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS, MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD UP TO 1972, PART II**, by Samir A. Makdisi, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.2 (Spring 1975) 199-206.

Continues an article from vol. 29, no.1, Winter of 1975. This section contains an evaluation of Lebanon's monetary performance and the main conclusions of the author's study. The criteria used by the author to evaluate monetary performance are it's: "success in permitting the maintenance of relative price stability; influence on balance of payments . . . ; proper credit allocation and the growth in the level of monetary savings . . ." He concludes that there is a need to apply "monetary tools more effectively . . . the financial process should be properly influenced by the authorities to insure that it is serving the purposes of development."

##### 5. *Lebanon: Government and Politics*

**ALIENATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN LEBANON**, by Nafhat Nasr and Monte Palmer, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.4 (October 1977) 493-516.

Reports the result of a survey of 1,434 Lebanese students attending six universities and colleges in Beirut. The levels of alienation among Lebanese students are correlated with actual involvement in a variety of political activities including participation in student organizations and nonviolent protest. On the basis of this survey the authors conclude: "Judging by levels of political alienation among a 10 percent sample of Lebanese university students," the Lebanese Republic "is very precarious." It was found that "approximately 75 percent of all students surveyed fell in the 'alienated' category." When initial correlations between alienation and participation were controlled for religious sect and social class . . . several trends emerged: "strong correlations" among members of "status deprived sects," particularly the Shii and Druze . . . ; "High correlation between lower class alienation and protest participation . . ." and that "deeply religious Muslims, . . . particularly those attending the Arab University, were more highly participant in protest activities than less religious Muslims." Includes four statistical tables illustrating the results of the survey. The authors note that "with very minor changes, this article was completed before civil war broke out in Lebanon."

**LINKAGE POLITICS AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO LEBANESE CRISES**, by Dr. Paul H.B. Godwin and Dr. Lewis B. Ware, in *Air University Review*, v.28, no.1 (November-December 1976) 80-89.

Lebanon is a society in which the Christian/non-Christian balance "which structures the principal political processes . . . is fused to the broader Muslim environment within which Lebanon must exist." When Lebanon "in order to resist the destabilizing impact of Arab nationalism . . . sought the support of the United States," the result was a "de facto abrogation of the 1943 National Pact upon which the internal stability of the Lebanese political system rested." After reviewing the Lebanese crises of 1958 and 1975 the authors conclude: "In 1958 the link to the Arab-Israeli conflict was present as a secondary political issue, but by 1975 the link had become fused, and it is impossible to settle the Lebanese crisis without negotiating the linkage. More than any other, it is this linkage that deters the introduction of U.S. military force on the side of the ruling Christian oligarchy. To do otherwise would destroy any chance for future progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli impasse."

**SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION**



IN LEBANON: A CASE OF SOCIAL MOSAIC, by Halim Barakat, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.3 (Summer 1973) 301-318.

In contrast to many observers and students of Lebanese society who see Lebanon as a Pluralistic society that has achieved a harmony of various interests, the author sees Lebanon as a "Mosaic" society composed of groups whose relationships are regulated by . . . some system of checks and balances . . . without, however, being accompanied by a consensus on fundamental issues facing these groups." The author summarizes the dominant features of Lebanese society as: "Lack of consensus on fundamentals, lack of extensive and open dialogue, private loyalties and interests dominate public loyalties and interests, geographical concentration of different religious communities, non-separation of religion from the state . . . Absence of a unified educational system and the existence of conflicting reference groups." The author finds that as long as the above conditions continue unchallenged "Lebanon will remain a mosaic society with dim prospects for stability and national unity and, thus, threatened at its very roots."

STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE LEBANESE KATA'IB PARTY, by John P. Entelis, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.1 (Winter 1973) 21-35.

The Lebanese Kata'ib Party (LKP), began in 1936 as a "narrowly sectarian paramilitary and sportive association" that was devoted to "protecting and propagating Lebanese Christian interests against the increasing tide of Arab nationalist sentiment . . ." Today the LKP is "Lebanon's most dynamic nationalist political party exceeding others in its membership support, structural adaptability, ideological commitment, and coercive powers to influence government policy." The author addresses himself to one factor . . . "the party's increased organizational complexity and structural differentiation . . ." to explain its rise to prominence. (The same author has published a similar article under the title: Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib as a Case Study, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.9, no.3 (October 1973) 325-340).

THE SUPERVIGILANTES: THE LEBANESE KATAEB PARTY AS A BUILDER, SURROGATE AND DEFENDER OF THE STATE, by Frank Stoakes, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.11, no.3 (October 1975) 215-236.

"The Lebanese Kataeb Party (Hizb al-Kata'ib al-Lubnaniyya) is the most important example in the Arab world of an organised mass party which is nationally based and competitive . . . And while remaining a competitive party, independent of the state, it has attempted to perform many of those roles of state- and nation-building which are typical

of single parties. It is with the Kataeb's self-appointed duties towards the state that this paper is concerned."

THE ZU'AMA' OF ZAHLAH: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN A LEBANESE TOWN, by Peter Gubser, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.2 (Spring 1973) 173-189.

Discusses "the framework within which the Zu'ama' of Zahlah gather, maintain and use political power and authority." The Zu'ama are leaders who . . . "exchange economic, social and administrative aid for political support and loyalty . . ." "The discussion is limited to the christian town of Zahlah and its christian leaders, all of whom are candidates for the Lebanese chamber of deputies. The author finds that the power of the Zu'ama is being undermined by new economic organizations, the disappearance of "peasant-type labor in farming", and the modernization of the states government structure.

(Note: An article by the same author on a similar topic has appeared in, *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.11, no.3 (October 1975) entitled THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS IN A LEBANESE TOWN)

6. *U.S. Intervention in Lebanon 1958*

US INTERVENTION IN LEBANON . . . 1958, by Lt. Col. Margaet M. Bodron, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.2 (February 1976) 66-76.

A brief review of the landing of US military forces in Lebanon during the 1958 Civil War. The author describes the political situation in Lebanon before the outbreak of hostilities, the United Nations' attempt to investigate the Lebanese government's allegations of "massive infiltration" by the United Arab Republic, the landing of American troops in Beirut, and the results of the United States intervention. The author concludes that "The American landing in Lebanon was a case history in the use of limited war and the practice of applied diplomacy . . . Judging from the manner in which the military forces were handled, the United States hoped for a political solution rather than a military one."

7. *Soviet Union and the Lebanese Power Struggles LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE CRISIS OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST*, by Annette E. Stiefbold, in *Air University Review*, v.28, no.6 (September-October 1977) 62-70.

The Lebanese crisis posed the "latest threat to Moscow's painstaking efforts to achieve a resolution of the Middle East conflict favorable to itself and its clients. For reasons of both ideology and practicality, the situation in which two Soviet-armed clients, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), confronted each other in a power struggle was one in which the Soviets could not long remain impartial . . . The Soviets had no



alternative but to side openly with the Palestinians and their allies among the Lebanese left." Attempts to apply pressure on Syria showed only the "limits of the Kremlin's ability either to control its Middle Eastern clients or effect crucial gains on their behalf." Their call for a reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference is a "move to place the Middle East problem before what they hoped would be a more hospitable venue. As cochairman of the Geneva Conference they might reasonably expect to regain the diplomatic initiative that the preceding events had denied them."

#### H. Saudi Arabia (See also Appendixes)

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AMERICA AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: THE FIRST TWO HUNDRED YEARS, by Joseph J. Malone, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1976) 406-424.

History of the relations between the United States and the Arabian Peninsula focusing mainly on Saudi Arabia. The author is Professor of Foreign Affairs and Director, Middle East, South Asia and African Studies, The National War College, Washington, D.C.

THE BOARD OF GRIEVANCES IN SAUDI ARABIA, by David E. Long, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.1 (Winter 1973) 71-75.

Briefly describes how Saudi Arabia has adapted a classical Islamic institution the al-Mazalim to modern needs thru its highest administrative tribunal, The Saudi Arabian Board of Grievances (Diwān al-Mazālim). "The creation of a modern Ministry of Justice . . . will not alter the basically Islamic character of the Saudi legal system; and so long as the legal system is based on shariah law, it is unlikely the Saudis will abandon the Grievance Board . . ."

EMERGENCE OF A NEW MIDDLE CLASS IN SAUDI ARABIA, by William Rugh, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.1 (Winter 1973) 7-20.

The social, economic and political role of the "New Middle Class" in Saudi Arabia is examined. "They are distinguished from the rest of the middle class by their reliance on secular, nontraditional knowledge to attain their positions . . . Conservative forces are still strong . . . and will retain a marked influence in Saudi education, justice, and public behavior for some time. The New Middle Class is still . . . small . . . it had eschewed demands for political change. But predictions in the Saudi Development Plan show a dramatic growth of this class in the near future, and its political influence is bound to grow as well."

MAPPING ARABIA, by John Leatherdale and Roy Kennedy, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.141, Part 2 (July 1975) 240-251.

John Leatherdale, Mapping Manager and

Roy Kennedy, Superintendent Surveyor with Hunting Surveys Limited have both led geodetic traversing parties in Arabia. This paper is based on a lecture given to the Geographical Society on 16 December 1974. The authors describe surveying techniques and methods of operation in the desert with particular reference to the contributions being made by Hunting Surveys Limited. Countries discussed include Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Includes drawing showing "most of the geodetic control which now exists throughout the Arabian peninsula."

ONCE A YEAR IN MECCA, by Gwyn Rowley and Soleiman A. El-Hamdan, in *Geographical Magazine*, (September 1977) 753-759.

Describes the impact of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca on the economy of Saudi Arabia. The "Hajj demands facilities for 700,000 pilgrims for only three weeks in every year. The extra facilities constructed to cater to the Hajjees, "are underused for that part of the year outside the period of the pilgrimage." The number of Hajjees have been rapidly increasing as faster and cheaper methods of travel have become available to the 450,000,000 Muslims of Islam. Estimates of future pilgrim flows have been consistently surpassed "well before their target dates." In 1973 645,182 foreign pilgrims entered Saudi Arabia and the total number of pilgrims both foreign and Saudi was estimated to be in excess of 1,000,000. "It is possible to envisage the time when the number of Hajjees will exceed the capacity of the various sites in the limited time available . . . Such developing conditions could result in a specified pilgrim quota being allocated to each country . . . with the country of origin being responsible for the details entailed in the allocation and administration of the permits." Photos. Map illustrating the "route of the pilgrimage."

THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION IN SAUDI ARABIA, by A.R. Kelidar, in *Asian Affairs*, v.9 (Old Series v.65) Part I (February 1978) 23-30.

There have been three occasions where the process of succession in Saudi Arabia could be observed: after the death of Ibn Saud in 1952, the abdication of King Saud in favor of Faisal in 1964, and the accession of Khalid to the throne after the death of Faisal in 1975. The author discusses some of the important factions that have been revealed within the 3-5,000 member royal family and how these might affect later successions to the throne.

SAUDI ARABIA: GREATNESS THRUST UPON THEM, by James M. Bedore, in *Middle East International*, no.79 (January 1978) 14-16.

Discusses the factors that make "avoidance of war in the Middle East the prime Saudi foreign policy concern." Their problem the author concludes is that their power was acquired so fast that



they are "ill-prepared to cope with the responsibilities . . ."

**SAUDI ARABIA: SPECTACULAR RESULTS ACHIEVED AT JEDDAH PORT**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.44 (4 November 1977) p. 8.

The new President of the Saudi Ports Authority, Fayez I Badr, is credited by Saudi officials as the person responsible for the clearing of congestion at Jeddah port and at Dammam. "Within a year, Dammam and Jeddah more or less doubled their unloading efficiency."

**SAUDI ARABIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA**, by James P. Piscatori, in *Naval War College Review*, v.29, no.4/Sequence number 263 (Spring 1977) 53-68.

While Saudi Arabia has not become a party to the Geneva conventions concerning the territorial sea, it has "accepted several principles that are part of the emerging international consensus." In general the Saudi position is "not seriously at odds with the Western position generally and the American position particularly." However Saudi Arabia's behavior has differed: "On its western shores, it has acted to support the claim that Israel has no legitimate right of transit to Eilat . . . On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has indicated a willingness to cooperate and negotiate in matters concerning the Persian Gulf . . . The Kingdom, moreover, has committed itself in principle to the equitable distribution and exploitation of sea resources off both shores."

**THE SUPER-CONNECTOR FROM SAUDI ARABIA**, by Louis Kraar, in *Fortune*, v.95, no.6 (June 1977) 109-116.

Personality profile of Adnan Khashoggi, son of the personal physician to the late King Ibn Saud, who is currently involved in the controversy concerning the "overseas payoff scandals of Northrop and Lockheed." The article is based on an "eighteen day traveling interview."

#### 2. *Saudi Arabia History: King Faisal*

**FAISAL: THE END OF AN ERA**, by Elizabeth Monroe, in *Middle East International*, no.47 (May 1975) 11-13.

The assassination of King Faisal on the Prophet's birthday, 1975, "deprived his countrymen of a leader with a store of wisdom and experience that no one can immediately replace." The author reviews the career of the King Faisal "from desert obscurity to world status."

#### 3. *Economic Development and Industrialization*

**ARABIA GREETES THE FUTURE**, by Walter Gunthardt, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.27, no.2 (May 1977) 8-15.

Reports first-hand impressions of the "breathtaking pace of construction" taking place in Saudi Arabia. The author reports that "What the

Saudi government is trying to accomplish in the five-year plan running from 1975 to 1980 can only be categorized as an economic revolution . . ." Outline map on page 12 shows oil and gas fields, pipelines, and refineries.

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA**, by Radmilo Trojanovic, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, no.621 (20 February 1976) 26-28. (Belgrade)

Comments on the oil boom, domestic development and international position of Saudi Arabia. As Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia do not maintain diplomatic relations with one another "contacts and links between them are sporadic and irregular. This may seem surprising given the fact that they have cooperated very successfully in the activities of the non-aligned from the movement's initial conference in Belgrade and at the United Nations . . . Yugoslavia and Saudi Arabia could certainly have more frequent contacts and carry on much more active cooperation . . . The initiative, however, should come from Riyadh, for on the Yugoslav side there is no barrier to the establishment of such relations."

**THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA: AN OVERVIEW**, by Ramon Knauerhase, in *Current History*, v.72, n.423 (January 1977) 6-10 plus.

In Saudi Arabia, "the deterioration of the old social order has accelerated and viable alternative has apparently not developed. By 1980, one out of every five or six persons in the kingdom will be foreigner; and the strain on the country will be severe." Includes Tables: "Crude Oil Output and Government Oil Revenues", 1938-1975; "Selected Indicators of the Structure and Growth of the Non-Oil Economy"; "Selected Indicators of Progress in Social Services, Various Years" (Education and Health); "Total Government Revenues and Expenditures, Absorptive Capacity and Money Supply".

**EXPANSION STRAINS SAUDI RESOURCES**, by John L. Kennedy, in *Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, n.20 (16 May 1977) 85-91.

Describes the many projects currently underway in Saudi Arabia to increase her productive capacity, and to create new capabilities. Map of "Key projects in Saudi Arabia. Diagram illustrating "How Key East Coast Projects Fit Together."

**SAUDI ARABIA: MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT HAS TOP BUDGET PRIORITY**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Report*, v.21, n.30 (29 July 1977) 6-9.

Reviews the provisions of the Saudi budget for 1977/78. "The development of manpower, covering education and vocational training, for the first time heads the list . . . Infrastructure and economic resources are next on the budget list, as Saudi Arabia continues the trend towards a more funda-



mental approach to development." Includes Statistical tables.

**SAUDI ARABIAN REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES: THE POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS**, by Donald A. Wells. Washington, D.C., Resources for the Future, Inc., 1974. 34 p.

Discusses the capacity of Saudi Arabia to 'absorb' income and to spend it in a manner consistent with national objectives. Donald Wells estimates future revenues, analyzes past expenditure levels and patterns, and assesses potential development strategies of Saudi Arabia to support his conclusion that "Saudi Arabia's absorptive capacity is greater than the casual observer would suspect."

**SAUDI ARABIA'S ECONOMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1970's**, by Ramon Knauerhase, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.2 (Spring 1974) 126-140.

Concentrating on the period from 1962/63 to the beginning of 1972, the author seeks "to dispel the misconceptions regarding economic conditions in the kingdom, to present a brief description of Saudi Arabia's economy today and to show that the country has made considerable progress in its economic development." Before the discovery of oil in 1938, the country's largest source of income was "pilgrims' expenditures"; now the Kingdom's economic growth "is based entirely on exploitation of its oil resources." Despite hopeful indicators, "the future of the kingdom's economic development is by no means rosy." Among the problems to be faced: "the country will have to replace or rebuild a substantial portion of its physical plant in the near future, because much of the recent investment in buildings, roads and other capital goods has been of extremely low 'quality,' there is also a need to diversify the economy and "to establish backward and forward linkage from the oil sector." Rapid advances in economic development are limited by: "the continuing conservatism of the religious community, and . . . the large oil revenues which have fostered a sense of security and leisure . . ."

**SAUDIA RIDES AN ECONOMIC BOOM**, by John F. Brindley, in *Interavia*, v.29, no.4 (April 1974) 319-320.

Saudia Arabia's national airline Saudia is showing a slow steady growth in its equipment and services on both international and domestic routes. This has been accompanied by developments in the whole civil aviation network. While "of the 4,300 staff, 1,000 are employees seconded from TWA or other foreign nationals under contract, . . . major decision-making is firmly in the hands of the Saudis . . ." "Adiagram of international routes and a table: "Saudia in Figures, 1969/72" are included in the text.

**STRATEGY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN SAUDI ARABIA**, by H.E. Dr. Ghazi Algosaibi, in *Journal of Energy and Development*, v.2, n.2 (Spring 1977) 218-223.

Saudi Arabia's Minister of Industry and Electricity writes of Saudi Arabia's industrial strategy. "The manufacturing sector has been assigned a considerable role . . . This sector will be focused mainly on (a) hydrocarbon-based industries, . . . and (b) import substitution of some important commodities for which the domestic market is large enough to justify the economic operation of the industries concerned . . . The . . . objective . . . is to maximize the welfare of the people at large within the shortest possible time without rupturing the religious and moral values of the country."

**A TALE OF THREE CITIES: DHAHRAN, RIYADH, JEDDA**, by Richard H. Nolte, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1977. 50p. (*Southeast Asia Series*, v.20, no.1).

"A visit in 1977 confirms that the development of Saudi Arabia is still, symbolically speaking, a tale of three cities: Riyadh, representing the King and control; Dhahran, the oil capital of industry and power; and Jedda, an entry port for modern training and influence from the outside . . . These essays were the result of a journey to Saudi Arabia in 1957, halfway in time between the beginning and the present. They depict a kingdom already well along the millrace of development . . . they are thus at once a useful introduction to present-day Saudi Arabia, and a base line against which to measure subsequent growth and change." Map of Oil Facilities in Middle East compiled by Arabian American oil company as of 1955.

#### 4. *Saudi Arabia: Oil and Gas*

**ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY**, by Robert L. Clifford, in *Asian Affairs*, v.63 (New Series v.7), Part 2 (June 1976) 178-182.

The story of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), since its genesis in 1933.

**OIL: TOWARDS A NEW PRODUCER-CONSUMER RELATIONSHIP**, by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, in *World Today*, v.30, no.11 (November 1974) 479-486.

Text of a lecture given at Chatham House September 17, 1974 by Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. He states that "Saudi Arabia has always felt the need for moderate and gradual price increases that cope with market conditions and to which the consuming countries' economies can be adjusted."

**OIL SURPLUSES: WESTERN FEARS OF BLACKMAIL MAY BE UNFOUNDED**, by Michael Prest, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21 no.39 (30 September 1977) p. 10 plus.

"Oil producers are investing and spending their revenues successfully and safely. The money



is being recycled. The suspicion that the US, or other western countries, might be 'held ransom' have to be reconsidered . . . The political leverage which surplus countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, can exert; provides more legitimate cause for concern." Statistics: Exchange reserves in sterling held by central monetary institutions of oil-exporting countries, total exchange reserves held, Sterling banking and money market liabilities to non-official holders in oil-exporting countries and total banking and money market liabilities, page 44 and 45.

SAUD ON WAR AND OIL, by Arnaud de Borchgrave, in *Newsweek*, v.90, n.18 (31 October 1977) p.64. (Interview)

Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal discusses a setback in the prospects for a resumption of the Geneva conference on the Middle East. Prince Saud made the following points; "The crux of the matter is whether Geneva will tackle real issues for a real settlement . . . The legitimate representatives of the Palestinians have to be in Geneva or it will be a meaningless exercise . . . Israel has to achieve acceptance in the area and . . . a settlement with the Palestinians—the creation of an independent Palestinian state . . ." As for use of the oil weapon should there be another war: "I was not saying we would use the oil weapon. I am saying that we will use whatever resources we have, including oil supplies to our brothers, to hurt our enemy . . . We will never embargo oil for the sake of an embargo."

SAUDI AND IRANIAN PETROCHEMICALS AND OIL REFINING: TRADE WARFARE IN THE 1980's?, by Louis Turner and James Bedore, in *International Affairs*, (London), v.53, no.4 (October 1977) 587-603.

Looks at oil refining and petrochemical production and suggests they "are in the process of joining industries like cars, steel, shipbuilding, textiles and electronics as battlefields on which exporters and importers quarrel over the speed with which non-traditional producers can replace more established ones." This represents the first time that the "oil-producing world will find itself seeking markets for its industrial products . . . The pessimists will note that Western policy makers are increasingly convinced that the balance between the world's supply of, and demand for, oil will become steadily more critical during the 1980's thus raising the spectre of trade and oil diplomacy becoming helplessly intertwined as far as our two sectors are concerned."

SAUDI ARABIA'S GAS PROGRAM: A BIG JOB FOR ARAMCO, by R.W. Scott, in *World Oil*, vol.183, no.2 (August 1, 1976) 25-30.

An outline of the main parts of Saudi Arabia's gas program and Arabian American Oil Co. role in

it. The project which has already begun is "the largest . . . in the history of the petroleum industry—a multi-billion dollar effort to collect, process and utilize the vast amounts of associated natural gas now flared daily in Saudi Arabia." The project is "to provide fuel and feedstock for the industrialization of Saudi Arabia." This is the "key to Saudi Arabia's plan to lessen its dependence on crude exports as the main source of national income." A project of this "massive scope" presents "logistics problems unprecedented in past petroleum industry operations." The need to import more than "30,000 people . . . to work on the gas program . . . also seems to be a source of concern to the Saudi government, which has—until now—closely controlled entrance visas to the country." Map of final configuration of the gas system and the "main points of interest."

#### 5. Saudi Arabia: Water Development

THE OIL-INTO-WATER MIRACLE, by Mohamed Al-Faisal, in *The Geographical Magazine*, v.49, n.3 (December 1976) 169-173.

Prince Mohamed Al-Faisal explains how oil and gas can convert sea water into fresh water for industry and agriculture. Color and Black and white photos. Map: "Production of Desalinated Water and Power in Saudi Arabia up to 1982." Chart: "Phased Production Programme of Desalination Plants."

WATER AND DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA, by Peter Beaumont, in *The Geographical Journal*, v.143, Part 1 (March 1977) 42-60.

Saudi Arabia despite its low precipitation possesses large volumes of ground-water in eleven major aquifers. "These are currently being developed in the eastern part of the country, mainly for irrigation purposes. Most of this ground-water is, however fossil water with apparently little recharge taking place at the present day. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water is responsible for the development of water resources within the country and over the last decade or so has initiated a number of large water resource projects. Many of these, such as the Al Hasa project, have not been as successful as was planned and as a result, attention is now focussed on smaller schemes. A growing problem, with increasing urbanization, has been the provision of water for cities." To solve this problem wells have been sunk to tap the deep aquifers and desalination plants have been commissioned. The desalination plant at Jedda commissioned in 1970 is currently one of the world's largest producers of desalted water and "within a few years it could well be producing more desalted water than the rest of the world put together . . . Water produced by such methods is expensive and it is, therefore, imperative that water conservation measures within the towns and cities be greatly improved." Text includes four tables of figures and six maps



illustrating precipitation, the main groundwater aquifers, cultivated land, location and capacity of actual and planned desalination plants.

6. *U.S. Arms Transfer to Saudi Arabia* (See also I-B-5 and III-A-10)

**ARMS AND ADVISORS: VIEWS FROM SAUDI ARABIA IRAN**, by E.A. Bayne and Richard O. Collin, Hanover, N.H., American Universities Field Staff, Inc., 1976. 21p. (*Southwest Asia Series*, v.9, no.1)

"In considering the mechanics of transferring both military technology and military equipment from the United States to Persian Gulf nations, the authors focus on the pivotal role of the military advisor. They also explore the close relationship between the sales of arms and the sale of information/advice and the development of a coherent arms policy."

**MIDEAST JET SALE CLEARED: FIRST DELIVERIES IN FALL**, in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, v.108, no.21 (22 May 1978) p. 20.

Details Defense Secretary Harold Brown's assurances on the Saudi Arabian sale in a letter to committee chairman, Sen. John Sparkman prior to the vote on the arms sale. The 54-44 Senate vote cleared the way for the jet fighter sales package to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt to begin deliveries in the fall. Deliveries scheduled are: eight Northrop F-5E fighters originally scheduled for sale to Ethiopia which "will now be included in the 50 F-5E's Egypt is to receive." 75 General Dynamics F-16 fighters for Israel "will begin delivery in late 1981, and is to be completed by the end of 1983." While delivery of 15 McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters will begin in mid-1981, to be completed in early 1982. Saudi Arabia also will begin receiving the first of its 60 F-15s in mid-1981, with delivery to be completed by mid-1984."

7. *Saudi Arabian Oil and the United States*

**ACCESS TO OIL—THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIPS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN**, Prepared by Fern Racine Gold and Melvin A. Conant, at the request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate. Washington, Government Printing Office, December 1977. 113p. (Pub No. 95-70)

Evaluates the bilateral relationships between the United States, and Iran, and the United States and Saudi Arabia in terms of their contribution to access to oil. Chapters include: Access to Oil; The Franco-Algerian Example, 1962-73; Saudi Arabia; Iran; and Implications for the United States. The authors conclude: "the meaning and durability of the U.S. relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia depend very largely on the continuing political acceptance by either kingdom of the arrangements.

Unless this political factor remains secure, and the undertakings of the parties remain harmonious and to their mutual benefit, everything will fall apart in the Gulf. Yet the prospect is one of change, of instability . . ." The U.S. interest in the Gulf is a reflection "both of the vital interests of allies and of its own growing dependence upon Middle East oil . . . A U.S. commitment to the defense of the oil resources of the Gulf and to political stability in the region must constitute one of the most vital and enduring interests of the United States."

**U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS AND THE OIL CRISES OF THE 1980's**, by Dankwart A. Rustow, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.3 (April 1977) 494-516.

"On present trends and patterns of oil flow, the United States—assuming no renewed recession and in the absence of vigorous energy policies—will confront two danger points when needed additional imports would be available only from high levels of Saudi Arabian production: one in 1978 or 1979 before oil starts flowing fully from Alaska, and a later one, sometime in the early or mid-1980's, when growing domestic demand will have surpassed the Alaska supplies . . . Only with . . . a determined effort in the energy field and a systematic reduction of our dependence on oil imports will the United States be able to reassert its leadership within the Western alliance system and the freedom of action of its foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere."

8. *Saudi Arabia: National Security and Defense*

**THE DESERT SUPERSTATE: A RICH BUT VULNERABLE FEUDAL MONARCHY HURTLES INTO THE JET AGE**, in *Time Magazine*, v.111, no.21 (22 May 1978) 34-46.

Impressions of Saudi Arabia on the eve of the controversy in the U.S. Congress over the proposal to sell Saudi Arabia the F-15 fighter. "With or without the F-15, the Saudis have no illusions about being able to fight off a serious attack from Israel, to say nothing of a combined assault by hostile neighbors with Soviet backing. Thus the very modest Saudi strategy is to be strong enough to hold out for a mere two or three days until international support could be rallied and a powerful friend—say the U.S.—could rush to its aid." Despite a web of friendship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. "There has never been a formal treaty of any kind between the two nations." The author concludes: "A strong Saudi Arabia can help to stabilize the entire region—including Israel. For despite the anti-Zionist rhetoric that emanates sporadically from Riyadh, the Saudis are a strong moderating force in the Arab world, and no peace settlement will be possible without their tacit approval." Text includes short articles on: The Majlis: Desert Democracy; and, The House of Saud: Solidarity Forever. Color photos.



**IRANIAN AND SAUDI ARABIAN SECURITY INTERESTS**, by Alvin J. Cottrell, in *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies*, Special Supplement, May 1978. 50-56.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia because of its possible effect on their security interests in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Iran and Saudi Arabia share several security objectives: "(1) the preservation of their monarchical forms of government, (2) the maintenance of friendly . . . governments in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region, (3) the continuance of the flow of oil to . . . Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, and (4) the prevention of external forces from gaining hegemony in the region . . . Additionally, there is a deep Saudi interest in supporting Somalia, an Islamic state, for religious reasons." Saudi Arabia at present is limited to providing financial and diplomatic support as a means for influencing events in the Horn of Africa. Iran is developing its forces so that they "will be able to counter threats as far south into the Indian Ocean as the 10th degree North Latitude, which crosses the edge of Somalia and passes into the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden." Mr. Cottrell concludes that: "Iranian and Saudi Arabian security policies are tied directly to the need to maintain the status quo in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This, in turn, is related to their new-found economic prosperity which depends on the continued export of oil to the world's industrialized nations. Arms build-ups in the area—particularly Iran's—are a reflection of mounting concern that they must fend for themselves rather than depend on the United States or anyone else for maintaining the stability and security of their region."

**NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES TO SAUDI ARABIA**, by Dale R. Tahtinen. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 45p.

Discusses potential conflicts facing Saudia Arabia during the next decade. Mr. Tahtinen examines the steps taken by the Saudis to improve their defense capabilities and analyzes the effectiveness of Saudi military forces in meeting specific security challenges. Includes a discussion of the implications of the proposed sale of F-15's to Saudia Arabia by the United States. The author concludes: "Wisely or not, Saudi Arabia does not envision the type of defense that develops an offensive capability." Factors which make it unlikely that the Saudis will adopt anything other than a defensive posture are: "its limited manpower, its need to rely upon other states for almost all of its military needs, its inclination to use its wealth to influence other states toward moderation, and its basic conservatism . . . Saudi Arabia faces a number of potential national security challenges, none—of an immediate

nature. Nevertheless, it is understandable why a sovereign nation would want an adequate defense against possible aggressors . . . The United States must be concerned with Saudi Arabia's national security if the relationship between the two states is to continue to be mutually beneficial." An Appendix giving the number and types of major weapons in the states bordering Saudi Arabia is on pp. 34-45. Information for this appendix is largely from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1977-78.

**REASON SAUDIS FRET OVER U.S. POLICY**, by Smith Hempstone, in *U.S. News and World Report*, v.84, no.11 (20 March 1978) 33-36.

The Saudis show "increasing dismay" over the direction of U.S. policy in "three key areas": (1) "President Carter's unwillingness to take concrete measures to prevent the Horn of Africa from falling under Soviet-Cuban control. (2) U.S. refusal or inability—to insist that Israel be more flexible on Mideast peace terms that would be acceptable to moderate Arab nations—especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. (3) Congressional reluctance to permit the Saudis to buy 60 F-15 fighter planes and Egypt 50 F-5E fighter bombers in a package deal that would allow Israel to acquire 15 F-15s and 75 F-16 fighter-bombers. After reviewing major Saudi actions in 1976-1977 in support of various foreign policy objectives the author discusses the two main points of current concern: (1) The Red Sea, where the Saudis are "alarmed" that with "Yemen-Aden already a Soviet base, Moscow is moving into position to straddle Babel Mendeb, the southern entrance to the Red Sea." This would be a possible threat to their main port of Jidda. In response "the Saudis are backing some of the secessionists in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea." (2) The Persian Gulf, the main outlet for Saudi Arabia's oil, is pressured by "radical Iraq" which is "stockpiling Soviet weapons." On the other side, non-Arab Iran is rapidly building its military power. The author concludes that there are increasing indications that "more and more influential Saudis, including those closest to Khalid's throne, are demanding that the U.S. demonstrate how greatly it values its alliance with Saudi Arabia."

#### **I. Syria (See also I-B-2 and Appendixes)**

##### **1. Miscellaneous Aspects**

**MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE: COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT**, Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 April 1976, 2p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Document 94-444.)

"Expresses objections to Senate approved additional transition quarter funding for foreign military sales and security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria."

**SYRIA: ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE HAS**



**YET TO YIELD RESULTS**, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.42 (21 October 1977) p.11.

The report of the committee for the investigation of illegal gains, set up in August by President Assad, has yet to be published. Assad's "personal integrity is beyond doubt," The problem is that the "anti-corruption campaign must be directed at some of the people on whose support" the success of his five-year plan depends.

**SYRIA: A LAND RENEWED**, by V. Peresada, in *International Affairs*, no.4 (1976) 108-115. (Moscow)

A Journalist's notes on "the changes that have taken place in Syria in the period of her independent development." Topics covered include the role of the "state sector," the tragedy of el Que-neitra," the "sound basis" of Soviet-Syrian friendship, and Syria's support for the "Soviet Union's initiative on a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference." The author concludes: "the country's advance along the path it has chosen is being hampered by Israel's continued occupation of a part of Syrian territory and the schemes by reactionary forces. Still, the Syrian people, relying on the friendly support of the socialist countries, look to the future with confidence."

#### 2. Hafez Assad

**COOL HEAD IN DAMASCUS**, by Alain Cass, in *Middle East International*, n.60, (June 1976) 6-8.

Impressions of Syria's President Hafez Assad as head of state. After five years in power, "there is enough of an underlying pattern in his manner of handling events to point to two basic influences. The first is an apparently constant awareness of the three immutable factors which any Syrian President who wishes to survive must take into account in all his dealings. These are: the Ba'ath within Syria; the armed forces; and Ba'athist Iraq, with its fifth column within the rival Syrian wing of the Party. There is a fourth factor . . . the confessional balance which has so often upset the status quo . . . The second, basic influence which appears to guide him is caution. Assad is at heart a conciliator, an exponent of the art of the possible. The author concludes that "his ambitions, both personally and for his country, are still far from clear."

#### 3. Syria: Government and Politics

**LOCAL POLITICS IN SYRIA: ORGANIZATION AND MOBILIZATION IN FOUR VILLAGES**, by Raymond A. Hinnebusch, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.1 (Winter 1976) 1-24.

An examination of the "organizational and mobilizational performance of the Syrian Ba'ath regime" The author, who did his field research in Syria in 1973-74, focuses "on the local level linkage which constitutes the critical key to mass mobilization many would-be-revolutionary regimes often fail to find." He first presents a general "ideal-typical model of the Syrian system of local mobiliza-

tion," and then examines this in relation to four villages that he visited with the cooperation of the Ba'ath Party's National Command. As an investigation into the degree of change in the villages precipitated by Ba'ath activity at the local level "these little studies can be offered as tentative probings, not as a definitive mapping." The author found both successes and failures in the villages he visited. He concludes that the future success of the "Syrian road to development . . . remain unclear."

**THE PERMANENT SYRIAN CONSTITUTION OF MARCH 13, 1973**, by Peter B. Heller, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.1 (Winter 1974) 53-66.

The complete text of the Syrian Constitution of March 13, 1973. Professor Heller in an introductory note states that "the new document changes little in Syria's earlier semi-parliamentary facade . . . Despite the ulama-inspired riots protesting the lack of characterization of Islam as the state religion, the new . . . Constitution . . . does no more than concede that the head of state must be a Muslim. It also reiterates the 1969 provision that Islamic fiqh is the principal source of legislation, another concession by the Ba'athists who wish to secularize the state."

**SYRIAN POLITICAL AGE DIFFERENTIALS 1958-1966**, by Ronald R. Macintyre, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.2 (Spring 1975) 207-214.

Studies the age medians" of Syrian deputies and cabinet members between 1958 and 1966 to determine if they are "essentially similar to or different from previous Syrian political generations. Some observations are also made of the utility of political age as an analytical variable." The author concludes that "the trend is to more youthful men entering the highest political offices. This is most marked in the case of the Ba'ath (1963-66). General compactness of this regime is further in evidence with standard deviation from the mean averaging 1-3 years . . . Political age thus effectively differentiates between the Ba'ath (1963-66) and the previous political regimes." Text includes four tables showing ages of Ba'ath Ministers in Syria and Iraq, UAR Ministers, Syrian secessionist ministers during the period and the age distribution of "senior non-governmental ba'ath party command members, 1947-66."

#### 4. Syria: Economic Aspects

**SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN SYRIA**, by Ziad Keilany, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no.1 (January 1973) 61-72.

"With the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1957 and subsequently the take-over of the Ba'ath oligarchy in 1963, the ideology of "Arab Socialism" emerged as a reality in Syria. By a series of radical economic and social measures . . . the Ba'ath party completed the conversion of the econ-



omy from a presominantly free private enterprise type into a socialist economy in which the state plays a decisive role in its management . . . The distinct impact of economic planning in Syria is that it continues to be used as a vehicle to restructure the economy in a manner which gives the public sector a pivotal role in managing the economy."

STATISTICS: SYRIAN FIVE YEAR PLAN (1976-80), in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.42 (21 October 1977) p.45.

Two tables: Syria: investment in the fourth five-year plan, 1976-80; and Syria: major investment projects under the five year plan.

#### 5. *Syrian-Soviet Relations*

LEBANON, SYRIA, AND THE CRISIS OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Annette E. Stiefbold, in *Air University Review*, v.28, no.6 (September-October 1977) 62-70.

The Lebanese crisis posed the "latest threat to Moscow's painstaking efforts to achieve a resolution of the Middle East conflict favorable to itself and its clients. For reasons of both ideology and practicality, the situation in which two Soviet-armed clients, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), confronted each other in a power struggle was one in which the Soviets could not long remain impartial . . . The Soviets had no alternative but to side openly with the Palestinians and their allies among the Lebanese left." Attempts to apply pressure on Syria showed only the "limits of the Kremlin's ability either to control its Middle Eastern clients or effect crucial gains on their behalf." Their call for a reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference is a "move to place the Middle East problem before what they hoped would be a more hospitable venue. As cochairman of the Geneva Conference they might reasonably expect to regain the diplomatic initiative that the preceding events had denied them."

NEW HORIZONS OF SOVIET-SYRIAN FRIENDSHIP, by R. Vasilyev, in *International Affairs, Moscow*, no.7 (July 1974) 85-88.

The official visit to the Soviet Union (April 1-16) by a Syrian Party and Government delegation, led by Secretary General of the Baath Party and President of the Republic Hafizal Acad, was a major event in the development of the Soviet-Syrian relations which was closely watched by world public opinion. The negotiations were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and were frank and friendly. The joint Soviet-Syrian statement notes that in the course of a constructive exchange of opinion 'the common stand of both parties on the key international problem, and their solidarity in the struggle for freedom, independence, social progress and lasting peace were reaffirmed.' It was natural that the Soviet-Syrian talks devoted much attention to the Middle East crisis. The sit-

uation in the Middle East remains tense. Despite the profound crisis resulting from the failure of its aggressive annexationist foreign policy line, Israel has continued to refuse to abide by the relevant UN decisions. It still hopes through maneuvering to keep the occupied Arab territories and avoid a radical and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. In order to intensify pressure on the Arab countries, Israel has been committing aggressive acts against Lebanon."

SYRIA IN SOME SOVIET PUBLICATIONS, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.13, no.2 (May 1977) 258-260.

Based on Soviet writing in "many general and specialised works," several of which are reviewed in this article, the author concludes that Soviet interest in Syria is "close and intensive" and "it is possible to infer that Syria is a special case."

#### 6. *Syrian-Soviet Military Relationship 1955-1977*

SOVIET MILITARY AID TO IRAQ AND SYRIA, by Roger F. Pajak, in *Strategic Review*, vol.4, no.1 (Winter 1976) 51-59.

The author is Foreign Affairs Adviser with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He assesses the record of Soviet military aid to Iraq and Syria delineating the course of the arms aid program in these two countries since the June 1967 War. He finds that: Arms aid has emerged as the most durable instrument of the Soviet drive to gain influence in the Middle East. The Arab states have received about sixty percent of total Soviet military assistance to the Third World." However, this aid much of it to Syria and Iraq "has not enabled the Soviets to exercise leverage for political concessions in either country, nor have the activities of the Iraq or Syrian Communist parties been facilitated. Furthermore, Moscow has discovered that its material largesse has created risks by identifying the USSR with the actions of client states over which it has little control. On balance, however, the Soviets probably view arms aid to Iraq and Syria as their most effective policy instrument, and it appears that some sort of arms aid relationship with both countries will be maintained by Moscow."

THE SOVIET-SYRIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, 1955-1977, by Peter Mangold, in *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, v.122, no.3 (September 1977) 27-33.

Syria played "a key role both in inter-Arab politics and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It outflanked turnkey to the south, and it had, of course, a Mediterranean coastline. Strategically and politically therefore, it was a complement, and at a later stage an alternative, to the more important Soviet-Egyptian connection." The Soviet Union has become "closely involved in Syria's foreign and de-



fence policies becoming, in effect, the country's armourer and its protector of last resort." In assessing the success and failure of Soviet military policy in Syria the author finds: "on the credit side, the Russians were able to bolster sympathetic regimes in Damascus, to neutralise the Baghdad Pact and then to orientate Syrian foreign policy towards the East. Indirect involvement via the Syrians in the Arab-Israeli conflict helped to make the Soviet Union into a Middle East power and the facilities which the Soviet Navy acquired at Latakia and Tartus were of some value to the Mediterranean squadron." On the debit side: "The Soviet Union did not get a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, nor all the military facilities it had sought. The Syrians proved exceptionally difficult allies to influence or to control, and while the Syrian connection proved less costly for Moscow than that with Egypt, it nevertheless faced Soviet policy-makers with a series of very different problems."

#### 7. Syria: Religion and The State

RELIGION AND THE STATE IN SYRIA, by A.R. Kelidar, in *Asian Affairs*, v.61 (New Series v.5), Part 1 (February 1974) 16-22.

The Sunni Muslims are a majority in Syria. When the first non-Sunni President of Syria, Assad, tried to introduce a new constitution which did not specify Islam as the state religion, the Sunni led a campaign against the regime that culminated in a series of riots in April 1973. Dr. Kelidar addresses the background of these and other similar riots.

#### J. Turkey (See also III-A-11, IV-A and Appendixes)

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY—OPPORTUNITY OR HAZARD FOR TURKEY'S ECONOMY?, by Werner Gumpel, in *Intereconomics*, no.7/8 (July/August 1977) 192-197.

"Turkey once chose the road into the EC of its own free will. This decision was consistent with its European orientation since the days of Ataturk. The association with the EC and the prospect of full membership are nevertheless attracting much criticism in Turkey today. Therefore it is important that West Europeans should try to find out the reasons for this attitude and draw the proper conclusions."

KINSHIP, PRIMORDIAL TIES, AND FACTORY ORGANIZATION IN TURKEY: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL VIEW, by Alan Dubetsky, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, n.3 (July 1976) 433-451.

Examines several factories of differing size and scale with "special-emphasis" upon smaller factories (up to 50 workers), to show how their social structure can be "understood in terms of certain persistent principles of Turkish social structure and culture. These principles concern the sociological

significance of trustworthiness in Turkish society. Ultimately . . . the differentiation of those who are trustworthy from those who are not is parallel to the differentiation of those whose honor is certain and those whose is not—the basic of endogamous marriage in Turkey."

REGIONAL AND RURAL-URBAN SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN TURKEY, by K.S. Srikantan, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.3 (Summer 1973) 275-300.

Based on population censuses and the 1968 *Social Survey of Family Structure and Population Questions*, the author analyzes . . . "the differences in the social, urban and demographic transitions among the five major regions of Turkey, The Black Sea, Aegean-Marmara and Mediterranean regions, Central Anatolia and Eastern Turkey . . ." He finds that "rural-urban differentials may be shown to be larger than the rural differences for most of the characteristics." Test includes Tables of Regional Socio-Demographic Indicators and a population potential map showing the "accessibility in 1965 of the countries population at different provincial centers."

THE STATE OF TURKEY, by Andrew Mango, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.13, no.2 (May 1977) 261-274.

Five recent books on modern Turkey are reviewed: Geoffrey Lewis's, *Modern Turkey*, (1974); Engin D. Akarli's and Gabriel Ben-Dor's, *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, (1975); Keman H. Karpat's, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, (1973); and Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974 (1975); Suzanne Paine's, *Exporting Workers: the Turkish Case*, (1974).

TURKEY: A DELICATELY POISED ALLY, by Andrew Mango. Washington, D.C., Georgetown University; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975. 73p (The Washington Papers: 28).

Internal politics; Foreign policy; Ethnic minorities: The Kurds. Map. Statistical data.

TURKEY: SHADOWS OF CONFLICT, by Dwight James Simpson, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 11-14 plus.

Turkey faces many problems: A "malfunctioning" economy, population growth, the Kurdish minority, and conflicts with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. "Most observers believe that Turkey would prevail in a war with Greece; Greece is badly overmatched in terms of military power. But for Turkey even a 'victory' over Greece would be dangerous, perhaps disastrous in other areas." Particularly in domestic politics, economic stability and relations with other countries.

#### 2. Government, Parties, and Politics

AL-FATAH IN TURKEY: ITS INFLU-



ENCE ON THE 12 MARCH COUP, by Robert W. Olson, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no.2 (May 1973) 197-206.

Examines "some of the major events which led to the coup" of March 12, 1971. "Three major 'precipitators' will be considered. The returned Turkish members of al-Fatah, . . . and their role as leaders of Dev-Genc (Revolutionary Youth Party), the leftist student organization; second the role of the al-Fatah members and Dev-Genc in the Turkish Peoples Liberation Army (TPLA) as one of the major perpetrators of urban guerrilla actions in the weeks preceding the coup; third, the connection among the al-Fatah members, Dev-Genc, and the Turkish Labor Party (TIP), the only socialist party in Turkey."

ASPECTS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION IN TURKEY, by Sabri Sayari, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.2 (Spring 1976) 187-200.

A discussion of the "formal and informal aspects of party organization" in Turkey concentrating on two major parties: the Justice Party (JP) and the Republican People's Party (RPP). The author covers: the general characteristics and membership of the parties, the central party organs, and the regional and local party organization. Tables showing the occupational backgrounds, educational levels, and reelection rates of the members of the parties central executive organs between 1961 and 1970 are included in the text.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION AS REFLECTED IN BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE: THE TURKISH BUREAUCRACY AND A 'HISTORICAL BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE' TRADITION, by Metin Heper, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.7, no.4 (October 1976) 507-521.

After a resume of the development of a bureaucracy-dominated polity during Ottoman-Turkish times, the author presents the results of a survey of attitudes of "some members of Turkish higher civil servants covering the period 1945-1960." He then comments on some of the bureaucratic changes that accompany recent indicators that a period of "induced" social change is being replaced by "organic" change. He concludes: "The Turkish bureaucracy with its heavy ingredient of the Ottoman ruling tradition has gained some ground in assuming a favorable attitude toward further diversification of the Turkish society. But the imposition upon it of efficiency and effectiveness values by the recently rising and relatively modern business and industrial groups seems to be progressing at a less than satisfactory pace. The historical bureaucratic tradition of empire both frustrates, and at times, distorts that progress."

THE RECALCITRANCE OF THE TURKISH PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY "BOURGEOIS

POLITICS': A MULTI-FACTOR POLITICAL STRATIFICATION ANALYSIS, by Metin Heper, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.4 (Autumn 1976) 485-500.

The author, an associate professor of political science and public administration at the Department of Social Sciences, Bogazici University, Bebek-Istanbul, Turkey describes the relative position of the "two crucial elite elements in the Turkish context . . . the public bureaucracy and the rising entrepreneurial groups." He explores the two groups "in terms of their political power, occupational prestige, income and wealth, education and knowledge as well as their 'ideology,' and attitudes and aspirations." The author concludes that: "the transition to multiparty politics put an end to the all-pervasive status and influence of the civil bureaucracy in the Turkish polity but has not rendered it subservient to the other groups." The change in Turkey from an "induced social change pattern" to an "organic change" is at a rate that "is slower than we are generally led to believe."

STABLE INSTABILITY OF THE TURKISH POLITY, by Metin Tamkoc, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.3 (Summer 1973) 319-341.

An examination of the sources of instability in Turkey since 1946. The author concludes that the instability is "a necessary consequence of the process of modernization." In the 1960's when international tensions were relaxed the attention of the "intelligentsia" was diverted from the external to the internal scene. "There they found a 'great gap' between superstructure and infrastructure in terms of their modernity. This 'great gap' was made 'glaringly real' under the provisions of the 1961 constitution . . ." Clashes between those who supported "revolutionary socio-economic change" under the "True Atatürkists" and those who supported "necessary reforms" under military-civilian leadership within parliamentary democracy grew violent. Lacking a charismatic leader who could create consensus, the dissension within the elite group that dominates the Turkish political scene, intensified. In 1971 the situation appeared out of control and the military leaders moved to install a non-partisan cabinet and institute martial law. The author concludes that "pragmatic orientation, realism and moderation . . . are the most important stabilizing forces in domestic politics." He finds that the "present military-civilian collective leadership, like their predecessors . . . is determined to . . . further socio-economic reforms as circumstances permit . . ."

TURKEY: DEMIREL'S POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY ALIENATES JP MODERATES, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.32 (12 August 1977) p.7 plus.

"Many supporters of Premier Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party are disappointed in his revival



of the Nationalist Front coalition of three right-wing parties, and in the policy concessions he must make to his partners to keep the coalition together . . . The coalition's policies show little change . . . as with the last National Front, the government's policies appear to be designed primarily from political expediency and only secondarily to meet the economy's requirements."

**TURKEY: POLITICAL FACTIONS MAR ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.49 (9 December 1977) 3-4.

Commentary on the Turkish draft budget for 1978/79. This budget "appears to be the victim of politicking by members of the government coalition, and offers little hope of easing the dire plight of the economy." Table compares the major expenditures shown in the draft budget versus the actual expenditures of 1977/78. "Substantial" increases are shown for defence, security and the gendarmerie.

### 3. Elections

**CIVIL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN TURKEY: THE 1973 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION**, by Roger P. Nye, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, v.8, no.2 (April 1977) p. 209-228.

"The 1973 presidential election was perhaps the most critical political event to occur in Turkey since the 1960 military coup. It was a test of the strength of Turkey's civilian institutions and constitutional procedures as well as a test of the military's patience with civilian politicians and compromise politics. The following is an analysis of that election and its importance in the ongoing civilian-military confrontation in Turkey." In conclusion the author finds that the results of Turkey's 1973 elections show: "The Turkish military's one-shot theory of military intervention' . . . has become institutionalized as an extensive and continuing influence in civilian politics . . . Second, the election was the longest and most crucial instance since 1960 in which party leaders dared to openly challenge the will of the military command . . . Finally, the importance of this confrontation was that neither side emerged as the clear-cut victor . . . Both sides, despite the rhetoric, remained committed to the parliamentary system."

**THE 1973 ELECTIONS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL**, by Jacob M. Landau, in *World Today*, v.30, no.4 (April 1974) 170-180.

Describes the late 1973 parliamentary elections in Turkey and Israel. The author "attempts a preliminary comparison between the issues, the campaigning, and the results." Includes two tables showing the National Assembly and Knesset vote in 1969 and 1973 by party.

**TURKEY: AFTER THE STORM**, by Ken-

neth MacKenzie, in *Conflict Studies*, n.43 (April 1974) 17p.

Discusses Turkey after the October 1973 elections "which signalled the return to constitutional rule . . . The new government is basically nationalist, but includes pronounced and anti-American and anti-Western elements." The author covers: the leftist challenge and response, the transition in the army's role, political contradictions, the pro-Arab stance, Cyprus confrontation and constraints in Turkey's foreign policy.

### 4. Turkish Democracy

**TURKISH DEMOCRACY IN TRAVAIL: THE CASE OF THE STATE SECURITY COURTS**, by William Hale, in *The World Today*, v.33, no.5 (May 1977) 186-194.

"Do the requirements of state security justify severe legal limitations on the freedom of expression? The story of the Special Courts is part of Turkey's search for a stable parliamentary regime as an alternative to military rule."

### 5. Foreign Relations

#### a. Miscellaneous Aspects

**GREECE-TURKEY: AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF ISSUE (DONE AT BERNE, NOVEMBER 11, 1976)**, in *International Legal Materials*, no.1, n.16 (January 1977) p.13

The text of the "Berne Agreement on Continental Shelf" reproduced from an unofficial English translation provided by the Embassy of Greece at Washington, D.C. The translation appeared in "Greece, A Monthly Record, vol.II, no.9 (November-December 1976).

**TURKEY-DIVERSIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY**, by Udo Steinbach, in *Aussen Politik*, (Winter 1973) 439-449.

"Turkey has long been the accepted bastion of the Western defense system on the Black Sea and the Aegean straits; however, since the late 1960s, according to Dr. Steinbach, Turkey's policy has been evolving from dependence on the West toward a more independent international stance. He cites many reasons for the change, including the general world atmosphere of detente, an internal change signaling a renewed interest in Turkey's non-Western heritage, and anti-Americanism brought on in 1964 by the US denial of support should the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus escalate to involve the USSR. Evidences of its new foreign policy diversification are Turkey's new relations with the USSR, the Balkan countries of East Europe, the Arabic countries in the Middle East, its partners in CENTO, and its desires for bilateral rather than collective alliances and agreements . . ."



**TURKEY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE**, by Seyfi Tashan, in *NATO Review*, v.25, no.5 (October 1977) 18-21.

The Director of the Foreign Policy Institute of Ankara presents: "an unofficial Turkish view on the relations between Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance together with a conspectus of these relations, the changes of emphasis in Turkish foreign policy, as well as current trends in Turkish public opinion regarding Turkey's place in the Alliance." The author concludes: "Turkey feels that it should contribute to the best of its ability, to the strength of the Alliance because the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance is the primary safeguard for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. I believe on this point, which is the main direction of Turkish policy, there is a remarkable national consensus . . . Turkey's principal political factions view its bonds with the Atlantic Community not only within the context of the modernization process, and its military needs, but also within the new conditions of equilibrium and detente."

**TURKEY AND THE WEST**, by Neville Brown, in *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, v.121, no.2 (June 1976) 63-67.

Briefly reviews the major factors that will influence future Turkish foreign policy decisions: internal political problems, the case of Cyprus, the state of the Turkish economy, the position of Bulent Ecevit, and past links with the West. The author concludes: "Turkey does seem sure to remain a peripheral member of NATO . . . But, in the course of this next decade or so, the American garrison in Turkey may well experience successive reductions, perhaps to the size and configuration of a strong military mission; and, at all events, Ankara will remain decidedly inflexible over Cyprus and forcefully insistent apropos Aegean oil claims." The above "prognosis" would have to be changed if the "radical left" came to power. "Only one kind of development could make such a transformation possible. It is that some external factor might fatally erode the physical and moral cohesion of the Turkish military establishment." One such factor "could be the prolonged imposition . . . of an arms embargo." Another cause "could be a mishandling of any reconsideration of Turkey's projected full membership of the EEC."

(Note: "This article is based in part on a comprehensive report on this subject completed recently for the Stanford Research Institute.")

b. *Turkish-U.S. Relations and Tensions*  
**THE BICENTENNIAL IN AMERICAN-TURKISH RELATIONS**, by Harry N. Howard, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no. 3 (Summer 1976) 291-310.

Reviews the history of American-Turkish relations, concentrating on the period from when the first formal American-Ottoman treaty of commerce and navigation was signed (May 7, 1830) through the new four year agreement on bases in 1976. The author concludes "it is doubtful . . . that Turco-American friendship will now be strained to the breaking point and that the Turkish Republic will now move toward the USSR or even toward a more neutralist position in world politics."

**CONTROVERSY OVER THE CUTOFF OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY**, in *Congressional Digest* v.54, no.4 (April 1975) 99-128.

Includes the following sections: "Turkey: its History and Geography; Turkey's Treaty Relationships With the U.S. and NATO, The Scope of U.S. Aid to Turkey, The Cyprus and Opium Situations, Action in the 93rd and 94th Congress, Pros & Cons: The Controversy Over Proposals for Immediate Cutoff of U.S. Aid to Turkey." Summaries of arguments are presented in favor of the cutoff from: Senator Thomas Eagleton, Senator Adlai Stevenson III, Representative Ray Madden, Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, Representative Charles Rangel. Arguments against the cutoff are summarized from: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Representative John Rhodes, Representative Richardson Preyer, Representative David Dennis and Representative James Symington.

**NATO, TURKEY AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS**, by American Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, D.C. American Foreign Policy Institute, 1978. 47p. (Studies on NATO Defense Policies)

Six articles: "NATO, Turkey and United States Strategy," by Z. Michael Szaz; "The United States and Turkey: The Disintegration of a Twenty-Five Year Alliance," by Ambassador Parker T. Hart; "Turkey-A Loyal United States and NATO Ally," by Bernard Lewis; "The Defense of the Southeastern Flank of NATO and Turkish Arms Embargo," by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer; "The Strategic Importance of Turkey and the Arms Embargo," by Albert Wohlstetter; and "The Cyprus Question and Turkey's Role in NATO," by Congressman Stephen Solarz.

c. *Turkish Opium Poppy: Political and Economic Repercussions*

**TURKEY: CROSS FIRE AT AN ANCIENT CROSSROADS**, by Robert Paul Jordan, photographs by Gordon W. Gahan, in *National Geographic*, v.152, no.1 (July 1977) 88-123.

"A nation pointed West by Kemal Ataturk looks in new directions." Text includes map showing poppy growing regions, oil fields and major geographic features.

**TURKEY: OPIUM POPPY GROWING THRIVES BUT MARKETING PROVES DIF-**



FICULT, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.38 (23 September 1977) p.7 plus.

The Turkish governments' opium poppy cultivation program has been successful in stopping "illicit opium production in Turkey for the last three years." The Turkish farmers are "now able to grow the richest cash crop their farms can produce with guaranteed sales to the government at a generous price." The result has been a rapid increase in opium poppy cultivation. "In 1976/77 213,000 farmers sowed a record 80,000 hectares of opium poppies." The state agency responsible for buying and disposing of this production, the Soil Products Office (TMO) "has to pay the bill." It is becoming harder to sell the Opium crop as "there are few factories capable of processing the poppy capsule. Actions being taken to solve this problem include: construction of a factory in Turkey to convert poppy straw into codeine other drugs; a price freeze; and crop rotation.

THE UNITED STATES, TURKEY AND THE POPPY, by James W. Spain, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.3 (Summer 1975) 295-309.

The author, a Foreign Service Officer who served in Turkey from 1970 to 1974, recounts how Turkey first instituted a ban on the cultivation of the Opium Poppy and then reversed that ban. He concludes that the United States objective in regard to Turkish opium has changed "to control rather than eradication. If this is to be successful, continuation and even expansion of American and Turkish cooperation in enforcement is essential." Since July 1, 1974, when opium poppy cultivation was resumed in seven provinces, the United States and Turkey, "if they are to avoid frustrating each others' objectives, will . . . have to trust each others' good intentions and be cautious in condemning each others' actions."

#### d. Turkish-Yugoslavian Relations

TITO IN ANKARA, by A. Bukovac, in *Review of International Affairs*, v.27, no.629 (20 June 1976) 7-9. (Belgrade)

"President Tito's visit to Turkey has shown that, notwithstanding their different positions and other specifics, Yugoslavia and Turkey have come closer to each other in a number of respects and are prepared to work together toward stabilizing peace and security in their region . . . An important feature of the Ankara talks was the assessment that in a region exposed to foreign interference and pressure no single event or crisis can be viewed outside the context of overall developments in the area. Bearing this in mind, both sides expressed the view that the Cyprus problem should be settled as soon as possible without the meddling of foreign factors."

#### 6. Export of Labor

THE ECONOMICS OF EXPORTING LA-

BOUR TO THE EEC: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE, by Tansu Ciller, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, no.3 (October 1976) 173-186.

An analysis of the "impact of labour emigration on a developing labour-exporting country, namely, Turkey. Includes seven tables of statistics.

#### 7. Foreign Trade

TURKEY: AILING ECONOMY JEOPARDISES FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACTS, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.37 (16 September 1977) 5-6 plus.

The reluctance of Western banks to accept financial guarantees from the Turkish government has resulted in "many firms . . . losing overseas business opportunities which could do much to improve the country's precarious economy." Table showing "Turkey: Trade With the Middle East," on page 50.

#### 8. Military Aspects

MILITARISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ed. by Kenneth Fidel. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1975. 319 p.

Among the chapters: Military organization and conspiracy in Turkey.

THE TURKISH NAVAL ACADEMY: 200 YEARS OF NAVAL EDUCATION, by Lieutenant Hayati Tezel, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.99, no.8/846, 7-85.

A collection of black and white photographs illustrating the history of the Turkish Naval Academy on the occasion of its 200th anniversary.

#### 9. Trade Unionism

LABOUR AND TRADE UNIONISM IN TURKEY: THE EREGLI COALMINES, by Delwin A. Roy, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.12, no.3 (October 1976) 125-172.

Concentrates on "the problems with which the nascent labour movement is beset, when confronted by a culturally and intellectually disparate labour force . . ." This article focuses on the labour movement in the Ereğli Coal Basin, in the province of Zonguldak, northwestern Turkey, bordering the Black Sea. Here lie "virtually all of the known deposits of bituminous coal" and the "centre of Turkish heavy industry." The area has experienced "increasing labour difficulties and violence." The pattern set in the "collective agreements" of the Zonguldak Mine Workers' Union "often serves as a model of demands in other sectors of the economy." Includes twelve tables of statistics.

#### K. Yemen (North): Yemen Arab Republic (San'a) (See also Appendixes)

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

MOCHA'S FADED CHARMS, by A.S.I. Berry, in *Middle East International*, no.74 (July 1977) 23-25.

A visitor's description of Mocha; "A ghost-



town" that still exists as a port with a population reduced to a twentieth of its "hey-day" size. Now, however, the crowding of the Yemen port Hodeidah has "given Mocha the chance to be the Yemen Arab Republic's second port."

**NORTH YEMEN: AID AND WORKER'S REMITTANCES FINANCE BIG IMPORT RISE**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, n.34 (26 August 1977) 6-7.

North Yemen's demand for imported food and consumer goods, "already rising fast, is expected to expand still more as the five-year development plan gets under way . . . The consumer boom is largely the result of workers remittances. Estimates of these remittances vary between \$300 million and \$900 million a year. But, in addition, North Yemen last year received \$500 million in foreign aid from Arab oil states, the US, West Germany . . . China and the USSR." Development is hampered by "a lack of skilled manpower and port congestion." The worker's remittance are directly linked to the shortage of manpower as in a nation of "6.67 million . . . an estimated 1 million . . . work abroad."

**NORTH YEMEN: BUSINESSMEN WAIT FOR SIGNS OF STABILITY**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.43 (28 October 1977) 3-4.

"The assassination of Command Council Chairman Ibrahim al-Hamdi has caused fears for North Yemen's political and economic future." Tables of imports and exports by commodity thru 75/76; and of the balance of payments.

**NORTH YEMEN: HEAVY PRICE IS PAID FOR HODEIDA CONGESTION**, by John Whelan, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.41 (14 October 1977) p.11 plus.

The North Yemen port of Hodeida is the "world's second most congested port" with a "160 days . . . wait" for conventional cargo ships. This is "delaying contractors" mobilisation on important projects. The congestion surcharges are also forcing up costs, because construction materials have to come in on expensive roll-on, roll-off (ro-ro) vessels." Land transport does not appear to be a reasonable alternative: "some talk about insurgents and bandits blocking the road in the north; . . . the road south of Abha, in southern Saudi Arabia is poor, and once across the Yemeni border it is practically non-existent." One US company plans to start unloading by balloon using a Skyhood ship-to-shore system. This has been "greeted with some reservations" by other freight forwarders. Hampered by a "lack of skilled supervision and modern unloading gear" the port is "likely to remain congested" until its clearing becomes "a priority" with North Yemen's government.

**NORTH YEMEN: PLAN TALKS BRING**

**HOPE OF STABILITY**, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.44 (4 November 1977) 3 plus.

"North Yemen's economy officially opens up to free enterprise on 26 November. That was the impression given on 13 June by Prime Minister Abdel-Asis Abdel-Ghani's speech on the five-year plan, and by the subsequent preparations for the international conference on the plan, which will open in Sanaa on 26 November." Statistical tables: Average annual percentage growth rates by sector, Expenditure in the plan by sector, Financing of the plan, Requirements during plan period. Text includes an outline of the negative aspects of North Yemen's economy that have been determined and the goals to be obtained by the economy.

**NORTH YEMEN: TRADITION AND MODERNISM**, by Tabitha Petran, in *Middle East International*, n.39 (September 1974) 15-17.

The Central Planning Organization (CPO) established in 1972 has become "the most dynamic organization in the country." It is moving to coordinate foreign aid, to improve agriculture and health, to build a government administration and to improve education. It must work, however, "within the limits imposed by an antiquated social structure which the 1962 revolution has not basically altered."

**ON THE FRANKINCENSE ROAD IN YEMEN**, by Richard Harrington, in *Canadian Geographical Journal*, v.95, n.3 (December 77/January 78) 14-21.

Report of the visit of a British tour party to the Yemen Arab Republic in February 1977. This was the "first English-speaking group admitted." Mr. Harrington's black and white photos illustrate the story.

**SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICS IN THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC**, by Robert W. Stookey, in *The Middle East Journal*, Part I, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 248-260; and Part II, v.28, no.4 (Autumn 1974) 409-418.

On June 13, 1974, the Yemeni army, "encouraged by major tribal leaders, forced the resignation" of the government of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, President of the Republican Council, and Prime Minister 'Abdallah al-Hajri. A new civilian government under authority of a military Command Council headed by Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi was installed. In Part I the author examines "the structure of Yemeni society as it related to the aims, implicit or avowed" of the former government. Part II discusses "the factors which led to the collapse of the . . . government, and those which may be expected to affect the viability and longevity of the new regime." The present government represents a "shift of the locus of authority away from the traditional religious establishment; . . . and the joint



assertion of a legitimate authority by the two principal elements of Yemeni society possessing the ability to exert physical force: the leadership of the northern tribes and the army. The coalition is fundamentally a zaydi one, and can hardly be reassuring to the bulk of the Shafi'i community, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is equitably represented in high administrative positions." The author concludes that the "coup appears to assert secularist, modernizing trends, which, . . . were in tension with the Islamic values of the Iryani regime . . . The life expectancy of the present regime will be related to the willingness of the tribal chiefs to accept a modification of their . . . role consonant with the modernization process."

A TALE OF TWO YEMENS, by Raymond Carroll with Nabila Megalli and Lloyd H. Norman. in *Newsweek*, v.92, no.2 (10 July 1978) p.39.

"North and South Yemen are tiny and impoverished Arab nations—with a crucial geographic importance. Sitting on the eastern bank of the Bab el Mandeb strait, between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, they overlook the vital route of Arab oil to the West. For the same reason, they are natural targets in the contest for control of the Middle East—as events last week made brutally clear. In a plot apparently conceived and executed by hard-line leftists, the President of North Yemen was assassinated . . . , the President of South Yemen was overthrown, and executed, and the Soviet Union's influence seemed more entrenched than ever . . ." The authors report that: Robayi Ali, President of South Yemen, was blamed for the murder and sensing that his enemies were behind it tried to arrest Abdul Fattah Ismail, the ultra-leftist General Secretary of the National Liberation Front Party. This led Ismail to mobilize his Cuban-trained militia and police to unseat the President. Some Arab sources suggested that the East Germans planned the double operation and the Cubans flew the MIG's that helped to topple Ali. Said one diplomat in Beirut, "this is not the end, it is just the beginning."

THE YEMENS: NORTH HOLDS STEADY COURSE AS MOSCOW FACTION TAKES SOUTH, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.22, no.26 (30 June 1978) p.15.

Saturday, 24 June, a bomb carried in the bag of an official South Yemeni envoy exploded killing President Ghashmi of North Yemen and the envoy. This led to a "showdown" between Salem Robaya Ali and Abdel-Fattah Ismail, chief of South Yemen's sole political party, the National Front. By Monday evening Aden Radio announced that Ali had been tried and executed, and Ali Nasser Mohammad had been appointed chairman of the presidential council and would continue as prime minister. The changes made it seem that South Yemen "had become even

closer to the Soviet Union. The shift, although slight in ideological terms, might give the Soviet Union just what it needs to win a firm base in the Arabian peninsula." It is thought that "Ali's attempts to steer Aden's policy closer to the rest of the Arab peninsula must have caused the final break with Ismail, but there is no clear evidence that Ismail instigated the plot to kill Ghashmi and discredit Ali. Another suspect is the North Yemeni para-troop leader and former command council member Abdullah Abdel-Aalem, who was left out of the government when Ghashmi dissolved the council to become President in April . . . His possible motive for assassinating Ghashmi might have been revenge for former president Hamdi's murder, which many attributed to Ghashmi. Whatever the motive, the explosion in Sanaa was the detonator needed to set things off in the south."

## 2. Yemeni (North)—Soviet Relations

SOVIET BOOKS ON THE YEMEN, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.10, no.2 (May 1974) 234-237.

Discusses the general approach and tone of Soviet writing on Yemen in the 1960's and early 1970's. Specific titles are analyzed and described.

(LI) YEMEN RUSSIA'S STEPPING STONE TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, by Maj. Corliss E. Zylstra. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air Command and Staff College, 1974. 67 p. (Research Study.)

"This study evaluates the Soviet Union's foreign policy to the Yemen Arab Republic. It attempts to determine the Soviet Union's motivation for pursuing relations with Yemen and reasons for their active involvement in the Yemen civil war in 1967. It concludes that initial Soviet interest in Yemen was opportunistic. But, as the Soviets gained confidence in their foreign policy in the late 60s, they became more aggressive and actively courted the Yemen Arab Republic because of its strategic proximity to the Indian Ocean."

## L. Yemen (Aden): People's Democratic Republic (Southern Yemen) (See also Appendixes)

### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

AKHDAM TRIBE IN SERVITUDE, by James Horgen, in *Geographical Magazine*, June 1976, 533-538.

"Between Asia and Africa, Arabia is the meeting place of races. Along the Red Sea coast live tribes who form effectively African enclaves amidst the Arabs. One such tribe is the Akhdam of Yemen, legendary descendants of an invading Ethiopian army in the 6th century AD, who have preserved their ethnic identity but have sunk to the lowest level of Yemeni society, the street-sweepers." As such they form the largest of the African "castes" on the coast, "numbering about 60,000, lo-



cated mainly in and around Hodeida, Zabid and Bait al-Fauih." Photos, in color and black and white, of the Akhdams.

### 2. *Egyptian Intervention in Yemen, 1962*

INTERVENTION IN THE YEMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES, by A.I. Dawisha, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.1 (Winter 1975) 47-64.

The Egyptian intervention in Yemen, which followed the September 26, 1962 coup by Yemeni army officers against Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the successor to the Imamate eight days earlier, "precipitated the first actual intervention by an Arab army in another Arab state, and involved . . . Egypt and Saudi Arabia in a protracted political and military conflict which spanned the best part of six years." This article analyzes "the motives behind, and the conduct of, the Egyptian involvement in the Yemen." The author concludes that: "a major variable which determined in Egyptians' decision to help the Republicans was . . . their almost total ignorance of social and political conditions of the Yemen." In the period between the coup and the decision by Egypt to intervene "almost all of the information reaching Egypt emanated from Republican sources . . . It was generally accepted during this period that the Imam had been killed . . . ; his subsequent emergence in northern Yemen did not become known until nearly three weeks later. By then, the Egyptians had committed not only their military power, but also . . . their prestige . . . Nasir perceived the Yemeni venture as an excellent opportunity to . . . regain the initiative and prestige lost as a result of the Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic. Finally, one must not forget the rational assessment of the strategic and political advantages . . ."

### 3. *Yemeni (South)—Soviet Relations*

A TALE OF TWO YEMENS, by Raymond Carroli with Nabila Megalli and Lloyd H. Norman. in *Newsweek*, v.92, no.2 (10 July 1978) p.39.

"North and South Yemen are tiny and impoverished Arab nations—with a crucial geographic importance. Sitting on the eastern bank of the Bab el Mandeb strait, between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, they overlook the vital route of Arab oil to the West. For the same reason, they are natural targets in the contest for control of the Middle East—as events last week made brutally clear. In a plot apparently conceived and executed

by hard-line leftists, the President of North Yemen was assassinated . . . , the President of South Yemen was overthrown, and executed, and the Soviet Union's influence seemed more entrenched than ever . . ." The authors report that: Robayi Ali, President of South Yemen, was blamed for the murder and sensing that his enemies were behind it tried to arrest Abdul Fattah Ismail, the ultraleftist General Secretary of the National Liberation Front Party. This led Ismail to mobilize his Cuban-trained militia and police to unseat the President. Some Arab sources suggested that the East Germans planned the double operation and the Cubans flew the MIG's that helped to topple Ali. Said one diplomat in Beirut, "this is not the end, it is just the beginning."

THE YEMENS: NORTH HOLDS STEADY COURSE AS MOSCOW FACTION TAKES SOUTH, by David Shirreff, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.22, no.26 (30 June 1978) p.15.

Saturday, 24 June, a bomb carried in the bag of an official South Yemeni envoy exploded killing President Ghashmi of North Yemen and the envoy. This led to a "showdown" between Salem Robaya Ali and Abdel-Fattah Ismail, chief of South Yemen's sole political party, the National Front. By Monday evening Aden Radio announced that Ali had been tried and executed, and Ali Nasser Mohammad had been appointed chairman of the presidential council and would continue as prime minister. The changes made it seem that South Yemen "had become even closer to the Soviet Union. The shift, although slight in ideological terms, might give the Soviet Union just what it needs to win a firm base in the Arabian peninsula." It is thought that "Ali's attempts to steer Aden's policy closer to the rest of the Arab peninsula must have caused the final break with Ismail, but there is no clear evidence that Ismail instigated the plot to kill Ghashmi and discredit Ali. Another suspect is the North Yemeni para-troop leader and former command council member Abdullah Abdel-Aalem, who was left out of the government when Ghashmi dissolved the council to become President in April . . . His possible motive for assassinating Ghashmi might have been revenge for former president Hamdi's murder, which many attributed to Ghashmi. Whatever the motive, the explosion in Sanaa was the detonator to set things off in the south."



## CHAPTER V

### ISRAEL

(See also Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter VI, and Appendixes)

#### A. National Security and Defense

##### 1. Miscellaneous Aspects

IN THE FACE OF THE NATIONS; ISRAEL'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, by Yosef Teikoah. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1976. 284 p.

I. Self-Determination for the Jewish people; II. Israel and Ishmael (including: The territories under Israeli Conflict and the Palestinians); III. In the face of the nations (Israel and the UN; Israel and USSR and China; The principle of negotiations; visions and reality of peace). Appended. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

ISRAEL'S TIME OF TRANQUILITY, by Bernard Reich, in *Current History*, v.72, no.423 (January 1977) 22-24 plus.

"The Sinai II agreements of September, 1975, marked the beginning of a period of relative tranquility for Israel, providing a respite from the pressures of the October War and its aftermath . . ." This period "is likely to be followed by pressures during the 1977 Israeli elections and the improvement of the Lebanon situation . . . The year 1977 will mark the shift from a time of tranquility to the crucial stage of hard decision on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

THE MODERN HISTORY OF ISRAEL, by Noah Lucas. New York, Praeger, 1975. 499 p.

Part I: The Origins of Modern Israel; Part II: The State in the Making (1904-48); Part III: The Nation in the Making (1947-51). Map. Select bibliography of works in English.

##### 2. Military Posture

ISRAEL'S CHANGING MILITARY POSTURE, by Charles Wakebridge, in *Military Review*, v.56, no.6 (June 1976) 3-7.

The 1973 October War has forced the Israeli Defense Staff to "adopt a strong defensive doctrine." The Israelis have since the October 1973 war constructed defenses across "the three vital passes into the Sinai Desert proper—the Khatmia, Giddi and Mitla." A similar chain has been constructed on the Golan Plateau. "These static defenses eat up manpower . . ." The author finds that Israel's "former grandiose panzer mobility . . . has been displaced by static maginot line rigidity . . . which could indicate that the military initiative in the

Middle East may be passing . . . to the Arabs."

ISRAEL'S DEFENSE DOCTRINE: BACKGROUND AND DYNAMICS, by Major General Israel Tal, in *Military Review*, v.53, no.3 (March 1978) 22-37.

Reviews the defense concept and doctrine of the Israeli Defense Forces in light of the experiences of the 1973 war. General Tal concludes that: in Israel's situation with her limited manpower and land holdings, faced by an enemy with regular forces posted along her borders and with large reserve forces, a "mobile armored formation . . . is the only one capable of carrying the offensive into the depth of the enemy's territory, threatening his vital strategic objectives and the survival of his armies." For this purpose "the tank is the core and backbone of the armored formation . . . All other arms are integrated in the formation to support the tank and serve it by dismounted fighting, providing protection, breaching obstacles and providing fire and logistic support". The air force ensures the reserve army's freedom to deploy and mobilize by covering it and the "strategic objectives of the state" against the air forces of the enemy. "Its role also is to act as the strategic long-range arm of the country so as to inflict strategic blows on military and economic infrastructure in enemy countries and on military objectives in the operational combat areas." The tank in the IDF "is not a supporting weapon but a decisive tactical and operational weapon" that is the best solution for a small nation with limited manpower. (The author Major General Israel Tal, Israeli Army Reserve, is assistant minister of defense, responsible for the Israeli tank project)

THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: THE POSSIBILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE NEXT WAR, by Dr. Uri Bialer, in *RUSI, Journal of the Royal Services Institute for Defence Studies*, v.122, no.4 (December 1977) 65-71.

Evaluates the likelihood and effect of Arab bombing of Israeli civilian targets in a future military conflict. Dr. Bialer concludes: "should the Arab states decide to attack Israel in political and military conditions not radically different from those



at present existing in the region, it is extremely likely that they will resort to aerial bombing of Israel's cities, and that Israel will inevitably retaliate with conventional bombing." He finds that the Arabs have the capability to inflict casualties by bombing Israeli civilian targets that would be "far greater . . . than Israel sustained in the Yom Kippur War." He feels they are more likely to chose this course in the next war as a result of their heightened awareness of the "fundamental Israeli weakness" . . . her "deep concern over loss of life."

### 3. *The Policy of Defensible Borders* (See also II-A)

**ISRAEL: BORDERS AND SECURITY**, by Colonel Merrill A. McPeak, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.54, no.3 (Aril 1976) 426-443.

Analyzes "security-related territorial concerns" in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author states "the suggestion here is that, insofar as security is concerned, what Israel requires in exchange for territory is demilitarization. Following an overall settlement in which Israel trades territory for Arab pledges to end belligerency, obstacles to normalization are sure to crop up; renewed tension is a believable forecast . . . Israel . . . need not feel threatened, provided only that returned territories are demilitarized." Outline map on p.427 entitled "Israel: Borders and Security."

**ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS**, by Yigal Allon, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.1 (October 1976) 38-53.

Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1974 writes of Israel's need for defensible borders. He states that "According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of a peace settlement—would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war . . . For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, . . . will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized." The general lines of the solution of this problem are then detailed. Includes outline map: "Israel: Defensible Borders."

**ON THE TIP OF SINAI**, by Anna Ponger, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.7 (October 1976) 7-9.

Describes everyday life in Sharm el Sheikh (Known in Hebrew as Ophira): "Israel's most important position for guaranteeing free shipping in the Red Sea and for protecting the city of Eilat."

### 4. *Armed Forces*

#### a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

**FIVE FOREIGN ARMY RESERVE SYSTEMS**, by COL. Irving Heymont, USA-Ret and

COL. Melvin H. Rosen, USA-Ret, in *Military Review*, v.53, no.3 (March 1975) 83-93.

Examines the Army reserve systems of the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in order "to determine similarities and differences and their probable causes." Their missions, military service, reserve obligations, reserve training and reserve organizations are compared. "The significant differences are caused by the cumulative experience of each nation, its perceived security needs, and its allocation of manpower, money and materiel to security purposes . . . Any . . . viable reserve system . . . is . . . unique."

**A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI ARMY (1870-1974)**, by Zeev Schiff, translated and edited by Raphael Rothstein. San Francisco, *Straight Arrow Books*, 1974. 338p.

The military commentator for the Israeli daily, Ha'aretz writes the history of the Israeli Defense Force "with the view that it is at once the army of a modern, developing nation and one of the most respected and affectionately esteemed institutions in contemporary Jewish life." His coverage includes: "The Sinai Campaign, the Nahel the Making of the Israeli Soldier, Women in the Israeli Defense Forces, Intelligence, the Israeli Air Force, Doctrine, Terror and Retaliation, the War of Attrition, the Quest for Arms, Politics and the Army, the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and The War of Independence." The text includes a list of books for further reading, thirty-five outline maps, and many black and white photographs.

**THE ISRAELI ARMY**, by Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz. London, Allen Lane, Penguin Books Ltd, 1975. 461 p.

An analysis of the Israel Defence Forces: air, naval and ground. "Though loosely chronological, this book is neither a history of the Israeli Army nor a history of Israel's wars. Its central focus is on the men and ideas that have shaped Israeli defence since the beginning. —The authors . . . rely in large measure on personal sources, memoirs, journalistic accounts and data published outside Israel and beyond the reach of censorship." Maps, diagrams, figures and photographs. Appendixes pp.421-446 include: Appendix 1, The Nahal; Appendix 2, The Defence Service Law and its Implementation; Appendix 3, lists of Ministers of Defence, and military leaders 1948-1974; Appendix 4, Officers of General Rank up to 31 December 1971; Appendix 5, Extracts from Education Processes in the Israel Defence Forces by Col. Modechai Bar-On, 1962.

**OFFICER EVALUATION: SEVEN SYSTEMS**, by Major Robert L. Dilworth, in *Military Review*, v.53, no. 5 (May 1973) 15-27.

A short historical sketch and analysis of officer efficiency reporting systems being used in



seven armies: the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France, Canada, Israel and Australia. Review of Israeli officer evaluation procedures is meaningful because of their "recent combat successes" and their "high state of military preparedness." Officers are evaluated against six traits on a scale of 1 to 7: "control and leadership (when commander is being evaluated), loyalty and responsibility in carrying out missions, ability of officer to anticipate and react to unusual situations, teamwork, stability under stress and special situations, professionalism . . . The OER is considered only one means of judging an officer's qualifications and does not play a big part in promotion or other personnel actions."

**SIR BASIL LIDDELL HART'S DISCIPLES IN ISRAEL**, Jac Weller, in *Military Review*, v.54, no.1 (January 1974) 13-23.

Liddell Hart's influence on Israeli military leaders from the Haganah of the 1920's to the present Israeli Defense force is detailed. Sir Basil's concepts were exactly what the Israeli's needed according to Yigael Yadin, commanding officer at the Haganah Officer's school 1940-43. "We were and are a small nation; we must win quickly at a minimum of cost. We need especially to take maximum advantage of surprise, mobility, and quality. It's easier and cheaper to defeat our enemies from the flanks and rear than by ponderous frontal attacks." The author concludes that . . . "In the Six-day War of June 1967, the IDF operated the most closely to what Sir Basil had advocated . . . "After the war . . . "The Jews used him defensively as well."

**WAR AND PEACE DECORATIONS IN ISRAEL**, by Christoph-Ernst Kredel, in *An Cosantoir, The Irish Defence Journal*, v.37, no.8 (August 1977) 235-238.

Descriptions and photos of Israel's decorations for soldiers in war and in peace. Includes list of sources used.

b. *Army*

**ARMOUR AND INFANTRY IN ISRAEL**, by Jac Weller, in *Military Review*, v.57, no.4, (April 1977) 3-11.

Observers of the Israeli armed forces are often puzzled by their continued insistence on the separation of infantry, armor and paratroopers. The author points out that language is part of the problem as these terms have a different meaning in an Israeli context. The Israeli infantry is better understood in American terms as a 'Militia'. It consists mainly of reserves and is used almost exclusively for defense. Armor and paratroop organizations carry out most of the offensive missions. Paratroops often fight in close co-ordination with armor units. The riflemen and machine gunners who accompany armor units are not infantry

but "armor". The author notes that their number has greatly increased since the 1973 war. In the future "armor will be their primary offensive weapon and an organic combination of tanks and soldiers in APCs perhaps with a closer relationship to 'artillery'." The reason that Israeli adheres to her past pattern is that "Israel must be secure continuously at low level and able to win big wars, too . . . their organization wouldn't be right for the US on British armies, but we don't have their problems on their situations." Includes photos.

**BETWEEN ISRAEL AND DEATH**, by Edward Bernard Glick. Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole books, 1974. 182 p.

Describes the interaction between the Army of Israel and the people of Israel. The author seeks to explain "how Israel has so far managed to be a militarized but not militaristic, a disciplined but still democratic, modern garrison state." Chapter headings include: "The Sanctification of the Army, The Detractors, The 'Administered' Territories, Ex-Zahalniks: What Happens to Them?, The Israeli Military-Industrial Complex, Religion and the Army, The Army in Education and Social Integration, The Army and Politics and The 'New Militarism'?" . . . "Appendixes include: "Some Public Opinion Surveys of Israelis' Attitudes Toward Their Army," and "Questions Asked of People Interviewed." There is also a "Selected Bibliography" p.179-182.

**ISRAELI PARATROOPERS**, by Jac Weller, in *Military Review*, v.53, no.3 (March 1973) 49-59.

The mission, training and equipment of the Israeli paratrooper is described, including an account of the development and characteristics of the Galil assault rifle. These small elite forces operate as battalion-sized units on their own or in combination with armor to secure immediate control of critical points behind enemy lines. During peacetime these paratroopers are used in anti-guerrilla operations and in retaliatory strikes. ". . . They are easy to control, perform well in small units, and respond effectively to changes in plans."

c. *Air Force*

**ON EAGLES' WINGS: THE PERSONAL STORY OF THE LEADING COMMANDER OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE**, by Ezer Weizman. New York, Macmillan Publishing, 1976. 302 p.

Ezer Weizman, former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Air Force tells the story of the development of Israel's air force as he observed it over the years. He concludes: "My long association with the air force has taught me at least one fundamental fact about this country and its future: our existence here always has been, and always will be based on nurturing a standard of quality, and that is not a subject on which we have, or ever will have, a choice . . . This is a theme that . . . finds its sharp-



est expression in the story of the Israeli air force."

**SHIELD OF DAVID: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE**, by Murray Rubenstein and Richard Goldman. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1978. 223 p.

The history of the Israeli Air Force from the formation of the underground Sherut Avir ("Air Service"), in 1947, through four major wars and numerous skirmishes to the present day. Includes black and white photographs, and technical appendices with details on all Israeli Air Force aircraft types, armament, power plants, camouflage and markings. Outline Map entitled "Air Bases of the Israel Defence Force/Air Force."

d. *Navy*

**THE ISRAELI NAVY: 26 YEARS OF NON-PEACE**, by Martin J. Miller, Jr., in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v.101, no.2/864 (February 1975) 48-54.

Historical review of the development of the Israeli navy and its vessels. In the aftermath of the 1973 war the author concludes the "strategic outlook of the Israeli Navy remains unchanged. In the Mediterranean she still must protect her shores against quantitatively superior Arab naval forces, and, at least hypothetically, against Soviet naval forces . . . In the Red Sea, the Israeli Navy may be forced to carry out operations far from its own ports to insure the continued access to Eilat by merchant shipping . . ."

5. *The Raid on Entebbe, Uganda, 1976*

**HOW THE ISRAELIS PULLED IT OFF**, in *Newsweek*, v.88, no.3 (19 July 1976) 42-44 plus.

"Israeli commandos flew 2,000 miles to Uganda, gunned down a gang of terrorist hijackers and freed 104 hostages in one of the most spectacularly successful rescue raids of modern times. In the first days after Israel's Mission Impossible, the Jerusalem government kept the details a closely guarded secret. But last week, NEWSWEEK correspondents Milan J. Kubic and Michael Elkins in Jerusalem, James Pringle in Nairobi, and Scott Sullivan in Washington pieced together the extraordinary story of how the Israelis did it. The inside account."

**90 MINUTES AT ENTEBBE**, by William Stevenson with materials by Uri Dan. New York, Bantam, 1976. 216 p.

6. *Israeli incursions into Lebanon, 1977/1978 (As a Response to Terrorism)*

**AN EYE FOR A TOOTH** in *Newsweek*, v.90, n.21 (21 November 1977) 61-64.

Describes the Israeli attack on two Lebanese villages, three Palestinian refugee camps and other towns in retaliation for Palestinian rocket attacks that had killed three civilians in the Israeli city of Nahariya. "The Israeli strikes killed perhaps 100 Lebanese civilians and wounded scores more. But

the announced targets of last week's attack—Palestinian guerrillas and their base camps in southern Lebanon—were virtually untouched . . . The Israeli attacks heightened tension in the Middle East at a time when a diplomatic stalemate had already made it seem unlikely that the Geneva peace conference could begin next month, as Carter had hoped." Map illustrating locations of the Palestinian rocket fire, Israeli shelling, and Israeli air strikes. Box inset "Death of a village" presents an eyewitness report by Newsweek's Tony Clifton a few hours after Israeli planes bombed the Lebanese village of Azziye.

**ISRAEL STRIKES BACK**, in *Newsweek*, v.91, no.13 (27 March 1978) 26-40.

In response to a Palestine Liberation Army raid which killed 31 Israelis and an American outside of Tel Aviv, the Israeli's activated a "long-standing contingency plan to attack a growing guerrilla presence in Lebanon." The Israeli drive established a 6-mile deep "security belt" along the 60-mile Lebanese border and later was advanced three miles in several areas. (Map on page 29). The result: "A setback for peace and another problem for Carter and Begin." Israel now had "new territory to bargain with" and had "disrupted PLO organization temporarily." Sadat, Syria and Saudi Arabia were either unable or unwilling to support the PLO against the Israeli counterattack. However, "Israel remained vulnerable to Palestinian artillery and rocket attacks and . . . to . . . terrorist infiltration . . . by sea." Further complications were promised as a result of charges that Israeli planes used in the attack included "U.S.—made Skyhawks and Phantoms . . ." The PLO appeared to have achieved its aim of "impeding progress toward a peace settlement that left out the PLO."

7. *Military—Industrial Complex*

**ISRAEL'S OWN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX**, by Louis Kraar, in *Fortune*, v.97, no.5 (13 March 1978) 72-76.

Israel Aircraft Industries, government owned but run as an independent company, is developing into a "contender in world arms markets." Emphasis is on new products that can be sold internationally with as many of their components as possible being produced within Israel. I.A.I. has been involved in assistance to Ethiopia, South Africa and other nations where they are a "potent economic and diplomatic weapon in the country's struggle for survival." Plans are proceeding for development of their own "1980's fighter" that could substitute for the U.S. F-16 and give Israel more freedom from "American restraints."

**SPECIAL SERIES: ISRAEL AVIONICS**, by Phillip J. Klass, in *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April-May 1978. Various paging.

Presents a four part series on Israel's growing avionics/defense electronics industry. The four



parts are: Part I: New Capabilities Building Rapidly, v.108, no.15 (10 April 1978) 32-37; Part II: Three Firms Dominate Output, v.108, no.16 (17 April 1978) 38-50; Part III: Tadiran Enters Airborne Avionics Field, v.108, no.17 (24 April, 1978) pp.99-106; Part IV: Electronic Warfare Capability Developed, v.108, no.18 (1 May 1978) pp.55-61.

**B. Israel's Nuclear Option: Mystery and Policy (See also I-B-6)**

**ISRAEL AND THE ATOM: THE USES AND MISUSES OF AMBIGUITY, 1957-1967**, by Yair Evron, in *Orbis*, v.17, no.4 (Winter 1974) 1326-1343.

Addresses the "issues arising from Israel's potentiality as a military nuclear power." The author concentrates on two aspects of this potential: "(1) the place the whole idea of nuclear weapons and a nuclear option has occupied in Israel's strategic doctrines and postures—preceded by a brief outline of her basic strategic postures during the 1950's and up to the 1967 war; and (2) the diplomatic and strategic uses of Israel's nuclear option, including a discussion of the role of ambiguity and the resultant uncertainty in her 'atomic diplomacy' vis-a-vis the Arab world." Extensive references to related articles are included in the footnotes.

**ISRAEL AND THE BOMB**, by David Binder, in *Middle East International*, n.59 (May 1976) 6-8.

Addresses the question of the background and sources for some of the American news reports concerning Israel's possession of atomic bombs.

**ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR POLICY**, by Lawrence Freedman, in *Survival*, v.17, no.3 (May/June 1975) 114-120.

"On 1 December, President Ephraim Katzir said to a group of science writers, 'it has always been our intention to develop a nuclear potential. We now have that potential.' These comments were much publicized, and were mainly important, in that they could be taken as a semi-authoritative confirmation of what was already known . . . This article argues that there is little reason to believe that nuclear weapons are about to play a central role in the Middle East conflict, nor is it likely that the Israeli government will change its current policy of maintaining a well-developed nuclear option. An explicit Israeli move to a strategy based on a nuclear deterrent would result in a deterioration of her national security."

**MYSTERY OF ISRAEL'S BOMB**, by David Martin, in *Newsweek*, v.91, n.2 (9 January 1978) 26-27.

"In the mid-1960's, 206 pounds of enriched uranium . . . disappeared from a small processing plant in Apollo, Pa. For years, the FBI, the CIA and the now defunct Atomic Energy Commission tried in vain to discover what happened to the miss-

ing uranium, suspecting that it was somehow diverted to Israel where it was fabricated into nuclear weapons. Their suspicions focused on Zalman Shapiro, a dedicated Zionist and enterprising scientist who ran the Apollo plant. The FBI . . . reports that it finds Shapiro committed 'no provable illegal act.'" This is an account of a review of recently declassified government files and an interview with Zalman Shapiro.

**SPECTRE OF A MIDDLE EASTERN HOL- OCAUST: THE STRATEGIC AND DIPLO- MATIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM**, by Robert E. Harkavy. Denver, Colorado Seminary, 1977. 126p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, v.14, Book 4)

Analyzes the strategic and political impli- cations of an Israeli nuclear weapons capability. Main subjects discussed are the history and back- ground of Israeli nuclear weapons development; the unanswered questions of probable use, and strate- gic doctrine; Nuclear doctrines, international per- spectives, and prospects for a future balance in the Middle East. The utility of Israeli nuclear weapons in terms of possible scenarios and doctrines is dis- cussed in detail. The author concludes: "An omi- nously worsening balance is very likely . . . to accelerate Israel's nuclear build-up and to increase the temptation to depend on an overt nuclear threat . . . Particularly if Israel is forced to aban- don the 'buffer' territories acquired in 1967, its gov- ernment will be under strong pressure to preempt, backed by the nuclear threat, in the face of another looming conflict . . . The probability of nuclear war in the Middle East now appears to be substantially higher than that of a nuclear exchange between the great powers or nuclear explosions anywhere else . . . Though we have discussed . . . Israel's nuclear threat within the traditional analytic frame- work developed for mutual deterrence at the Big Power level, the paradigm is only partly valid . . . For Israel, if the choice should be between conven- tional and nuclear death, if deterrence should fail, then . . . its choice of an apocalyptic end for all con- cerned in the Middle East conflict would have a terrible but irrefutable logic uniquely its own." Ex- tensive references to other material are contained in the footnotes at the end of the study. Text in- cludes three figures: Israel-Eye of the Hurricane in the Middle East; Jericho Missile Nuclear Deliv- ery Capability vis-a-vis Confrontation State Tar- gets from pre-1967 and post-1967 Israeli Boundaries; Potential Perimeters of Israel Nuclear Delivery Capability.

**C. Government, Parties and Politics**

**1. Constitution**

**ISRAEL'S DILATORY CONSTITUTION**, by



Samuel Sager, in *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, v.24, (1976) 88-99.

The Index Editor for the Knesset Record, Jerusalem, describes how Israel's constitutional development has: "followed a halting and uncertain course marked by intermittent and seemingly endless debate both in the Knesset and among the interested public; and after nearly three decades of independence Israel remains without a written constitution."

## 2. Elections

**THE EARTHQUAKE-ISRAEL'S NINTH KNESSET ELECTIONS**, by Don Peretz, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 251-266.

An analysis of the results of the May 1977 national election for Israel's ninth Knesset. The landslide away from labor which had dominated the Israeli government since 1948 was termed by some Israeli papers "the earthquake." It was unexpected, "Few observers . . . nor most of the country's highly credible public opinion polls "had predicted it. It resulted from "the precipitous decline of labor rather than a remarkable increase in Likud's strength." The Likud bloc gained just over ten per cent more Knesset seats and 3.2 per cent additional votes than it had in the eighth Knesset, while labor lost 40 per cent of its seats and 15 per cent of its votes. Campaign polls, however, showed at least a ten per cent spread between labor and Likud to Labor's advantage. Labor's decline in Israel is not an isolated event among western social democratic parties. Economic and social problems not foreign policy were the primary issues in the minds of the voters. Increased labor factionalism and the appearance of a new party the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC-Dash) a few months before the elections siphoned off much of labor's traditional vote. The author includes a table showing the official results of the election by party. Still unanswered are three major questions: "Will Likud be able to sustain the strength it has built from a coalition of nationalists and economic conservatives of the Liberal Party? Will DMC hold together as a centrist opposition bloc . . . to bring electoral reform to Israel, or will it be coopted into government? Has the Labor Alignment sufficient institutional vitality to continue as a social-democratic alternative?"

**ELECTIONS 77: A MOMENT GUIDE TO THE CONFUSION OF POLITICS IN ISRAEL**, in *Moment*, v.2, n.6 (April 1977) 12-15 plus.

Past and present problems in Israeli elections. Includes chart illustrating "Knesset seats since 1949" broken down by election year, type of party (Left, Right, Religious, other) and party.

**THE 1973 ELECTIONS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL**, by Jacob M. Landau, in *World Today*,

v.30, no.4 (April 1974) 170-180.

Describes the late 1973 parliamentary elections in Turkey and Israel. The author "attempts a preliminary comparison between the issues, the campaigning, and the results." Includes two tables showing the National Assembly and Knesset vote in 1969 and 1973 by party.

**THE WAR ELECTION AND ISRAEL'S EIGHTH KNESSET**, by Don Peretz, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.2 (Spring 1974) 111-125.

Israel's eighth parliamentary elections in 1973 left the pattern existing since the state was established in 1948 unchanged. The same three largest blocs emerged with approximately the same political power, but with a different number of seats. The trend away from labor continued. The author concludes: "The sharply drawn contrasts in the election between the two leading parties, the closing gap in votes between them, and the prevailing mood of the country, all have accelerated trends toward a two party system. If the rightist coalition of liberals and nationalists can hold together, they could become a credible alternative to labor."

## 3. Parties and Politics

**CLEAVAGE IN ISRAEL**, by Amos Perlmutter, in *Foreign Policy*, no.27 (Summer 1977) 136-157.

A "successor generation" is now taking control of the Israeli political scene. Composed of "ex-generals, police chiefs, senior bureaucrats and technocrats and a few university professors and journalists this "new meritocracy" now in their forties and fifties are finding "Yigal Yadin's new party, DASH (Democracy-Change), their natural habitat. This change of elites has brought with it the opportunity for new political alignments and coalitions." After examining the "roots of Israeli politics" the author comments on the "significance of these changes for Israel's foreign policy." He concludes that "international negotiations involving Israel will become more cumbersome, more limited, and more protected than they might have been had labor retained its hegemony."

**CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S RELIGIOUS PARTIES**, by Stephen Oren, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.1 (Winter 1973) 36-54.

Discusses the growth and impact of the three Orthodox Jewish parties: Mafdal (Miflaga Datit Leumit)—National Religious Party, Aqadat Israel—League of Israel, Pai-Workers of the League of Israel. These parties while never obtaining over 15 per cent of the vote have been able to "impose aspects of Jewish religious law on Israeli society and polity . . ." Divisions between the religious parties have proceeded from . . . "terms of support for the Zionist movement" . . . to "Theocratic" demands" . . .



to the present disagreements between "those who would maintain the religious parties as 'pressure groups' having little concern with general policy, and new groups inside the religious parties that wish them to function as political parties concerned with security, economic and immigration policy." The problem of the future of the territories acquired by Israel in 1967 was the "catalyst" that brought the parties into questions "far beyond the religious pale." This introduced "a new element into Israeli politics, one that could well upset the present political balance of the state."

**ISRAEL: DIVIDED: IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS IN THE JEWISH STATE**, by Rael Jean Isaac. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 227 p.

An account of the extremist fringes in Israel's political spectrum and their consequences on the Israel's quest for survival. Examines the origins, leadership, and ideologies of two groups: The Land of Israel Movement which seeks to incorporate all captured territory into the boundaries of Israel; and the Peace Movement which seeks survival by conciliatory Arab neighbors. Also examined are the evolving policies of Israeli Government as it tries to steer a middle course between the positions of the groups. Maps. Selected bibliography.

**THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ISRAELI POLITICS**, by Scott D. Johnston, in *World Affairs*, v.139, no.4 (Spring 1977) 308-318.

Discusses the prospects for a change in the "established order" in Israeli politics in terms of: The prospects for Change, Contingent Variables and the Factors of System Maintenance. The author concludes: "there should not be any automatic assumption that the style and content of Israeli politics are about to undergo some drastic or even major transformation. The powerful currents now pressing in the Israeli body politic will be resisted by other powerful currents and forces . . . The passing of the founders has, however, substantially taken hold. In the absence of another major war and crisis . . . it may be argued that the politics of succession in Israel could bear major resemblance to the quarter century of politics that has preceded it."

#### 4. Radical Dissent

**NATIVE ANTI-ZIONISM: IDEOLOGIES OF RADICAL DISSENT IN ISRAEL**, by David J. Schnall, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.2 (Spring 1977) 157-174.

Despite the fact that "radical dissent is anomalous to both Zionist ideology and the Israeli political system," groups at both ends of the political spectrum have appeared to present organized protest to Zionism. This study concentrates on the ideological underpinnings of three of these movements: The Haolam Hazeh (New Force), organized

around journalist Uri Avneri—a member of Knesset from 1965-1973 and an announced candidate for future elections; The Israel Socialist Organization (Matzpen), a "radical youth oriented movement" which "regularly calls for mass leftist revolution which will turn the whole Middle East into a socialist camp," and the Rakah (New Communist List) a "largely Moscow directed party" that has become "the major spokesman for the political and civil rights of Israel's Arab minority." The author defines them as radical "given their rejection of the principles of the ideological mainstream, i.e. political Zionism." The three movements are discussed in terms of where they are, where they say they ought to go and the means by which they intend to get there. His presentation is supported by numerous quotations from the various leaders of the movements. He concludes that only time will tell if recent attempts by these and other dissenting groups to form a common front "will result in greater electoral success and mass support."

#### 5. Political Leaders

**ABBA EBAN INTERVIEW**, in *Moment*, v.3, n.2 (December 1977) 15-18 plus.

Comments on the labour parties reaction to its loss of power in the last Israeli election; the first few months of the new Begin government; and the Arab-Israeli situation.

**AMBITION IN ISRAEL: A COMPARATIVE EXTENSION OF THEORY AND DATA**, by Gerald M. Pomper, in *Western Political Quarterly*, v.28, n.4 (December 1975) 712-732.

Examines United States ambition theory in an Israeli context through questionnaires mailed to three independent samples of Israeli politicians; Cabinet members, municipal councilmen, and party executives. "As a dependent variable, ambition is found lower among those in static offices and in less competitive parties. Political desire also diminishes with advancing age, although ambition persists longer in Israel than in the United States. Ambition is also tested as an independent variable affecting attitudes of party loyalty, ideological commitment, and support of national centralization. These relationships vary by age, party, and office. Although some generalizations of ambition theory are supported by these data, modifications are also necessary because of variation among politics. Future patterns of recruitment in Israel, such as the necessity for military experts, are likely to change these findings further." The author further concludes: "Military leaders are likely to be increasingly prominent in Israeli politics, not as revolutionaries but as parliamentary leaders. While the founding generation is passing from the scene, forced early retirement of officers provides an alternative source of recruitment . . . Moreover, probably more than any other institution in the na-



tion, the armed forces emphasize merit in the selection of leadership, bringing able persons to prominence."

AN INTERVIEW WITH SHIMON PERES, conducted by Leonard Fein and Mark Heller, in *Moment*, v.1, n.7 (February 1976) 12-18.

Israel's Minister of Defense, interviewed in New York, comments on the Palestinian question, and Israeli domestic politics.

ISRAEL'S NEW CABINET, in *Israel Digest*, American Edition, v.20, no.13 (July 1, 1977) p.8 plus.

Photos and brief biographies of Prime Minister Begin's new cabinet. Included are Menahem Begin, Aharon Abu-Hatzeira, Dr. Josef Burg, Moshe Dayan, Simha Ehrlich, Zevulun Hammer, Yigal Hurwitz, David Levi, Yitzhak Modai, Gideon Patt, Ariel (Arik) Sharon, Eliezer Shostak and Ezer Weizman.

NOTES ON THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF DR. MOSHE SNEH, by David J. Schnall, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.3 (Summer 1973) 342-352.

Traces and analyzes the political thought of Moshe Sneh, who was the chief of one of Israel's two Communist Parties. Particular emphasis is placed on "a systematic outline of his views on Israel's position vis-a-vis the Arab states."

#### 6. Moshe Dayan

MOSHE DAYAN: STORY OF MY LIFE, by MOSHE DAYAN, New York, William Morrow, 1976 640p.

Autobiography describing Dayan's experiences from his birth in Palestine in 1915, thru his service as Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, and as Minister of Defense. He concludes: "I believe that the extent of Israel's military strength has virtually reached its quantitative limits . . . Therefore, the way in which Israel must secure a balance of forces against the Arab world . . . lies in improving the quality of her weapons . . . What happened in the Yom Kippur War was not a 'mishap' but an expression of present reality . . . The military and political might of the Arabs increased, and the countries of the West, including the United States, feared anything that could disturb the smooth flow of oil to them from the Middle East . . . I do not know what is the military nature of the American commitment to the survival of Israel. But from our national and political point of view, even if we had been saved by American troops, our position point of view, even if we had been saved by American troops, our position would have been grim . . . Our foremost duty is—the revival of the Jewish nation in its homeland." Various maps and photo are included in the text.

#### 7. Menachem Begin

BEGIN AND THE 'MAKING OF ISRAEL',

by Humphrey Walz, in *Middle East International*, no.76 (October 1977) 15-16.

"Shortly after the Israeli General Election in May, 1977, Shmuel Katz visited the United States as Prime Minister Menachem Begin's Special Representative. Here L. Humphrey Walz recalls the book Katz wrote about his days with Begin in the underground Irgun Zvai Leumi\* and suggests it may provide some clues to the present Israeli governments thinking." The author compares statements in the book with statements made by Mr. Katz during his visit to the United States in 1977. He reports that "Katz, on his 1977 summer visit to the USA, could tell a gathering of Orthodox rabbis: 'We are confident that the Jewish community in America will stand out courageously (in support of Begin) and challenge (the US) government if it becomes necessary.'" Joseph Lelyveld (New York Times Magazine, July 10, 1977) "tells of doubts and reservations voiced in response . . . The author concludes that "they are likely to deepen and multiply if current events lead to a wider study of Days of Fire."

\*Days of Fire: The Secret History of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Making of Israel, by Samuel Katz. Doubleday & Co., 1968.

HOW DIFFERENT IS BEGIN?, Avi Shlaim, in *Middle East International*, no.75 (September 1977) 15-17.

The May general election "was the culmination of a long-term process which has been changing the balance of forces in the country in favour of the right." Major changes from previous policy can be expected "in the field of relations between religion and state", in a movement toward a "laissez-faire" economic policy, and in a "markedly more hawkish and inflexible" foreign policy. The author concludes that "prospects of peace in the Middle East are unlikely to improve as a result of the recent change of government . . ."

ISRAEL'S HARDENING LINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by Dennis Mullin, *U.S News and World Report*, v.83, n.1 (4 July 1977) 59-61.

Comments on why Begin is "talking so tough as meetings with Jimmy Carter draw near." While "many Israelis have a number of reservations about Begin . . . They almost unanimously support the new Prime Minister's rejection of a return to the country's 1967 borders . . . The dilemma that the occupied lands pose . . . is summed up . . . by Foreign Minister Dayan: What we want, the Arabs reject. What they suggest, we do not want to accept." Includes Box inset of a discussion between U.S. News and World Report and Ezer Weizman, the new Israeli Defense Minister, "Why can't Washington listen to us?"

MENACHEM BEGIN: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN, by Eitan Haber, Translated by Louis



Williams. New York, Delacorte Press, 1978. 321 p.

Eitan Haber, military correspondent for the *Yediot Aharonot*, traces the three major periods of Begin's life and the events and influences in each that formed his personality, ideology, and opinions: his early years in Poland and in a Soviet prison camp; his years as head of the underground in Palestine; and his years as leader of the opposition in Israel.

#### 8. *Role of the Military*

ISRAEL'S CITIZENS IN UNIFORM, by Peter Forster, in *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.26, no.11 (February 1977) 19-22.

Is Israel a militaristic state? The author suggests that by the "equating of military service and civic duty" the Israelis have safeguarded themselves "against a fundamentally militaristic attitude." Further "as long as national defense is a task borne by all Jewish citizens, rather than by a self-seeking standing army, tendencies hostile to the state are unlikely to arise within the ranks."

THE LAVON AFFAIR, by Avi Shlaim, in *Middle East International*, no.76 (October 1977) 12-14.

The 'Lavon Affair' of 1960, which ended in the resignation of the then Israeli Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, had its origin in a "security failure" in 1954. The details of this affair, which until recently could only be referred to in the Israeli media as 'the mishap', only recently have become known through the publication of the diaries of Moshe Sharett, who was Prime Minister when it occurred. The controversy centered around the question of who had given the orders to activate a "disastrous operation" by Israeli Military Intelligence in Egypt. Pinhas Lavon became the "unwilling scapegoat" in a confrontation that developed between Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff, Shimon Peres, Director General of the Defense Ministry, and Colonel Benjamin Givly, Chief of Military Intelligence. The author concludes that the 'mishap' was the product of "fundamental deficiencies in the prevailing system for the management of national security..." It furthermore showed the "extent to which the Defense Establishment acted as a pressure group for an activist policy and the lengths to which it could go in pursuing an independent policy which did not accord with the aims of the Government."

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL 1967-1977, by Amos Perlmutter. London, England, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1978. 222 p.

A sequel to an earlier work "Military and Politics in Israel 1948-1967." Presents an overview of the "behavioral, psychological and individual motivations and practices of the persons and the relationships between the three crucial offices that dominate national security in Israel: the Prime Min-

ister, The Minister of Defence, and the Chief of Staff. The author concludes that, on the whole, the formula for civil-military relations in Israel has worked successfully. It has been informal, as in the past, and very much dependent on the personality and style of the individual office holder. The civil-military formula operative in Israel clearly demonstrates the persistence of the civilian authority over the military power, with a manifest division of labour between the authoritative civilians who dominate the military professionals."

#### 9. *Zionism*

ZIONIST SOCIALISM AND THE ARAB QUESTION, 1918-1930, by Yosef Gorni, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.13, no.1 (January 1977) 50-70.

"The Zionist socialist movement played a vital and decisive part in implementing the objectives of Zionism in Palestine; it is probably the only example in modern history of a labour movement attaining leadership of a nationalist cause. And it was as a result of its national activism that Palestinian Jewish labour found itself in direct confrontation with the Arab question." The author examines "the ideological roots of their views on... problems with which the State of Israel is still wrestling."

ZIONIST THINKING TODAY, In *Israel Digest*, American edition, v.20, no.12 (June 17, 1977) 8 plus.

Excerpts from the introduction to the papers prepared by the Zionist Executive for discussion by the Zionist General Council. Includes excerpts from the paper on "Israel as a Zionist State." Other subjects covered include "Zionism Today, The Centrality of Israel, and Our Right to the Land of Israel."

#### D. *Foreign Relations*

##### 1. *Relations with Africa*

AFRICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: IMPACT ON CONTINENTAL UNITY, by Jake C. Miller, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.4 (Autumn 1975) 393-408.

A review of the relations between Israel and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The October War of 1973 "was able to achieve what years of intense Arab diplomatic efforts had failed to accomplish-a 'continental response' to Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, African support for Israel had begun a slow erosion, but by the conclusion of the war, virtually all African states had deserted the Israeli cause." Although Guinea was the first African state to break relations with Israel after the 1967 war, "other countries of Black Africa did not join the parade until 1972. In that year, Uganda, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville severed... ties, and were followed by Niger and Mali during the first week of



1973." African nations breaking relations with Israel between October 4-November 8, 1973, were: "Dahomey, Rwanda, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Kenya." The author reviews the reasons given for severing relations and concludes that "no one reason appears to exist to explain why . . . Continental unity on this basic issue is likely to remain intact only to the extent that the interests of the Arabs of North Africa and the Blacks of sub-Saharan Africa coincide. One should be aware of the fact, however, that the degree of wealth, as well as religious beliefs are likely to be major factors . . ."

ISRAEL, THE ARABS AND AFRICA, by Yaacov Shimoni, in *Africa Report*, v.21, no.4 (July-August 1976) 51-55.

A discussion and description of the current state of Israel's relations with Africa.

OIL, ISRAEL AND THE OAU: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Timothy M. Shaw, in *Africa Today*, v.23, no.1 (January-March 1976) 15-26.

"In November 1975 the United Nations General Assembly declared Zionism to be a form of racism, thus in effect equating it with apartheid in South Africa. That his resolution was adopted with the support of most black African states has dramatically highlighted the shift in attitude of these states toward Israel, whose relationship with them in trade, aid, and diplomacy prior to 1967, and in most cases prior to 1973, had been cordial or at least amicable. The vote reflects the fact that the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 with its concurrent injection of the politics of oil into international relations has brought about permanent changes in the global economy and a realignment of the international order. The impact on the African continent has been profound. It is this impact, the new realpolitik of Africa, in which oil reserves and other strategic resources are an important determinant of power, which will be examined in this essay, with special emphasis on Southern Africa and Israel."

#### 2. *Relations with Ethiopia*

THE ISRAELI CONNECTION, by Michael Ledeen, in *The Washington Review of Strategic and International Studies*, Special Supplement, May 1978. 46-49.

Formal ties between Israel and Ethiopia ended in 1973 at a time when relations were broken with practically all of black Africa. Informal relations, however, continued and consisted "primarily" of Israel giving aid in the struggle against the Eritrean Liberation Front, "which had had close ties with the Palestine Liberation Front since the

late sixties." The Israelis-supplied the Ethiopians with "counterinsurgency training, medical supplies . . . spare parts, webbing and light arms." During this period the Israeli "exodus" from Ethiopia continued, by mid-1977 there were "at most 25-30 Israelis in all Ethiopia." Mr. Ledeen concludes: "Israeli policy in Horn was dictated by an overwhelming confluence of converging factors: her historic cultural affinity with Ethiopia combined with a demonstrated openness on the part of Haile Selassie; the desire to keep sea lanes open and continue to use Ethiopia as a halfway house on the way to Kenya and South Africa; her fear of the Red Sea becoming an 'Arab' lake; her concern about growing Soviet influence, until recently centered in Somalia; her conviction that Ethiopian territorial and political stability was fundamental to the stability and tranquility of the entire area; and her antagonism to the Eritrean revolt, which was closely linked to the PLO."

#### 3. *Relations with Nigeria*

ISRAEL AND NIGERIA AND CHANGE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP, by Olajide Aluko, *The African Review*, v.4, no.1 (1974) 43-59.

"When Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Israel on 25 October 1973 a new dimension to the relationship between the two countries was introduced . . . These recent developments may be seen as further evidence of the change that has been evolving in the pattern of relationships between Lagos and Tel Aviv since Nigeria's independence in 1960. Yet some elements of continuity in their relationships remain."

#### 4. *Relations with the Third World*

ISRAEL IN THE THIRD WORLD, ed. by Michael Curtis and Susan Aurelia Gitelson. Transactions Books, New Brunswick, N.J. 1976. 419 p.

I. Israel and Development; II. Economic Relations and Technical Assistance; III. Political and Cultural Relations; IV. Third World Attitudes. Appended; Israel's Foreign Aid Projects.

#### 5. *Relations with the Soviet Union*

ISRAELI SOVIET COLD WAR, by Surendra Bleutani. Delhi, India, 1975. 216 p.

"Attempts to examine the factors which conditioned Israeli attitudes and policies towards the Soviet Union both before and after the creation of the state of Israel . . ." CHAPTER I: Zionism, Communism and Russians/Soviet Policy towards West Asia, 1919-1954; CHAPTER II: Israel, and the Super Power Rivalry in West Asia, 1955-1956; CHAPTER III: Israeli-Soviet Encounter Outside of Arab Israeli Conflict 1955-1966; CHAPTER V: Israel, the Soviet Union and the June War of 1967. Bibliography.

ISRAELI-SOVIET RELATIONS, by Surendra Bhutani, in *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal*, v.6, no.1 (July 1973) 125-151.



"There is something unique about the relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. One can hardly think of a parallel or even something similar in the relations of either of these two countries with other countries. Israel came into existence with the help of the Great Powers including the USSR. Hence the survival of Israel depends to a large extent either on a consensus among the Great Powers or on the commitment of either of the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its establishment Israel has itself been involved in, and affected by, the competition of the Great Powers for supremacy in West Asia. In the post World War II era no Great Power, which aspired to play a major role in international affairs could afford to dispense with an active interest in West Asia and the Soviet Union was no exception to this. However, the Soviet relations with Israel were not determined solely by its policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, but by the Soviet domestic policy in regard to its Jewish population and by its desire to appear in a favourable light before world opinion in regard to its treatments of Jews. On the other hand, because of its Zionist ideology, Israel has been deeply concerned about the Jewish community everywhere in the world and particularly about the Soviet Jewry."

SOVIET BOOKS ON ISRAEL, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.10, no.3 348-350.

A review article that discusses "several characteristic works" by the Soviets on Israel during the 1960's and 1970's. Seven recent publications criticizing Zionism and "linking the ideology with . . . the State of Israel" are also reviewed.

#### 6. *Israel and the Soviet Jews*

SOVIET JEWS AND ISRAEL, by Diana Richmond, in *Middle East International*, n.78 (December 1977) 20-22.

Addresses the problem of Russian Jews, furnished with exit permits to Israel but deciding in Vienna to proceed elsewhere. The problem is "an old one" but it "attracts increasing attention in the Israeli press." The issue has also led, to problems for American Jews.

#### 7. *Relations with the UN (See also II-A)*

##### a. *Condemnation of Zionism*

THE ANTI-ZIONIST RESOLUTION, by Bernard Lewis, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.1 (October 1976) 54-64.

Inquires into the November 10, 1976, Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which declared that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." After discussing the motives of the sponsors the author concludes: "For the Arabs, the aim is to delegitimize the state of Israel. The condemnation of its ideological basis, for whatever reason, is an important step toward

that end . . . For the Russians, the purpose is to delegitimize, not just the state of Israel, but the Jewish people, or at least Jewish peoplehood, and to obtain for their actions toward this end a seal of international approval . . . All this has nothing whatever to do with the rights and wrongs of the Arab-Israel conflict which . . . is basically not a racial one."

##### b. *The UNESCO Controversy*

DR. SHAMS EL-DIN EL-WAKIL ON THE UNESCO CONTROVERSY, by Hisham Sharabi, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.2 (Winter 1975) 3-11. (Interview)

"Recent resolutions concerning Israel of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provoked a strong international controversy . . . As the Egyptian delegate to Unesco, Dr. Shams El-Din El-Wakil, former Minister of Higher Education in Egypt, and ex-President of the Arab University in Beirut, played a central role in the proceedings." This is an account of an interview with Dr. El-Wakil in Beirut in December.

#### 8. *Relations with the United States*

##### a. *Miscellaneous Aspects*

ISRAEL: THE EMBATTLED ALLY, by Nadav Safran. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978. 633 p.

A history of Israel and its relations with the United States from 1947 through "Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy to Carter's peace campaign." The presentation is divided into two parts: The first part includes: The Origins of Modern Israel; The Physical, Human, Economic and Constitutional Environment; The Pattern of Internal Politics; and National Defense: Threats, Responses, Implications. The second part focuses on "Israel and America in International Politics." Professor Safran concludes: "The Six Day War of 1967 was a watershed which clearly demarcated the period before it, in which Israel played at best a useful role in the prevailing conceptions of American interest in the Middle East, from the period after it in which Israel came to play a central role in the conception of American Middle East interests . . . The further change in American conceptions after 1967 turned the United States into a virtual ally of Israel . . . That evolution has been determined primarily by . . . America's changing conceptions of its political-strategic interests in the Middle East . . ." Bibliography pp.601-613.

ISRAEL AND THE ROGERS PEACE INITIATIVES, by Michael Brecher, in *Orbis*, v.18, no.2 (Summer 1974) 402-426.

Examines in detail Israel's "strategic decision to accept Rogers Plan 'B' and the accompanying cease-fire." This decision "was preceded by more



than a year of pre-decisional events, decisive inputs . . . and two important tactical decisions." The results of this decision in Israel were: "renewed disdain for the United Nations . . . ; a priori rejection of Arab statements affirming a willingness to make peace; and concern about possible abandonment by the United States . . . That decision in essence implied a crumbling of three pillars of Israel's policy from 1967 to June 1970: (1) a reversal of her insistent demand for direct negotiations; (2) an acceptance of the term 'withdrawal' from occupied territories; and (3) an official commitment to carry out all the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 . . ."

**ISRAEL'S YEAR OF DECISION**, by Bernard Reich, in *Current History*, v.74, no.433 (January 1978) 15-18 plus.

"In 1977, . . . Israel seemed increasingly concerned about the nature of specific United States policies and potential United States 'pressures,' and the United States seemed afraid that a propitious moment for peace and a movement toward a settlement would be lost."

**THE US AND ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS**, by David G. Nes, in *Middle East International*, no.82, April 1978. 11-12.

Discusses the US attitude toward Israeli settlements in Israel's occupied territories. The author concludes that "the Begin Government has had good cause to be surprised by the Administration's 'hard line' on this issue . . . The settlement policy of the Begin Government . . . differs little—if at all—from that of the Labor Party Government which held power from 1948 to last summer . . . The 'settlements' are in harmony with the Zionist territorial imperatives considered as fundamental to the secure and viable Israel to which the US has been committed for thirty years. To question them at this late date is understandably seen as an unacceptable reversal of US policy." Includes a Map illustrating the settlements.

b. *US Congressional Support of Israel*

**CONGRESS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IN THE U.S. SENATE, 1970-1973**, by Robert H. Trice, in *Political Science Quarterly*, v.92, n.3 (Fall 1977) 443-463.

Reviews the nature and strength of support in the Senate for aid to Israel for the period 1970 to 1973. "He finds that the most plausible factors accounting for such support—ideological liberalism, distribution of the Jewish population among the states, and financial support to individual senators from Jewish groups—in fact are related only weakly to voting patterns." Includes six statistical tables.

**JETS FOR SAUDIS: MIDDLE EAST PLANE SALES BACKED BY SENATE VOTE IN MAJOR CARTER VICTORY**, by David Maxfield, in *Congres-*

*sional Quarterly Weekly Report*, v.36, no.20 (20 May 1978) 1263-1265.

Describes the debate in the Senate concerning the Carter's administration's "controversial plan" to sell \$4.8 billion worth of jet fighters to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. "In one of those old voting patterns, where liberals oppose liberals, conservatives split with conservatives, it was Republican support that was the key to Carter's victory." While "Sales critics objected to linking Israel's supplies to the Saudi contracts and asserted that the Carter policy would 'sap the morale' of the Jewish state. Contract supporters argued that the United States now must be 'evenhanded' in relations with both Israel and Arab states because of the complex weave of U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle East." In reply to Sen. Ribicoff's statement that "without a stable, predictable supply of oil from Saudi Arabia . . . the West would face the worst depression in the industrial era," Sen. Moynihan said: "In essence, the aircraft sale is a rationalization of American nervelessness in the area of international economic policy as well as political and military policy." Text includes table of the Senate role call vote by name and by party.

**MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE: COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT**, Washington, Government Printing Office, 8 April 1976. 2 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives Document 94-444.)

"Expresses objections to Senate approved additional transition quarter funding for foreign military sales and security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria."

**MORE THAN JETS AT STAKE IN CARTER'S SENATE VICTORY**, in *National Journal*, v.10, no.20 (20 May 1978) p.813.

Details the Senate vote on resolution (S ConRes 86) to disapprove the Presidents proposal to sell warplanes to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. The roll call of the vote is given. "The vote was not so much the Jewish Lobby's first major defeat as it was a renunciation of a bilateral U.S.-Israeli approach to diplomacy in the Mideast in favor of a new, regional strategy."

c. *The Case of Arab Boycott of Israel and the U.S. Congress*

**THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL**, by Nancy Turck, in *Foreign Affairs*, v.55, no.3 (April 1977) 472-493.

As the U.S. Congress is now considering attaching "strong anti-boycott provisions to the Export Administration Act, . . . it is essential to examine the boycott and to try to gauge the effects of anti-boycott legislation on those negotiations, on trade (including the price and supply of oil) and an overall U.S. relations with the Arabs as well as with Israel."

**THE ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE**



**JEWS**, by Walter Henry Nelson and Terence C.F. Prittie. New York, *Random House*, 1977. 269p.

Details specific cases in which Arab nations have used their oil wealth as a "threat to prevent all countries from having any business dealings with Israel." The authors conclude with a series of suggested actions that the U.S. could take to counteract the Arab boycott.

**INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTTS AND DOMESTIC ORDER: AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**, by Henry J. Steiner, in *Texas Law Review*, v.54, no.7 (November 1976) 1355-1410.

Professor Steiner "scrutinizes the Arab boycott, analogous United States boycott practices, and various congressional antiboycott proposals. He refutes the arguments of spokesmen for the boycott, who defend the institution on moral and legal grounds, and executive officials, who favor a cautious, muted American response. According to Professor Steiner, neither international comity nor sound foreign policy counsels against strong, coherent federal regulation of the participation of American firms in the boycott." This article is based on a paper delivered at the Conference on Transnational Economic Boycotts and Coercion, held at the University of Texas School of Law on February 19th and 20th, 1976.

**POSITION ALTERED: CARTER MOVES CAUTIOUSLY ON ANTI-BOYCOTT PROPOSALS**, In Congressional Quarterly: *Weekly Report*, v.35, n.11 (12 March 1977) 433-437.

"Carter's enthusiasm for a tough anti-boycott bill appears to have cooled in recent weeks. Congress 'determination has not. . . The problem for the new administration is not entirely unlike that which confounded its predecessor: a concern that legislation that is too strong could endanger Middle East peace efforts as well as cause Arab oil producing countries to raise their prices . . . Nevertheless, the Carter administration's willingness to work out a mutually agreeable bill with Congress is in itself a sharp departure from the record of the Ford administration." After summarizing the position of the new administration and of Congress on the issue of the Arab boycott this article goes on to describe the background of the boycott, Jewish lobbying, the position of business and the Middle East Peace Factor. Includes a table of "Arab Boycott Demands" reported by U.S. firms from 1970 to September 1976.

**US: INTEREST GROUPS PREPARE TO FIGHT ANTI-BOYCOTT LAWS**, by Joe Kamalick, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, v.21, no.39 (30 September 1977) p.3 plus.

The Carter administration's anti-boycott regulations, released on 21 September and effective as of 18 January 1978 are "likely to come in for

heavy criticism, both from Jewish groups and US businessmen trading with the Middle East." The author reports on a Chicago seminar on 23 September which reviewed the regulations. "Their principal author, deputy assistant Marcuss" reviewed the 11 basic issues dealt with by the regulations while Cherif Bassiouni, chairman of the Mid-America-Arab Chamber of Commerce commented on his points. "Businessmen at the seminar . . . noted that the regulations would probably dissuade US companies large or small, from considering new undertakings in Arab countries."

d. *Israel as a Religious Symbol* (See also II-A-4, and VI-G-11)

**THE HOLY LAND: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: THE CHRISTIAN AMERICAN CONCERN**, by Robert W. Stookey; **AMERICAN JEWS AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL: A BICENTENNIAL PERSPECTIVE**, by Helen Anne B. Rivlin; **THE ARAB AMERICANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST**, by Jacqueline S. and Tareq Y. Ismael, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.30, no.3 (Summer 1976) 351-405.

Palestine is "sacred not only to Christianity and the Old Testament Judaism from which it . . . emerged but also to Islam, the third universalist, monotheist faith, which had roots in both . . ." These studies examine how the American heirs of these faiths have been affected by them concerning the question of Palestine and the development of the Israeli state. Robert Stookey in his paper concludes: American Christians knew of the Bible lands only through "the missionary press" and through "scholarly or touristic writings preoccupied with Scriptural associations, awareness that Palestine had contemporary inhabitants grew only slowly . . ." When "the political destiny of Palestine began to force itself on the national attention . . . Christians drew conflicting and mutually irreconcilable conclusions from the same guiding principles. The issue's moral dilemmas have proved as insoluble for American Christianity as for the American government." Professor Rivlin addresses the question "why is there almost universal consensus among American Jews today that the existence of Israel is an historical necessity and 'the major focus of Jewish expression?'" She concludes that the "most significant development was the enormous increase in the Jewish population beginning in 1877." By 1924 "about one-third of East European Jewry had come to the United States . . . those who remained faced pogroms, revolutions, wars . . ." They came to this country "as a society and not as individuals . . ." Their children "became embittered by the upsurge of antisemitism in the period after World War I . . . outraged by the failure of the powers to keep open the escape route to Palestine, determined that the . . . remnant who survived the war should have



at least a haven among their own kind." As a result they "mustered all their resources" . . . to support the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine that could "determine its own policies and which would provide a place for Jews to live . . ." The last article by Jacqueline S. and Tareq Y. Ismael considers the relationship between American Arabs and the Middle East in terms of the "social and political context of ethnic relations within American society." Arab Americans until 1967 "generally considered themselves well integrated into American society . . . they . . . refrained from identification with 'Arab' issues, considering that the political process was closed on such issues. The success of ethnic based movements in the United States during the 1960's, however, combined with the "unprecedented public attention and public ridicule on the Arabs", following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Since then there have emerged a number of Arab American organizations . . . "dedicated to challenging the Zionist paradigm of the Arab peoples, to increasing the scope of American humanitarianism in the Middle East to include the Palestinian refugees, and to protecting the rights . . . of Arab Americans." The "negative Arab stereotype" and the "growing hostility between the United States and Arab countries," is seen as a product of "the success of organized Jewish Americans." It is their "major focus" to "challenge this" and to "foster the development of a humanized image of the Arab people."

*e. Israel and the American Jews*

**FOR ZION'S SAKE: AMERICAN JEWS AND ISRAELI POLICY**, by Henry Siegman, in *Moment*, v.1, n.6 (January 1976) 13-17.

The Executive Vice President of the Synagogue Council of America writes: "A policy that conceded the eventual return of the territories would give Israel the moral and political leverage to insist that any withdrawal must be preceded by a phased normalization of relations with her neighbors . . . Israel has left herself open to the charge that, when faced with a choice of peace or territory, she prefers territory . . . American Jews now offer unqualified support for retention of territories, this in the face of a widely shared conviction by the U.S. government and the American media that Israel's position is both unreasonable and contrary to fundamental American interests. This Jewish stance gives credence to the view that for the American Jewish community, the U.S. interest national interest is a marginal consideration when it conflicts with Israel's foreign policy. The impact of Israel's policy on American Jewry, while clearly secondary to considerations of Israel's vital security, is hardly a trivial matter . . ." The author concludes: "Israel must now develop strategies that persuasively demonstrate . . . that given the choice of territories or peace, Israel's choice will always be peace."

*f. Carter's Commitment to Israel*

**CARTER AND ISRAEL**, by Steven L. Spiegel, in *Commentary*, v.64, n.1 (July 1977) 35-40.

Addresses the question of whether President Carter's campaign statements and later statements on assuming the Presidency may be interpreted as pro-Israel. The author concludes: "there is ample evidence in the presidential statements concerning the Middle East that Carter's commitment to Israel-as expressed in his insistence on full normalization and his advocacy of 'defensible' borders-is real and deeply held; at the same time, however, there is sufficient ambiguousness in the statements themselves to give rise to doubts about their meaning, and little thought seems to have been devoted to their possible implications. Since no one understands precisely what Carter believes, there is plenty of room for future disillusionment." The author finds that "a policy has been emerging which, in contrast to what the President has said, has generally been unfavorable to Israel . . . It remains to be seen whether President Carter himself will become a force for settlement or a force for war. On the basis of his administration's performance so far, there are grounds for fear and not too many grounds for hope."

**CARTER, ISRAEL, AND THE JEWS**, by Leonard Fein, in *Moment*, v.3, n.2 (December 1977) 9-15.

Addresses the question of whether President Carter and "his people have abandoned Israel." the author discusses the Middle East issues focusing on "how Israel's friends might easily come to disagree about the kind of solution that would best serve Israel's interests." In conclusion he offers "two different kinds of explanations for the American Jewish response to the Administrations efforts."

**CARTER VS ISRAEL: WHAT THE POLLS REVEAL**, by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, in *Commentary*, v.64, n.5 (November 1977) 21-29.

Surveys taken since 1948 down to the summer of 1977 have "never . . . found more support for the Arabs than for the Israelis, no matter how the question has been asked." The authors have located twenty-seven national polls taken between 1967 and 1977. In these "sympathy for Israel has ranged between 35 and 56 per cent, and sympathy for the Arabs between 1 and 9 per cent, with the remainder saying 'neither side,' 'both sides,' or 'don't know.'" This "sympathy for Israel does not, however, translate directly into support for U.S. military aid to Israel," or to "the involvement of American troops." The authors conclude: "Beyond whatever opinion the majority holds on specific issues like oil, Israel is fervently backed by a politically potent minority, including a very large number



of non-Jews, who are prepared to punish at the ballot box those who seek to undermine the unique American-Israel relationship . . . What our examination of the opinion polls, reveals . . . is that a confrontation with Israel will create a deep conflict within the United States, one that could very well parallel the Vietnam controversy in its bitterness, and that could have a devastating effect on the popularity and the chances for reelection of those responsible."

g. *US Army Supply to Israel* (See I-B-5, and III-A-10)

h. *Complexities of US Political Influence on Israel*

DOES WASHINGTON HAVE THE MEANS TO IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT ON ISRAEL?, by Steven J. Rosen and Mara Moustafine, in *Commentary*, v.64, no.4 (October 1977) 25-31.

The authors address the "argument . . . taken up by some prominent members of the American foreign-policy elite, such as George Ball, and other influential opinion-makers like Edward R.F. Sheehan, who have argued that precisely because of Israel's increased dependence on the United States and the leverage that this relationship carries with it, the United States holds the key to peace in the Middle East." Examining the possible military and economic sanctions that the United States might apply to Israel the authors find that there are "significant . . . limitations on the ability of the United States to apply pressure in each area." Furthermore, "American pressure may even have the reverse effect of hardening Israeli attitudes toward negotiations. In many ways, the victory of the Likud was a reaction to pressures from Washington and reflected a belief among the electorate that Labor was too weak to stand up to the Americans." The authors conclude: "Blunt instruments of pressure tend to be attractive to those who hold a simple stimulus-response theory of the relationship between punishment and behavioral modification. But a more complex understanding of the world shows this view to be dubious as psychology and futile as diplomacy."

9. *Relations with Latin America*

ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH LATIN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ANGLE, by Yoram Shapira, in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, v.30, n.2 (Autumn 1976) 3-31.

Israel's technical assistance to Latin America began in 1961. The author describes the motives behind this effort, the type of programs involved and its political relevance. He concludes: "While, on the whole, Israel's cooperation program has undoubtedly been aimed at some broad political objectives, these have never been converted into any sort of Standard Operating Procedure. Actual decisions as to participation in projects . . . are being

made primarily on a professional rather than a political basis" . . . The direction of Israel's effort is "for the most part, into the fields of agriculture, cooperativism and youth movements, with Science and Technology occupying prominent place only after 1970." Text includes four tables: "Latin American Countries with which Israel has Cooperation Agreements (as of March 1976); Israeli Expert Years in Latin America by Country 1962-1974; Trainee Years in Israel by Country 1962-1975; Israeli Technical Assistance By Continent (1958-1974)."

E. *Land and the People* (See also II-A)

1. *Population Problems*

THE THREAT WITHIN; ISRAEL AND POPULATION POLICY, by Leonard J. Sangerman and others. New York, Vantage Press, 1975. 61 p.

Identifies a "new threat to the Jewish State of Israel". This is the fact that "if the present demographic picture persists in Israel, there will be a non-Jewish majority within the next two to three generations." The authors look at the demographic history of modern Israel, the social, cultural and religious roots of the current problem, the present population policy of the government of Israel, and "its failure." They suggest as a "viable alternative", to the present "pronatalistic" policy, a policy of "family planning" throughout the nation. "Assuming equal acceptance" of an anti-natalistic policy by both Jews and non-Jews, the Jewish component of the population in the next twenty-five years would comprise about "three and a half times the non Jewish component, comparing this with the projected ratio of 3.1 to 1 with the current fertility patterns." Includes Bibliography.

2. *Minorities and Human Rights*

a. *Israeli Security Measures and Human Rights*

CONGRESS HEARS ISRAELI CRITIC, by Barbara Bright-Sagnier, in *Middle East International*, n.37 (July 1974) 24-26.

Gives an account of the testimony of Israel Shahak, the "first Israeli to testify before the U.S. Congress against Israel's alleged systematic violations of the human rights of non-Jews within its territories." Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on international organizations and movements, Dr. Shahak "blames much of the discrimination in his country on American Jews . . . primarily the United Jewish Appeal."

ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, by Michael Goldstein, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.32, no.1 (Winter 1978) 35-44.

Describes how Israel has implemented one major security measure and how various Palestinians and Israelis perceive that implementation.



This security measure, Administrative detention, is "one of the more controversial Israeli security measures employed in the Occupied Territories. It is controversial not only among the Palestinian Arabs against whom detention is used, but also among Israeli Jews." The reason for this controversy is that it allows the arrest and imprisonment of people on "the speculation that an individual may be dangerous in the future." The origin of this law is found in the British Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which were designed to control the terrorism that was expected to follow any breakdown of the wartime truce between the Arabs, the Jews and the British." While the number of people reported held under Administrative detention has declined from a high of 1131 in 1970 to about 40 in 1976, the fact that Israel continues to live in a state of war means that "despite deep misgivings", Israeli's feel, "there is no alternative."

b. *Arabs in Israel*

ARAB IMMIGRATION INTO PRE-STATE ISRAEL: 1922-1931, by Fred M. Gottheil, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no.3 (October 1973) 313-324.

An analysis of the statistical evidence concerning Arab immigration into Palestine. The author concludes that "Although numerically less than the Jewish immigration during the period, the significance of Arab immigration is nonetheless emphasized by its comparison with the Jewish population inflow. Arab immigration composed 36.8 per cent of the total immigration into pre-State Israel. The situation in non-Israel Palestine was somewhat different. There, Arab migration was positive, but inconsequential." Includes statistical tables.

BECOMING MODERN IN BAYT AL-SHABAB, by Egon Mayer, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.29, no.3 (Summer 1975) 279-294.

Based on a series of interviews with young men from an isolated Druze village on Israel's Mt. Ha'ari plateau in northern Galilee. The author concludes that "as young Druze are learning the 'ways' of Israeli society, they are becoming 'disenchanted' as Druze and are becoming increasingly more conscious of themselves as Arabs . . . it may turn out that the Israeli government will have subsidized the development of a peculiar sense of Arab nationalism within its own borders." The name of the above village has been "disguised in accordance with promised confidentiality."

DISCRIMINATION BY LAW, by David Caploe, in *Middle East International*, n.37 (July 1974) 12-15.

Based on material gathered during a series of trips to the Arab villages of Israel, mainly in the Triangle (Sharon Valley), the Galilee and Nazareth. Describes How the Law of Return, and the Jewish

National Fund" together with other laws act to make the Arab Israeli a "second-class citizen." The author concludes that "the case of the Israeli Arabs can be . . . perceived as an almost classic study in forced proletarianization."

FORGOTTEN ARABS OF ISRAEL, by A.R. George, in *Middle East International*, n.21 (March 1973) 16-18.

Describes the creation of the Bedouin reservation and Israeli policy toward the nomadic tribes in the Negev. The author concludes that this policy "amounts to what is virtually forced sedentarization . . . in terms of human suffering the cost of this forced acceleration of the process is high."

ISRAELI ARABS, by Daniel Rubenstein, in *Moment*, v.1, n.10 (May-June 1976) 21-26.

Several months before the "initial outbreak of violence in the Galilee, the editors of *Moment* asked Daniel Rubenstein, a distinguished Israeli journalist, to interview two representative Israeli Arabs." The interviewees were: Elias Nasrallah, a member of Rakah, the Communist party and Rasmi Bayadassi, Deputy Advisor on Arab Affairs in the Prime Ministers Office, and a member of the Labor Party.

ISRAEL'S ARABS AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, by Marc A. Tessler, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 251-266.

After a review of scholarly appraisals concerning the status of Israel's Arab population, the author reports the results of a survey of the political identity of the Arabs who have become Israeli citizens. The survey was conducted in the northern part of Israel during 1974-1975 by Arab University students under the authors supervision. An "analytic" sampling of 348 persons selected on the basis of age, education, sex, residence, religion and citizenship were interviewed. Several tables presenting the results of these interviews are included in the text. The author concludes that "a sizable number of Arab citizens reject Israeliness and would identify with another country if given the opportunity."

REFUGEES WITHIN ISRAEL: THE CASE OF THE VILLAGERS OF KAFR BIR'IM AND IQRIT, by Joseph L. Ryan, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.4 (Summer 1973) 55-81.

The villagers of Kafr Bir'im and Iqrit "the 'Uprooted,' as they have been termed in the Israeli press . . . were dispossessed by the Israeli army in 1948, and have been struggling from within Israel for a quarter of a century for the right to return to their homes. In 1972, their case finally burst into the open and provoked controversy inside Israel and among both Jews and non-Jews outside." This occurred when their "demand" to return to their homes in 1972, was given a "cold reception by the Israeli government . . ." The author describes the



controversy by concentrating on one of the villages, Kafr Bir'im from the beginning of its problem in 1948. The author concludes: "If one were to ask . . . why the members of Black September resort to violence and what they do not, on the contrary, seek justice by peaceful means, the story of Kafr Bir'im and Iquit is one answer. In fact . . . if a . . . writer were to set out expressly to contrive a set of conditions that would show the futility of Palestinians resorting to peaceful means, he could hardly make up a case more convincing . . ."

c. 1976 *Violence in Galilee*

**GALILEE: EXPLOSION ON THE HOME FRONT**, by Peter Mansfield, in *Middle East International*, v.59 (May 1976) 10-12.

Discusses Israel's "Judaizing" of Galilee, and the Arabs' instinctive resistance" that form the "basis" of the situation that led to the riots in Galilee. These riots showed "that the condition of Israel's Arab minority presented a problem that could no longer be ignored" as it constituted a "threat to the foundation of the state." The author concludes: "Israel's present policy of trying to Judaize Galilee is defeating its own ends as it is making the Arab minority (including some of the Druzes) increasingly conscious of the fact that they still belong to the Palestinian nation, whatever their identity cards may say."

**WEST BANK: THE POT BOILS OVER**, by Sir John Richmond, in *Middle East International*, n.59 (May 1976) 13-14.

Based on his stay during the month of February on the West Bank, the author gives "a personal impression" of the cause of the riots that broke out in Galilee on March 30th, 1976, in which six Israeli Arabs were killed. He states: "My impressions are probably coloured by the fact that my acquaintance is wider among Arabs than among Jewish Israelis, but it seems quite clear to me that the current violence results mainly from the Israeli policy of confiscating Arab land both inside Israel and the occupied territories, and by the weakness of the Israeli Government in the face of its military and security establishments and of the latter-day Zealots of the Gush Emunim movement."

d. *Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands: Legal Aspects*

**THE LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR THE EXPROPRIATION AND ABSORPTION OF ARAB LANDS IN ISRAEL**, by Sabri Jiryis, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.4 (Summer 1973) 82-104.

Describes the "legalistic framework created by the government of Israel as a basis for the expropriation of Arab lands." The five primary laws were: 'the Absentees' Property Law of 1950, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Article 125, Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) of

1949, the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste (Uncultivated) Lands) of 1949, and the Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation) Law of 1949. The practical effect of these "five land confiscation laws" was completed by "the official transfer of the ownership of lands already transferred in practice to the state of Israel and the various official organizations" through the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law of 1953.

e. *Eastern and Western Jews in Israel's Society*

**EASTERN AND WESTERN JEWS: ETHNIC DIVISIONS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY**, by Lee E. Dutter, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.4 (Autumn 1977) 451-468.

Addresses the following questions: "What ethnic divisions are present in Israeli society? Have these divisions had any political relevance in the past? What are the future political implications of these divisions? In addressing these questions, the focus is on Israeli Jews." The author points out the significant economic, political and social differences, correlated with ethnic divisions. He concludes that "there ethnic divisions will persist into the future and that they bode ill for the long term stability of the Israeli political system and, derivatively, Israel's ability to deal effectively with her Arab neighbors, especially in adhering to the terms of a Middle East peace settlement . . . This potential consequence . . . deserves greater scholarly attention than it has received in the past."

**STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION: A CASE STUDY OF AN ISRAELI MINORITY GROUP**, by David Nachnias, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.27, no.3 (Autumn 1973) 456-470.

Reports in detail data collected on the leaders of the Moroccan minority in Israel. The author used interviews, questionnaires and observation of delegates to the International Congress of North African and Moroccan Jews held in Israel April 1972. The study "delineates the systematic conditions which facilitate mobilization of leaders and tests the 'status inconsistency' hypothesis as a source of oppositional political behavior in a developing nation." The author concludes that "It is one's behavioral experience with politics that pre-dispose him to act in certain ways, among which aggression is just one. In developing politics in which conflicts for redistribution are new, institutional and non-violent oppositional behavior is elected by leaders of deprived groups."

**F. Sociological Aspects**

1. *Public Opinion: What Israeli's Think and Say*  
**THE HAWKS AND DOVES OF ISRAEL**, by Andreas Kohlschutter, in *Atlas* v.23, no.8 (August 1976) 13-16.

Impressions from many interviews and talks



with Israeli people. Quotations highlight the conclusion that "irreconcilable factions paralyze an aging leadership." This article is "adapted from 'Zeit Magazin,' of the liberal 'Die Zeit,' of Hamburg."

**ISRAELI ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**, by Daniel Heradvsteit, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.3 (Spring 1973) 68-93.

Summarizes the results of a series of interviews conducted by the author with "Israeli elite groups with the aim of clarifying their perceptions of the Middle East conflict." The interviews were conducted during March 1972 by the Deputy Director of the Research Division of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

**THE NEW ISRAELIS**, by David Schoenbrun, New York, Atheneum, 1973. 258 p.

Reports on the "new Israelis" those born and raised in Israel. The authors "let them talk for themselves through transcripts of . . . interviews . . . recorded in the summer of 1971" with some two hundred young Israelis. Their answers are compared to those of their teachers, parents, leaders and against the results of more extensive national studies conducted by the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research. Chapters include: Of Women, Sex, Love and Marriage; College Without Youth; The Scientific Israelis; The Kibbutz is Dead! Long Live the Kibbutz; What Price Peace; Of Men and Arms; Black Panthers and White Jews; The New Israelis and Judaism, Zionism, and Israel. An appendix presents tables prepared by Dr. Elie Kenan of the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research, from the answers to a "Continuing Survey" of national opinion, conducted quarterly by the Institute. (p. 234-243)

**THE PALESTINIANS IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ISRAELI YOUTH**, by Elia Zureik, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.4, no.2 (Winter 1975) 52-75.

Addresses "one important source of cleavage in Israeli society, that pertaining to the development of critical thought among young Israeli Jews of the kind that is directed at the fundamental pillars of Zionism and the state." The author focuses on the high school student. His main sources of information are "public opinion polls, in-depth interviews by various Israeli newspaper correspondents with high school students and, whenever available and applicable, sociological studies of youth in Israel."

**THE RESPONSE OF THE ISRAELI ESTABLISHMENT TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR PROTEST**, by Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Moshe Livne, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.31, no.3 (Summer 1977) 281-296.

The October war between Israel and the Arabs in 1973 was followed by a protest movement

which accused Israel's leadership of mismanaging the war, and asked for replacement of that leadership and for changes in basic political processes. There were several large scale demonstrations in which thousands participated. A few months later the protest subsided as suddenly as it had begun. This case study analysis of the "establishment's responsiveness to demands from the rank and file and the relationship between the establishment's internal structure and its responsiveness", is based on a content analysis of newspaper reports in the Ha'aretz, the Ma'ariv and Yediot Achronot during 1974, and on participant observation by Moshe Livne. The authors conclude that the "establishment revealed itself to be far from monolithic; on the other hand, it was, to put it mildly, less than fully responsive."

## 2. *Effect of War on Crime in Israel*

**"BUSINESS (CRIME) AS USUAL" IN WARTIME CONDITIONS AMONG OFFENDERS IN ISRAEL**, by Yael Hassin and Menachem Amir, in *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, v.66, n.4 (December 1975) 491-495.

By studying daily reports criminal offenses, the authors "identify and differentiate several aspects of crime patterns "in Israel during the 1973 War. These are compared with the "same phenomena during an identical period during two control years preceding the war." The authors conclude: "the actual decrease in the amount of crime in the early days of the war reversed itself after the sixth day of the war . . . There was an increase in those crimes which require specialization or professional expertise . . . For these people the blackout is not a defense against bombs, but a cover to avoid detection." The "criminal sector" was apparently unaffected by the "atmosphere of volunteerism, patriotism and solidarity" that "swept over Israel during the war."

## G. *Economic Aspects*

### 1. *Desertification*

**THE NEGEV LIFE-STYLE**, by Joel Schechter, in *Geographical Magazine*, November 1977, 101-102.

How the Israelis are applying technology to the problem of desertification. Map identifies "regional water projects."

### 2. *Can Israel's Economy Afford Peace*

**THE ISRAELI ECONOMY: CAN IT AFFORD PEACE?**, by Ibrahim Oweiss, in *Middle East International*, n.40 (October 1974) 18-21.

Reviews Israel's economic situation "to ascertain whether, and to what extent the Israeli economy is a war economy." The author, an associate Professor of Economics at Georgetown University concludes: "It is clear that in the absence of war or mounting tension, Israel, a country poor



in natural resources, would never have been able to achieve its high growth rate . . . It is not, therefore, in the economic interest of Israel to defuse tension so long as sporadic wars can be contained within time and space. Israel however cannot eco-

nomically afford unlimited warfare over an extended period . . . If Israel is forced militarily or politically to withdraw from occupied Arab territories, the Israeli economy will definitely suffer adverse effects . . ."



## CHAPTER VI

## ITEMS FOR FURTHER REFERENCE AND RESEARCH ON THE MIDDLE EAST

## A. Miscellaneous

**BACKGROUND NOTES.** Washington, D.C., U.S. Dept. of State. latest edition.

Series of short, factual pamphlets on the countries of the world written by officers in the Department of State's geographic bureaus and edited and published by the Editorial Division of the Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs. Includes information on the country's people, land, history, government, political conditions, economy, foreign relations, and U.S. policy. Included also is a profile, brief travel notes, map, list of government officials and a reading list. Revised regularly usually on a two or three year cycle. Available from the Government Printing Office.

**LAWRENCE: THE PERPETUAL ENIGMA,** by John Parker, in *Middle East International*, no. 76 (October 1977) 24-26.

Publication of a new biographic study of T.E. Lawrence is the occasion for this review of the major works on his life. The newest biography, T.E. Lawrence, by Desmond Stewart, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1977, is found to be "the most enjoyable and stimulating, in some ways the most acute, . . . so far . . . Desmond Stewart knows Arabic fluently . . . , and has lived for many years in Arab countries."

**THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1976-77.** London, Europa Publications, Ltd. 1976. 930 p.

Reference book which is revised annually. Includes: General Survey, Regional Organizations, Country Surveys, Who's Who in the Middle East and North Africa, Calendars, Time Reckoning and Weights and Measures, Bibliographies, and Research Institutes, Maps. The 1976-77 edition included special articles on: The Religions of the Middle East and North Africa, The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1967-76, The Jerusalem Issue, Documents on Palestine, Palestine Organizations, Oil in the Middle East and North Africa, The Arms Trade with the Middle East and North Africa, The Suez Canal.

**MIDDLE EAST ANNUAL REVIEW, 1978.** The Middle East Review, England, 1977. 428 p.

Issued Annually since 1975. Includes North Africa. Sections include: Trade, Industry, Civil Engineering and Construction, Services, Finance,

and The Middle East-Country by Country. Statistics.

**NATIONAL BASIC INTELLIGENCE FACTBOOK.** Washington, D.C., Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, Central Intelligence Agency. Semi-Annual.

Issued twice a year. Brief factual information about the countries of the world: Land, people, government, economy, communications and defence forces. Color maps of geographic areas are bound in the back. January 1978 edition included: Canada, Middle America, South America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, U.S.S.R. and Asia, Oceania.

**SOME SOVIET WORKS ON ISLAM,** by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no. 3 (October 1973) 358-362.

A review of the approach of Soviet writers to Islam. Recent Soviet works on Islam indicate that they have "faced, but failed, to overcome a dilemma . . . On the one hand, Soviet scholars have investigated Islam in a serious, knowledgeable way-although within the general framework of a Marxist approach. At the same time journalists and political authors have sometimes felt it necessary to pass a value-judgment . . . on Islam, as one of the world's major religions-in the context of the relentless campaign for atheism. The task of the latter writers has been further complicated by the fact that millions of Muslims live in the Soviet Union . . ."

**STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1976.** Twenty-eighth Issue. New York, United Nations, 1977. 877 p. (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S/4.)

Includes some information of an economic and social affairs nature on many nations of the world.

**WHO'S WHO IN THE ARAB WORLD, 1974-1975,** Gabriel M. Bustros, editor. Beirut, Lebanon, Publitec Publications.

Contains more than 4,000 biographical notices of prominent personalities in the countries of the Arab world. Additional sections include: "Outline of the Arab World," and a "Survey of the 17 Arab Countries."

**WORLD BANK/IDA; ANNUAL REPORT 1974-75.** Washington, World Bank/International Development Association, 1974. 144 p.

Includes data on Middle East countries.



## B. Atlases

INDIAN OCEAN ATLAS, Central Intelligence Agency. August 1976. 80 p.

Maps, graphics, photographs and some text concerning the Indian Ocean and littoral countries. Subjects covered include: Natural Environment; Resources; Shipping; Political Relationships: "Zone of Peace"?; Law of the Sea, Waterway Issues concerning the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Malacca-Singapore Straits; Islands in the Sea: including the Arabian Sea Islands, Seychelles and British Indian Ocean Territory with Diego Garcia; Air Access to Indian Ocean Islands." Reference Map to the Indian Ocean Area dated 8/76 is inserted in the publication.

ISRAEL AND BORDERLANDS: REFERENCE MAPS. Washington, D.C., Central Intelligence Agency. Undated and unpagel.

Maps, in color, showing the main topographic features, man-made and natural, of the areas on Israel's borders. The section on the Northern and Eastern Borderlands is drawn from three map sheets produced between 1974 and 1976 (Scale 1,150,000) and includes Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the West Bank. The section on the Western borderlands is at a scale of 1,500,000 and includes the border areas of Egypt, Sinai, and Saudi Arabia.

1976 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE. 107th ed. Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1976. 669 p.

The section on general world information includes: air line distances; altitudes of selected cities; latest official population figures; gazetteer index of countries, regions and political divisions and world political information table; general index of foreign places and physical features; steamship distances; time chart; world facts and comparisons; and world physical comparisons.

THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD. COMPREHENSIVE EDITION. New York, The New York Times Book Co., 1975. 223 p.

WORLD BANK ATLAS; POPULATION PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND GROWTH RATES. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975. 30 p.

A series of tables providing this information for the various countries of the world.

## C. Chronologies

CHRONOLOGY: MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1945 and 1977, in *The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs*, Third Edition, edited by Mark A. Bruzonsky. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., September 1977. pp. 151-183.

(CHRONOLOGY) 1975: A YEAR OF DIVERSIONS, by E.C. Hodgkin, in *Middle East International*, no. 55 (January 1976) 4-6.

Chart of events November 1974 thru November 1975 appears on page five.

(CHRONOLOGY) 1976: YEAR OF THE LOCUST, by Edward Mortimer, in *Middle East International*, no. 67 (January 1977) 8-11.

Diary of Events 1975-76 on page nine. (December 1975 thru November 1976)

CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CUMULATIVE EDITION, 1976. Washington, Government Printing Office, January-December 1976. 152 p. (94th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives.)

"Updated monthly edition of a CRS-prepared series of chronologies of significant international events in selected areas, listing notable occurrences for 1976 in the following fields: arms control, energy, Indochina, the Middle East, U.S. Soviet-Chinese relations, Southern Africa, and Cyprus."

CHRONOLOGIES OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Washington, Government Printing Office, January 1977. 27 p. (95th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives.)

"Updated monthly edition of a CRS-prepared series of chronologies of significant international events in selected areas, listing notable occurrences for Jan. 1977 in the following fields: arms control, energy, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Panama Canal, and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Western Europe."

1977: NEW IDEAS, OLD FACTS, by Edward Mortimer, in *Middle East International*, no. 79 (January 1978) 6-9.

Annual review of major events in the Middle East during 1977. Includes a chronology: "Diary of Events 1976-77".

## D. Handbooks

THE GULF HANDBOOK 1976-77, edited by Peter Kilner and Jonathan Wallace. London, Trade and Travel Publications. 555 p. Maps.

This is the first edition of a guide for businessmen and visitors to the gulf states: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Includes: "Sectional Coloured Maps, Health Information, Book and Periodical List, Currency Guide." Each country section includes a black and white photograph of the current head of state, introductory information, tourist information, a list of newspapers and periodicals, and an outline map of the central part of the capital city.

A NEAR EAST STUDIES HANDBOOK,



570-1974, by Jere L. Bacharach. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1974. 147 p.

Concentrates on the geographic area of Iran, Egypt, Turkey, The Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula; that is Southwest Asia and Egypt. Transliteration Systems; Abbreviations: Major Journals and Periodicals; Abbreviations: Twentieth Century Social, Political and Economic Groups; Tables of Dynasties and Rulers; Genealogies; Historical Atlas; Calendars; Chronology to June 1974; Time Chart: 600-1800; Index for Historical Atlas.

**POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD**, by Arthur S. Banks. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977. 604 p.

"Published for the Center for Comparative Political Research and the Council on Foreign Relations, this volume is a reference tool for researchers in political science and related disciplines. An annual publication, the Handbook is a singularly valuable source of: 1) background country information, and 2) information on contemporary inter-governmental organizations of the world. The first section, in alphabetical order by customary English name followed by the national language name, presents analytical and descriptive essays encompassing demographic and political facts on independent nations, as well as territories and subdivisions. Specific topics covered are political and governmental status and background including constitutional structure, current issues, ruling and opposing political parties, platforms and constituencies and cabinet structure; language; urban centers; institutions; media; foreign relations; and diplomatic representation. If a country is politically divided, the country is treated as a whole, followed by information on the separate entities, as in China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam. The second section, also in alphabetical order, provides information on intergovernmental organizations that pursue cooperative efforts in such areas as trade and economy, defense, ecology, technology, health and atomic energy. Information on each organization includes formation, purpose, structure, leadership, organs, membership, and activities. While many of these organizations are very familiar, e.g., NATO, UN, WTO, EEC, many are relatively unknown. The Handbook incorporates two Appendices: Appendix A lists, by country, the membership of the UN and related agencies; Appendix B provides, by country, statistical data on area, population, and per capita figures for export, GNP, school enrollment, telephones, and news circulation."

[PUBLISHED AREA HANDBOOKS ON MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES]. Washington, D.C. American University, Foreign Area Studies, various dates.

DA PAM 550-43—EGYPT

DA PAM 550-68—IRAN  
DA PAM 550-31—IRAQ  
DA PAM 550-25—ISRAEL  
DA PAM 550-34—JORDAN  
DA PAM 550-24—LEBANON  
DA PAM 550-51—SAUDI ARABIA  
DA PAM 550-80—TURKEY  
DA PAM 550-83—THE YEMENS  
DA PAM 550-92—PERIPHERAL STATES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA  
DA PAM 550-85—PERSIAN GULF STATES

#### E. Periodicals

**ARAB REPORT AND RECORD.** (London).

News of the two week period is summarized by country. There is a time lag of about two weeks between the time period covered and the summary of that period. Countries covered: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Yemen. Coverage also includes a section on inter-Arab affairs and on Arab-Israeli Affairs. Sections under each country include: Political, Economic, Social and Foreign Affairs. Annual subject and persons indexes. This periodical is published bi-weekly.

**ARAB REPORTS AND ANALYSIS: SELECTIONS FROM ARABIC PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS**, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Quarterly.

"This section includes a selection of research and analysis relevant to the Palestine problem that appeared in Arabic periodicals during the quarter, and also reprints news items drawn from reports in the Arabic daily press in the same period which have not been reproduced abroad."

**INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES.** Published quarterly for the Journal of the Middle East Studies Association of North America. Cambridge University Press, New York.

**JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES: A QUARTERLY ON PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**, Published Jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and Kuwait University.

Published in Lebanon this journal features signed articles on topics concerning the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regular features include: Book reviews, a summary of news, articles and comments from the Israeli and the Arab press, collections of analytical articles and reports from non-Middle Eastern sources, a review of the recent periodical literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict,



and reprints of Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

**MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST.** MEED Ltd, published weekly. (London) Weekly report on economic developments.

**MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL**, published monthly. (London) Covers politics, economics, and culture.

**THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL**, published quarterly by The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.

In addition to scholarly articles, regular features are: Book reviews, a bibliography of recent periodical literature and an extensive chronology. Countries covered include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, The Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Turkistan, the Arab World.

**MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES.** Published three times a year. Frank Cass & Co. (London).

#### F. Additional Materials On:

##### 1. Airlines

**PILLARS OF WORLD AIR TRANSPORT**, by Interavia Information and Data Services, in *Interavia*, v.32, no.10 (October 1977) 1003-1022.

Lists all member and associate member airlines of the International Air Transport Association plus "about 50 other major carriers." Airlines in the Middle East are listed in alphabetical order under the Asian section from page 1018 to page 1021. Airlines included: Alia, The Royal Jordanian Airline; El Al, Israel Airlines Limited; Gulf Air (Bahrain); Iran Air; Iraqi Airways; Kuwait Airways Corporation; MEA, Middle East Airlines-Air Liban, Saudia, and TMA, Trans Mediterranean Airways SAL. Cyprus Airways; Olympic Airways; and Turk Hava Yollari A.O., Turkish Airlines, Inc. are covered under Europe. While Egyptair is listed under Africa. Listings include name of company, insignia, management, capital, description of fleet in operation and on order, 1976 Traffic data, and principal routes.

##### 2. Arab-Israeli Conflict

**DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL: ARAB DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, quarterly. (Documents)

Each issue contains "a selection of important documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict issued individually or bilaterally by Arab leaders, governments and political organizations."

##### 3. Arms and Military Balance

**JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS 1977**, ed. by MAJ. F.W.A. Hobart. London, Jane's Yearbooks.

With information on some of the weapons in some of the countries of the Middle East.

**THE MILITARY BALANCE 1977-1978.** London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 111 p.

With information on The Middle East and the Mediterranean. Bilateral agreements with external powers; multilateral agreements including external powers; arrangements within the region. Includes data on The Armed Forces of: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen Arab Republic (North), Yemen: People's Democratic Republic (South).

**R.U.S.I. AND BRASSEY'S DEFENCE YEARBOOK, 1977/78.** Boulder. Colo., Westview Press, 1977. 430 p.

See also annuals for previous years.

**WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1978.** Stockholm, International Research Institute, 1978. 518 p.

The sixth issue of the SIPRI Yearbook continues the analysis of the world's arms races and the attempts to stop them. Includes data on Middle East countries.

**WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ARMS TRADE 1963-1976.** Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978. 168 p. (Publication 98.)

The information is provided for all the major countries of the world. Trends in World Military Expenditures; Developed and Developing Worlds; World Arms Trade; Relative Burden. With statistical notes and statistical tables.

##### 4. Air Forces and Aircraft

**AIR FORCE OF THE WORLD-1976**, in *Interavia*, v.31, n.2 (February 1976) 165-176. (English edition).

A compilation of the aircraft operated by the World's air forces. Information is listed by Region and then by country. Air Force, Navy and Army fleets are noted separately where applicable. Emphasis is on the "actual aircraft in use," or on order. Data presented is the "best available" as of January 1, 1976.

**WORLD MILITARY AVIATION: AIRCRAFT, AIR FORCES, WEAPONRY, INSIGNIA**, by Nikolaus Krivinyi and others. New York, Arco Publishing Company, 1977. 231 p.

Revised and updated from *Taschenbuch der Luftflotten*, 1976. Beginning with a survey of 135 air forces, World Military Aviation presents information on their strengths, organization, major bases, equipment in service, manufacturers and future development programmes. The main section of the book is a nation-by-nation encyclopedia of the world's warplanes. For each aircraft currently in military service, there is a three-view drawing, to-



gether with a listing of specifications, which include weights, performance, dimensions, power plant, payload/armament and production. Further sections provide basic details of missiles (with line drawings), bombs, guns and torpedoes, and there are also 128 color illustrations showing the insignia, roundels and fin flashes, for each of the world's air forces.

#### 5. *International Affairs*

**CHIEFS OF STATE AND CABINET MEMBERS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: A REFERENCE AID**, Washington, D.C., National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency. MO.

Completely revised editions are issued once a month. Includes many governments that are not fully independent and others not officially recognized by the United States. Governments are listed in alphabetical order according to the most commonly used version of each country's name. Alphabetical name index.

**INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA; A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES**, by Ann Schulz. Detroit, Michigan, Gale Research Company, 1977. 244 p.

Chapter 1: International Politics, The Middle East, and Resource Materials; Chapter 2: Regional Issues; Chapter 3: The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States; Chapter 4: External Powers in The Middle East; Chapter 5: The Arab-Israeli Conflict; Chapter 6: Petroleum; Chapter 7: Reference Materials, including Bibliographies and indexes; Chapter 8: Serials.

**INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK AND STATESMEN'S WHO'S WHO**, 1977. London. Kelly's Directories, 1977. Various paging.

**THE MIDDLE EAST YEARBOOK**, 1977, prepared by University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, London, The Middle East Magazine, 1976. 288 p.

Facts and figures on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Includes: geography, economy, foreign relations and country by country surveys. Statistics. Maps.

**POLITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY**, ed. by Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, New York, The New York Times Book Company, 1974. 510 p.

Political compendium on the Middle East in the present and the recent past. Condensed information, alphabetically arranged, on countries and peoples, on national and political movement parties and leaders, on ideas and ideologies, on disputes and war, alliances and treaty. Photos.

**STATUS OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS**. Washington, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence

and Research, January 1978. 19 p. (Geographic Bulletin, Publication 8735.)

Provides nomenclature used by the U.S. Government for the 148 independent nations on the world scene, also included are general data on the capital, area, and population of each nation. This bulletin contains similar data for nonindependent states. Two appendices list the nations which have become independent since World War II. The world map locates all countries described in the text.

**YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1978**, ed by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 497 p.

With each passing year, the task of keeping abreast of changing developments in the Communist world becomes more difficult. This Yearbook edited by Richard F. Staar, provides a comprehensive survey covering the calendar year 1977 of the organizational structure, internal development, domestic and foreign policies, and activity of Communist parties throughout the world.

#### 6. *Oil, Gas, Water and Minerals*

**MINERAL YEARBOOK, VOLUME 3; AREA REPORTS: INTERNATIONAL**. Washington, U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1976. 1193 p.

**WATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD; SELECTED STATISTICS**, comp. and ed. by Frits van der Leeden. Port Washington, N.Y., Water Information Center, Inc., 1975. 568 p.

Includes the countries of the Middle East.

**WORLD PETROLEUM REPORT '76**, v.22 (1976) 126 p.

An annual review of international oil operations.

**WORLDWIDE CONSTRUCTION**, in *Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, n.41 (3 October 1977) 110-172.

"Worldwide survey of major construction projects in processing and pipelining tabulates capacities, contractors, estimated costs, and time of completion." Includes: Refineries, petrochemicals, sulfur, related fuels, gas processing and pipelining, all by country where the project is located.

**WORLDWIDE REPORT**, in *Oil and Gas Journal*, v.75, no.53, (26 December 1977) 97-190.

Annual Review of worldwide oil and gas reserves. Master tables on pp. 100-101 summarize world production and refining data. A field-by-field and plant-by-plant survey of the world oil fields and refineries follows on pp. 103 and 148.

#### 7. *Ports*

**PORTS OF THE WORLD 1974**. 27th ed. London, Benn Brothers Limited, 1974. 867 p.

8. *United Nations: Speeches, Reports, Resolutions*  
**THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE WALDHEIM REPORT**, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, v.2, no.4 (Summer 1973) 181-205. (Document)

Reprints the second part of the report re-



quested of the Secretary-General by the United Nations Security Council on the efforts undertaken by the United Nations pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict since June 1967. The "Report of the Secretary-General under Security Resolution 331 (1973) of April 20, 1973 was published on May 21, 1973. The second part "describes the attempts of the Security Council and The General Assembly to bring about a settlement, and outlines the activities of the Jarring mission."

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PALESTINE: MAJOR RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL, 1947-1977, in *Middle East International*, n.77 (November 1977) 17-20.

Text of the major resolutions.

WAR, PEACE, AND INTEGRATIVE COMPLEXITY: UN SPEECHES ON THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, 1947-1976, by Peter Suedfeld, Pjilip E. Tetlock, Carmenza Ramirez, in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v.21, no.3 (September 1977) 427-441.

"UN General Assembly speeches concerning the Middle East conflict made by representatives of Israel, Arab countries (Egypt and Syria), the USA, and the USSR were scored for integrative complexity. Speeches were sampled from twenty years between 1947 and 1976. Complexity of information-processing was significantly reduced in speeches made in months preceding the outbreak of war (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973), except in the case of the USSR. Israel . . . showed the greatest reductions prior to war. The low level of complexity characteristic of Israeli and Arab speeches during 1976 may reflect the escalation of the Lebanese civil war or may be a predictor of a major outbreak of hostilities in the near future."

WHO'S WHO IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED AGENCIES, by Michael Hawkin. New York, Arno Press, 1975. 824 p.

"With this volume, Arno Press inaugurates a new series of biographical directories designed to provide authoritative and comprehensive biographical material in areas where current information is not easily accessible. The directory contains biographies covering more than 3,700 United Nations and agency personnel as well as diplomatic representatives of Member and observer States in New York and Geneva. Information for each person listed includes: name; position; business and home addresses and telephone numbers; languages spoken; career positions; countries of service; education; professional memberships and interests; books and articles written; and avocational interests. In addition, the volume lists Secretariat staff members holding the rank of Chief or Divisional Director (P-S) and above, mission personnel from the level of Counsellor and up, members of governing boards

and councils, and selected other categories. Also included is a listing, by country, of more than 450 United Nations offices worldwide, containing their mailing addresses, street addresses, telephone numbers, cable and telex codes. The directory contains extensive reference materials, a good part of which is devoted to the first organizational roster of the UN system ever published. The roster provides a structural breakdown of the UN secretariats, agencies and other UN organs, with names of senior officials. This roster is designed to make it easier to locate appropriate contacts in connection with a specific request or problem. The contents pages and information on how to use the volume are presented in six languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish."

### G. Bibliographies

#### 1. *Middle East: Miscellaneous Aspects*

THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST 1948-1973: A SELECTIVE AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, comp. by George N. Atiyeh. Boston, G. K. Hall. 1975. 664 p.

"The main purpose of this bibliography is to list and introduce by annotation significant publications on the contemporary Middle East, and to familiarize the student or novice researcher with the basic literature on selected topics in the Social Sciences. While most of the entries are for works in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish, some works in Arabic, Turkish and Persian are included. . ." The bibliography is organized into the following major sections: 1. The Middle East; 2. The Arab-Israeli Conflict; 3. The Arab Countries; 4. The Arabian Peninsula; 5. The Fertile Crescent; 6. The Nile Valley; 7. The Maghrib; 8. Turkey; and 9. Iran.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN PAPERBACK III (1969-1974), by Harry N. Howard, in *The Middle East Journal*, v.28, no.3 (Summer 1974) 315-326.

The Book Review Editor for *The Middle East Journal*, presents a "brief, selected, and annotated bibliography. . ." to "guide students and others interested. . . to some of the more useful works which treat of developments within the Middle East and its basic problems." Annotations are limited to a few words. This continues bibliographies published in 1964, (v.18, no.3, Summer 1964 pp 355-366) and 1969 (v.23, no.3, Summer 1969 pp 383-391).

[REFERENCES], in AVAILABILITY OF WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES, by D.C. Ion. London, Graham & Trotman, 1975. pp. 237-250.

SOME SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON THE MIDDLE EAST, by Jacob M. Landau, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, v.9, no.2, (May 1973) 227-230.

Discusses several Soviet bibliographies "bearing on Middle Eastern research." Their contents and approach are outlined, and their useful-



ness is evaluated. In general Mr. Landau finds that Soviet bibliographies on the Middle East are published in "a relatively small number of copies," and that "practically all such bibliographies list items published only in the Soviet Union."

2. *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *ARAB STATES OF THE LOWER GULF: PEOPLE, POLITICS, PETROLEUM*, by John Anthony. Washington, D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1975. pp. 236-259.

Documents; Books, Monographs, Pamphlets, Proceedings; Periodical Literature.

3. *Middle East and North Africa*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEXES], in *INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA; A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES*, by Ann Schulz. Detroit, Michigan, Gale Research Company, 1977. pp. 169-199.

4. *Middle East: Economic Aspects*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST*, by Z.Y. Hershlag, Leiden, Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1975. pp. 314-328.

QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, England. Every Quarter 77 separate Reviews are issued covering over 150 countries. Contents include an analysis of political developments relevant to understanding the economy, government economic policies, performance of key business indicators, evaluation of foreign trade data, assessment of development plans and statistical appendixes. Annual reference supplements for each country summarize the essential background data on economic and political developments and key long-term trends. Middle Eastern countries covered by these reports include: Egypt; Israel; Iran; Turkey; Iraq; Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus; Saudi Arabia, Jordan; The Arabian Peninsula; Shaikhdoms and Republics. In addition there is a special annual report on "Oil in the Middle East."

5. *Middle East Oil and U.S. Foreign Policy*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *MIDDLE EAST OIL AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE U.S. ENERGY CRISIS*, by Shoshana Klebanoff. New York, Praeger, 1974. pp. 261-279.

Official Sources; International Organizations Publications; Secondary Sources (books and theses).

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY] in *THE MIDDLE EAST: US POLICY, ISRAEL, OIL AND THE ARABS*, Third Edition, edited by Mark A. Bruzonsky. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc, September 1977. pp. 184-189.

6. *Bibliographies on Oil Power*

[BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE], in *OIL, POWER AND POLITICS: CONFLICT IN ARA-*

*BIA, THE RED SEA AND THE GULF* by Mordechai Abir. London, Frank Cass, 1974. pp. 211-213.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS*, by Mason Willrich and others. New York, The Free Press, 1975. pp. 213-221.

Books; articles and pamphlets; official documents.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *OIL MONEY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY*, by Yoon S. Park. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1976. pp. 199-205.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *OIL POWER*, by Carl Solberg. New York, Mason/Charter, 1976. pp. 279-299.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *OPEC AND THE MIDDLE EAST; THE IMPACT OF OIL ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT*, ed. by Russell A. Stone. New York, Praeger, 1977. pp. 246-247.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *POWER PLAY: OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST*, by Leonard Mosley. New York, Random House, 1973. pp. 443-447.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *OIL: THE BIGGEST BUSINESS*, by Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, London, Eyre Methues. 1975. pp. 391-392.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE ECONOMICS OF THE OIL CRISIS*, ed. by T.M. Rybczynski. New York, Holmes & Meier, 1976. pp. 194-197.

General background; economics and politics of the oil industry; alternative sources of energy.

7. *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE MIDDLE EAST IN SOVIET POLICY*, by R. D. McLaurin. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975. pp. 171-200.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *SOVIET MIDDLE EAST MEDITERRANEAN FRONTIER: EXPANSION AND SECURITY*, by Col. William M. Stokes, III. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, May 1977. pp. 35-37 (Unpublished Manuscript).

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *SOVIET-MIDDLE EAST RELATIONS*, by Charles B. McLane. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. pp. 123-126.

Bibliography to volume one of a survey in three volumes (Soviet-Third World Relations).

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1970*, by Robert O. Freedman. New York, Praeger Publishers. 1975. pp. 180-192.

Documentary collections and statistical studies; books; articles; periodicals used.

(\*)—[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV*, by Oles M. Smolansky. Lewisburg, Penn., Bucknell University Press, 1974.

8. *Soviet Arms for the Arabs*

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in *ARMS*



FOR THE ARABS: THE SOVIET UNION AND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, by John D. Glassman. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. pp. 235-239.

9. *Israeli-Soviet Cold War*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ISRAELI-SOVIET COLD WAR, by Surendra Bleutani. DELHI, INDIA, 1975. pp. 188-205.

10. *Arab-Israeli Conflict*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE ARAB-ISRAELI-CONFLICT, by Gerald Kurland, Charlotteville, N.Y. Samhar Press, 1973. pp. 31-32.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in BEHIND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: THE REAL IMPASSE BETWEEN ARAB AND JEW, by Carl Earl Alroy. New York, Putnam's Sons, 1975. pp. 287-306.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in PERIODICALS IN REVIEW: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN PERIODICAL LITERATURE, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, quarterly.

A regular feature of this quarterly review is a section listing "articles and reviews of books on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict from a wide variety of periodicals appearing mainly in Arabic, English, French and Hebrew." In the Spring/Summer 1976 issue entries were arranged under the following headings: "History and Geography; Politics and Political Institutions; Diplomacy and Law; Military; Social, Economic, Education, Bibliography, Biography, Literature; Book Reviews."

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CRES-CENT AND STAR: ARAB & ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, ed. by Yonah Alexander and Nicholas N. Kittrie. New York, AMS Press, 1973, pp. 467-486.

11. *Jerusalem*

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in JERUSALEM: A FACTUAL BACKGROUND, by Anthony S. Reyner and Jane Philips, in *World Affairs*, v.137, no.4 (Spring 1975) 326-335.

Includes 36 citations.

12. *West Bank*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE WEST BANK: IS IT VIABLE? by Vivian A. Bell. Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1975. pp. 155-165.

H. *Middle East (Bibliographies by Country)*

1. *Bahrain*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in BAHRAIN: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN A MODERNIZING SOCIETY, by Emile A. Nakhleh. Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976. pp. 179-187.

Lists general and specific sources for Bahrain: books, periodicals, government documents, laws and decrees.

2. *Cyprus*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in CYPRUS: THE UNFINISHED AGONY, by P.N. Vanezis. London, Abelard-Schuman, 1977. pp. 112-114.

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS, by Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie. Stanford, California, Hoover Institution, 1975. pp. 185-190.

(SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY) in SURVEY ESSAY: ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION, by George A. Kourvetaris, in JPMS: *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, v.4, no.1 (Spring 1976) 161-164.

From the authors note: "This bibliography contains additional useful information on the Cyprus issue. This material should be read by those interested in the general theme covered in this analysis. The bibliography does not include the . . . reports . . . issued by the U.N. and the U.S. Congress on the Cyprus Question nor those sources available in other than the English language." It does include references to dissertations and Theses, meetings and conferences, as well as books and articles.

3. *Egypt*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. 3rd ed. Washington, Department of the Army, 1976. pp. 399-433. (DA PAM 550-43.)

4. *Iran*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ASPECTS, by Feridun Fesharak. New York, Praeger, 1976. pp. 309-315.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in IRAN: AN ECONOMIC PROFILE, by Jahangir Amizgac. Washington, D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1977. pp. 267-271.

5. *Israel*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ISRAEL: THE EM-BATTLED ALLY, by Nadav Safran. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978. pp. 601-613.

A selective bibliography which cites "key and representative works" where there is abundant material. Where material is "relatively scarce, as with military affairs and the diplomacy of recent years, the items mentioned come close to exhausting the English-language sources on the subjects, excluding periodical literature. Works in Hebrew and Arabic are cited only if they contain important material not available elsewhere."

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in BETWEEN ISRAEL AND DEATH, by Bernard Glick. Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 1974. pp. 179-182.

Lists books, articles and documents.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in THE MOD-



ERN HISTORY OF ISRAEL, by Noah Lucas. New York, Praeger, 1975. pp. 469-484.

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in ISRAEL DIVIDED: IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS, IN THE JEWISH STATE, by Rael Jean Isaac. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. pp. 207-217.

6. *Lebanon*

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7. *Oman*

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in GUERRILLA WARFARE AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: THE REBELLION IN DHUFAR, by J.E. Peterson, in *World Today*, v.139, no.4 (Spring 1977) p.291.

In extensive footnote, refers to the "scope, accuracy and ideological viewpoint" of various articles, studies and books on the rebellion in Dhufar.

8. *Persian Gulf States*

[BIBLIOGRAPHY], in AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, by Richard F. Nyrop and others. Washington, Department of the Army, 1977. pp. 411-427. (DA PAM 550-185.)

Sources used in the preparation of this publication are listed. In addition there is a short commentary at the end of each chapter concerning the major sources of information available and their usefulness.

9. *Oatar*

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY], in QATAR, A MEED SPECIAL REPORT, by Michael Prest, in *Middle East Economic Digest*, Special Report, April 1977, p. 26.

List titles and sources of seven current items on Qatar's economy.

10. *United Arab Emirates*

[SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY], in UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, by John Whelan, *Meed Special Report*, July 1977, p. 50.

Lists 16 titles concerning the United Arab Emirates.



**APPENDIX I**  
**BACKGROUND NOTES**

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**APPENDIX I.A**

**BAHRAIN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1977. (Publication 8013).]



# background NOTES

## Bahrain

department of state \* december 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: State of Bahrain

### PEOPLE


Most of the population of Bahrain (bā-rāh) is concentrated in the two principal cities of Manama and Al Muharraq. The indigenous people—80 percent of the population—are from the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. The most numerous minorities are Iranians, South and East Asians, and Europeans.

Islam is the major religion, with the Sunni sect predominating in the urban centers and the Shi'a sect in the rural areas. There are both Roman Catholic and Protestant churches in Bahrain as well as a small indigenous Jewish community.

### HISTORY

Bahrain was the site of the ancient civilization of Dilmun, which flourished as a trading center in the period 2000-1800 B.C.

Since the late 18th century, Bahrain has been governed by the Khalifa family, originally of the Utbah clan of the large Anaiza tribal confederation of the Arabian Peninsula. The Khalifa family also claimed suzerainty over Qatar, and a member of that family habitually resided at Al Dawhah (Doha), the capital of Qatar. This political relationship persisted until 1868, when, at the request of Qatari nobles, the



British conducted negotiations for the termination of the Bahraini claim, except for the payment of tribute.

### PROFILE

#### People

POPULATION: 305,000 (1977 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.4%. DENSITY: 1,140 per sq. mi. (440 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: 80% Arab; 12% Iranian, Pakistani, Indian. RELIGIONS: About 50% Sunni Muslim, 50% Shi'a Muslim. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English, some Persian and Urdu. Commercial languages are Arabic and English. LITERACY: about 35%.

#### Geography

AREA: 260 sq. mi. (673 sq. km.); 4 times the size of Wash., D.C. CAPITAL: Manama (pop. 90,000). OTHER CITY: Al Muharraq.

#### Government

TYPE: Traditional Emirate (Cabinet-Executive system). INDEPENDENCE: August 15, 1971. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: May 26, 1973.

BRANCHES: Executive—Emir (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of Ministers (Cabinet). Judicial—independent judiciary with right of judicial review.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: Universal. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 6 towns and cities.

FLAG: Three-fourths red field with serrated line separating white field on staff side.

#### Economy

GNP: \$630 million (1977). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$2,500 (1977). AVG. INFLATION RATE LAST 3 YRS.: 15%.

AGRICULTURE: Land 10%. Labor 5%. Products—eggs, vegetables, fruit.

INDUSTRY: Labor 90%. Products—oil, aluminum, fish.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, fish.


TRADE (1977): Exports—\$650 million: oil, aluminum, fish. Partners—Japan and Arab countries. Imports—\$670 million: machinery, oil industry equipment, motor vehicles, foodstuffs. Partners—UK, US, Japan.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: US\$1 = BD 0.395.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: Significant support from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).





The tribute ended with the occupation of Qatar by the Ottoman Turks in 1872.

The ruler of Bahrain entered into relations with the United Kingdom in 1805, and the first treaty between the two parties was signed in 1820. A binding treaty of protection was concluded in 1861 and further revised in 1892 and 1951. This treaty was similar to those entered into by the British Government with other Persian Gulf principalities. Under it the ruler

could not dispose of any of his territory except to the United Kingdom and could not enter into relations with any foreign government other than the United Kingdom without British consent. The British promised to protect Bahrain from all aggression by sea and to lend its good offices in case of land attack.

After World War II Bahrain became the center for British administration of treaty obligations in the lower Persian Gulf area.

When the U.K. Government announced a policy decision in 1968 (reaffirmed in March 1971) to end the treaty relationships with the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms, Bahrain joined the other eight states (Qatar and the seven Trucial Shaikhdoms, the latter now called the United Arab Emirates) under British protection in an effort to form a union of Arab emirates. By mid-1971, however, the nine shaikhdoms still had not been able to agree on terms of union, and the termination date of the British treaty relationship was approaching (end of 1971). Accordingly, Bahrain decided to seek independence as a separate entity. It became fully independent on August 15, 1971, as the State of Bahrain.

In May 1973 the Emir enacted a new Constitution, which set up an experimental parliamentary system and protected individual liberties. In August 1975, however, the Government temporarily disbanded the National Assembly, and no date has been announced for the reintroduction of representative institutions.

#### GEOGRAPHY

Bahrain consists of a group of islands in the Persian Gulf midway between the Qatar Peninsula and mainland Saudi Arabia. In addition to the main island of Bahrain, the most important islands in the archipelago are Al Muharraq, Umm Na'san, Sitrah, An Nabi Salih, and the Hawar Group.

The island of Bahrain has an interior plateau 100-200 feet (30-60m.) in elevation with a hill (Jabal Dukhan) rising to 445 feet (135m.) above sea level, the highest point on any of the islands. Bahrain is connected to Al Muharraq by a causeway 1¼ miles (2.8 km.) long and with Sitrah by another newly opened causeway.

The climate is hot and humid most of the year. Daytime temperatures regularly reach 106°F (41°C), and the relative humidity is 70-80 percent. Rainfall averages less than 4 inches (10cm.) annually. Date palms, vegetables, and forage crops are grown on Bahrain and on some of the smaller islands, but Al Muharraq is virtually barren of vegetation.



## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Provisions of the 1973 Constitution called for the Emir, upon consultations, to appoint a Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers functioned as Executive and was responsible to the popularly elected National Assembly.

Bahrain was governed under this system until the summer of 1975. At that time the Emir exercised his authority under the Constitution to disband the Assembly. In doing so, he reported to the Bahraini people on the danger to national security stemming from several instances of alleged subversive activity of some Assembly Members. He promised the Bahrainis prompt action on housing improvements and in curbing inflation. The Government was reorganized by the Emir, and a new Ministry of Housing was established.

Bahrain is presently being ruled by Emiri decree. The Constitution continues in force, and the Government has reaffirmed its commitment to reintroduce some form of representative government in the future.

Bahrain's six towns and cities are administered by one central Municipal Council, whose members are appointed by the Emir. The courts administer the legal code and can review the laws to insure their compatibility with the Constitution.

### Principal Government Officials

Emir—Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa

Crown Prince—Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa

### Council of Ministers

Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa

Commerce and Agriculture—Habib A. Kassim

Defense—Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa

Development and Industries—Yusuf Ahmad Al-Shirawi

Education—Abdulaziz bin Mohammad Al Khalifa

Finance and National Economy—Ibrahim Abd Al Karim

Foreign Affairs—Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa

Health—Dr. Ali Fakhro

Housing—Khalid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa

Information—Tariq Abdulrahman Al Moayyed

Interior—Mohammad bin Khalifa Al Khalifa

Justice and Islamic Affairs—Abdullah bin Khalid Al Khalifa

Labor and Social Affairs—Isa bin Mohammad Al Khalifa

Public Works, Electricity and Water—Majid Al-Jishi

Transportation and Communications—Ibrahim Mohammad Humaydan

Ambassador to the U.N.—Salman Mohammad Al-Saffar

Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdulaziz Buali

The Bahrain U.N. Mission is at 747 - 3rd Ave., New York, New York 10017

The Bahrain Embassy in the United States is at 2600 Virginia Ave. NW., Washington, D.C. 20037 (tel. 202-965-4930).

### ECONOMY

Prior to the 1930's Bahrain's economy was based largely on pearl fishing. The natural-pearl industry declined as an important source of income due both to a depression and to competition from the cultured-pearl industry. The important factors in the economy today are the petroleum and aluminum industries, transit trade, and banking.

According to a 1974 agreement, the Government of Bahrain owns 60 percent of its only producing oil company, the Bahrain Petroleum Co., Ltd. (BAPCO). The rest is owned jointly by Standard Oil of California and Texaco. A new company, Bahrain National Oil Company (BANOCO), will administer the portion of BAPCO owned by the Government of Bahrain as well as the exploration rights. It also owns all natural gas reserves. Oil reserves are much smaller than those of other Persian Gulf countries and are rapidly being depleted; offshore exploration is currently being undertaken to expand reserves. The 1976 production averaged 57,000 barrels per day (bld).

One of the largest refineries in the Middle East is located at Sitrah,

with a capacity of 250,000 bld. To supplement Bahrain's own crude, an undersea pipeline has been constructed to this refinery from fields in Saudi Arabia. The Sitrah oil-loading terminal can accommodate the largest supertankers. Bahrain also shares with Saudi Arabia the revenue from the Abu Safah offshore field.

Presently about 85 percent of Bahrain's budget comes from oil revenues, which have grown steadily since 1973. Bahrain's role as an entrepôt, transportation, and service center in the Persian Gulf supplements the petroleum industry's contribution to the economy. A major part of the budget is concerned with development. The Government provides free health and educational services. Soon a \$300 million drydock project, the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, will be completed.

In addition, a major power and

### TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Wear summer attire from May to mid-Oct. and spring/fall clothing from mid-Oct. through Apr. Visitors should always dress conservatively in public.

*Customs*—A visa and valid smallpox, yellow-fever, and cholera immunizations are required for entry. Health requirements change. Travelers should check the most current information. Transit visas with 72-hour validity can be purchased at Bahrain's international airport.

*Health*—Take normal precautions regarding food and drink. Modern health services are provided in several hospitals and health centers.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone connections are excellent because intercontinental calls enter the satellite communications system from Bahrain. Cable and telex connections to leading hotels and businesses are good. One Bahrainian radio station broadcasts in Arabic and another in English.

*Transportation*—Gulfair, an airline in which Bahrain participates with other gulf states, operates services to India, Saudi Arabia, other gulf states, and points in Europe. Many other major airlines serve Bahrain's international airport. Taxis and rental cars are available in Manama.



## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

American University. *Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

Anthony, John D. *People, Politics and Petroleum*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

Belgrave, James, and Bernard Gerard. *Bahrain*. Paris: Ministry of Information, Government of Bahrain, 1976.

Belgrave, James, M.D. *Welcome to Bahrain*, 8th ed. Singapore, 1976.

Busch, Briton C. *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Curtis, Jerry L. *Bahrain, Language, Customs & People*. Singapore, 1977.

Hazelton, Jared E. *Public Finance Prospects and Policies for Bahrain, 1976-1987*. Beirut: The Ford Foundation, 1975.

water project is being undertaken at Sitrah. An important new development in 1977 was the passage of legislation which encouraged the establishment of offshore banking units aimed at channeling Arab capital through Bahrain. Thirty-eight international banks, including several American ones, have begun operations under this legislation.

Imports have risen from \$168.3

million in 1970 to \$670 million in 1976. The increase in oil revenues has made this expansion of imports possible, although the 1976 and 1977 budgets show small deficits.

Since 1958 there has been no customs duty on goods in transit, and warehouses have been reserved for merchandise intended for reexport. Harbor facilities are well developed and have helped to make Bahrain a leading transit center in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain's favorable position was improved in 1977 by the removal of harbor congestion. Repair slips for small vessels and workshops for the maintenance of marine engines are available.

In an attempt to diversify the economy, the Government has actively pursued a policy of encouraging foreign investment. A notable development was the international consortium formed in 1968 to construct a \$72 million aluminum smelter at Sitrah. The plant is currently operating at almost full capacity, although marketing has proved to be a problem.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

In 1970 Iran abandoned its longstanding claim to Bahrain. The termination of the British protectorate over Bahrain was accomplished amicably. Since achieving full independence, Bahrain has maintained friendly relations with all of its neighbors and the broader world community. It maintains a particularly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. Relations with Iran are also good.

Bahrain has shown close support for Arab and Islamic solidarity and has

called for the just rights of the Palestinians. It has also supported American peacemaking efforts in the Mideast. Bahrain has indicated special interest in close cooperation with Persian Gulf states and continues its dedication to the concept of eventually joining a federation of the largest possible number of gulf states.

## U.S.-BAHRAIN RELATIONS

When Bahrain became independent, the U.S.-Bahrain relationship, long excellent on an informal basis, was transformed into a more formal one with the establishment of diplomatic relations. The U.S. Embassy at Manama was opened September 21, 1971, and a resident Ambassador was sent there in 1974. Bahrain opened an Embassy in Washington in 1977.

In 1977, the agreement establishing Bahrain as the home port for the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) was terminated. However, arrangements have been made which will allow the ships of MIDEASTFOR to call at Bahrain from time to time. The Department of Defense-sponsored Bahrain School will remain along with a small administrative support unit.

## Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Wat T. Cluverius IV  
Counselor Officer—Vincent M. Battle  
Economic/Commercial Officers—Gordon Powers, David N. Kelling  
Public Affairs Officer—Larry R. Taylor

The U.S. Embassy in Bahrain is located at Manama, Shaikh Isa Road, P.O. Box 431, Manama, Bahrain (tel. 714151).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8013, Revised December 1977  
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

\* U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977 O-261-124 (2421)

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402  
Price 50 cents (single copy). Subscription price: \$24.00 per year; \$6.00 additional for foreign mailing.



**APPENDIX I.B**

**CYPRUS  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1976. (Publication 8198).]



background  
NOTES

## Cyprus

department of state \* december 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Cyprus

## GEOGRAPHY

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea and lies 44 miles (71 km.) south of Turkey and 260 miles (418 km.) east of Rhodes, the nearest part of Greece.

The Troodos Mountains in the southwest (highest peak 6,400 feet (1,951 m.) above sea level) and the

Kyrenia Range along the northern coast dominate the Cypriot landscape. The fertile central plain, or Mesaia, lies between these mountain ranges.

The climate is typical of the Mediterranean; summers are hot and dry, and winters are mild and damp. The average annual temperature is 69°F (21°C). December and January are the rainy season; the average annual rain-

fall is 19.8 (50 cm.). Cyprus suffers from periodic droughts.

## PEOPLE

About 78 percent of all Cypriots are Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, and some 18 percent are Turkish-speaking Muslims. The remaining population consists of Armenians, Maronites, and other minor groups. In coexisting for four centuries, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have come to share many customs but have maintained their separate cultures, traits, and loyalties. Greek Cypriots belong to the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus, headed by Archbishop Makarios III, who is also secular leader (Ethnarch) of the Greek Cypriot community and President of the Republic. Turkish Cypriots are Muslims. Greek and Turkish are the official languages, and English is widely used. Twenty-one percent of the Cypriot population is in either primary or secondary schools; the island has no university.

Nicosia, the capital and largest city on the island, is located on the central plain. Other important urban centers, all located on the coast, are Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos, and Kyrenia.

Almost all Turkish Cypriots are now concentrated in the Turkish-controlled northern portion of the island. This resulted from an agreement reached at the third Vienna session of the intercommunal talks, held in early August of 1975, which provided for movement north of the approximately 6,000 Turkish Cypriots that still remained in the south. At the same time, the remaining Greek population in the north is diminishing.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 3,572 sq. mi. (9,247 sq. km., approx. twice as large as Delaware). CAPITAL: Nicosia (pop. 112,000). OTHER CITIES: Limassol (pop. 48,000), Famagusta (pop. 39,000), Larnaca (pop. 21,000). (1973 figs.).

## People

POPULATION: 671,000 (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 1% DENSITY: 190 per sq. mi. (73 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Greek-speaking Christians, Turkish-speaking Muslims, Armenians, Maronites, British. RELIGIONS: Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Maronite. LANGUAGES: Greek 80%, Turkish 18%, English. LITERACY: 82%.

## Government

TYPE: Republic. INDEPENDENCE: August 16, 1960. CONSTITUTION: August 16, 1960.

BRANCHES: Executive—President (Chief of State and Head of Government), elected to 5-year term. Legislative—unicameral House of Representatives (50 members elected for 5-year terms). Judicial—Supreme Court.

FLAG: Against a white background, the

shape of the island in gold above two green crossed olive branches.

## Economy

GNP: \$715 million (1975). PER CAPITA: \$1,165. GROWTH RATE: GNP and per capita growth rates have declined as a result of disruption of 1974.

AGRICULTURE: Land 56.7%. Labor 36%. Products—potatoes, grapes, citrus fruits, wheat, barley, carob, sheep, goats, pigs.


INDUSTRY: Labor 47%. Products—food and beverage processing, nonmetallic mineral products, public services, construction. NATURAL RESOURCES: Copper, pyrites, asbestos, amber, gypsum, chromite, building stone, marble, clay, salt.

TRADE (1975 figs.): Exports—\$152 million. Principal partners—UK \$53.3 million, USSR and Eastern Europe \$17.3 million, FRG \$2.7 million. Exports to US—\$1.3 million. Imports—\$308 million. Principal partners—UK \$58.7 million, Italy \$18.7 million, FRG \$20 million. Imports from US—\$8 million.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Cyprus pound=US\$2.41

US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: US A.I.D.—(1946-74) \$10.3 million, PL 480 (1946-74) \$28.7 million, Peace Corps (1946-71) \$0.3 million, EXIM (through FY 1972) \$2.7 million. Since 1974—\$55 million (additional \$17.5 million allocated for FY 1977), all for refugee relief activities, from US A.I.D.







## HISTORY

### Background of the Cyprus Problem

During most of its history, Cyprus has been ruled by outsiders. Even though it achieved independence in 1960, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece reserved the right of intervention under certain circumstances. The island's strategic location has been of value to every power that has dominated the eastern Mediterranean. However, the Greek character of the majority of the population, inherited from early Greek colonization and solidified through some 800 years of rule by the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian Byzantine Empire, survived despite foreign rule. Turkish Cypriots represent a once-dominant group—Turks who came to the island after the powerful Ottoman Empire captured Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571. Ottoman use of the Cypriot Orthodox Church to administer the island under Turkish control strengthened both the Church and the unity of the ethnic Greek population throughout the centuries of Turkish rule. After 1878, when the declining Ottoman Empire ceded control of Cyprus to the United Kingdom as security for a loan, most of the Turkish population remained on Cyprus. The island was formally annexed by the United Kingdom in 1914 and became a Crown Colony in 1925.

During the 19th century, one after another of the areas of the Ottoman Empire where Greeks were in the majority successfully rebelled against Turkish rule and joined to form what is now modern Greece. On Cyprus, however, attempts at rebellion were unsuccessful. When the first British administrators arrived, Greek Cypriots made clear their desire for *enosis* (union with Greece), while Turkish Cypriots expressed their determination not to be absorbed into mainland Greece.

### The EOKA Rebellion

Under British rule, agitation for *enosis* continued. Riots in 1931 forced the British to declare a state of emergency which lasted into 1933. This agitation climaxed in 1955. At that time, with British power in the area declining, a guerrilla campaign against the British was launched by a Greek Cypriot underground movement, the

"National Union of Cypriot Fighters" (Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston—EOKA). In the ensuing 4 years of violence on the island, relations among the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey became strained. The Government of Greece officially endorsed the Greek Cypriots' claim for majority rule and self-determination. The Government of Turkey, pointing out that the application of these principles would lead to *enosis* and therefore to Greek territorial expansion, took the position that if British control were relinquished, Turkey's national security and the Turkish Cypriots' personal safety would require at least the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.

### Independence

Peace came with agreements signed at Zürich and London in 1960 which provided for establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus. The "Zürich agreements," later embodied in the Constitution and treaties, (a) prohibited union of the island with Greece or its partition between Greece and Turkey; (b) made Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom guarantors of the Republic's independence, territorial integrity, and security, as well as of "the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution"; (c) reserved to the guarantors the right to take collective or individual action to fulfill this obligation (the Treaty of Guarantee); and (d) arranged for tripartite Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish defense of the island (the Treaty of Alliance). Certain military base areas were kept under British sovereignty (the Dhekelia and Akrotiri Sovereign Base Areas). Although Archbishop Makarios expressed reservations regarding these agreements, he lacked Greek Government support, and the agreements were ratified February 19, 1960.

Cypriot independence was declared on August 16, 1960, and the Constitution went into effect that day. As President Makarios remarked at the time, Cyprus became a State but not a nation. In the period following, the new Republic prospered in spite of the unique character of its governmental structure. As time passed, however, the mutual suspicions of the two communities complicated the orderly workings of the government. Dissatis-

## TRAVEL NOTES

Travelers visiting the Republic of Cyprus may arrive by air at Larnaca, or by sea at ports in the southern portion of the island. Those wishing to visit the Turkish-controlled north should plan to arrive at Ercan International Airport in the northern portion of the island or at ports in the north (including Famagusta). Ercan Airport is served by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot airlines. Travel between the northern and southern portions of the island is not possible at present except by leaving the country. Other airlines currently operate about 25 flights per week to Larnaca International Airport in the southern portion of the island from Athens, Beirut, and Tel Aviv. Ships carrying cargo and passengers call regularly at Larnaca and Limassol, the principal ports in the south.

*Climate and Clothing*—The climate of Cyprus is somewhat comparable to that of the South Atlantic States. Clothing and shoe requirements on Cyprus are about the same as for Washington, D.C. Rainfall is almost exclusively between December and March. Summer temperatures often exceed 100°F (38°C), but the humidity is usually low.

*Health*—Cyprus is a relatively healthful area with no unusual health problems. Community and public sanitation, while lower than in the US, is much higher than in other Middle Eastern countries and is perhaps comparable to most southern European countries.

*Telecommunications*—Although there are no telephone connections between the North and South, telephone service otherwise is good throughout the island. Cyprus has telegraph and telephone communications with all parts of the world, and telephone calls to Europe and the United States are usually clear and uninterrupted.

*Tourism*—Historical and archaeological sites from neolithic, Hellenic, Macedonian, Roman, Crusader, and Turkish periods of influence are abundant on the island. Visitors may be interested in the Cyprus Museum as well as in archaeological sites such as those at Khirokitia, Enkomi, Salamis, Kato Paphos, and Kouion.

*Transportation*—Bus and taxi service are the only forms of local public transportation. In Nicosia good taxi service is always available at moderate prices.

faction steadily increased among the Greek Cypriots and culminated in President Makarios' proposal in November 1963 of 13 constitutional



amendments. These were rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots who felt the proposed changes would have effectively removed guarantees protecting their status.

#### The Crisis of 1963-1967

Following a rapid increase in tensions, armed combat broke out between the two communities in late December 1963 and continued sporadically throughout most of 1964. The intercommunal fighting created a grave danger of war between Greece and Turkey, each of which supported its respective Cypriot community. Also, the revived call for *enosis* further aroused the mainland countries, as national pride and prestige became engaged on both sides. Initially, a force composed of British troops attempted to establish and enforce a cease-fire on the island. When this proved unsuitable, the matter was taken up by the U.N. Security Council. In a resolution of March 4, 1964, the Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and authorized the Secretary General, in agreement with the parties, to designate a mediator to promote an agreed settlement.

With the outbreak of hostilities in December 1963, the United States for the first time became actively involved in an effort to achieve a peaceful solution. Under Secretary of State George Ball and Senator William Fulbright were sent as envoys to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia in early 1964. When it became apparent in June of that year that Turkey was preparing for a possible invasion of Cyprus, President Lyndon Johnson dispatched a strong letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu warning against such a step. While the letter may have helped dissuade the Turks from invading, it created serious frictions between the United States and Turkey.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented to the Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks in July and August 1974 two plans for *enosis* with, in exchange, a Turkish military base on Cyprus and other Greek concessions. These plans, while at times close to being accepted, in the end were rejected by both Greece and Turkey. The U.N. mediator, Galo Plaza, submitted a report to the Secretary Gen-

eral March 26, 1965, which outlined his views for a settlement. The report was not accepted by the Turkish side.

UNFICYP, which was initially authorized for a period of only 3 months, has since been extended at periodic intervals and remains a stabilizing force on the island today. Now numbering about 3,100 men from eight countries, it has worked constantly to prevent minor incidents from developing into renewed fighting by conducting negotiations between the opposing forces at all levels. After August 1964, no major crises occurred until November 1967, when an attack by Greek Cypriots on two Turkish Cypriot villages led to a major confrontation between mainland Greece and Turkey. War was averted by the emergency mediation of U.S. Presidential emissary Cyrus Vance working in concert with representatives of the United Nations and NATO. Greece and Turkey agreed on the withdrawal of the Greek (military) treaty contingent and a stepdown of Turkish military preparations.

#### The Crisis of 1974

In July 1974, elements of the Cyprus National Guard, which was controlled by mainland Greek officers, launched a coup d'etat which had the support of the mainland Greek Government. President Makarios fled the island and heavy fighting broke out among the Greek Cypriot factions. Five days later, the Turkish Government, citing its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, launched military operations along the north coast of Cyprus. Shortly thereafter, the coup collapsed, and Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, was named Acting President of Cyprus in accordance with the Constitution.

A cease-fire was achieved, but in August, following the breakdown of talks in Geneva over Greek Cypriot unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish armed forces launched another offensive, which resulted in Turkey's occupation of almost 40 percent of the island.

One of the most tragic aspects of the events of 1974 was the displacement of almost 200,000 persons,

mostly Greek Cypriots, from territory occupied by the Turks.

#### Settlement Efforts

From 1964 through 1967, numerous efforts were made to find a settlement which Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriots could all accept. A number of formulas were considered and rejected. After the 1967 crisis, however, it was agreed that the Greek goal of *enosis* would be set aside and that discussions might be held on the understanding that Cyprus would remain independent. Accordingly, intercommunal negotiations between representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots began in June 1968.

Following the breakdown of the local talks in September 1971, U.N. Secretary General U Thant actively encouraged the representatives of Cyprus' communities to revive the talks. Upon assuming the duties of Secretary General in 1972, Kurt Waldheim continued his predecessor's efforts and was eventually successful. The reactivated local talks were inaugurated on June 8, 1972, but had failed to achieve any breakthrough when they were interrupted by the 1974 crisis.

In December of 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, during the NATO meeting in Brussels, in an effort to get the two Cyprus communities back to negotiations. In January 1975, Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Rauf Denktash, agreed to meet and discuss the substantive political issues underlying the Cyprus problem. In addition, a subcommittee was formed to discuss humanitarian issues on a weekly basis. Despite intensive meetings, little progress was made, and the talks were suspended in mid-February following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of a "Federated Turkish State of Cyprus," now called the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (TFSC).

In April 1975, following consideration of the Cyprus problem by the United Nations, the intercommunal talks were restarted with an expanded mandate under the personal auspices of Secretary General Waldheim. Three sessions were held in Vienna and a fourth in New York in September



1975. Despite some progress on humanitarian and practical issues, the negotiators were unable to agree on a basis for addressing the main substantive issues of the Cyprus problem. The New Year round of talks ended in an impasse when the Greek Cypriots refused to proceed in the absence of specific Turkish territorial proposals, which they said had been promised by the Turks at the third Vienna meeting. The talks remained suspended until the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed, at a December 1975 NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, that Greece and Turkey would call on Secretary General Waldheim to work with the parties to achieve resumption of the talks.

The intercommunal talks resumed in Vienna in February 1976. There the two parties agreed for the first time to exchange substantive proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus problem. Both sides did submit proposals in April. The Turkish Cypriots, however, rejected Greek Cypriot proposals on territory claiming that these contained suggestions made earlier by Mr. Waldheim and that it was impossible for them to accept "a paper linking the Secretary-General to the Greek Cypriot proposals." The subsequent Turkish Cypriot submission called for Greek Cypriot proposals on territorial adjustment and stated Turkish willingness to begin negotiations on this issue.

Although both sides expressed their readiness to resume talks, the exchange of views continued essentially unchanged in tone over the following months. In June the Greek Cypriot side stated that the Turkish Cypriot set of proposals provided "no basis for constructive negotiations and its whole content is completely unacceptable." In essence, each side continued to claim that the other had made no meaningful suggestions on the question of territorial adjustment.

In an effort to break this deadlock, Secretary General Waldheim invited the two chief negotiators to New York in September 1976. In a series of meetings ending September 21, the Secretary General sought agreement on a formula which might overcome the procedural obstacles then blocking progress. Both sides agreed to consider his suggestion that "mixed commit-

tees" meet to work on details, while at the same time the main talks could proceed under his chairmanship. They also agreed to continue discussion of these procedural issues in Nicosia. No further progress had been achieved, however, by late November 1976.

## GOVERNMENT

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provides for the executive branch of the government to be headed by a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, each elected by a majority vote of his respective community for a 5-year term. Although the President is officially Chief of State and Head of Government, the Vice President has parallel duties and authority and veto power over certain legislation.

To assist in the exercise of executive power, the Constitution provides for a Council of Ministers (Cabinet), three members of which are to come from the Turkish Cypriot community. Since 1963, however, there has been no Turkish Cypriot participation in the Council of Ministers. The Constitution also provides for Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers with responsibilities for such matters as education, personal status, and culture. The Greek Communal Chamber was abolished in 1965, and its functions were absorbed by the central government.

The legislative system consists of a House of Representatives with 50 members elected for 5-year terms; 35 are from the Greek Cypriot community and 15 are elected by the Turkish Cypriots. The House of Representatives has continued as a purely Greek Cypriot institution since the intercommunal disturbances of 1963 when Turkish Cypriot participation in the government ceased.

Although this government continues to claim legal authority over all of Cyprus, in fact the island has been divided since the military operations of 1974. With Turkish mainland forces occupying slightly less than 40 percent in the north, Cyprus is being transformed into two increasingly autonomous areas.

In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots formally constituted a new government and a "Turkish Federated

## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country; the Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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State of Cyprus," an entity not recognized by the U.S. Government or the international community. Turkish Cypriots contend that establishment of the "TFSC" in no way prejudices the eventual form of government which will result after a negotiated solution to the Cyprus dispute. Rauf Denktash, who was elected Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriots in 1973, proclaimed himself head of the "Federated State." A Turkish "Constituent Assembly" in the north is the legislative counterpart to the House of Representatives in the south.

## Principal Government Officials

President—Archbishop Makarios III

Vice President—Rauf R. Denktash



### Council of Ministers

Agriculture and Natural Resources—  
Frixos Kolotas  
Commerce and Industry—Antonios I.  
Pierides  
Communications and Works—Georgios  
Tombazos  
Defense and Interior—Khristodoulos  
Veniamin  
Finance—Andreas Patsalides  
Foreign Affairs—John Christophides  
Health—Andreas Mikelides  
Justice—George Ioannides  
Labor and Social Insurance—Marcos P.  
Spanos  
Education—Christosomos Sofianos  
Ambassador to the U.S.—Nicos  
Dimitriou  
Ambassador to the U.N.—Zenon  
Rossides

Cyprus maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2211 R Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-462-5772). There is also a Consulate General at New York and Honorary Consuls in Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, and St. Louis.

### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The island's present division dominates all other issues in politics today. The events of 1974 radically altered not only the political and economic situation but also the population. Following the third Vienna session of the intercommunal talks in August of 1975, almost all the Turks still living in the Greek Cypriot south were allowed to move to the Turkish-controlled north, thus creating two relatively homogeneous areas. Although approximately 4,000 Greek Cypriots remain in the north, the island is now essentially divided into two ethnic areas which have almost no contact with each other.

The House of Representatives continues to function as a solely Greek Cypriot institution. Of the 35 seats which were originally allotted to Greek Cypriots, 21 belong to the pro-Makarios right-centrist, "Democratic Front," led by Spiros Kiprianou, as a result of elections held in September 1976. The Communist Party (AKEL), which joined with Kiprianou and others in a "Popular Front," won nine seats, as they did in the 1970 elections. Four seats went to the quasi-socialist EDEK party, which also joined the coalition, and the

remaining seat was won by Greek Cypriot Chief Negotiator Tassos Papadopoulos, running as an independent. Former President and Chief Negotiator Glafcos Clerides' "Democratic Rally," which opposed Makarios, won 27 percent of the popular vote but no seats in the House because of the "winner-take-all" election system.

The last presidential balloting took place February 18, 1973. The Turkish Cypriots held parallel elections for Vice President the same day. When nominations closed February 8, no candidate had been nominated to oppose Makarios, and the Archbishop was declared reelected for a third 5-year term. With Turkish Cypriot Vice President Kuchuk's decision not to stand again for reelection, Rauf Denktash, then Chief Negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot side and an acknowledged leader in the Turkish Cypriot community, was also unopposed and declared Vice President of the Republic.

A "Constituent Assembly" now functions in the Turkish-controlled north. Denktash's National Unity Party (NUP) which won 54 percent of the vote in elections in June 1976, dominates the Assembly with 30 of the 40 seats. Denktash himself won over 75 percent of the votes in his bid for reconfirmation as President of the "TFSC." Other political groups in the Turkish north are the center opposition Communal Liberation Party (5 seats, 20 percent of the votes in June 1976); the moderate Popular Party (2 seats, 11.7 percent); and the far left Republic Turkish Party (2 seats, 12.7 percent).

The creation of a large refugee population has resulted in added political pressure on the Cyprus Government. The fate of over 180,000 refugees in the south will be an essential ingredient of any Cyprus settlement. In the short term, the government has instituted a number of measures to improve their situation until a permanent solution can be found. Because they number almost a third of the original population, they are a potent political force and are becoming increasingly restive as negotiations drag on.

With Turkish troops in the north and a growing separation between the Greek and Turkish areas, the political

situation on the island will remain tense until a negotiated settlement is reached. In addition to the refugee problem, the most important issues which must be solved are the return of some of the territory the Turks now hold (which will assist in settling refugees), the nature and functions of the future central government, and the question of participation by the Turkish community in that government.

### ECONOMY

Cyprus is predominantly an agricultural country. Prior to the summer of 1974 about 40 percent of the economically active population of 270,000 was engaged directly in farming. Fragmentation of land holdings and a chronic water shortage constituted the most important limiting factors on agricultural production. Agricultural exports include citrus fruits, potatoes, vine products, and carobs.

By late 1976 unemployment in the south had dropped to about 15 percent. Light manufacturing and construction were the primary industrial activities prior to the events of 1974 and contributed 25 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP). Mineral products were a significant export, but the island's economically retrievable deposits are rapidly being depleted, and production of metals and minerals has declined greatly. Until the outbreak of trouble in 1974, the tourist industry in Cyprus had experienced rapid growth, primarily because of government support for an expansion program which took full advantage of Cyprus' favorable climate and geography and its rich cultural heritage.

The economy of Cyprus suffered a devastating blow as a result of the hostilities which occurred in July and August of 1974. That portion of the island occupied by Turkish forces includes a large part of the rich central plain ("Mesaoria") and contained economic activities which had provided the bulk of the island's foreign exchange earnings and the employment of the equivalent of 35 percent of the labor force. Virtually all the major tourist facilities came under Turkish control, as well as over 55 percent of the mining output and about 45 percent of the agricultural output. Nearly 40 percent of the pop-



ulation became refugees, and the unemployment rate initially rose above 25 percent of the economically active population in the area under Greek Cypriot control.

Since that time, however, the Greek Cypriot economy has recovered strongly. The 1975 GNP totaled \$715 million, as compared with 1973 (preconflict) GNP of \$963 million, despite the loss of almost 40 percent of the country's natural resources and close to 70 percent of its productive capacity. Foreign exchange reserves in July 1976 amounted to \$250 million, about 8 months' import cover.

The creation of a large refugee problem coupled with a sizable reduction in economic activity and the sharp rise in unemployment has constituted a formidable economic challenge for the government. Provision of relief assistance to displaced persons became the immediate concern. Even prior to the initiation of an ambitious Emergency Economic Action Plan, promulgated by the government in September 1974, the authorities had instituted a comprehensive program aimed at providing employment by reviving industrial activity. The development budget of 1975 placed particular emphasis on the development of the agricultural and animal husbandry sectors, and specifically on the production of basic food staples and raw materials. This emphasis continues in 1976.

Most of the Turkish Cypriots who previously lived in the south have moved into the Turkish-controlled northern area. Thus, there are essentially two separate, almost totally independent, economic units in Cyprus at present. The economy of the north is unlikely soon to return to the production levels of the prewar period, because managerial and capital resources necessary to reactivate the economy are lacking.

The few economic indicators which are available from the north are often unreliable. It is estimated that the northern area has a population of somewhat over 100,000. Prior to the events of 1974, the area had a population in excess of 200,000 including at least 150,000 Greek Cypriots. The terms of a political settlement will determine in large measure the extent to which the Turkish Cypriot

economy will be reintegrated with the Greek Cypriot economy.

#### Basic Economic Data

	1973	1974	1975
	(\$US million)		
GNP			
at current prices	936	867	798
at constant prices	963	777	715
Per capita GNP at constant prices	1,245	1,459	1,165
Total imports	451	407	308
Total exports	173	152	152
Imports from U.S.	30	26	8
Exports to U.S.	2	1	1.3
Gold, foreign exchange reserves	307	268	215
Balance of trade surplus	-93	-135	-126
Consumer Price Index (1970 = 100)	118	137	143

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Cyprus is a member of the United Nations and most of its specialized agencies and the Council of Europe. An association agreement with the European Community (EC) is in effect. The presence of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force and of a Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General reflects Cyprus' active and close relationship with the United Nations.

The Government of Cyprus follows a nonaligned foreign policy, although it inclines toward the West because of cultural affinities, trade patterns, and its close relations with Greece, to whom it looks for political support in the intercommunal problem. Relations with the Government of Turkey, always difficult since independence, have essentially been nonexistent since the hostilities of 1974. The presence of Turkish troops in the north is a source of constant irritation, and restoration of normal relations with Turkey must await a permanent settlement.

Since 1974, Cyprus has been especially active in international fora in pressing its case and pushing for condemnation of Turkey's actions in Cyprus. Rauf Denktaş has also made extensive travels abroad to rally support for the cause of the Turkish Cypriots.

#### U.S.-CYPRUS RELATIONS

The United States has been active in assisting the Cyprus communities to negotiate a settlement of the Cyprus

problem. Following the hostilities of 1974, the United States was instrumental in restarting the intercommunal negotiations in January 1975. In April 1975 the talks were once again resumed, this time under an expanded mandate and under the personal auspices of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. The United States supports this forum and has worked with the parties to assist them in establishing a negotiating framework which would allow the full discussion of the key substantive issues.

The United States is also the major financial supporter of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP), whose presence is an essential element of stability in the present situation. Since the establishment of UNFICYP in 1964, the United States has paid more than \$40 million to support it—about 40 percent of the total cost incurred by the United Nations to maintain the force.

The United States has also provided almost half of all relief assistance since the hostilities of 1974. That amount totaled \$25 million in FY 1975 and \$30 million in FY 76. For FY 77, \$17.5 million has been approved by the Congress. This assistance has been channeled exclusively through agencies of the United Nations and the International Red Cross to displaced persons and other needy individuals in both the Greek and Turkish areas of the island. As the immediate humanitarian needs were met, the emphasis of assistance has shifted to employment-creating activities and other social assistance programs, especially housing.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William R. Crawford, Jr.  
Deputy Chief of Mission—C. Edward Dillery  
Supervisory Political Officer—Ernest H. Latham, Jr.  
Economic-Commercial Officer—Bruno A. Kosheleff  
Defense Attache—Col. John Lund  
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Robert A. Jellison  
Consular Officer—Alice K. Straub

The U.S. Embassy on Cyprus is located at Therissos Street and Dositheon Street, Nicosia (tel. 65151 through 65155).

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**APPENDIX I.C**

**EGYPT  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, September 1975. (Public 8152).]



# background NOTES

## Egypt

department of state \* september 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Arab Republic of Egypt

### GEOGRAPHY

Egypt is located in the northeastern corner of the African Continent and is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea; on the west by Libya; on the south by the Sudan; and on the east by the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, and the State of Israel. Only about 10,000 square miles of the area—consisting of the ribbon-like Nile Valley, the Nile delta north of Cairo, and a few oases—are cultivated. Water from the Aswan High Dam is expected to

increase the cultivable area eventually to about 12,500 square miles.

Egypt is an almost rainless block of desert consisting mainly of high plains and some rugged hills and mountains in the east along the Red Sea coast and along the valley of the Nile River. The country's existence depends almost exclusively on the Nile River, which rises in Ethiopia and Uganda and flows northward through Sudan into Egypt, where it stretches almost 550 miles from Aswan to Cairo.

Extending south from the 32d

parallel to below the Tropic of Cancer, Egypt has a warm, arid climate. Winter temperatures at Cairo normally range between 40° and 65°F; summer temperatures between 70° and 100°F. Rainfall is almost entirely limited to the northern coastal area, where it averages 8 inches a year. South of Cairo (where annual rainfall averages 1 inch), precipitation drops to nearly negligible amounts. The highest point is Mt. Catherine in the southern Sinai—8,600 feet above sea level. The lowest is the Qattara Depression, a basin in the western desert of about 10,000 square miles, the floor of which is some 400 feet below sea level.

### PROFILE

#### Geography

AREA: 386,000 sq. mi. (slightly larger than Calif., Nev., and Ariz. combined). Includes the approx. 22,500-sq. mi. Israeli-occupied area of the Sinai peninsula. CAPITAL: Cairo (pop. 8.4 million). OTHER CITIES: Alexandria (pop. 2.5 million), Port Said, Suez, Ismailia.

#### People

POPULATION: 38 million (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1%. DENSITY: 95 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Egyptians, Copts, Bedouins, Nubians. RELIGIONS: Sunni Muslim (90%), Christian. LANGUAGES: Arabic, English, French. LITERACY: 38%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 54 years.

#### Government

TYPE: Republic. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1971. INDEPENDENCE: 1922.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State); Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—unicameral People's Assembly (350 elected members and 10 appointed by the President). *Judicial*—

Court of Cassation, State Council.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes—red, white, and black from top to bottom—with a golden hawk in the center stripe.

#### Economy

GDP: \$9.2 billion (FY 1973). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: NA. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$240.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 3%. *Labor* 50%. *Acres per capita* 0.2%. *Products*—cotton, wheat, rice, corn.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 11%. *Products*—textiles, processed foods, tobacco manufactures, chemicals, fertilizer, and petroleum and petroleum products.

TRADE (1973): *Exports*—\$1.3 billion: cotton, rice, petroleum, manufactured goods. *Partners*—U.S.S.R., East European countries, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, India. *Imports*—\$1.8 billion: foodstuffs, capital goods. *Partners*—U.S.S.R., Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, U.S.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Egyptian pound=US\$2.56.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N., Arab League, Organization of African Unity (OAU), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

### PEOPLE

Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second most populous on the African Continent (after Nigeria). Ninety-nine percent of the people are compressed into 3.5 percent of the country's area of the Nile Valley and its delta, making a population density there of more than 2,700 persons per square mile—one of the highest in the world. The proportion of people living in rural areas is decreasing as job opportunities in the urban centers are drawing more to the cities. The cities of Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia, which lie along the Suez Canal and had a combined population of 700,000 before the 1967 war with Israel, were largely evacuated as a result of the war. Many have now returned.

Lying at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean basin,





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Egypt has developed a fairly homogeneous population. Basically, Egyptians are of Hamitic origin, with some admixture in the north with people from the Mediterranean and Arab areas and in the south with the Nubian

groups from black Africa. However, the vast majority of Egyptians remain as they were when the pyramids were built—essentially a single people sharing a common ancestry and culture. Indigenous minorities include more

than 3 million Copts, who have retained their historic Christian affiliation; 50,000 Bedouins, who are basically nomadic; and Nubians, in the south, who originally came to the Nile Valley from Sudan.



## HISTORY

Egypt has a continuous recorded history of 5,000 years, the longest in the world. The country has had periods of strength, when neighboring territories fell under its domination, and periods of weakness, when it came under foreign rule. Egypt was a united kingdom from about 3200 B.C. until Alexander the Great conquered it in 333 B.C. From then until the 20th century it was under continuous foreign domination—by the Romans, the Persians, the Arabs (who introduced Islam to Egypt, which had been one of the first countries to adopt Christianity), and the Turks. The last period of foreign rule began in 1882, when the British occupied that area; in 1914 it became a British protectorate.

### Suez Canal

In the mid-1800's, while Egypt was under nominal Turkish sovereignty and Europe was experiencing industrial and commercial growth, the French took the initiative in providing a link for a shorter trade route between Europe and Asia. They obtained a 99-year concession from the Egyptian ruler to build and maintain a canal between Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, thus providing a waterway between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. With European capital the French organized the Suez Canal Co., and construction on the canal began in April 1859. The Suez Canal was opened for navigation on November 17, 1869.

The British Government obtained effective control of the canal in November 1875 by purchasing more than 150,000 shares of stock from the Suez Canal Co. for about \$20 million. This purchase left France and the United Kingdom as the majority stockholders. The Convention of Constantinople of October 29, 1888, provided that the canal was to be open to vessels of all nations, although the Egyptians closed the canal to Israeli shipping after 1948 by invoking article X (which authorized closure if necessary for the maintenance of public order).

In 1956 the new Egyptian regime, headed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the canal in reaction to withdrawal of Western prom-

ises of aid in building the Aswan High Dam. The Suez crisis eventually led to war in October and November of that year, at which time Israel invaded the Sinai and was joined subsequently by the United Kingdom and France who attacked the Suez Canal area. During this war the canal was blocked by sunken ships. It was reopened to international traffic 5 months later, and in July 1958 the Egyptian Government and the new company, called the Suez Canal Authority, agreed to reimburse \$64 million to the former stockholders. The final payments were made in July 1963.

In June 1967 the canal was again closed as a result of war between Egypt and Israel. Egypt, however, received a subsidy from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to compensate for the loss in revenue.

The canal remained closed during the years when Israeli forces occupied the eastern shores of the canal in Sinai. Following the October 1973 war and the military disengagement agreement concluded between Israel and Egypt under U.S. auspices, the whole of the canal, including the eastern shore in Sinai, came under Egyptian control. Egypt declared its intention to reopen the canal as soon as possible. The United States responded to an Egyptian request for assistance in this endeavor by initiating mine clearance and salvage operations, which began in the late spring of 1974. The U.K. and France also provided assistance. U.S. naval vessels and aircraft, along with U.S. Army ordnance experts, assisted and advised their Egyptian counterparts during these operations. On June 5, 1975, the strategic waterway was reopened to international traffic.

### Independence and Revolution

Although an Egyptian nationalist movement developed in the 1870's against British and French domination of the government, the country did not gain its independence until post-World War I. In 1922, Egypt became a monarchy under King Fuad I. The British, however, retained extensive powers as well as a major military presence in the Suez Canal Zone, which was used as a major Allied base of operation during World War II.

Under the leadership of Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a group of military officers (the "Free Officers") staged a coup d'etat on July 23, 1952, and exiled King Faruk, who had ascended the throne on the death of King Fuad in 1936. The Free Officers declared Egypt a republic on June 18, 1953. They were motivated by a desire to remove elements that traditionally had exploited the country. The regime they founded sought to raise the standard of living, develop the country's military and economic strength, and unify the Arab world under Egyptian leadership.

Pursuit of these objectives at times has led Egypt into collision with the West. Under Egyptian pressure, the British in 1954 agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The year 1955 found Egypt opposing the Baghdad Pact. Four years later this was recreated as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a Western-supported defense arrangement which included Iraq, Egypt's rival for leadership in the Arab world. Later in 1955 Egypt accepted military assistance from the U.S.S.R., and in 1956 it accepted the Soviet offer of aid to construct the Aswan High Dam after the United States withdrew its offer to help finance the first stage. Egyptian-Soviet military and economic relations have continued to grow over the years.

President Nasser's leadership and identification with Arab nationalism and social aspirations acted as a powerful magnet during the early years of the regime. The union of Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic was proclaimed on February 1, 1958, and was subsequently ratified by plebiscite. The union was troubled by economic and political incompatibilities, however, and Syria seceded in September 1961. Egypt nevertheless continued to call itself the United Arab Republic.

In April 1971 Egypt agreed to join Libya and Syria in a supranational federation to be called the Confederation of Arab Republics. Arrangements were made to draft a constitution and submit the federation plan to plebiscite in the three countries on September 1, 1971. On September 2, 1971, announced results showed that the formation of the Federation of Arab



## TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Clothing should be suitable for hot summers or cool winters.

*Customs*—Visas are required and should be obtained before arrival. International health cards bearing valid smallpox certificates are required. Immunizations for typhoid, poliomyelitis, cholera, paratyphoid, and gamma globulin should be kept current.

Egypt, along with most Arab countries, forbids entry to anyone whose passport bears any indications of travel to or from Israel.

*Health*—Cairo has several well-equipped hospitals, and the practice of medicine and surgery is excellent.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone service on the whole is good, although delays may be encountered even on calls to towns near Cairo; service and reception vary with demand and atmospheric conditions. Telegrams can be sent from the main post office or from hotels (for an additional charge).

*Transportation*—Both regional and worldwide airlines serve Cairo's International Airport. Internal air service is available from Cairo to Luxor and Aswan. Rail service is available south to Aswan and north to Alexandria from Cairo. The capital has an abundance of taxis.

Republics was approved in Egypt, Libya, and Syria by some 10 million voters—98.1 percent of those eligible for the ballot. On the same day the United Arab Republic became the Arab Republic of Egypt.

### Wars With Israel

In 1948-49 Egypt played a major role in a war between the Arab states and the newly established State of Israel. A truce was brought about under U.N. auspices, and in 1949 four armistice agreements were negotiated and signed at Rhodes, Greece, between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Egypt assumed the administration of the Gaza Strip, a small area of the original Palestine mandate bordering on the Sinai to which many of the Arab refugees had fled.

By 1955, however, the armistice had deteriorated seriously, and the

Egyptian-Israel armistice line became the scene of armed hostilities launched from both sides. In July 1956 the withdrawal of U.S. aid for the Aswan High Dam project, followed by President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal for the stated purpose of using its revenues to finance the dam, climaxed in the 1956 Suez war. Israel's invasion of the Sinai Peninsula at the end of October was followed by British and French landings at Suez in November, which were made with the stated purpose of separating the combatants and preserving the international character of the Suez Canal. The canal was closed to all shipping as a result of the hostilities.

A cease-fire was quickly arranged, and British and French forces were replaced by the end of December with forces of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). The Suez Canal was cleared and reopened in March 1957, following withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Although the Egypt-Israel line remained relatively quiet following the 1957 settlement, in 1966 and 1967 incidents of terrorism and retaliation across the other armistice lines with Israel became progressively more serious. With the rise of tension in the area, the arrangements with regard to navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and for the stationing of U.N. troops between Israel and Egypt came apart in May 1967. Egypt moved armaments and about 80,000 troops into the Sinai Peninsula and asked the U.N. Secretary General to withdraw the U.N. forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. On May 22 President Nasser declared the Straits of Tiran closed, thereby blockading the Israeli port of Eilat.

Hostilities broke out on June 5 between Israel and Egypt. Jordan and Syria soon joined Egypt. After 6 days of fighting, all parties had accepted the cease-fire called for by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Israel was left in control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. The Suez Canal was once again closed to shipping.

Efforts to arrange a negotiated settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967) were unsuccessful and led to growing frustration and bitterness on the part

of Egypt and other Arab countries. After more than 6 years of what was called a "no peace, no war situation," Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. Israeli forces eventually were able to throw back the Syrian advance and to establish a foothold on the western shore of the Suez Canal. But Egyptian military forces were able to hold on to a thin perimeter along the eastern shore of the canal gained when Egyptian forces successfully crossed the canal and overran the Israeli-held Bar Lev Line.

U.S. diplomatic efforts during October and November in the capitals of the belligerents and at the United Nations brought an end to hostilities on all fronts. An intense diplomatic initiative led by the United States resulted in the introduction of U.N. forces and observers to the cease-fire zones. The parties directly concerned agreed to meet in Geneva in December 1973 for a peace conference under the cosponsorship of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to seek a negotiated settlement of the longstanding dispute. But it was U.S. diplomacy during this critical period that led to a military disengagement agreement, signed in January 1974 by Israel and Egypt. Israeli forces withdrew from the enclave gained on the western shore of the canal, and both sides agreed to the establishment of a U.N. buffer zone separating the Egyptian forces along the eastern shore of the Suez Canal from the Israeli forces concentrated further east. A similar military disengagement agreement was later reached between Israel and Syria. The way was thereby opened for further intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts toward progress on a negotiated settlement using the step-by-step approach.

In August 1975 U.S. diplomacy stimulated another attempt to achieve a second interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. This effort was successful, and on September 1 an agreement was initialed; on September 4 it was signed. The agreement notes that Egypt and Israel agree to resolve the conflict between them by peaceful means, to observe the cease-fire, and to abjure the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other. Egypt agreed to permit nonmilitary



cargoes destined for, or coming from, Israel to transit the Suez Canal. Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from the Giddi and Mitla Passes in the Sinai, to enlarge the buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces and to return to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oil fields. The U.S. offered to man an early warning system in the Sinai. This proposal, which will result in the posting of up to 200 American civilian technicians in the Sinai, requires congressional approval. Implementation of the agreement is currently underway. The agreement specifically calls for continued efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

## GOVERNMENT

Egypt has a strong, presidential-type government. Under the Permanent Constitution proclaimed on September 11, 1971, executive authority is vested in the President. He is popularly elected to a 6-year term and must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast. The President appoints the Vice President, the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet). When the People's Assembly is not in session he rules by decree, but any legislation so promulgated must be submitted to the Assembly for approval when it reconvenes. Nonsubmission of decrees to, or their rejection by, the Assembly deprives them of force of law. In normal circumstances the President may veto a bill or draft law and return it to the Assembly within 30 days of its enactment. If the specified time limitation is exceeded or the Assembly again passes it by a two-thirds majority, it becomes law. Should a temporary event prevent the President from exercising his functions, the Vice President may act for him. If the President resigns, he addresses his resignation to the People's Assembly. In case of a mid-term permanent vacancy in the position of the President by death or disability, the Presidency is assumed by the Speaker of the People's Assembly. If the Assembly is dissolved at that time, power is then assumed by the Presi-

dent of the Higher Constitutional Court, provided that neither he nor the Speaker are running for President at the same time.

The unicameral People's Assembly has 360 members—350 elected from the 175 parliamentary constituencies and 10 appointed by the President. An Assembly term is 5 years. At least half of the members must be workers or peasants (*fellahin*). Under the Constitution the People's Assembly has the sole authority to enact legislation while it is in session.

Egypt's judicial system is based on European (principally French) legal concepts and methods. The highest court is the Court of Cassation, whose judges are appointed by the President.

### Principal Government Officials

President—Anwar Al Sadat  
Vice President—Muhammad Husni Mubarak  
Prime Minister—Mamduh Salim  
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Ismail Fahmy  
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of War—Gen. Muhammad 'Abd al-Ghani al-Gamasy  
Ambassador to the U.S.—Ashraf Ghorbal  
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ahmad Esmat Abdel Meguid

Egypt maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2310 Decatur Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008. There are also Consulates General in New York and San Francisco.

## POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Political parties in Egypt were outlawed in 1953. The regime has sought to replace them with a single mass organization which would support the regime and its policies. The first two efforts, the National Liberation Rally and the National Union, were not successful. The present organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was established in 1962 and was subsequently reorganized in 1966 and in 1971.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser dominated virtually every aspect of life in Egypt from 1952 until his death in September 1970. He was looked

## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

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upon as a leader among the Arab states as well. Following Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat, one of the 1952 revolutionary group, was nominated President by the governmental and ASU organs and elected by national plebiscite. His term began in October 1970 for a full 6 years. The last People's Assembly elections were held in October 1971.

On September 11, 1971, Egypt's Permanent Constitution, based on studies by the ASU and the People's Assembly, was passed by general referendum. It embodies the goals and principles of the revolution and henceforth serves as the basis of government.

The declared long-range objectives of the Egyptian Government are to bring the benefits of education, representative government, and modernism to all the people of Egypt. One of its major actions has been a restructuring of the socioeconomic system. Through a program of nationalization of major industrial and commercial companies, sequestration of foreign-owned proper-



ties, breaking up of large estates, and exclusion of traditional leaders from influential positions, the government has largely displaced the old landowning aristocracy. In its place there has emerged a new elite of technicians and army officers.

## ECONOMY

Egypt's economic growth in recent years has been slow due in large part to the 1967 war. As a consequence of that war, canal earnings stopped, tourist receipts declined, and the Sinai oil fields were lost, seriously limiting imports of needed commodities and impairing repayment of foreign indebtedness. With the reopening of the canal, the return of the oil fields, and increased foreign contributions to promote economic development, it is expected Egypt's economic growth will now accelerate.

Egypt's economic problems cover a broad front. Severe import restrictions and deflationary policies have had to be imposed, creating a serious constraint on economic production and growth. Due to shortages of raw materials and spare parts, Egypt's industries have been operating at considerably less than full capacity. The lack of fertilizer imports has limited agricultural productivity (about 80 percent of Egypt's exports, mainly cotton, are processed agricultural products).

Investment expenditures have been low, and job opportunities have grown more slowly than the labor force, increasing underemployment. This has been intensified by the rapid population growth and a need to expand social services at the expense of investment in productive enterprises. Migration to the cities has increased the urgent need for social and welfare services.

The Egyptian economy is dominated by the public sector. However, Egypt has recently taken a number of significant steps to implement a new development strategy that envisages expansion of the private sector and the encouragement of foreign private investment.

### Agriculture and Industry

The Egyptian economy is basically agricultural, as it has been for centuries. Half of the total labor force of 10 million is engaged directly in this sector, and many others are engaged in processing or trading agricultural prod-

ucts. Thus, the majority of the population depends on some 6 million acres of high fertility soil in the Nile Valley and delta areas for their means of support.

The climate and availability of water permit multiple cropping (several crops a year on the same piece of land) and almost doubles the actual crop area in any one year, but farming is generally inefficient by modern standards. Production is for the market with very little subsistence agriculture. Cotton, wheat, rice, and corn are the principal commodities; cotton provides almost one-half of all export earnings.

To limit development of a one-crop economy, the government restricts the planting of cotton to one-third of each owner's land. Although wheat is less profitable than several other crops, the law requires most landowners to plant at least one-third of their land in wheat. Nevertheless, the annual shortfall between cereal production and consumption averages 2.5 million tons.

In 1947 half of the cultivable land was held by less than 2 percent of the landowning population. Maximum holdings have now been reduced to 100 acres per family, and some 300,000 families (8 percent of the rural population) have received land under agrarian reform distribution.

Since the per capita resources of water and cultivable land are limited, Egypt has concentrated on industrialization as a means of raising productivity. As the government has assumed larger and larger managerial responsibilities, the role of the small entrepreneur class has dwindled. Since the nationalization of the early 1960's, all major industries and public utilities have been run by organs of the central government. Nevertheless, the principle of private enterprise continues to be recognized, and most agricultural land, as well as a large proportion of trade, remains privately owned.

The industrial sector currently accounts for slightly over 20 percent of GNP, 35 percent of total exports, and about 13 percent of total employment. As a result of the Egyptian Government's recent steps to encourage participation by foreign capital in the development effort, a number of projects—involving at least partial

foreign equity totaling more than \$3 billion—are being discussed. These projects range in size from immense petrochemical complexes, refineries, and sponge iron plants to a variety of small manufacturing ventures in the \$2-\$10 million range.

### Natural Resources

Egypt has few natural resources other than the agricultural capacity of the Nile Valley. The major minerals found are phosphates, petroleum, and iron ore. Petroleum production is moderate from offshore fields in the Gulf of Suez and some recent strikes in the Western Desert. Egypt has become an exporter of small quantities of petroleum despite the loss, at least for the present, of its Sinai oil fields and has hopes that further petroleum discoveries will be made in the future.

In the past year, 22 petroleum companies, including about 15 American firms, have signed petroleum exploration and development agreements with the Egyptian General Petroleum Co. Obligations have been made to spend several hundred million dollars on exploration in the next 2 years.

### Trade and Balance of Payments

In recent years Egypt has had regular and substantial deficits in its foreign trade—imports have exceeded exports. With growing domestic demand for its export crops and the forced shift of its earnings away from convertible foreign exchange, Egypt has been required to set import limits that severely hamper not only economic development but the efficient use of existing agricultural and industrial capacity. Lack of import capacity for pesticides and fertilizer has delayed the spread of the "Green Revolution" to Egypt, and much industrial plant lies idle or underutilized through lack of replacement machinery, spare parts, and raw materials. In short, Egypt's ability to earn foreign exchange for needed imports is circumscribed by its financial inability to import the necessary inputs for export production. In 1973 exports totaled about \$1.015 billion, while imports were about \$1.600 billion. Cotton is the most important export from Egypt, accounting for more than 50 percent of



total earnings. Rice, petroleum, and manufactured goods, however, are assuming increasing importance. Foodstuffs (especially wheat—almost 3 million tons a year) and capital goods have accounted for a substantial share of Egypt's imports. In recent years Communist countries have taken about 50 percent of Egypt's exports and supplied about 35 percent of its imports.

The recent balance-of-payments difficulties have forced Egypt to maintain a substantial level of short-term borrowing. Added to its long- and medium-term debts, this burdens the economy with a very substantial debt service ratio.

Until the June 1967 war, earnings received from Suez Canal revenues and tourism covered a substantial proportion of Egypt's trade deficit. In 1966 Suez Canal earnings amounted to about \$220 million. Despite the special subsidy payments from some other Arab states, Egypt is still dependent on substantial additional inflows of foreign capital to finance its economic growth.

#### Transportation and Communication

Transportation facilities in Egypt follow the pattern of settlement along the Nile. The major line of the nation's 4,000-mile railway network runs from Alexandria to Aswan. Other important lines run along the north coast to the Libyan border and eastward to the Suez Canal. More than 14,000 miles of motor roads (5,000 miles of which are hard surfaced) cover the Nile Valley delta and Red Sea coast. The Nile River system of approximately 1,000 miles, plus another 1,000 miles of navigable canals, are also extremely important for inland transport. The major ports are Alexandria and Port Said. All major cities, except Alexandria, have airports, of which Cairo International is the most important.

Radio Cairo, a government monopoly, is the most important communications facility in the Arab world and beams its broadcasts to all Middle East countries. Television was introduced in 1960 and can be viewed in 95 percent of the Republic. The Cairo and Alexandria press are very active, and Cairo newspapers and books are read throughout the Arab world. The Egyptian

film industry, once the Arab world's leading one, has become less active but is still important.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Egypt is acknowledged as the leading state in the Arab world. Its population, industry, and armed forces are the largest of the Arab countries. The Egyptians are also Arab leaders in, among other spheres, the arts, literature, publishing, and movie production.

Egypt is influential in various other international contexts. From the 19th and early 20th centuries, when France and the United Kingdom competed for predominance and guided the building of and managed the Suez Canal, Egypt has retained a special importance for those two nations. Following the 1967 war, Egypt's relations with the U.S.S.R. grew increasingly close. Egypt also plays an important role as a Mediterranean state. It has been very active as a third world nation and, through a special relationship which evolved in the 1950's and 1960's with Yugoslavia and India, is looked upon by many in Africa and Asia as a leader of the nonaligned group of states. It has developed its cultural ties as well with the substantial Muslim population of sub-Sahara Africa and has extensive influence in that area.

The main themes of Egypt's foreign policy are Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and the championship of the Arab cause vis-a-vis Israel. President Nasser caught the imagination of many Arabs as the first important Arab leader in the post-World War II era to espouse anticolonialism, sharply reduce foreign influences in Egypt, and vitalize dreams of unification of the Arab world as a single nation. Through dynamic leadership, the new Egyptian regime in the 1950's and early 1960's became the personification for many Arabs of a movement for (a) Arab unity, (b) reduction of foreign influence, and (c) modernization. For the Egyptians, however, insistence on pan-Arab nationalism has gone hand-in-hand with a strong sense of pride in their own Egyptian nationality, a stronger feeling of identity than is found in the other Arab countries.

Arab socialism, as espoused by President Nasser and adhered to by his

successor, was developed gradually by the Nasser regime in response to the economic and social needs of the population. The Arab socialism of Egypt is not rigidly Marxist, rejects the doctrine of class struggle, and does not oppose private ownership of property. It is centered on state capitalism, raising living standards through industrialization, and bringing about a broader distribution of wealth. Nasser's propagation of Arab socialism brought him into sharp ideological conflict with the governments of more conservative Arab countries in the period before the 1967 war.

The importance of the Arab-Israel dispute in Egyptian foreign policy has varied over the years, depending on the extent of tensions with Israel and the vicissitudes of Egypt's disagreements with other Arab countries. Since the 1967 war it has been Egypt's all-encompassing external concern. Egypt accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, but it never abandoned the option of attempting to regain its territories occupied by Israel in 1967 through recourse to war.

Relations with the U.S.S.R. deteriorated following the expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972. Relations between Moscow and Cairo are troubled, however, by Egyptian complaints that the U.S.S.R., following a massive Soviet military supply effort during the October 1973 war, has dragged its feet on military supplies since the war and has turned a deaf ear to Cairo's requests for a rescheduling of Egypt's heavy debt burden.

#### U.S.-EGYPT RELATIONS

Before 1967, U.S. relations with Egypt went through several cycles. The United States attempted to cooperate with the new Egyptian regime when it came to power in 1952. Relations were soon soured, however, by differences over such matters as U.S. friendship with Israel, U.S. refusal to finance the Aswan High Dam, the Baghdad Pact, and U.S. arms supplies to other Middle East countries. Relations between the two countries began to improve late in 1958, and the



United States provided technical assistance, development loans, and large quantities of agricultural commodities to Egypt. In 1964 relations began to deteriorate again, primarily over questions relating to third countries rather than to strictly bilateral problems. When the "6-day war" broke out in 1967, Egypt accused the United States of being actively involved in the hostilities on the side of Israel and broke relations on June 6, 1967. (President Nasser subsequently admitted that this charge was based on misinformation.)

Formal diplomatic relations were

reestablished on February 18, 1974. A close cooperative effort aimed at working out a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute has been bolstered by efforts in the economic field. The United States launched a \$250 million AID program during FY 1975. An intense effort is underway to further deepen and broaden U.S.-Egyptian relations in the economic, cultural, and scientific fields under the auspices of the Joint U.S.-Egyptian Commission, established in June 1974 during former President Nixon's visit to Egypt.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Hermann F. Eilts  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Frank E. Mastrone

Counselor for Political Affairs—Arthur Lowrie

Counselor for Economic/Commercial Affairs—Edward L. Peck

Counselor for Public Affairs—Howard H. Russell, Jr.

Counselor for Economic Development—Wilbert R. Templeton

The U.S. Embassy in Egypt is located at 5 Sharia America Al Latiniyah, Garden City, Cairo.

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**APPENDIX I.D**

**IRAN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1976. (Publication 7760).]



background  
NOTES

## Iran

department of state \* december 1976

## OFFICIAL NAME: Empire of Iran

## GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Iran, located in southwestern Asia between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, shares borders with the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey.

The topography consists mainly of interior desert plains and highlands. These are surrounded by a rugged mountain rimland, 6,000-18,000 feet (1,824-5,472 m.) above sea level (almost one-half the land area of Iran), which is dissected by deep valleys and gorges and a few plains areas.

Iran's climate is diversified, primarily because of its topography. Annual precipitation ranges from 40 inches (86 cm.) along the Caspian Sea

coast to less than 8 inches (17 cm.) in the interior and the south. Winter temperatures are very low in the north but are warmer in the south. Summers are hot in all parts of Iran except at the highest elevations.

The distribution of Iran's population is strongly influenced by climate and geography. Most Iranians live in the north and northwest, with the heaviest concentrations along the Caspian coast, in and around Tehran, and in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan. About 70 percent of the country—mostly mountain and desert areas—is virtually uninhabited. A large-scale migration of Iranians from rural to urban areas, encouraged by Iran's rapid industrialization and moderniza-

tion, has occurred. Almost half the population now lives in urban areas. The population is extremely youthful, with almost half under 15 years of age.

About two-thirds of Iran's people are ethnic Iranians, who speak related Indo-European languages such as Persian, Kurdish, Gilani, Mazandharani, Baluchi, Lur, and Bakhtiari. About one-fourth of the population is composed of Turkic-speaking peoples, including Azerbaijanis, Turkomans, and Qashqais. Semitic Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and Assyrians constitute a smaller ethnic group. The 1956 census reported 642,000 nomadic tribesmen.

The gradual establishment of compulsory primary education was begun in 1943, and today, primary and sec-

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 636,000 sq. mi. (1,647,240 sq. km., slightly larger than Alaska). CAPITAL: Tehran (pop. 4.2 million, 1976 est.). OTHER CITIES: Isfahan (575,000), Meshed (562,000), Tabriz (493,000), Shiraz (356,000), Abadan (306,000).

## People

POPULATION: 34.4 million (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.2% (1976). DENSITY: 50 per sq. mi. (20 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Iranians (Persians) 63%, Kurds 3%, Turkomans, Baluchis, Arabs; and Lur, Bakhtiari, and Qashqai tribes. RELIGIONS: Shi'a sect of Islam 93%, Sunni sect 5%. Small minority of religious groups, including Jews, Christians, Armenians, Assyrians, Bahais, Zoroastrians. LANGUAGES: Farsi (Persian), Turki, Kurdish, English, French. LITERACY: 40%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 50 yrs.

## Government

TYPE: Constitutional monarchy. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1906.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—Shah (Chief of State). Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament; 268-member Majlis (Lower House), 60-member Senate (Upper House). *Judicial*—Supreme Court (appointed by Shah).

POLITICAL PARTY: Resurgence Party of the People of Iran (RPPI, formed March 1975). SUFFRAGE: Universal over 20. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 19 Provinces, 3 Governorates.

FLAG: Three horizontal bands—green, white, and red, with a sun rising over a lion brandishing a sword on the white band.

## Economy

GNP: \$53.2 billion (IFY 1975-76). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.7%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$1,600.

AGRICULTURE: Land 14%. Labor 37%. Products—wheat, barley, rice, sugar beets, cotton, dates, raisins, tea.

INDUSTRY: Labor 27%. Products—oil, petrochemicals, textiles, cement, food processing, steel, aluminum, metal fabricating, auto assembly.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, gas, iron, copper.


TRADE (IFY 1975-76): Exports—\$21.8 billion: petroleum 87%, carpets, cotton, fruits, nuts, hides and leather, ores. Partners—US, Japan, FRG, USSR, East Europe. Imports—\$19.7 billion: non-military items include machinery, iron and steel products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment. Partners—US, FRG, Japan, UK, USSR.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 70.5 rials=US\$1 (December 1976).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: Total: \$2.8 billion (none since 1971). US only—\$1.1 billion.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and affiliated agencies, CENTO, Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), OPEC, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IMF, IBRD, Colombo Plan.





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ondary schooling is available to more than 80 percent of the children. Almost 5 million children attend more than 28,000 schools. Education is free through the university level (including study outside Iran), with 2 years of national service required for every year of government-financed university study. Increasing emphasis is being placed on training students in fields which will advance Iran's development as a technological and industrial nation.

## HISTORY

Although Iran (historically known to the West as Persia) has been overrun

frequently and has had its territorial composition altered through the centuries, it must be counted among the world's more ancient nations. Invaded by Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Mongols, and others—and often caught up in the affairs of larger powers—Iran has always reasserted its national individuality and emerged from its times of trouble as a political and cultural entity.

Preliminary archaeological findings have pushed knowledge of Iranian prehistory to middle paleolithic times (100,000 years ago). The earliest sedentary cultures date from 18,000 to 14,000 years ago. The sixth millennium B.C. shows fairly sophisticated levels

of agricultural life and the beginnings of proto-urban concentrations.

Numerous dynasties have ruled Iran during its long history. Its first period of greatness was under the Achaemenians (559-330 B.C.), a dynasty founded by Cyrus the Great. After the Hellenistic period (330-250 B.C.) came the Parthian (250 B.C. to A.D. 226) and the Sassanian (A.D. 226-651). The Arab Muslim conquest of Iran was followed by the conquests of the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols, and Tamerlane. Iran underwent a revival under the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1736), whose most prominent figure was Shah Abbas. After the Conqueror Nadir Shah and his succes-



sors came the Qajar Dynasty (1795-1925), which was succeeded by the present Pahlavi Dynasty.

Iran's modern history began in 1906 with the convening of the first Majlis (Parliament) and the signing of Iran's Constitution. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia agreed to divide Iran into zones for commercial development, sparking nationalist opposition. Oil was discovered in 1908 at Masjid-i-Suleiman. Struggles between constitutionalists and supporters of the Qajar Shah marked the years before World War I, and the nation was disrupted further during the war.

In 1921 Reza Khan, an Iranian officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, seized control of the government. In 1925 he became Shah and ruled as Reza Shah Pahlavi for almost 16 years. During his reign Iran began to modernize, and the central government reasserted its authority over the tribes and the provinces. In September 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, the present Monarch, Shahanshah (King of Kings) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

During World War II, Iran was a vital link in the Allied supply line for lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union. After the war, Soviet troops stationed in northwestern Iran not only refused to withdraw but backed Communist revolts which established pro-Soviet regimes in the northern regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Iranian Government actions, supported by the United Nations and the United States, resulted in Soviet withdrawal in 1946.

The ensuing period witnessed a growth of Iranian nationalism that culminated in the nationalization of the British-owned oil industry in March 1951. After a political crisis in 1953 and a subsequent period of political uncertainty, Iran initiated a series of economic, social, and administrative reforms in 1961. These were formalized in a national referendum in January 1963 and came to be known as Iran's White Revolution. The core of this program was land reform, widely considered to be one of the more successful land-reform projects in the world.

The period since 1963 has been characterized by rapid modernization and economic growth, internal polit-

ical stability, and a dynamic foreign policy that has elevated Iran to a leadership role in the region. Iran's success was symbolized by the coronation of the Shah in 1967 and the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire in 1971.

## GOVERNMENT

Iran is a constitutional monarchy in which the Shah plays an active decisionmaking role. The Prime Minister (Head of Government) and other Cabinet members are appointed by the Shah, with the approval of both Houses of Parliament, for terms determined by the Shah.

The bicameral Parliament is composed of a Majlis (Lower House, 268 seats) and a Senate (Upper House, 60 seats). Parliamentary elections are by direct popular vote every 4 years. One-half of the Senate is appointed by the Shah.

Iran's 19 Provinces are administered by Governors-General, and its 3 independent Governorates are under the authority of Principal Governors. These officials are appointed by the Shah. The administrative system and the judicial system resemble those of France more than they do British or American models.

The RPPI (Resurgence Party of the People of Iran) was created by the Shah in March 1975 in order to enlist the energies of all Iranians in a massive national effort to realize the goals set by the Shah-People Revolution. The party structure is designed to reach down as far as the village level and to encompass all segments of political opinion, with the caveat that members must declare their support for the Constitution, the Monarchy, and the goals of the Shah-People Revolution. The other political parties were dissolved at that time. The government continues to be deeply committed to an ambitious program of economic, social, and administrative reforms, as well as to industrialization, modernization of other sectors of the economy, and modernization of Iran's Armed Forces.

## Principal Government Officials

Monarch—Shahanshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

## TRAVEL NOTES

**Customs**—All incoming travelers must have a valid visa for the duration of their stay and an up-to-date international health certificate listing the required immunizations. Visas may be obtained from the Embassy of Iran in Washington or from Iranian Consulates General in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, or Houston. (Appropriate Consulate depends on applicant's state of residency.)

Iran's long history and diverse cultures have left a variety of sites of interest to tourists. Among the most popular are: Persepolis, ceremonial capital of the Achaemenian kings, outside Shiraz; Isfahan, a city of water and canals, developed by Shah Abbas as his capital; Azerbaijan, where Turkish and Armenian influence remains strong; Qom and Meshed, centers of Islamic traditionalism; and Yazd, center of Iran's Zoroastrian faith.

*Iran Today*, by Jean Hureau, offers excellent information on Iranian tourist attractions.

**Transportation**—Over 60 international flights a week serve Tehran. Daily domestic flights are available to Iran's major cities.

Comfortable train travel is possible to Tabriz, Meshed, Khorramshahr, and Shahi, near the Caspian resort town of Babolsar. Bus service connects all the major cities.

Taxis are plentiful in Tehran. Fares are determined by meters. Tipping is not expected. Cars can be rented daily with or without drivers.

**Communications**—Long-distance telephone calls may be made from Tehran. The waiting period for a call to the U.S. varies from 2 to 6 hours. Cables, TELEX messages, night letters, and international mail may also be sent from Iran.

**Health**—Smallpox immunizations are required, and yellow fever and cholera shots are recommended. (These requirements are subject to change.)

City water in Tehran is potable.

Prime Minister—Amir Abbas Hoveyda  
Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff—  
Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari  
Finance and Economy Minister—  
Hushang Ansary  
Foreign Minister—Abbas Ali  
Khalatbari  
Interior Minister—Amir Qassem Moini



Minister of State, Executive Director  
for Plan and Budget Organization—  
Abdol Majid Majidi  
Ambassador to the U.S.—Ardeshtir  
Zahedi  
Ambassador to the U.N.—Fereyduun  
Hoveyda

Iran maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 3005 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-483-7639). There are Consulates General in New York City, San Francisco, Chicago, and Houston.

### ECONOMY

Iran's modern economic development is one of the more successful in the world. Traditionally an agricultural country, it has achieved significant industrialization and general economic modernization and has one of the world's higher economic growth rates. The economic boom which started in 1964-65 has not yet faltered, though some problem areas in the economy do exist.

As the world's second largest exporter of petroleum, Iran relies heavily on oil revenues to provide government income and foreign exchange. With the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951, these revenues were almost entirely lost. They were not restored until a settlement was concluded in 1954 with a consortium of international companies, the Iran Oil Consortium Ltd. (IOC): U.S. (40 percent), British (40 percent), Dutch (14 percent), and French (6 percent). In 1957 the Iranian Government and the Italian state-owned oil company (ENI) signed the first joint-venture oil agreement.

In subsequent years a number of other joint-venture agreements were signed with U.S. and other foreign partners by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), largely for exploitation of offshore areas. Several of these areas have produced oil in commercial quantities, but in 1974, oil from the IOC consortium area still accounted for about 90 percent of total production.

As a result of new arrangements reached in 1971 and 1972 between the member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries



Persepolis at night, Shiraz

Courtesy Embassy of Iran

(OPEC), including Iran, and the international oil companies, government revenue from oil production significantly increased.

In May 1973, the agreement of 1954 with the consortium was renegotiated. The 1954 agreement was replaced by a long-term preferential sales contract: Iran's oil income was to reach approximately the level determined by the participation agreement signed in 1972 by other Persian Gulf oil producers. NIOC took over internal management responsibility within the agreement area, with the consortium continuing technical operations under a service contract. NIOC also obtained increasing levels of crude oil for export. A December 1973 decision on prices made by Persian Gulf oil producers caused Iran's oil revenues to increase sharply again. Further increases occurred in 1974.

Iran's oil revenues, which were US \$89.6 million in 1955, were \$4 billion in 1973 and \$19 billion in 1975-76. The government has generally devoted some 70 percent of these revenues to economic development and social welfare, supplementing them with U.S.

Agency for International Development (AID) funds (before 1968) and loans from the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), other international financial institutions, and other countries.

The first comprehensive and systematic effort at development began in 1955 with the second development plan. Expenditures, however, soon outstripped revenue, and by 1960 Iran was faced with a serious balance-of-payments problem and inflation. With the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran launched a stabilization program in the early 1960's, and after a period of recession, the current economic upswing began in 1964.

During the third and fourth development plans (1962-66, 1967-73), the economy made remarkable progress. Between March 1965 and March 1973 Iran's GNP rose at an average annual rate in excess of 11 percent in constant money terms. Relative price stability was maintained during this period. The fourth development plan (1967-73)—which called for \$6.9 billion in public expenditures and 9.4



percent annual growth rate—attained or exceeded most of its major objectives. Public investment was concentrated in infrastructure and large basic industry projects, such as petrochemical plants, a steel mill, an aluminum factory, a gas pipeline to the Soviet Union, and greater use of water resources associated with emphasizing regional development in such promising areas as Khuzistan in the southwest and the Ghazvin Plain in central Iran.

Iran's fifth development plan (1973-78) calls for a total development investment of \$70 billion, of which about two-thirds is to come from the public sector. Total government expenditures of \$123 billion in real terms for the duration of the plan are expected to increase GNP to \$67 billion in 1978, or \$1,860 per capita.

Government income from increasing levels of petroleum exports will finance the continuing boom. Industrial exports other than oil are

expected to grow about 30 percent annually. By the end of the plan period, major projects to exploit other natural resources (natural gas and copper ore) should be making a growing contribution to the economy.

In the fifth plan increased emphasis is placed on agricultural development, which has lagged behind projections, labor-intensive industry, social welfare, and other programs designed to pass a growing share of the benefits of Iran's progress on to the mass of its people.

Iran has entered into many joint projects with firms from other countries, which may involve investments of billions of dollars. The largest of these involve oil refineries, petrochemical plants, steel, machine-building industries, natural gas, pipelines, and liquefaction projects.

Recently, the strains of rapid growth have become apparent in rising inflation and high demand for skilled manpower. The agricultural sector has lagged in productivity, and several different modes of organizing the agricultural sector are being tried in an effort to replace traditional systems weakened or supplanted by land reform.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

In October 1955 Iran aligned itself with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact (now the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO), and it has maintained this posture despite considerable Soviet pressure. Iran's political and economic relations with Western Europe have become closer since 1962, and a number of important trade and aid agreements have been signed.

After several years of strained relations marked by a vigorous Soviet propaganda campaign, Soviet-Iranian relations took a more cordial turn in September 1962, when Iran relieved Soviet fears by declaring that it would not permit foreign missiles to be based on Iranian soil. Relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries are now normal and involve some economic assistance and an increasing amount of barter trade.

Iran has greatly expanded its diplomatic relations in recent years, estab-

#### READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

The leading English-language newspaper is the *Kayhan Weekly International*.

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
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lishing relations with the People's Republic of China, German Democratic Republic, North Korea, North Vietnam, and many non-Communist countries. It has improved its relations with most Arab states, particularly since the military withdrawal of the United Kingdom from areas in the Persian Gulf in 1971. Iran has made effective use of its oil wealth through loan assistance to other countries, including Egypt, Syria, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African states.



Courtesy Embassy of Iran

Aryamehr steel mill complex, Isfahan




## U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

U.S.-Iranian relations have been close for many years. The United States has sought to cooperate with Iran in maintaining Iranian independence and in promoting social and economic progress.

Since the immediate post-World War II period, the United States has had a continuing interest in Iran's security from external threats. As an observer in CENTO, the United States encourages Iran to work closely with other CENTO members for regional security and to strengthen its economic and cultural ties with its regional CENTO partners. Since the British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the United States has encouraged Iran to cooperate with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states for regional security. Under a 1959 agreement with Iran, the United States, in accordance with constitutional provisions, will take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, in case of aggression against Iran by a Communist state.

The United States has extended assistance such as sales of surplus agricultural commodities required by the Iranian supply situation, technical assistance for economic development, and military assistance. The U.S. AID Mission was closed on November 30, 1967, and U.S. military grant assistance has since also been terminated. Since that time, we have continued to sell Iran items to improve its defensive capabilities. The United States supplies the major part of Iran's military imports (some \$10 billion in orders in the period 1970-75) and maintains a Military Assistance Advisory Group



Courtesy Embassy of Iran

Sharyade Arya Mehri, Tehran

(MAAG), paid for, in large part, by the Government of Iran.

In November 1974, the United States and Iran established a Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation designed to intensify cooperation in economic matters and to enlist the services of the American public and private sectors in Iran's massive development effort. The Joint Commission is concentrating its efforts on private sector participation in the development of Iran's economic and social infrastructure and on providing technical expertise at the request of the Iranian Government.

The United States and Iran maintain an active and expanding program of educational and cultural exchanges.

About 20,000 Iranians are currently studying in the United States, and over 50 U.S. universities are assisting Iranian educational and governmental institutions in a variety of ways.

Approximately 30,000 Americans currently reside in Iran.

### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Vacant  
Minister-Counselor—Jack C. Miklos  
Chief, U.S. Mission to Iranian Army and Military Assistance Advisory Group—Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Miles, USAF

The U.S. Embassy in Iran is located at Ave. Takht-e-Jamshid and Roosevelt Avenue, Tehran (tel. 214-2225).

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Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

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**APPENDIX I.E**

**IRAQ  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, August 1976. (Publication 7975).]



background  
NOTES

## Iraq

department of state \* august 1976

## OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Iraq

## GEOGRAPHY

Iraq, historically known as Mesopotamia, is located in the Near East and is bordered by Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

The country slopes from mountains 10,000 feet above sea level along the border with Iran and Turkey to reed-matted marshes on the Persian Gulf. About 68 percent of the land is desert, waste, or urban; 18 percent agricultural; 10 percent seasonal and other grazing land; and 4 percent forested.

The waters of its twin river system—the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers—irrigate a fertile plain. Portions of the Syrian Desert sweep across the land.

Average temperatures range from more than 120°F in July and August to below freezing in January. Most of the rainfall occurs from December through April and averages between 4 and 7 inches annually.

## PEOPLE

The two largest ethnic groups are the Arabs and the Kurds. Other dis-

tinutive groups are the Assyrians, Turkomans, Iranians, Lurs, and Armenians.

Iraq is the only Arab country in which the majority of the Muslims are members of the Shiite sect. There are also small communities of Christians, Jews, Bahais, Mandaeans, and Yezidis. The Kurds are mostly Muslims but differ from their Arab neighbors in language, dress, and customs.

Arabic is most commonly spoken, with Kurdish spoken in the northern, Kurdish areas. English is the most commonly used Western language.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 172,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Calif.). CAPITAL: Baghdad (pop. 3.5 million). OTHER CITIES: Basra, Mosul.

## People

POPULATION: 11 million (1976 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.3% (1976). DENSITY: 63 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arabs (75%), Kurds (15-20%). RELIGIONS: Islam (95%). LANGUAGES: Arabic, Kurdish. LITERACY: 25-40%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 30-40 yrs.

## Government

TYPE: Revolutionary Council. INDEPENDENCE: 1932.

BRANCHES: Executive—Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) governs by decree, Council of Ministers is appointed by RCC. Legislative—Constitution provides for a National Assembly, but no such body has been formed. Judicial—Court of Cassation and special courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Ba'ath Party dominates; Communist Party of Iraq nominally participates in a coalition.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes—red, white, and black—with three green stars on center white stripe.

## Economy

GDP: \$11 billion (1974). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 18.4% (1970-73). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$800 (1974). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 13% (1969-72).

AGRICULTURE: Land—18%. Labor—50%. Products—livestock, wheat, barley, dates.

INDUSTRY: Labor 14%. Products—petroleum, cement.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, natural gas, phosphates.

TRADE: Exports—\$8.8 billion (1975 est.): petroleum, dates. Partners—France, Italy, USSR. Imports—\$5 billion (1975 est.): manufactured goods, food grains, machinery, construction materials, livestock, technical services. Partners—FRG, Japan, France, UK, Yugoslavia, US.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Iraqi dinar=US\$3.40.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Arab League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

## HISTORY

Prior to the Muslim conquest in the 7th century, Iraq had been the site of a number of flourishing civilizations, including the Sumerians (who had one of the earliest known writing systems), the Babylonians, and the Parthians. The capital of the Abbassid caliphate was established at Baghdad in the 8th century and became a famous center of learning and the arts. Baghdad was a frontier outpost of the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1638.

Iraq became a British mandated territory at the end of World War I and was declared independent in 1932. The country was ruled as a constitutional monarchy by the Hashemite family which also ruled in Jordan. Iraq was a founding member of the Arab League in 1945 and joined the United Nations the same year. Iraq was an original member of the Baghdad Pact (which grouped Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain) and was headquartered in the Iraqi capital.

Hashemite rule was ended by the army-led revolution of July 14, 1958.





518123 7-76

during which King Faysal II and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said were killed. General 'Abd al Karim Qasim, the leader of one of the military units involved in the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy, took power. Qasim ended Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact (later reconstituted as the Central Treaty Organization) in 1959. Qasim was assassinated in a coup d'état in February 1963 in which the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'ath Party) took power with General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr serving as Prime Minister and with Colonel Abdul Salam Arif in the nominal position of President.

Nine months later the Ba'ath gov-

ernment was ousted in a coup led by Abdul Salam Arif. In April 1966 Arif was killed in a plane crash and was succeeded by his brother, General Abdal Rahman Mohammed Arif. On July 17, 1968, a group composed of leaders of the Ba'ath Party and elements of the armed forces overthrew the Arif regime and Hasan al-Bakr became President of Iraq and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

#### GOVERNMENT

Iraq is governed by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) consisting of a small number of civilian

and military members. The RCC enacts legislation by decree. Through it the Ba'ath Party has ruled Iraq since 1968. The RCC's President (chief of state and supreme commander of the armed forces) is elected by a two-thirds majority of the RCC. A 29-member Council of Ministers (cabinet), appointed by the RCC, has administrative and some legislative responsibilities. The provisional Constitution calls for the establishment of a National Assembly, but to date no such body has been formed. Iraq is divided into 16 provinces, each headed by a governor with extensive administrative powers.

Iraq's judicial system is based on



the French model, as introduced during Ottoman rule. There are three types of courts—civil, religious, and special. The Court of Cassation is the court of last recourse. The Special Courts, established in 1965 to try cases affecting national security, have been used increasingly.

#### Principal Government Officials

President, Head of Government,  
Chairman of the Revolutionary  
Command Council (RCC)—Ahmad  
Hasan al-Bakr  
Vice-Chairman of the RCC, Secretary  
General of the Regional Ba'ath  
Party—Saddam Husayn

#### Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Saadoun Hammadi  
Defense—Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr  
Finance—Fawzi Al-Qaisi  
Interior—Izzat Ad-Douri  
Oil and Minerals—Tayeh Abdul Karim  
Ambassador to U.N.—Abdul Karim al-  
Shaikhly  
Chief, Iraqi Interests Section, Wash-  
ington, D.C.—Mohamed Amin  
Al-Hassan

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Ba'ath (Renaissance) Party controls the government, although the Iraqi Communist Party nominally participates in a coalition government.

The Kurdish rebellion, an intermittent source of instability for the Baghdad Government for many years, ended in March 1975 with the victory of the Ba'ath government over Kurdish insurgents.

#### ECONOMY

While Iraq has great agricultural potential, oil production accounts for almost all of its revenue. Iraq is the fourth largest oil producer in the Middle East, with potential reserves estimated as second only to Saudi Arabia's. In advancing the principle of state ownership, the Ba'ath government has taken control of Iraq's petroleum production. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), a consortium of Western companies, was nationalized in 1972 after a decade of disputes over concession rights. Following the nationalization, Iraq's trade with the West declined and oil revenues

dropped. Iraq then turned to the U.S.S.R. as a market for its oil and as a source of manufactured goods. However, the IPC Agreement of March 1973 resolved the major problems between Iraq and Western oil companies, and, since that time, commercial relations with the West have expanded. After the October war in 1973, Iraq announced the nationalization of a portion of the only remaining Western-owned petroleum interest, the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC). Nationalization of the BPC—and thus of all foreign oil interests in Iraq—was completed on December 8, 1975, when the remaining French and British holdings were taken over with promise of compensation.

Iraq has solicited Western technology and has undertaken several multimillion-dollar projects to expand petroleum production. Expansion of the deep sea terminal near Fao is now completed, as is the "strategic" pipeline connecting Iraq's northern oil fields to the Gulf. A pipeline across Turkey to the Mediterranean is under construction. These facilities will largely replace the oil pipelines across Syria through which Iraq formerly exported a major part of its crude oil.

Agriculture employs half of the labor force but contributes less than 20 percent to the gross domestic product (GDP). Iraq is continuing efforts to develop and modernize the agricultural sector, but progress has been less dramatic than in the petroleum sector. Dates are the largest export crop, earning Iraq \$16 to \$20 million annually.

In 1975 exports rose to \$8.8 billion while imports totaled about \$5 billion (\$310 million from the United States). (Iraq continues to sign major contracts with U.S. firms, most notably a recent one for a \$1.1 billion petrochemical complex (a joint U.S.-F.R.G. commercial venture). Petroleum products account for 92 percent of Iraqi exports, roughly three-fourths of which go to Western European countries.

There has been a dramatic and sustained rise in Iraq's GDP, which roughly doubled between 1973 and 1976 as a result of increased oil prices. Iraq is recycling its oil revenues into the development of both its natural resources and its industrial and agricultural base, providing for continued economic expansion and increased

#### TRAVEL NOTES

*Clothing*—Take clothing for a climate similar to that of Arizona. (Temperatures may reach over 120° in the summer.) Western clothing, especially shoes, is not readily available.

*Customs and Immigration*—All foreigners must have a visa. Check requirements with the Embassy of India, Iraqi Interests Section.

*Health*—Baghdad's facilities suffice for uncomplicated medical and surgical problems. Doctors are generally overworked and facilities overcrowded. Baghdad's central water system provides potable water. Do not drink untreated water in the villages and rural areas.

*Lodging*—Hotel space is extremely limited. Make reservations well ahead of time. A \$34 nonrefundable deposit is required for each room requested.

*Telecommunications*—All communications media are government-controlled or -owned. The major radio station and all television stations are located in Baghdad. The dial telephone system is satisfactory, although limited to large cities. Long-distance service is available within Iraq and to nearby capitals. Radio-telephone connections to Europe and the U.S. are satisfactory in favorable weather, but you may experience delays.

*Transportation*—International flights land at Baghdad airport on a regular basis, but schedules may change without notice. Confirm reservations. Al Basrah and Umm Qasr are major seaports. Barge traffic travels up the Tigris to Baghdad. A railway connects Al Basrah and Umm Qasr with Baghdad and with Turkey and Europe. Buses and taxis provide good local transportation; taxi fares are negotiable. Paved highways connect major cities and neighboring countries. All vehicles must be covered by third-party personal injury insurance.

opportunities for foreign participation in the growing Iraqi market for technological goods and services.

A number of major economic and technical cooperation agreements were reached in 1974-75 involving the delivery of crude oil in exchange for technical aid in a variety of fields. The agreements are mostly long term (some are up to 20 years) and range from several hundred millions of dollars to \$3 billion. Countries involved include Japan, Spain, Italy, France, the German Democratic Republic, and the U.S.S.R.



### READING LIST

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### FOREIGN RELATIONS

A major factor in foreign policy has been the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraq considers itself in a technical state of war with Israel and has opposed all attempts to reach a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States. During the October war in 1973 substantial quantities of Iraqi troops and equipment were sent to Syria.

Iraq maintains various military and political agreements with other Arab States, but relations within the Arab world have varied greatly. Relations with Syria, Iraq's western neighbor,

have been marred by traditional political rivalries, as well as by disputes over the Euphrates waters, oil transit fees, and, most recently, Syria's participation in Lebanon's civil war. Relations with Jordan have recently improved since the conclusion of economic cooperation agreements. Iraq and Kuwait have yet to settle an old dispute over border demarcation between these countries. Relations with Iran have been improving since a March 1975 agreement which ended the Kurdish rebellion, although the two countries continue to view each other as competitors for influence in the Persian Gulf. There has also been

improvement in Iraqi-Saudi Arabian relations, and a settlement of a longstanding border disagreement between the two states. Iraqi-Turkish relations have generally been good.

Iraq maintains relatively good relations with almost all Communist countries and has relied on the Communist bloc for military assistance. In April 1972 Iraq and the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Relations with Western European countries have recently improved, especially in the commercial field. Iraq resumed diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in February 1974 and with Great Britain in April 1974. France now ranks with the Soviet Union as Iraq's largest trade partner.

### U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS

At the time of the June 1967 conflict, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States. In 1972 the United States established a small Interests Section in Baghdad under the auspices of the Belgian Embassy. Iraq maintains an Interests Section at the Indian Embassy in Washington. Commercial relations between the United States and Iraq have improved.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section—Marshall W. Wiley  
Commercial Officers—T. Patrick Killough, Allen Keiswetter  
Consular/Political Officer—Bronson Percival  
Administrative Officer, U.S. Interests Section—Thomas Flesher

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**APPENDIX I.F**

**ISRAEL  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, January 1977. (Publication 7752).]



background  
notes

## Israel

department of state \* january 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Israel

## GEOGRAPHY

Israel has four topographical regions: the coastal plain, the central mountains, the Jordan Rift Valley, and the Negev Desert in the south; the

Negev comprises half the country's total area.

The climate is temperate except in the Negev, where it is very hot. Most rain falls from October to April, and the average rainfall is about 28 inches

(71.4 cm.) in the north, 19-21 inches (48-53 cm.) in the central regions, 1-8 inches (2.5-20 cm.) in the Negev.

Elevations run from Galilee's Mt. Meron at 3,930 feet (1,197 m.) above sea level to the Dead Sea, which, at 1,300 feet (396 m.) below sea level, is the lowest point on earth.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 7,993 sq. mi. (20,701 sq. km.); about the size of N.J. CAPITAL: Jerusalem\* (pop. 355,500\*\*). OTHER CITIES: Tel Aviv-Yafo (353,800), Haifa (227,200), Ramat Gan (121,100).

## People

POPULATION: 3,650,000 (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.1%. DENSITY: 442 per sq. mi. (170 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Jewish (85%), Arab (15%). RELIGIONS: Judaism, Islam, Christianity, and Druze. LANGUAGES: Hebrew, Arabic, and English. LITERACY: Jewish 91%, Arab 64% (education free and compulsory between ages 5-15). LIFE EXPECTANCY: 69.5 yrs., Jewish males; 73.3 yrs., Jewish females.

## Government

TYPE: Parliamentary democracy. INDEPENDENCE: May 14, 1948. CONSTITUTION: No written document.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—unicameral: Knesset. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Labor Alignment (Labor Party and Mapam), National Religious Party, Likud, Torah Front, and

numerous smaller parties including a small Communist party. SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 6 Administrative Districts.

FLAG: White field on which is centered a blue six-pointed Star of David bordered above and below by blue horizontal stripes. (Design is based on Jewish prayer shawl.)

## Economy

GNP: \$12 billion. GROWTH RATE 1.2%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$3,425.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 20%. *Labor* 6.5%. *Products*—citrus, other fruit, cotton, wheat, grains, vegetables, and dairy.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 25.3%. *Products*—food processing, textiles, metal products, electronics, chemical and petroleum refining, transport, and diamonds.

TRADE: (1975): *Exports (goods)*—\$2.07 billion: diamonds, chemicals, citrus, textiles, minerals. *Partners*—US, UK, FRG. *Imports (goods)*—\$4.0 billion: fuel, machines, rough diamonds, food and consumer durables. *Partners*—US, UK, FRG.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 8.90 Israeli pounds=US\$1 (Jan. 1976).

ECONOMIC AID: Total US aid since 1948—\$8.6 billion.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, GATT, Int. Atomic Energy Agency, and 27 other inter-governmental organizations.

## PEOPLE AND CULTURE

Of the estimated 3.5 million Israelis, about 3 million (85 percent) are Jews. The non-Jewish minority has tripled in size since 1948. The Jewish population has more than quadrupled since independence, with two-thirds of the increase due to immigration. About half of these immigrants are from the Arab countries of the Near East and North Africa. Recently, however, especially since 1973, immigration has declined and barely exceeded emigration in 1975.

Of the Jewish population, 48 percent were born in Israel, 27 percent in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and 25 percent in Asia and Africa. There are two main ethnic divisions of about equal size among the Jews: the Ashkenazim, or Jews of Northern and Eastern European origin; and the Sephardim, or Oriental Jews, who came to Israel from the countries of the Near East and the Mediterranean Basin.

Of the non-Jewish population, about 75 percent are Muslims, 16 percent are Christians, and 9 percent are Druzes and others. Most non-Jews are Arabs, but a small number of Europeans reside permanently in Israel.

\*Israel proclaimed Jerusalem its capital in 1950. The US, like most other countries, does not recognize it as the capital and maintains its Embassy at Tel Aviv.

\*\*Including east Jerusalem, occupied by Israel in 1967. Population figures for the cities are 1976 estimates.



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Education between ages 5 and 15 (gradually being raised to 16) is free and compulsory. Total enrollment in the Israeli education system is over 878,000 (1972). The school system is organized into kindergartens, 6-year primary schools, 3-year junior secondary schools, and 3-year senior secondary schools, after which a comprehensive matriculation examination is offered for admission to college. There are seven university-level institutions with a combined enrollment of about 50,000.

Israelis, among the most avid newspaper readers in the world, publish 11 daily newspapers in Hebrew, 4 in Arabic, and 9 in other languages including English, Russian, Romanian, French, and Yiddish. Over 550 other periodicals are published, more than half of them in Hebrew. Israel ranks second in the world in books published per capita. The country has over 2,000 libraries.

With a population drawn from more than 100 countries on five continents, Israeli society is rich in cultural diversity and artistic creativity. The arts are actively encouraged and supported by the government.

Israeli interest in music is evident in the fact that the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra has over 32,000 subscribers and gives 180 concerts a year in every corner of the country in addition to frequent tours abroad. Almost every municipality and small agricultural settlement has its chamber orchestras or ensembles of some sort. Folk dance, drawing from the cultural heritage of many immigrant groups, is very popular. Israel also has several professional ballet and modern dance companies.

Theater attendance in Israel is the highest in the world, per capita, with over 3 million tickets sold every year. The repertoire covers the entire range of classical and contemporary drama including plays by Israeli authors. Of the three major repertory companies, the most famous, *Habimah*, was founded in 1917.

Artist colonies thrive in Safed, Jaffa, and Ein Harod, and a number of Israeli painters and sculptors exhibit and sell their works worldwide. Haifa and Tel Aviv have outstanding museums of modern art.

The Israel Museum in Jerusalem houses the Dead Sea Scrolls along with a vast collection of Jewish religious and folk art.

## HISTORY

The creation of the modern State of Israel in 1948 was preceded by more than a half-century of efforts by Zionist leaders to create a sovereign nation as a homeland for Jews dispersed throughout the world. Attachment to the Land of Israel is a recurrent theme in scripture, and the desire of Jews to return to what is to them their rightful homeland was first expressed during the Babylonian exile and became a universal Jewish theme after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in A.D. 70 and the dispersal which followed.

However, it was not until the founding of the Zionist movement by Theodore Herzl at the end of the 19th century that practical steps were taken toward securing international sanction for large-scale Jewish settlement in Palestine—then a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Balfour declaration in 1917 asserted the British Government's support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This declaration was supported by a number of other countries including the United States and took on added importance following World War I, when the United Kingdom was assigned the Palestine mandate by the League of Nations.

In the following years, immigration of Jews grew slowly, but Nazi persecution greatly increased the tide. With the end of World War II and the revelation of the near-extirmination of European Jewry by the Nazis, international support for Jews wishing to flee to Palestine overcame British efforts to restrict them.

Soon international support for establishing a Jewish state produced results. In November 1947 the United Nations adopted a partition plan which called for dividing Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state and for establishing Jerusalem separately as an international city under U.N. administration. Violence between the Arab and Jewish communities erupted almost immediately. As the end of the

## TRAVEL NOTES

**Clothing**—Clothing and shoe needs are about the same as for the American Southwest. Low-heeled, thick-soled walking shoes are best suited for most tourist sites. Most of Israel is quite warm and humid, except for the months December through February. Rainfall occurs regularly in the winter months, but snow is rare.

**Community Health**—Israel requires at least one pharmacy in a neighborhood to be open or on call at all times; a list is published at least weekly in the English language *Jerusalem Post*. Israeli public health standards are about equal to those of the US; adequate medical and dental care is available and tap water is safe to drink.

**Telecommunications**—Telephone and telegraph services, domestic and international, are efficient, though often slow. Rates are about the same as those in the US.

**Transportation**—Israel has a good nationwide bus system, and taxis are plentiful and reasonable in the major cities. Rental cars are available at reasonable rates, and roads are fairly good and well marked. All automobiles must be covered by unlimited third-party insurance.

British mandate approached, the Jews made ready to declare a separate state, a development which the Arabs were determined to prevent.

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed. The following day, armies from neighboring Arab nations entered Palestine and engaged in open warfare with the defense forces of the newly founded state. Subsequently, a truce was brought about under U.N. auspices, and in 1949 four armistice agreements were negotiated and signed at Rhodes, Greece, between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

No general peace settlement was achieved, however, and for a number of years the violence along the borders continued. In October 1956, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, coincident with operations by French and British forces against Egypt in the Suez Canal area. Israeli forces withdrew in March 1957 after



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the United Nations established the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

In 1966 and 1967, incidents of terrorism and retaliatory acts across the armistice demarcation lines became progressively more serious. In May 1967, after serious tension had developed between Syria and Israel, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) moved armaments and about 80,000 troops into Sinai and ordered withdrawal of UNEF troops from the armistice line and Sharm el-Sheikh. Nasser then closed

the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, thereby blockading the Israeli port of Eilat at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. On May 30, Jordan and Egypt signed a mutual defense treaty.

Hostilities broke out between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on June 5. At the end of 6 days of fighting, when all parties had accepted the cease-fire called for by U.N. Security Council resolutions, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Kuneitra (Golan) sector of Syria, and the formerly Jordanian-controlled west bank of the Jordan River including the eastern sector of Jerusalem.

Subsequent U.S. efforts to negotiate an interim agreement to open the Suez Canal and achieve disengagement of forces were unsuccessful.

On October 6, 1973, a 6-year period of relative diplomatic and military quiescence ended with the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli conflict. Initially Syria and Egypt made significant advances against Israeli forces. However, Israel recovered on both fronts, pushing the Syrians back beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines and recrossing the canal to take a salient on its west bank.

The United States and the Soviet Union cooperated in bringing about a cease-fire. All major fighting stopped by October 25, and the cease-fire opened the way for new and serious negotiations between the parties to resolve their long and bitter dispute. (For subsequent history, see section on U.S. policy.)

### GOVERNMENT

The State of Israel is a republic. Its governmental system is not based on a single constitutional document but on several basic laws enacted by the Knesset (parliament).

The President of Israel (Chief of State) is elected by the Knesset for a 5-year term.

The Prime Minister (Head of Government) exercises executive power. Traditionally, the President selects as Prime Minister that party leader most able to form a government. Other members of the Cabinet must be approved by the Knesset, to which they are individually and collectively responsible. The membership of the Cab-

inet is negotiated among the parties forming the coalition.

Legislative power is vested in the unicameral Knesset. The 120 Members are elected by direct secret ballot to 4-year terms, although the Knesset may decide to call for new elections before the end of its term. All voting is for party lists rather than for individual candidates, and the total number of seats assigned any party reflects the percentages of the total vote cast in the elections for that party. Successful Knesset candidates are drawn from the lists in order of party-assigned rank. Under the present electoral system, all Members of the Knesset are elected at-large, but efforts have been made to change to a mixed single/local constituency system.

The independent judicial system includes secular and religious courts. These courts do not have the right of judicial review of the Knesset's acts: judicial interpretation deals only with problems of execution of the laws and the validity of subsidiary legislation. The highest court in Israel is the Supreme Court, whose judges are appointed by the President.

For administrative purposes, Israel is divided into six Districts, each headed by a Commissioner appointed by the central government. The Commissioners are responsible to the Ministry of Interior. Occupied territories are administered by the Israel Defense Forces.

### Principal Government Officials

President—Ephraim Katzir

#### Ministers

Prime Minister—Yitzhak Rabin

Deputy Prime Minister—Yigal Allon

Agriculture—Aharon Uzan

Commerce, Industry, and Development—Chaim Bar-Lev

Communications—Aharon Uzan

Defense—Shimon Peres

Education and Culture—Aharon Yadlin

Finance—Yehoshua Rabinowitz

Foreign Affairs—Yigal Allon

Health—Victor Shemtov

Housing—vacant

Immigrant Absorption—Shlomo Rosen

\*Interior—

Justice—Chaim Zadok

Labor—Moshe Baram

Police—Shlomo Hillel



\*Religious Affairs—  
 \*Social Welfare—  
 Tourism—Moshe Kol  
 Transport—Gad Yaacobi  
 Without Portfolio—Yisrael Galili  
 Without Portfolio—Gideon Hausner

Ambassador to the U.S.—Simcha Dinitz

Ambassador to the U.N.—Chaim Herzog

\*These portfolios, formerly held by the National Religious Party, are being administered temporarily by other ministers.

Israel maintains an Embassy in the United States at 1621 22 d Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-483-4100). There are also Consulates General at Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

## POLITICAL CONDITIONS

President Ephraim Katzir, the Labor Party candidate, was elected to office by the Knesset in April 1973.

As a result of party fragmentation under the proportional representation system, no one party has ever held a clear parliamentary majority. Cabinets have always represented coalitions, normally including members of four or five parties. The membership of the Cabinet is determined by negotiations among the parties forming the coalition. The governing coalition put together by the Labor Party after the 1973 elections consisted of the Labor Alignment (itself a coalition of the Labor Party and Mapam), National Religious Party, Independent Liberal Party, and two small Labor-affiliated Arab lists. With expulsion of the National Religious Party from the Cabinet on December 19, 1976, Prime Minister Rabin lost his working majority and resigned shortly afterwards. His cabinet, minus the NRP, became a caretaker government until new Knesset elections are held in May 1977.

The complex politics of coalition government in Israel is based on interpersonal and interparty relations. Thus far, the fact that the Labor Party has always had a comfortable plurality of votes in the Knesset has enabled it to organize all governments. But its less-

than-majority parliamentary strength has required it to form partnerships with parties controlling some 10-20 percent of the Knesset seats in order to maintain a stable majority of the 120 seats.

The distribution of seats in the present eighth Knesset, based on the election of December 31, 1973, is as follows: Labor Alignment and Arab affiliates 53; National Religious Party 10; Independent Liberal Party 4; Likud 36; Torah Front 5; Communist Party 4; others 8.

An important aspect of Israeli political conditions is the vast, ramified organization known as the *Histadrut* (The General Federation of Labor). The history of the Israeli labor movement and the history of the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state are largely the story of the *Histadrut*. It was inspired by the Zionist-Socialist ideas of Eastern European and Russian Jews who emigrated to Palestine before and after World War I with the intention of establishing a Jewish homeland. The purpose of the *Histadrut* in the years before the formation of the State of Israel in 1948 was to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine and to see that the new arrivals had employment and a place to live.

The *Histadrut* is divided into three main departments: labor unions, industrial and commercial enterprises, and the health and welfare department. The organization plays a unique role not only in labor/management relations and in the formulation of Israel's economic and social policies, but also as a major entrepreneur, banker, social insurance system.

*Histadrut* membership totals approximately 1.3 million, or 64 percent of the population 18 years or older. The trade union department of the *Histadrut* oversees the operation of unions that represent 85 percent (over 600,000) of Israel's wage and salary workers.

All Cabinet members are members of the *Histadrut*, the leadership of which is along the party lines of the present coalition government.

Internationally, the *Histadrut* has maintained close contacts with labor unions in the West and has developed working relations with Asian and African labor unions, even in countries

with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. The ties between the *Histadrut* and the AFL-CIO are traditionally very close.

## ECONOMY

Israel produces a variety of goods for world and domestic markets. Highly industrialized, its economic growth has been among the fastest in the world, averaging almost 10 percent a year in the first 25 years of the state's history. However, there has been a decline in growth since 1973, and the GNP rose only 1.3 percent in 1976.

Limited in natural resources and manpower, Israel has always had to rely heavily on imports. In the past, Israel was able to finance the excess of imports over exports by means of gifts and loans from abroad. This current account deficit, however, took on entirely new dimensions following the 1973 war and is now running at a level of almost \$4 billion per year compared to about \$1 billion previously. Financing this enormous deficit, much of which is defense-related, is the central economic problem facing the Israel Government today.

Inflation, 56 percent in 1974, 24 percent in 1975, and 25 percent in 1976, is another major problem. In November 1974 the government announced a series of austerity measures, including the devaluation of the Israeli pound by 43 percent, in order to reduce inflationary pressure and safeguard foreign exchange reserves. Another 10 percent devaluation was implemented in September 1975, and the government has continued to devalue the pound incrementally by a maximum of 2 percent at minimum intervals of 30 days. In July 1976, the pound's linkage with the U.S. dollar was shifted to a basket of five currencies weighted in part according to Israel's export pattern.

From FY49 to FY75, Israel received more than \$6.5 billion in assistance from the United States, over \$2.5 billion in the form of grants. U.S. assistance in FY76 totaled approximately \$2.3 billion. (The only other country giving major assistance to Israel is the Federal Republic of Germany, which provides about \$300 million annually in personal restitution



payments and \$50 million in long-term loans.)

The civilian labor force in 1975 was 1,133,000, of which 26.1 percent was employed in public services; 25.3 percent in mining and industry; 12.2 percent in commerce; 6.4 percent in finance; 6.7 percent in personal services; 6.5 percent in agriculture; 8.1 percent in construction and public works; 7.7 percent in transportation, storage, and communications; and 1 percent in public utilities. Approximately 100,000 Israelis are normally on active military duty in the armed forces. Israel still has nearly full employment; in 1975, some 66,000 workers from the occupied territories found employment in Israel, over 80 percent in construction, agricultural, and industrial work.

#### Industry

Gross industrial output in 1975 amounted to \$8.3 billion (according to weighted exchange rate for 1975 of US\$1=6.33 Israel pounds). In value of output, the food processing industry stood first with about 20 percent of the total. It was followed by textiles and clothing 14 percent, metal products 10 percent, electrical and electronic equipment 8 percent, chemicals and petroleum refining 7 percent, transport equipment 6 percent, and polished diamonds 5 percent.

Investment in productive capacity rose sharply during the period 1968-73 but has declined since the October 1973 war. The government is encouraging investment in export-oriented industries.

#### Agriculture

Agriculture has historically played an important role in Israel's economy, but its significance has been declining recently. Agriculture's share in the GNP stood in 1975 at 6.5 percent. Israel produces all its requirements for poultry and dairy products, fruits, vegetables, and cotton. Israel depends on imports for half its wheat and for most of its feedgrains, oilseeds, beef, and sugar. Agricultural production relies heavily on irrigation, and 90 percent of available water reserves are utilized. The lack of water limits

further growth of agricultural production, which has increased 11 times from 1948 to 1975. However, efforts are being made to reach a higher return per unit of water.

#### Transportation and Communications

Israel has a well-developed transportation network with about 500 miles (800 km.) of state-owned railroads, 5,000 miles (8,000 km.) of roads, and one international airport. Israel's international airline flies more than 130 flights per week to 18 countries including the United States. Israel's three major seaports are Haifa, Ashdod, and Eilat. More than 7.8 million metric tons of cargo, exclusive of oil, were handled in 1975, more than half at Haifa. At the end of 1975, Israel's flag fleet numbered 108 vessels. A system of pipelines transports crude oil from Eilat to Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Haifa.

#### Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

The balance of payments has traditionally been characterized by a large excess of imports over exports, which has been financed by a large capital inflow. Between 1948 and 1973, more than \$27 billion in gross capital imports entered Israel, \$13.9 billion of it in unilateral transfers involving no obligation to repay and the remainder in loans and investments. The outflow of capital in the same period was about \$5 billion, leaving net capital imports of some \$22 billion. Exports of goods and services as a percentage of imports, excluding defense imports, have risen from 14 percent in 1950 to more than 62 percent in 1975.

During 1968 and 1969, official foreign exchange reserves declined sharply due to heavy expenditures for military equipment. This trend was reversed in 1970, and reserves rose from \$460 million in that year to \$1.8 billion at the end of 1973. However, by the end of 1974, reserves had declined again to \$1.2 billion and have remained at that level.

In 1975 net imports of goods totaled about \$4 billion, of which 75 percent was in current production

inputs, 16 percent in investment goods, and 8 percent in consumer goods. The major import items were fuel, \$640 million; machines and equipment, \$540 million; rough diamonds, \$410 million net; spare parts, \$340 million; food, \$160 million; and consumer durables, \$110 million. Imports of services totaled \$3.7 billion. Imports from the occupied territories are estimated at \$320 million, bringing total imports into Israel for 1975 to about \$8.1 billion.

Net exports of goods in 1975 were valued at \$1.8 billion net, of which agricultural products amounted to 15 percent, and the remainder were industrial goods. The principal exports were polished diamonds, \$640 million; chemicals, \$185 million; citrus, \$175 million; textiles and clothing, \$160 million; food products, \$125 million; and minerals, \$85 million. Exports of services reached \$1.8 billion, of which transportation services were \$734 million and tourism \$233 million, bringing total Israeli exports to \$3.6 billion in 1975.

Agricultural exports totaled \$278 million in 1975. In addition to citrus fruits, which account for more than 60 percent of agricultural exports, Israel exports cotton, processed foods, fresh fruits, vegetables, peanuts, and cut flowers to Europe, particularly out of season.

The United States is Israel's principal source of imports. In 1975, U.S. exports of goods and services to Israel, excluding government-to-government military sales, totaled \$1.55 billion, or 22 percent of Israel's imports. Israel's principal imports from the United States (valued at \$326 million) are agricultural products, machinery of various kinds, transport equipment, and defense items. Almost half of the value of Israel's exports to the United States comes from polished diamonds; 9 percent is textiles and clothing; 8 percent is chemicals; and 7 percent is electrical and electronic equipment.

The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany account for 32 percent of Israel's imports (16% each). Israel has an expanding trade relationship with the European Community (EC). An agreement signed in



May 1975 provides for the eventual establishment of an industrial free-trade area between Israel and the EC.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

In addition to seeking an end to hostilities with the Arab nations, with which it has fought four times in two decades, Israel has given high priority to gaining wide acceptance as a sovereign state with an important international role. Prior to 1967, it had established diplomatic relations with a majority of the world's nations, except for the Arab states and most other Muslim countries. The Soviet Union and the Communist states of Eastern Europe (Romania excepted) broke diplomatic relations with Israel at the time of the 1967 war. Beginning in late 1972, and especially during the October 1973 war, most black African countries severed relations with Israel. Israel had been active in Africa with modestly-funded but significant assistance projects in many of these countries.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Israel established relations in 1965. Israel recognizes the People's Republic of China but has no diplomatic relations with it.

Israel is a member of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies and has a preferential trade agreement with the European Economic Community (Common Market).

The Government of Israel has stated its belief that a peace settlement with its Arab adversaries can be best achieved by direct negotiations leading to the signature of contractually binding peace treaties. It has not favored the efforts by the major powers (i.e., the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) to draw up guidelines for such a settlement.

### U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS

The United States has maintained close and friendly relations with Israel since its establishment in 1948. A long-standing fundamental principle of U.S. Near East policy has been concern for the maintenance of the security, territorial integrity, and independence of Israel and all other states in the area. Although this principle is

not manifested by any formal defense or security agreement between the United States and Israel, it has been enunciated by successive U.S. Presidents.

U.S. policy related to a Near East peace settlement is based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967, Resolution 242 includes the basic concepts of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency by all parties; respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area; and the right of all people in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It also affirms the need for freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and a guarantee of territorial inviolability and political independence for every state in the area.

With Resolution 242 as the cornerstone of U.S. policy, the United States has actively pursued its efforts to help Israel and its Arab neighbors reach peace.

The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 offered new opportunities for peace. The United States and the Soviet Union took the lead in helping to bring about the cease-fire. In the Security Council, the United States supported Resolution 338, which reaffirmed Resolution 242 as the approved framework for Middle East peace and called, for the first time, for negotiations between the parties aimed at establishing a just and durable peace.

A negotiating framework for the achievement of peace was established with the opening of the Geneva peace conference in December 1973 under the cochairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union. This marked the first time Arabs and Israelis had met with the aim of peace negotiations. The conference met for only one session.

The achievement of the cease-fire did not mean either the end of sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines or the dissipation of military

tension in the area. The United States set about to help the parties reach agreement on cease-fire stabilization and military disengagement. Implementation of these agreements with Egypt was completed by March 5, 1974, with Israeli forces pulling back from the canal and Egypt assuming control of both banks of the canal. Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974.

Although the parties failed to agree to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, further efforts by the United States resulted in an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1975 which provided for another Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula, a limitation of forces, and three observation stations staffed by U.S. civilians in a U.N.-maintained buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

Many obstacles to the achievement of peace in the area remain, but the essential basis has been formed in the broad acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the achievement of important military stabilization agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria that have reduced tension in the area.

The achievement of a military balance in the area—a central part of U.S. policy—has done much to encourage all sides to seek a settlement by negotiation rather than through military action.

Publicly and privately, the United States has sought to achieve limitations of arms shipments to the area. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not shown an inclination to cooperate.

The United States is convinced that until effective limitations are agreed upon, its policy of maintaining the military balance while avoiding actions which would lead to an escalating arms race is the best way to promote both stability and a peace settlement.

Much progress toward peace in the Middle East has been achieved, and the United States has played an important role in promoting it. Even though many difficult issues remain to be resolved between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the United States will continue to do all it can to help the parties reach a real peace.



**Principal U.S. Officials**

Ambassador—vacant

Deputy Chief of Mission—Thomas J. Dunnigan

Counselor for Economic/Commercial Affairs—William B. Dozier

Counselor for Public Affairs (USIS)—Stanley D. Moss

Counselor for Political Affairs—John E. Crump

Counselor for Administration—Leon J. Bajek

Defense and Air Attache—Col. Schuyler Bissell

Army Attache—Col. Bruce F. Williams

Navy Attache—Lt. Cdr. Ronald Swinnerton

Chief, Consular Section—James E. Kerr

Consul General, Jerusalem—Michael H. Newlin

The U.S. Embassy in Israel is located at 71 Hayarkon Street, Tel Aviv (tel. 54338). The Consulate General is at 18 Agron Road, Jerusalem (tel. 226312).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7752, Revised January 1977

Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

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**APPENDIX I.G**

**JORDAN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

**[Washington, Department of State, June 1977. (Publication 7956).]**



# background NOTES

## Jordan

department of state \* june 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

### PEOPLE

Jordanians are of Arab stock except for a few small communities of Circassians, Armenians, and Kurds, groups which have long since adapted themselves to the Arab culture. The official language is Arabic, but English is used widely in commercial and official sectors.

Slightly more than 50 percent of Jordan's population is rural, about 44 percent is fully urban, and less than 6 percent is nomadic or seminomadic. About one-third of the population lives on the West Bank of the Jordan River (a portion of former Palestine currently under Israeli military oc-

cupation). Most of the people live where there is enough rainfall to support normal cultivation.

Approximately 1,050,000 Palestinian Arabs, including more than 850,000 registered refugees and displaced persons, reside on the East Bank. All Palestinians living in Jordan enjoy Jordanian citizenship.

### HISTORY

The land which became Jordan is part of the Fertile Crescent and has shared in much of the glory and travail of that richly historical region. Its historical period began around 2000 B.C., when Semitic Amorites settled around

the Jordan River in the area called Canaan. Subsequent invasions and conquests included those by the Hittites, Habirus (Hebrews), Egyptians, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arab Muslims, Crusaders, Egyptians and Mamluks, and finally, Ottoman Turks, who dominated the region from the 16th to the early 20th centuries. From the end of World War I, the regions now known as Israel and Jordan were awarded to the United Kingdom as the mandate for Palestine and Transjordan, a part of the system of League of Nations mandates. (Historically, Palestine lay to the west and Transjordan to the east of the Jordan River.) In 1922 the

### PROFILE

#### People

POPULATION: 2.8 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.2% (1975). DENSITY: 75 per sq. mi. (29 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Mostly Arab, but small communities of Circassians, Armenians, Kurds. RELIGIONS: Sunni Moslem (95%), Christian (5%). LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English. LITERACY: 55%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 52 yrs.

#### Geography

AREA: 37,100 sq. mi. (96,088 sq. km.); slightly larger than Ind. CAPITAL: Amman (pop. 600,000). OTHER CITIES: Irbid (115,000), Az-Zarqa (225,000).

#### Government

TYPE: Constitutional monarchy. INDEPENDENCE: May 25, 1946. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: January 8, 1952.

BRANCHES: Executive—King (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of Minister (Cabinet). Legislative—bicameral National Assembly (appointed Senate, elected Chamber of Deputies). Judicial—civil, religious, special courts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Only the government-sponsored Arab National Union is officially recognized. SUFFRAGE: Males over 20. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 8 Governorates.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: Approx. 13% of GNP.

FLAG: Three horizontal bands of black, white, and green joined at the hoist by a red triangle with a white star in the middle.

#### Economy

GDP: \$850 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 6% (1973-76). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$523 (1975). AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INFLATION: 13% (1973-76).

AGRICULTURE: Land 11%. Labor 23% (1975). Products—wheat, fruits, vegetables, olive oil.

INDUSTRY: Labor 67% (1975). Products—phosphate, petroleum refining, cement production.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Phosphate, potash.


TRADE: Exports—\$130 million (1976): fruits, vegetables, phosphate. Partners—Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, India. Imports—\$650 million (1976): machinery, transportation equipment, cereals, petroleum products. Partners—US, UK, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Jordan dinar=US\$3.13.

US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: \$1.1 billion (1952-76): loans, grants, PL 480 (Food for Peace) programs.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Arab League and a number of Arab regional organizations; UN and several of its specialized agencies, e.g., FAO, IAEA, IBRD, WHO, IMF.





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British divided the administration of the mandate, establishing the semi-autonomous Emirate of Transjordan ruled by the Hashemite Prince Abdullah and continuing the administration of Palestine under a British High Commissioner.

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The mandate over Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946, and on May 25 the country became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. It continued to have a special mutual defense treaty relationship with the United Kingdom until 1957,

when the treaty was dissolved by mutual consent.

When the British mandate over Palestine ended on May 14, 1948, and the State of Israel was proclaimed, an armed conflict developed between the Israelis and Palestinian Arab nation-



alists, aided by neighboring Arab States (including Transjordan). Jordan's western boundary with Israel was demarcated by the armistice agreement of April 3, 1949, and in 1950 the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to include those portions of Arab Palestine annexed by King Abdullah.

By virtue of its signature to a mutual defense pact in May 1967 with Egypt, Jordan participated in the June 1967 hostilities between Israel and the Arab States of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. The 6-day war resulted in Israeli occupation of all western Jordanian territory as far as the Jordan River, including the Jordanian-controlled sector of Jerusalem.

The 1967 war brought about a large increase in the number of Palestinians living on Jordan's East Bank. (Its Palestinian refugee population—700,000 in 1966—swelled by another 300,000 refugees and displaced persons from the West Bank.) The period following the 1967 war saw a marked upsurge in the power and importance of Palestinian resistance (*fedayeen*) elements on the East Bank.

Differing with the Jordanian Government's policies both in theory and in practice, the heavily armed and highly motivated *fedayeen* constituted a growing threat to the sovereignty and security of the Hashemite regime. Tensions between the government and the *fedayeen* increased until, in June 1970, open conflict erupted.

Attempts were made by other Arab governments to work out a peaceful solution, but by September continuing *fedayeen* actions in Jordan—including the destruction of three international airliners held hostage in the desert east of Amman—caused the government to try to regain completely control over its territory and all the peoples living there. Heavy fighting broke out, in which a Syrian tank force (camouflaged as a Palestinian force) initially took up positions in northern Jordan in support of the *fedayeen*. After several days of tense developments, the Syrian force withdrew, and the Jordanian Army rapidly gained the initiative over the *fedayeen*. By September 22, Arab Foreign Ministers meeting at Cairo had arranged a ceasefire beginning the following day. Sporadic violence continued, however, until Jor-

danian forces won a decisive victory over the *fedayeen* in July 1971, expelling them from the country. Since that time, the *fedayeen* have not presented an internal threat to the Jordanian Government.

There was no fighting along the Jordan River ceasefire line during the October 1973 war. However, Jordan did send a brigade to Syria, where it was engaged in combat with Israeli units in Syrian territory.

## GEOGRAPHY

Jordan, a country of rocky deserts, mountains, and rolling plains, is predominantly arid; 88 percent of the land is desert or waste, 11% is agricultural, and only 1 percent is forested. The dominant topographical feature is the great north-south Jordan Rift Valley (a branch of the great African Rift Valley system) forming the depression of the Jordan River Valley, Lake Tiberias, and the Dead Sea (nearly 1,300 feet—396 m.—below sea level). The Jordan River divides Jordan into two regions—the East Bank and the West Bank. Immediately east of the river and the Dead Sea is the edge of a high plateau which receives moderate rainfall. The greater part of the East Bank, however, is an extension of the Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert. The small area west of the river is hilly and receives a fair amount of rainfall.

The country has a Mediterranean climate, with a rainy season from November to March and very dry weather for the rest of the year. Temperatures at Amman range from an average of 50°F (10°C) in January to an average of 90°F (32°C) in August.

## GOVERNMENT

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on the Constitution promulgated on January 8, 1952. Executive authority is vested in the King and the Council of Ministers. The King signs and executes all laws. He also holds veto power subject to override by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the National Assembly. He appoints and may dismiss all judges by decree, approves amendments to the Constitution, declares war, and commands the armed forces. All Cabinet decisions, court judgments, and the national cur-

## TRAVEL NOTES

**Climate and Clothing**—Climate is moderate, but seasons vary enough to require a diversified wardrobe. Conservative dress is appropriate.

**Customs**—A valid Jordanian visa is necessary for entry. Presently, persons whose passports contain Israeli visas are admitted only under special circumstances and with great difficulty. Therefore, you should not attempt to transit Israel en route to Amman. Smallpox immunization is required.

**Health**—Good medical and surgical care is available in Amman. Avoid uncooked vegetables and salads, tap water, and nonpasteurized milk.

**Telecommunications**—Long-distance telephone service is provided to the U.S., Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and most European cities. Telegraph service is available.

**Transportation**—Amman is serviced by several Middle East and European airlines. Direct air transportation to the U.S. by American carriers is available from Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, Athens, or Rome. Taxis are available in Amman; tipping is not customary.

**Touring**—Jordan has a number of sites of historical and archeological significance. Among them are: Jerash, one of the best preserved Greco-Roman cities in the world (it is still undergoing excavation and restoration); Madaba, which dates back to the middle bronze age (2000-1500 B.C.) and is mentioned in the Bible as a Moabite town; Petra, the city built out of reddish rock formations, lost to the world for hundreds of years until its rediscovery in the 19th century; Aqaba, established in the 13th century B.C. and Jordan's only seaport.

rency are issued in his name; he is immune from all liability for his acts.

The Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, is appointed by the King, who may dismiss other Cabinet members at the request of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies on matters of general policy and can be forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of "no confidence" by that body.

Legislative power rests in a bicameral National Assembly. The 30-Member Senate is appointed by the King for an 8-year term. Senators are



## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on Jordan. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

Abidi, Aqil Hyder Hasan. *Jordan: A Political Study, 1948-1957*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965.

American University. *Area Handbook for Jordan*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.

Glubb, Sir John Bagot. *Syria, Lebanon, Jordan*. New York: Walker, 1967.

Glubb, Sir John Bagot. *A Soldier With the Arabs*. New York: Harper, 1957.

King Hussein. *Uneasy Lies the Head*. New York: Geis, 1962.

Rogers, William P. *A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

Snow, Peter. *Hussein: A Biography*. London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972.

from the West and East Banks, but there is no requirement regarding the number to be chosen from each area. The 60-Member Chamber of Deputies is elected by adult male suffrage to a 4-year term subject to dissolution by the King. Traditionally, 30 Deputies are from the West Bank and 30 from the East Bank; the Israeli occupation of the West Bank has not affected this balanced representation. Of the 60 seats, 50 must go to Muslims and 10 to Christians.

Three categories of courts—civil, religious, and special—are provided for by the Constitution.

Administratively, Jordan is divided into eight Governorates, each headed by a Governor appointed by the King. They are the sole authorities for all government departments and development projects in their respective areas.

### Principal Government Officials

Chief of State—King Hussein I

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### Council of Ministers

Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs—Mudhar Badran

Agriculture—Salah Jum'a

Communications—Abd al-Raouf Rawabdeh

Culture and Youth—Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf

Development and Reconstruction—Hasan Ibrahim

Education—Dr. Abd al-Salam al-Majali

Finance and Customs—Muhammad Dabbas

Health—Dr. Khaled Shami (acting)

Industry and Commerce—Dr. Najm al-Din Dajani

Information—Adnan Abu Odeh

Interior—Sulaiman 'Arar

Justice—Ahmad abd al-Karim Tarawneh

Labor—'Isam 'Ajluni

Municipal and Rural Affairs—Ibrahim Ayyoub

Public Works—Sa'id Bino

Religious Affairs and Holy Places—Kamel al-Sharif

State for Foreign Affairs—Hasan Ibrahim

State for Prime Ministry Affairs—Dr. Abd al-Salam Majali

Supplies—Marwan Qasem

Tourism and Antiquities—Ghaleb Barakat

Transport—Ali Ishaiymat

Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdullah Salah

Ambassador to the U.N.—Hazem Nuseibeh

Jordan maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2319 Wyoming Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-205-1606).

### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

King Hussein is the central figure in Jordan. Since his reign began in 1953, he has weathered a series of difficult crises and has always been strongly and loyally supported by the Jordan Arab Army, the former famed Arab Legion.

Principal political events in the period 1972-76 include the announcement by King Hussein in March 1972 of his United Arab Kingdom plan, a proposal for a federal Jordan in which the Palestinians would enjoy a large

measure of autonomy in the West Bank wing of the Kingdom. The plan would be implemented following Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.

Following the October 1974 Arab summit conference (at Rabat at which King Hussein acquiesced in a general Arab decision to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians), the Jordanian Government was obliged to reassess its traditional role as spokesman for Palestinians residing on the West Bank. King Hussein dissolved Parliament and appointed a new Senate in which the percentage of Palestinians was reduced from 50 percent to 20 percent, and a new Cabinet was formed with fewer Palestinians represented.

Despite these developments, the Amman government has retained considerable ties with the West Bank. The government still channels funds to West Bank municipalities, continues to pay salaries to West Bank officials who were on its payroll prior to 1967, and provides modest financial support for certain West Bank development projects. It has also tacitly followed an "open-bridges" policy with regard to travel and agricultural commerce across the Jordan River. Many West Bank leaders have paid regular visits to Amman for consultations with Jordanian Government officials.

In February 1976, King Hussein briefly reconvened Parliament to ratify a Royal Decree amending the Constitution in order to postpone lower-house Parliamentary elections scheduled for that spring. The elections were put off indefinitely, and the Parliament was dissolved a second time.

In July 1976, Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifai submitted the resignation of his Cabinet, which he had headed since 1973. King Hussein appointed a new Cabinet under Mudhar Badran, whose government has been focusing largely on domestic issues such as inflation and economic development.

### ECONOMY

As late as 1958 Jordan was thought to have little economic future. It had few natural resources, no industry, a mere handful of hotels to house tourists, a serious need for adequately



paved roads, and low agricultural production relying almost exclusively on limited rainfall; moreover, much of the large refugee population was unemployed or underemployed.

Despite these handicaps Jordan's economy grew rapidly in the decade prior to the June 1967 war. Through effective use of foreign assistance—primarily grant aid from the United States—the gross national product (GNP) rose from about \$140 million in 1954 to more than \$575 million in 1967. It dropped slightly in 1970 to an estimated \$567 million. Per capita GNP reached \$250 in 1967, increasing at an annual rate of 9 percent. In 1970 it was about \$270.

All major sectors of the economy expanded: thousands of acres of newly irrigated farmland in the Jordan River Valley were brought under cultivation; a number of light industries were established; modern port facilities were developed at Aqaba; and income from tourism increased dramatically after steps were taken to preserve historical sites and build better roads and resort facilities. Jordan also developed its phosphate deposits for export and is planning to extract potash from the Dead Sea.

Immediately prior to the 1967 war the prospects for continued economic growth in Jordan were favorable. However, the economy suffered a major setback from the war; Jordan not only lost the income-producing West Bank and a significant portion of its population along with it but also was burdened with about 300,000 additional refugees and displaced persons.

By 1972, Jordan's economy had recovered the position that it has lost following 1967 war; during the 1973-75 3-year plan period the economy achieved a real growth rate in the gross domestic product of nearly 6 percent per year. The 1976-80 5-year plan is ambitious and optimistic, calling for a \$2.3 billion investment over the period and a real growth rate of 10 percent per year. Several industrial and mineral extraction projects are being constructed or planned.

Obstacles to sustained economic growth are inflation, a growing shortage of skilled labor (higher wages abroad attract skilled workers away), and a limited domestic market.

Amman's cost-of-living index increased by 20 percent in 1974 and again in 1975. For the economy as a whole, the rate of inflation during 1976 was estimated variously at between 14 and 22 percent.

The threat to economic development posed by recurring inflation is regarded as a serious one. Unemployment is no longer the problem that it had been for decades; in fact, inability to supply the demand for skilled workers is now a serious problem.

Foreign assistance plays a vital role and will continue to do so for several years at least. Annual cash grants from the United States and Arab countries amount presently to about \$90 million, although that amount may decrease somewhat in future years. Remittances to the Jordan Government from earnings by Jordanians abroad amount to \$300 million a year.

In development efforts for Jordan, the United States has been joined by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides direct support for the refugee population, also enjoys heavy financial participation by the United States.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

Jordan has consistently followed a pro-Western foreign policy and has been particularly friendly to the United States and the United Kingdom. It has never recognized Israel and, since the June 1967 war, a major objective of Jordanian foreign policy has been the recovery of those territories occupied by Israel in the course of the war. Jordan has worked persistently for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which sets forth the principles for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency; respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area; the right of the people in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; freedom of naviga-

tion through international waterways in the area; a just settlement of the refugee problem; and a guarantee of territorial inviolability and political independence for every state in the area.

Jordan joined the peacemaking process initiated by the United States following the October 1973 war. The issues in which Jordan has a particular interest—e.g., the future disposition of the West Bank, the status of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian question—constitute the most complex and emotional problems of the Middle East dispute. Although the precise role to be played by Jordan in negotiations regarding these and other key issues connected with future Middle East peacemaking efforts has been uncertain since the 1974 Arab summit decisions at Rabat, Jordanian policy remains strongly supportive of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jordan's relations with its Arab neighbors have improved since the 1974 Arab summit conference at Rabat, and there has been a trend toward closer political and economic ties between Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. Ties with Syria have progressed particularly well, with improved bilateral cooperation in cultural, commercial, economic, and social fields being carried on within a framework of joint Jordanian-Syrian commissions supervised at the highest level by King Hussein and Syrian President Assad.

## U.S.-JORDAN RELATIONS

Relations between Jordan and the United States have been close for more than 2 decades. A primary objective of U.S. policy since the 1967 war has been to assist in securing a just and equitable settlement of the issues arising from the Arab-Israeli war. The continued independence and stability of moderate Jordan is an essential element in the search for peace. Jordan must be strong and viable to make a positive contribution toward an enduring peace in the area. Accordingly, through economic and military assistance and by diplomatic support, the United States has helped to maintain Jordan's independence.



U.S. economic assistance to Jordan in fiscal year (FY) 1976 included \$52 million in budget support grants and a special "interim quarter" grant of \$51 million, an increase from the fiscal years 74 and 75 amounts of \$45 million and \$67.5 million respectively. Technical assistance of \$2.8 million for agricultural studies, technical training, and feasibility studies was also extended. This represents a three-fold increase from the FY 74 figure of \$967,000. Development loans totaling \$18 million were provided for new schools and roads and for studies on the proposed potash and Marqarin Dam projects. The PL 480 "Food for Peace" program supplied \$12.2 million worth of wheat and basic foodstuffs.

The U.S. military assistance program (MAP)—designed to meet Jordan's legitimate defense and internal security requirements—has been continuous since 1950. The U.S. assistance has been in the form of grant aid and foreign military sales (FMS)

credit. Total military aid through 1976 was \$1.2 billion. The FY 76 figure was \$5.5 million in grant military aid and \$82.5 million in FMS credit.

The United States continues to maintain close and friendly relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which it regards as a key factor in ongoing efforts to achieve a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. U.S. and Jordanian policymakers have consulted frequently throughout the course of the peacemaking process which began immediately following the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In February 1977, Secretary Vance included an official visit to Amman in his factfinding tour of various Mideast capitals, and King Hussein made an official working visit to Washington in April 1977 for consultations with President Carter and senior Administration officials regarding the future prospects and direction of the settlement effort.

On the bilateral plane, a U.S.-Jor-

danian Joint Commission, comprising both economic and military working groups, has functioned regularly since 1974 for the purpose of reviewing ways in which cooperation between the two countries can be developed to the fullest mutual benefit.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Thomas R. Pickering  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Roscoe S. Suddarth  
Political Section Chief—T. MacAdams Deford  
Economic Section Chief—Lloyd R. George  
U.S. AID Director—Christopher Russell  
Public Affairs Officer—John P. Foster  
Counsel—Wyatt Johnson

The U.S. Embassy in Jordan is located on Jebel Amman, Amman, across from the Intercontinental Hotel (tel. 44371-6).

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7956, Revised June 1977 Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

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**APPENDIX I.H**

**KUWAIT  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1977. (Publication 7855).]



# background NOTES

## Kuwait

department of state \* december 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: State of Kuwait

### PEOPLE

The people of the State of Kuwait (kōō-wāt) are primarily Arab in origin, but less than half are indigenous. Large numbers of Arabs from nearby states have settled in Kuwait, especially since oil production began to bring prosperity in the late 1940's. There are also sizable Iranian and Indian communities.

The native Kuwaitis are largely Sunni Muslims. The literacy rate, estimated at about 80 percent, is one of the highest in the Arab world. This is due in part to government emphasis on Kuwait's educational system. Public school education is free, and the government sends qualified students abroad for university study. About 2,000 Kuwaitis are students in the United States.

### HISTORY

Kuwait's modern history began with the founding of the city of Kuwait around 1740 by members of the Uteiba section of the Anaiza tribe who wandered northward from the region of Qatar. Its first definite contact with other states was between 1775 and 1779, when the British-operated Persian Gulf-Aleppo Mail Service was diverted from Persian-occupied Basra (in Iraq) to go through Kuwait.

During the 19th century, Kuwait at different times tried to obtain British support to maintain its independence from the Turks and various powerful Arabian Peninsula tribal movements, including the Ibn Rashids and the Wahabis.

In 1899 Shaikh Mubarak, surnamed "the Great," signed an agreement with



the United Kingdom pledging himself and his successors neither to cede any territory nor to receive agents or representatives of any foreign power without British Government consent. The

### PROFILE

#### People

POPULATION: 1,050,000 (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 6% (including immigration). DENSITY: 135 per sq. mi. (52 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab (85%), Iranian, Indian, Pakistani (13%). RELIGION: Islam (95%). LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English widely spoken. LITERACY: ca. 80%.

#### Geography

AREA: About 7,780 sq. mi. (20,150 sq. km.); slightly smaller than N.J. CAPITAL: Kuwait (pop. 800,000). OTHER TOWNS: Ahmadi.

#### Government

TYPE: Constitutional monarchy, governed by an Amir chosen by consensus of the ruling al-Sabah family from its own

members. INDEPENDENCE: June 19, 1961. SUFFRAGE: Males over 21. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: Government is centralized.

FLAG: Three horizontal stripes (green, white, and red) joining a black trapezoid at the staff side.

#### Economy

GNP: \$11.5 billion (FY 1975-76); \$12.5 billion (FY 1976-77 est.). PER CAPITA GNP: \$11,500 (FY 1976-77 est.). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: More than 18%.

AGRICULTURE: Arable land less than 1%. Most food is imported.

INDUSTRY: Petroleum, private business, and government employ most of the labor force; 75% non-Kuwaiti. Products—crude and refined oil, fertilizer, chemicals, building materials, shrimp. Water desalinization capacity about 60 million imperial gallons per day (1976 est.).

NATURAL RESOURCES: Petroleum, fish, shrimp.


TRADE: Exports—\$9.6 billion (CY 1976): 96% crude and refined petroleum, shrimp. Imports—\$3.3 billion (CY 1976 c.i.f.): foodstuffs, automobiles, building materials, machinery, textiles. Partners—Japan, US, UK, Federal Republic of Germany.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Kuwaiti dinar=US\$3.50.

ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED: ca. \$550 million (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) loans, 1960-76); ca. \$3 billion (other loans and grants, largely since 1967).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Arab League, UN, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (IBRD).





British in return agreed to grant an annual subsidy to support the Shaikh and his heirs and to afford them the United Kingdom's offices.

From then until 1961 Kuwait enjoyed special treaty relations with the United Kingdom, and foreign affairs were handled by the British. There was stability of rule, with Shaikh Ahmad governing from 1921 until his death in 1950 and Shaikh Abdullah from 1950 to 1965. By early 1961 the British had withdrawn their special court system, which handled the cases of foreigners resident in Kuwait, and the Kuwait Government began to exercise legal jurisdiction over all persons under new laws drawn up by an Egyptian jurist.

On June 19, 1961, Kuwait became fully independent by virtue of an exchange of notes with the United Kingdom.

On December 18, 1969, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement formally dividing the Neutral Zone and demarcating a new international boundary between the two countries. Prior to that date the Neutral Zone was an area of about 2,000 square miles (5,180 sq. km.) adjoining the southern border of Kuwait proper. Efforts to reach agreement on the division of the Neutral Zone's territorial waters have so far been unsuccessful. Both countries continue to share a joint interest in the former Neutral Zone's mineral resources.

## GEOGRAPHY

The State of Kuwait is located in the northeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, bounded on the north and west by Iraq, on the south by Saudi Arabia, and on the east by the Persian Gulf. Summer temperatures reach 130°F (54°C). Rainfall averages less than 4 inches (10 cm) annually.

Kuwait City is the capital, major port, and commercial center. More than half the country's population lives in this city and its immediate suburbs.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy. The Head of State is the Amir, who is chosen by consensus of the ruling al-Sabah family from its own members. The Constitution was promulgated in 1962. In August 1976, the Amir suspended several of its articles pending revision by a select committee and submission for approval, either by referendum or by the National Assembly, by August 28, 1980. The Amir also dissolved the National Assembly in August 1976; the timing of the assembly's reconvening is not clear—an election will be required. Pending reconvening of the assembly, legislative power is vested in the Council of Ministers, selected by the Prime Minister, who is, in turn, appointed by the Amir.

The judicial system in Kuwait was reorganized in 1959 by the promulgation of a law which established courts of law and adopted modern codes to cope with the new necessities of modern society. Criminal and civil codes are under revision with the help of foreign consultants.

Political parties do not exist in Kuwait. A 1964 law authorized formation of labor unions under detailed government regulation.

Kuwait has experienced an unprecedented era of prosperity and well-being under the guidance of Amir Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah and his late brother, Amir Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, who died in 1965 after ruling for 15 years. The country has undergone a remarkable transformation into a highly developed welfare state with a free economy.



### Principal Government Officials

Amir—His Highness Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah  
 Prime Minister—Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah  
 Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Information—Jabir al-'Ali al-Salim al-Sabah

### Other Ministers

Planning—Mohamed Yusuf al-Adasani  
 Education—Jasim Khalid ad-Dawud al-Marzuq  
 Housing—Hamad Mubarak al-'Ayyar  
 Public Works—Humud Yusuf al-Nisf  
 Interior and Defense—Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah  
 Social Affairs and Labor—Salim Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah  
 Communications—Sulayman Humud al-Zayd al-Khalid  
 Foreign Minister—Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah  
 Finance—'Abd ar-Rahman Salim al-'Atiqi  
 Public Health—Dr. 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Abdallah al-'Awadi  
 Cabinet Affairs—'Abd al-'Aziz Husayn  
 Religious Trusts and Islamic Affairs—Yusuf Jassim al-Hajji  
 Justice—'Abdallah Ibrahim al-Mufarrij  
 Electricity and Water—'Abdallah Yusuf Ahmad al-Ghanim  
 Oil—'Abd al-Muttalib 'Abd al-Husayn al-Kadhimi  
 Commerce and Industry—'Abd al-Wahhab Yusuf al-Nifisi  
 Legal and Administrative Affairs—Salman al-Duajj  
 Ambassador to the U.S.—Khalid M. Jaffar  
 Ambassador to the U.N.—Abdullah Yacoub Bisharah

Kuwait maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 2940 Tilden St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-966-0702).

### ECONOMY

In 1937 the Shaikh of Kuwait granted an oil concession to the Kuwait Oil Co. (KOC), a company which for many years was owned jointly by the British Petroleum Co. and Gulf Oil Corp. On January 1, 1973, the Government of Kuwait acquired a 25-percent share of KOC. This rose to 100 percent in 1976. Two other oil companies operate under

Kuwaiti concessions. The American Independent Oil Co. (AMINOIL), a subsidiary of R.J. Reynolds Co., has been producing oil in the former Neutral Zone's offshore area since 1954. The Japanese-owned Arabian Oil Co. has produced oil since 1961 from a former Neutral Zone offshore concession. The Kuwait-Spanish Petroleum Co. (51-percent-owned by the Kuwait National Petroleum Co.) had exploration rights in onshore areas relinquished by KOC, but gave these up in late 1976.

The Government of Kuwait, in late 1977, was negotiating the takeover of AMINOIL assets in Kuwait.

With an estimated 70 billion barrels of oil, Kuwait has more proved and probable petroleum reserves than any country in the world except Saudi Arabia. Of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members, it ranks third, after Saudi Arabia (11.5 million barrels per day—b/d) and Iran (6.7 million b/d) in terms of estimated productive capacity, being able to produce 3 million b/d. Because of Kuwait's oil conservation policy and market factors, oil production has averaged about 2 million b/d since 1975.

Kuwait is in the enviable position of having enormous oil wealth in relation to its population, producing over \$11,500 income per capita in 1976. Many social welfare, public works, and development plans have originated under government auspices due to oil wealth. These plans have modified greatly the previously austere lives of the inhabitants. Kuwait's broad range of government social services surpasses that of the Scandinavian countries in sheer scope and paternalism. Among the features are free medical services and education at all levels for Kuwaitis. Foreign nationals can pay relatively modest fees and obtain some state welfare services.

### Industry

Owing to its abundance and low cost, natural gas in Kuwait is considered the basic element in the country's industrialization program. Kuwait's industrial sector includes the world's largest water distillation plants; five oil refineries; and ammonia, desulfurizing, fertilizer, and

### READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

- American University. *Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.  
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brick, block, and cement plants. Kuwait plans to spend over \$15 billion between 1977 and 1981 on development projects, primarily for infrastructure, electricity and water, communications, housing, health, and road construction.

### Agriculture

Agriculture is limited owing to the lack of arable land, but the government has experimented in growing food through hydroponics (a technique of growing plants in solutions instead of in soil). Fish and shrimp are plentiful in territorial waters, and large-scale commercial fishing has been undertaken locally and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.

### Trade and Aid

The Kuwait dinar is a strong currency backed 100 percent by gold and foreign-exchange holdings. Government revenues are estimated at more than \$8 billion for fiscal year 77-78.



## TRAVEL NOTES

**Clothing**—Light clothing most of the year; however, winter months are cool. Visitors are advised to dress conservatively when visiting public places; however, dress for social functions is similar to that worn in the West.

**Entry Regulations**—Visas must be obtained from the Embassy of Kuwait in Washington or its Consulate in New York City.

**Health**—Visitors should exercise care regarding what they eat and drink. Several British doctors and a number of U.S.-trained doctors practice in Kuwait. Cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever vaccinations are required. Health requirements change. Travelers should check the most current information.

**Telecommunications**—Local telephone service is good; international links are available. Satellite ground stations are in operation.

**Transportation**—Several airlines maintain service to Kuwait from major cities in Europe and the Near East. Kuwait's national airline is expanding its services. Most principal roads in Kuwait are four-lane. All-weather highways run north to Iraq and South to Saudi Arabia.

Non-petroleum exports consistently have been of minor significance, but large oil exports have permitted a usually favorable balance of trade. Kuwait's current account balance-of-payments surplus in 1976 was about \$2.1 billion, and net foreign assets at the end of 1976 probably amounted to nearly \$20 billion.

Kuwait has been a source of economic assistance to other Arab states since 1960, even before it was fully independent. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) is an autonomous state institution patterned after Western and international lending agencies. Beneficiaries include Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Egypt. In early 1974 the Fund's capitalization was increased to \$3.5 billion, and its lending mandate was expanded to include all—not just Arab—developing

countries. The Kuwait Government has also bestowed large sums in loans and grants to a number of Arab states, including: Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This aid, including payments to Egypt and Jordan agreed upon after the June 1967 war, is entirely separate from KFAED loans. Kuwait has disbursed significant sums to Arab countries through the Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Gulf Organization for the Reconstruction of Egypt.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

Since independence Kuwait has been evolving its own international identity. It joined the Arab League and a number of U.N. specialized agencies, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and was accepted into membership in the United Nations in May 1963.

In foreign policy Kuwait is closely oriented to other Arab states in the defense of general Arab interests. The government and people reflect strong support for Arab causes. Conducting a program of economic and financial assistance for other Arab countries serves to promote the state's basic objective: the preservation and strengthening of its sovereign independence. Kuwait has also played an active role in promoting the economic development and political stability of the smaller Arab emirates in the Persian Gulf.

The State's main foreign relations problem in its early years of independence was Iraq's claim to the shajkhdom following the June 1961 announcement of Kuwait's independence. Fearing an Iraqi military occupation, the Kuwait Amir requested British assistance in defending his country. The British complied by dispatching troops. Kuwait presented its case before the United Nations and successfully preserved its sovereignty. The British forces were later with-

drawn and replaced by troops from certain Arab League countries, which in turn were withdrawn at Kuwaiti request in January 1963.

Pressures from Iraq for annexation of Kuwait were moderated with the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in February 1963, and the succeeding Iraqi Government signed an agreement in October 1963 recognizing Kuwait's independence. However, on March 20, 1973, several armed clashes underlined Iraq's continuing nonacceptance of portions of the undemarcated boundary. In July 1977 the two countries agreed to withdraw their troops behind an agreed line and to establish both ministerial-level and technical bilateral committees to discuss border matters, including demarcation.

Kuwait established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1963, and in November 1964 the two countries signed an agreement for economic and technical cooperation.

## U.S.-KUWAIT RELATIONS

The United States supports Kuwait's independence and orderly development. Kuwait has played a constructive role in the Persian Gulf and shares U.S. views that states in the gulf should work closely together for their own security. There has been no U.S. economic assistance to Kuwait other than Export-Import Bank loans in support of commercial transactions.

A U.S. Consulate opened at Kuwait in October 1951 was elevated to Embassy status at the time of Kuwait's independence 10 years later.

### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Frank E. Maestroni  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Peter A. Sutherland  
Political Officer—Garrett G. Sweany  
Economic Officer—Stephen W. Buck  
Public Affairs Officer—Edmund A. Bator

The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait is located at Bneid al-Gar, Kuwait. The mailing address is P.O. Box 77, Kuwait (tel. 424156/8).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7855, Revised December 1977

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**APPENDIX I.I**

**LEBANON  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, June 1977. (Publication 7816).]



background  
NOTES

## Lebanon

department of state \* june 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Lebanon

## PEOPLE

The population of Lebanon is comprised of both Christians and Muslims. Although no official census has been taken since 1932, past government registration figures have indicated that the population is almost evenly divided between these two religions. In recent years, however, Muslims have claimed that they are now in the majority, a factor which contributed to tensions preceding the 1975-76 civil strife.

Many Christian sects are represented in Lebanon, including the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Arme-

nian; the Maronites, who are affiliated with Rome, make up the largest Christian group. Muslims include members from the *Sunni* and *Shi'ite* sects. Adherents to the Druze sect (a group deriving from Islam but differing strongly from it) constitute another large minority.

Although no figures are available, it is estimated that 600-900,000 persons fled the country during the civil strife. Many of these have yet to return, adding some uncertainty to population figures and the confessional (religious) "balance" of the country. Moreover, the casualty toll was high: perhaps as

many as 40,000 were killed and some 200,000 wounded.

Many Lebanese still derive their living from agriculture. The urban population, concentrated mainly in Beirut and Tripoli, is noted for its commercial enterprise. Lebanon has a higher proportion of skilled labor than any other eastern Arab country.

## HISTORY

Lebanon is the historical home of the Phoenicians, Semitic traders who based a maritime culture there for nearly 2,000 years (c. 2700-450 B.C.). In later centuries, its mountains were

PROFILE<sup>1</sup>

## People

POPULATION: 3,149,000 (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.1% (1973). DENSITY: 787 per sq. mi. (303 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: 93% Arab, 6% Armenian. RELIGIONS: About half Christian, half Moslem and Druze. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), Armenian, French, English. LITERACY: 86%.

## Geography

AREA: 4,000 sq. mi. (10,350 sq. km.); slightly smaller than Conn. CAPITAL: Beirut (pop. 1 million). OTHER CITY: Tripoli (128,000).

## Government

TYPE: Parliamentary republic. INDEPENDENCE: 1943. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: May 26, 1926 (amended).

BRANCHES: Executive—President (Chief of State, elected by simple majority of Parliament for 6-year term), Cabinet (ap-

pointed). Legislative—unicameral Parliament (99-member Chamber of Deputies elected for 4-year terms). Judicial—secular and religious courts; combination of Ottoman, civil, and canon law; no judicial review of legislative acts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Organized along sectarian lines around individuals whose followers are motivated by religious, clan, and ethnic considerations. SUFFRAGE: Males over 21, females over 21 with elementary education. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 5 Provinces.

FLAG: Two horizontal red bands bordering a broader white band on which a cedar tree is centered.

## Economy

GNP: \$3 billion (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 7-10%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$730. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: NA.

AGRICULTURE: Land 27%. Labor 49%. Products—fruits, wheat, corn, barley, potatoes, tobacco, olives, onions.

INDUSTRY: Labor 11%. Products—service industries, food processing, textiles, cement, oil refining, chemicals, some metal fabricating, tourism.

TRADE: Exports—\$355 million (f.o.b. 1972): fruits, vegetables, textiles. Partners—principally Arab countries. Imports—\$850 million (c.i.f. 1972): metals, machinery, foodstuffs. Partners—U.S., European Communities, Arab countries.


OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: LL1.00=US\$0.32 (May 1977).

U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: \$99.1 million (1946-61, bilateral aid including P.L. 480, title II). Relief and rehabilitation assistance: approx. \$70 million (1975-FY 77).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League.

<sup>1</sup>The figures given herein are those available before the 1975-76 conflict. New figures are not available. See text for explanation of the effects of the conflict upon these sectors.







a refuge for Christians, and even later, Crusaders established several strongholds there. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the five Ottoman provinces which had made up what is now Lebanon were mandated to France by the League of Nations. The country gained its independence in 1943, and French troops were withdrawn in 1946.

Lebanon's history since independence can largely be defined in terms of its Presidents, each of whom has shaped Lebanon by his personal brand of politics: Shaikh Bishara el-Khoury (1943-52), Camille Chamoun (1952-58), Fuad Chebab (1958-64), Charles Helou (1964-70), Suleiman Franjiah (1970-76), and Elias Sarkis (1976-).

The terms of the first two Presidents ended in political turmoil. During the last months of President Chamoun's term in 1958, an insurrection, intensely aggravated by external factors, broke out. On July 15, 1958, in response to the Lebanese Government's appeal, U.S. forces were sent to help the country safeguard its independence. These forces were withdrawn by October 25, 1958, after the inauguration of President Chebab and a general improvement in the internal and international aspects of the Lebanese situation.

President Franjiah's term saw the outbreak of full-scale civil conflict in 1975. For several years prior to 1975, difficulties had arisen over the large number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the presence there of Palestinian *fedayeen* commandos. Frequent clashes, involving Israeli forces and the *fedayeen*, endangered civilians in south Lebanon and had an unsettling effect on the country as a whole. Following minor skirmishes from time to time in the late 1960's and early 1970's, serious clashes erupted between the *fedayeen* and Lebanese Government forces in May 1973.

Coupled with the Palestinian problems, Muslim and Christian differences grew more intense, with occasional clashes between sectarian private militias. In April 1975 a busload of Pales-

tinians was ambushed in the Christian sector of Beirut by Christian gunmen, an incident which is widely regarded as the spark which touched off the civil strife. Palestinian *fedayeen* forces joined the leftist/Muslim side increasingly as the fighting persisted, and fighting eventually escalated and spread to most parts of the country.

In February 1976, a 17-point compromise formula for greater Muslim representation in the government—the so-called Baaba Document—was proposed by President Franjiah with Syrian support. The proposal failed to halt the fighting, however, and heavy clashes resumed.

A new President, Elias Sarkis, was elected in accordance with constitutional requirements in May and installed in September. Arab summits in Riyadh and Cairo in October set forth a plan to end the war. The resulting Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), composed largely of Syrian troops, moved to separate the combatants in November. Most fighting ended by December.

The Sarkis government was given emergency powers by the Parliament in late December and began an effort toward economic reconstruction to be followed by political reform.

## GEOGRAPHY

Lebanon, situated on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, is bounded on the north and east by Syria and on the south by Israel. Its principal topographic features are a narrow coastal plain behind which are the high Lebanese Mountains, the fertile Beqaa Valley, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains extending to the Syrian border. An estimated 64 percent of the land is desert, waste, or urban; 27 percent agricultural; and 9 percent forested.

The Litani River, which flows into the sea north of Tyre, is the main river and is the only purely national river in the Near East. The Hasbani River, which is one of the sources of the Jordan River, rises within Lebanon.

The climate is typically Mediterranean, resembling that of southern California. Temperatures rarely exceed

## TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Clothing should be suitable for hot, humid summers or cool, damp winters. The wettest months are December through March.

*Customs*—Visas are required and should be obtained before arrival. In case of need they can usually be obtained on arrival at the Beirut airport, but this is uncertain and time-consuming.

International health cards bearing valid smallpox (and yellow fever if one is traveling from a yellow fever zone) certificates are required. Immunizations for typhoid, poliomyelitis, paratyphoid, and gamma globulin should be kept current.

Lebanon, along with most Arab countries, forbids entry to anyone whose passport bears any indications of travel to or from Israel.

*Health*—The practice of medicine and surgery in Beirut is excellent, and a variety of doctors can be found. Beirut has several well-equipped hospitals, but most suffered considerable damage during the fighting and are now understaffed as a result of the departure of personnel. Boil tap water, and carefully prepare fruits, vegetables, and meats.

*Transportation*—Both regional and worldwide airlines serve Beirut's Khalde Airport, albeit on a reduced schedule since the conflict. Rail transportation was disrupted by the war and has not been restored. Beirut has an abundance of taxis, but bus service is minimal at the present time.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone service, once good, is still haphazard, although the government has made good headway in rebuilding the telephone system. Service and reception vary with demand and atmospheric conditions. Telegrams can be sent from the main post office or from hotels (for an additional charge).

90°F (32°C) during the hottest months, but humidity is high.

## GOVERNMENT

A series of amendments has substantially altered the Constitution of 1926. Article 95 provides that the confessional (religious) communities of Lebanon shall be equitably represented in public employment and in



### READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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Qubain, Fahim I. *Crisis in Lebanon*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961.

Salem, Elie Adib. *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Salibi, K.S. *The Modern History of Lebanon*. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Salibi, K.S. *Crossroads to Civil War in Lebanon: 1958-1976*. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan, 1976.

the composition of the Cabinet but that such a measure is not to impair the general welfare of the state. This article supplements the National Covenant of 1943, an unwritten agreement which laid the political foundations of modern Lebanon. The covenant provides that public offices shall be distributed among the recognized religious groups and that the three top positions in the governmental system shall be distributed as follows: the President is to be a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the President of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shi'ite Muslim.

Muslim dissatisfaction with what they considered to be an inequitable

distribution both of political power and of the benefits of Lebanese society played a role in the 1975-76 conflict.

The President has a strong and influential position. He appoints a Cabinet of Ministers and designates one of them to be Prime Minister. The President also has the authority to promulgate laws passed by Parliament, issue supplementary regulations to insure the execution of laws, negotiate and ratify treaties, and propose new laws to Parliament.

The Chamber of Deputies, which has been only sporadically active in the last two years, is elected by adult suffrage based on a system of proportional representation for the religious groups of the country. Most Deputies do not represent political parties as they are known in the West, nor do they form Western-type groupings in Parliament. The Chamber forms political blocs usually based on confessional and local interests or on personal allegiance rather than on political affinities. The Chamber has traditionally played a significant role in financial affairs, since it has the responsibility for levying taxes and passing the budget. It also exercises political control over the Cabinet through formal questioning of Ministers on policy issues and by requesting a confidence debate.

Lebanon's judicial system is based on that of France. Juries are not used. There are three levels of courts in the Lebanese system: Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation. There is also a system of confessional courts, which have jurisdiction on personal status matters within their own communities.

Lebanon is administratively divided into five Provinces: Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, and the Biqa. Each Province is headed by a Governor who is appointed by Presidential decree. Each Governor rules through a Provincial Council which is composed of members automatically seated because of their predominate position within the Province and others who are appointed to serve as members.

### Principal Government Officials

President—Elias Sarkis  
Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Trade—Salim al-Huss  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense—Fuad Butrus

#### Other Ministers

Justice and Finance—Farid Rufail  
Labor, Education, Agriculture—Asad Rizq  
Public Health—Ibrahim Shuaytu  
Planning—Michel Dumit  
Interior, Housing—Salah Salman  
Public Works and Transport, Tourism—Amin Bizri  
Ambassador to the U.S.—Najati Kabbani  
Ambassador to the U.N.—Edward Ghorra

Lebanon maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2560-28th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-332-0300).

### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

In addition to its own indigenous political groupings, Lebanon contains branches of perhaps all other political parties to be found in the Arab world. These cover the entire political spectrum from far left to far right—from totally secular in orientation to wholly religious in character. The Arab Christians and Muslims generally look to particular political parties and leaders, depending on the sect to which they belong. The Palestinian refugees, numbering around 400,000 and predominantly Muslim, constitute an important and sensitive minority. Arab guerrilla organizations (including al-Fatah, the strongest single grouping) exist in Lebanon, drawing their strength from the Palestinian refugees.

Lebanese political parties are unlike the huge umbrella organizations found in the United States. Rather, they are generally vehicles for powerful leaders whose followers are often of the same religious sect. The interplay for position and power among these leaders and groupings produces a political tapestry of extraordinary complexity for the Western observer.



In the past, this system worked to produce a viable democracy. Recent events, however, have upset the delicate Muslim-Christian balance and resulted in a tendency for Christians and Muslims to group themselves for safety into distinct zones. All factions have called for a reform of the political system. As of this writing, such reform is still giving way to the more urgent requirements for security and economic recovery. Some Christians favor political and administrative decentralization of the government with separate Muslim and Christian sectors operating in a confederated framework. Muslims, for the most part, prefer reunification, but with an enhanced percentage of the population. The reforms which are eventually achieved will probably define Lebanon's future as a democracy.

## ECONOMY

Lebanon's economy is based on private enterprise with few controls exercised by the government. Two-thirds of the GNP were drawn from services, primarily banking, commerce, and tourism. Lebanon depended heavily on transit trade. Beirut was the focal point for trading activity in the Middle East and acted as an important gold and foreign exchange market before the civil conflict. The government has estimated that about \$3 billion in physical damage and an additional \$4-5 billion in lost income resulted.

The destruction was particularly heavy in the heart of Lebanon's economy—Beirut. The commercial center of the city, home of most banks and international businesses, was almost totally destroyed. It is estimated that only 10% of Lebanon's industrial facilities are still functioning.

The Sarkis government has given first priority to economic reconstruction in the hope that a rebuilt, sound economy will serve as the basis for political stability. Ambitious rebuilding programs for both political and private sectors are being prepared.

Some key elements of Lebanon's economy survived the fighting and

provide positive indications that the reconstruction effort can be successful. Beirut's port, the largest Mideast transshipment point for goods transiting to the Arab world, is being rebuilt and is already open to limited shipping. The banking sector remained largely intact and most banks, including some international ones, have reopened. The Lebanese Government retains, furthermore, gold and foreign exchange reserves worth more than \$2 billion at current market rates. Moreover, the peculiar Lebanese expertise in commerce and trade will lend itself well to the rebuilding effort. In the longer term, whether Lebanon can regain its economic role in the Mideast will depend in large part on the measure of political stability achieved by the Sarkis government.

Except for a few large oil refineries and cement plants, industrial establishments in Lebanon are predominantly small and heavily concentrated in and around Beirut. Major industrial activities include food processing, manufacturing of textiles and other light industrial goods, and the production of building materials. Although Lebanon is dependent on imports for an important part of its food supply, agriculture is also a basic part of its economy.

Lebanon is an important trade partner of the United States, which has traditionally been Lebanon's leading supplier.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

Lebanon's foreign policy reflects its geographic location, the composition of its population, and its reliance on commerce and trade. The totality of these factors made Lebanon a bridge between the West and the Middle East, a status the Lebanese hope to regain.

Lebanon's basic foreign policy goal is to maintain good relations with numerous countries. Fundamentally pro-West, it follows a more or less neutral line in its relations with the Communist countries.

As an Arab state, Lebanon seeks to maintain the best possible relations with all other Arab states. Although it did not participate in the 1967 or

1973 Arab-Israeli wars, Lebanon sides with other Arab states on the question of a Middle East peace settlement. Lebanon's southern border with Israel is uncontested but has been the scene of frequent incidents prior to 1975 involving Israeli forces and the fedayeen.

The Christian half of the country has traditionally looked westward and is especially interested in friendly ties with Western countries, particularly the United States and France. However, the National Covenant of 1943 requires the Christians to forgo seeking foreign protection or attempting to bring Lebanon under foreign control or influence. At the same time the Covenant requires the Muslims to forgo any attempt to bring Lebanon into any form of Arab union.

## U.S.-LEBANON RELATIONS

The United States has a special interest in Lebanon as a haven of economic freedom and political democracy and stability in the Middle East. Without becoming identified with individuals or factions in Lebanon, the United States seeks to maintain its traditionally close ties with Lebanon, to help preserve its independence and integrity, and to promote that country's political stability and economic development. The United States believes that a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Lebanon can make an important contribution to stability and peace in the Middle East.

The United States supports the programs of President Sarkis to restore security, stability, and unity to Lebanon and to rebuild that country's national institutions. Beginning late in 1975, the U.S. Government gave concrete expression to its concern for Lebanon and its citizens by initiating a program of disaster assistance, concentrated initially in the medical field, for the victims of the conflict. Secretary of State Vance in February 1977 announced an expanded U.S. program of relief and rehabilitation assistance for Lebanon, bringing total U.S. aid as a result of the strife to about \$70 million. U.S. support and assistance to Lebanon reflects not only human and



historical ties between the two countries but also the importance that the United States attaches to the sovereignty and national unity of Lebanon.

The U.S. bilateral economic assistance program for Lebanon was terminated in 1961. Since then the United

States has sold (in 1970, 1972, and again in 1977) food to Lebanon on concessionary terms under P.L. 480, title I. Grants of food under P.L. 480, title II (for relief purposes) have totaled \$17.6 million from 1961 through 1973. In addition, the United States

has helped finance construction of the American University Hospital, Beirut, and has assisted the American University of Beirut by financing a portion of its operating budget and by providing scholarship assistance to some of its students.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7816, Revised June 1977  
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs

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**APPENDIX I.J**

**OMAN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, May 1975. (Publication 8070).]



background  
NOTES

## Oman

department of state \* may 1975

OFFICIAL NAME: Oman

## GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

Oman is in the southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Its boundaries to the northwest are largely undefined, but its territory includes the tip of the strategically important Musandam Peninsula, which juts into the Strait of Hormuz. Through this strait passes two-thirds of the world's oil exports.

Oman's part of this peninsula is separated from the rest of the country by territory of the United Arab Emirates. Oman faces the Gulf of Oman on the northeast and the Arabian Sea on the south, with a coastline stretching almost 1,000 miles. To the southwest, Oman borders the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Sultan of

Oman exercises jurisdiction over villages in the northwest Buraimi area, though his claim is disputed.

Although the country is not divided into precise districts, the following regions may be noted: the tip of the Musandam Peninsula; the fertile, populous Batinah coastal plain that stretches south to Muscat; the Muscat-Matrah coastal area; the mountainous interior or Green Mountain region, with its western foothills and desert fringes; the Province of Dhofar in the south; and the offshore island of al-Masirah.

Oman's climate is extremely hot and humid. Average monthly low and high temperatures for January are 65° and 77°F; for June, 84° and 94°F. Humidity usually ranges between 60-80 percent. Annual rainfall averages from 1.5 to 3.5 inches, with wide fluctuations throughout the country. Precipitation in several parts of the country is sufficient to permit cultivation by spring or well irrigation, but with present technology only about 0.2 percent of the total land area is being farmed.

About a third of the country's population lives in the relatively narrow Batinah coastal plain; over half live as nomads or in small towns in the interior; some 50,000 live in the isolated southern Province of Dhofar; and only about 5,000 live in the remote Musandam Peninsula. Significant minorities of Iranians, Baluchis, Indo-Pakistanis, and East Africans live along the northeast coast and are engaged primarily as merchants, soldiers, civil servants, and laborers.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 82,000-100,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Kansas; northwestern borders undemarked). CAPITAL: Muscat (pop. 7,000). OTHER CITIES: Matrah (est. pop. 20,000), Nizwa (est. 10,000), Salalah (est. 10,000).

## People

POPULATION: 750,000 (1974 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.1% (1972 est.). DENSITY: 8 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab, Iranian, Baluchi, East African, Pakistani. RELIGIONS: Ibadhi Muslim (50%), Sunni Muslim (Shafai, Hanbali, Wahhabi rites), some Hindus. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu, Indian dialects. LITERACY: 5%-10%

## Government

TYPE: Absolute monarchy. INDEPENDENCE: 1650. CONSTITUTION: None.

BRANCHES: Executive—Sultan. Legislative—none. Judicial—traditional Islamic judges and a nascent civil court system.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: None. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 1 Province (Dhofar), 9 Regions, and districts (*wilayats*).

FLAG: Vertical red band at staff side with crossed swords symbol on upper left and horizontal white, red, and green bands.

## Economy

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP): \$900 million (1974 est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$1,200.

AGRICULTURE: Land 0.2%. Labor 73%. Products—dates 37%, lucerne 15%, onions 10%, limes 10%, wheat, tobacco, bananas, mangoes, coconuts.

INDUSTRY: Labor 13%. Products—crude oil, fish, local construction.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Oil, some asbestos, marble, copper.


TRADE: Exports—\$179 million (1973): principally oil, dates, limes. Partners (oil)—Japan 35%, France 16%, Canada 9%. Imports—\$394.4 million (1974): machinery and transport equipment 39.3%, manufactured goods 21.9%, miscellaneous manufactured goods (e.g., TV's, radios, etc.) 16.4%, crude materials and lubricants 5.8%, chemicals 3.7%. Partners—United Arab Emirates 22%, U.K. 19%, Japan 9%.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Omani rial = US\$2.89.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: Total—unknown. U.S. only—small Peace Corps program.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF). Oman is not a member of OPEC.





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Since 1970 the government has given high priority to education. By the end of 1973 over 34,000 pupils were enrolled in more than 100 schools, the overwhelming majority in the first three primary grades. The general overall goal is to give every child a basic education rather than to create an elite in a society that is ill-equipped to absorb them. Students who wish a university degree must study abroad.

#### HISTORY

Although its early history is some-

what obscure, it is known that Muscat and Oman (as it was known before 1970) was converted to Islam in the seventh century, during the lifetime of Muhammad. Contact with Europe was first established in 1508 when the Portuguese conquered the coastal region. Their influence predominated for more than a century, with only a short interruption by the Turks, and remains of fortifications built during Portuguese occupation can still be seen at Muscat.

After the expulsion of the Portu-

guese by the Omani ruler in 1650 and while resisting Persian attempts to establish hegemony, the Sultanate extended its conquests to Zanzibar, and to the Portuguese settlements in East Africa and its dominions on the Arabian Peninsula. It established Omani trading colonies on the coast of Persia (now Iran) and also extended a measure of control over the Makran coast (now Pakistan) of mainland Asia. (The last remnant of its holding, Gwadar, was ceded to Pakistan in 1958.) By the early 19th century Muscat and Oman was the most powerful state in Arabia.

Except for a brief period of Persian rule, the Sultanate has remained independent since 1650. It was the object of Franco-British rivalry for influence throughout the 18th century. The British gradually developed a paramount position in 1798 through an Agreement of Friendship with Muscat and Oman. Two years later the Sultanate agreed to receive a resident British representative. During the 19th century Muscat and Oman and the U.K. concluded several treaties of friendship and commerce. Their traditional association was confirmed in 1951 by a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation by which the United Kingdom recognized the Sultanate as a fully independent state, and ties have remained friendly.

Toward the middle of the 19th century, sons of the ruler (who had died in 1856) quarreled over his succession. As a result of this struggle the empire was divided in 1861, through the mediation of the British Government under the so-called "Canning Award," into two separate principalities—Zanzibar and its east African dependencies, and Muscat and Oman. The former undertook to pay the Sultanate an annual subsidy, a practice which continued until Zanzibar became independent in early 1964.

The family of the present Sultan had ruled in the Muscat-Oman area since the mid-18th century. From 1913 to 1920 the Sultan was faced with a rebellion by members of the Ibadhi sect residing in the mountainous interior, who wanted to be ruled exclusively by their religious leader, the Imam of Oman. This conflict was resolved by the Treaty of Sib (or Seeb), which granted autonomy to the Imam's fol-



lowers while recognizing the sovereignty of the Sultan. When the Imam died in 1954, intermittent fighting broke out in support of his successor. The insurgents were decisively defeated in 1959. The Sultan then declared the Treaty of Sib terminated and voided the office of the Imam. In the early 1960's the exiled Imam obtained support from some Arab governments, but this support has since terminated.

In 1964 a separatist tribal revolt broke out in Dhofar Province. Later, aided by certain Communist and leftist governments, the rebels formed the Dhofar Liberation Front, which subsequently merged with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). The PFLOAG's declared intention was to overthrow all traditional regimes in the Gulf.

In mid-1974, PFLOAG shortened its name to the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman" (PFLO) and embarked on a political rather than a military approach to power in the other Gulf states, while continuing the guerrilla war in the Dhofar.

## GOVERNMENT

The Sultan of Oman is an absolute monarch who rules with the aid of his ministers. The Sultanate has no constitution, legislature, or legal political parties.

The judicial system is based almost exclusively on the Sharia, the Koranic laws, and oral teachings of Muhammad. Jurisdiction is exercised by qadis,

men versed in the religious code. In the less populated areas and among the bedouin, tribal custom is often the only law. Civil and criminal codes and a secular court system are being organized, but they will remain subordinated to the traditional system.

Administratively, the populated regions are divided into *wilayats* (districts) presided over by *walis* (governors) who are responsible for settling minor disputes, collecting taxes, and maintaining peace in their districts.

### Principal Government Officials

Sultan and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance—Qaboos Bin Said

Personal Adviser to the Sultan on Diplomatic Affairs—Sayyid Tariq Bin Taimur Al Bu Said

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—Qais Abdul-Munim Al-Zawawi

### Other Ministers

Interior; Deputy Minister of Defense—Sayyid Fahar Bin Taimur Al-Said  
Trade and Industry—Mohamed Al-Zubair

Agriculture, Fisheries, Petroleum and Minerals—Said Ahmed Al-Shanfary  
Information and Tourism—Sayyid Fahad Bin Mahmood Al-Said

Ambassador to the U.N. and U.S.—Ahmed Abd Al Nabi Macki

Oman maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 3242 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008.

## POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The present Sultan, Qaboos Bin

Said, assumed power on July 24, 1970, in a palace coup d'etat directed against his father, Said Bin Taimur, who fled the country and died in exile in London in 1972. The new Sultan was confronted with insurgency in a country plagued by endemic disease, illiteracy, and poverty.

Sultan Qaboos reorganized the Cabinet to give Omanis more positions of responsibility and brought his Uncle Tariq from exile to act as his personal adviser. Qaboos abolished many of his father's harsh and irritating restrictions, which had caused thousands of Omanis to leave the country. He launched a major development program to upgrade educational and health facilities, to build a modern infrastructure, and to develop the country's material resources.

In a major effort to curb insurgency in Dhofar, Sultan Qaboos has expanded and reequipped the armed forces and has coupled a grant of amnesty for all surrendered rebels with a vigorous prosecution of the war in Dhofar. He has obtained direct military support from Iran and Jordan. By early 1975 the guerrillas were effectively confined to an area about 50 square kilometers in the extreme southwest corner of the Province—a rugged mountainous area bordering the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen—and civil action programs were taking on increased importance in the rest of the Province.

Since Tariq's resignation as Prime Minister in late 1971 (he is presently Personal Adviser), Sultan Qaboos has assumed more of the day-to-day responsibility for governing. The Sultan enjoys popularity for the sweeping changes he has made but must face the rising expectations which they engender.

## ECONOMY

With the decline of Oman as an entrepôt for arms and slaves in the mid-19th century, much of its former prosperity was lost, and the economy became almost exclusively one of agriculture, camel and goat herding, fishing, and traditional handicrafts. Dates and limes, which are grown extensively in the Batinah coastal plain and the inner highlands, comprised the bulk of the million dollars of agricultural ex-

## TRAVEL NOTES

**Clothing**—Summer clothing can be worn almost year-round. A sweater is advisable for cool winter evenings. Sleeveless tops, short skirts, and shorts should not be worn.

**Customs**—A visa is required for U.S. citizens and can be obtained from the Omani Embassy in Washington or from the Omani Mission to the U. N. in New York. Customs controls prohibit liquor.

**Health**—Medical facilities are minimal; however, most medicines are available. Smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, typhoid, and gamma globulin shots are recommended. Tap water is not potable, and uncooked food should be well prepared.

**Hotels**—Travelers should not enter Oman without confirmed accommodations. Because of limited hotel space and the general absence of tourist facilities, the Omani Government discourages tourism at the present time. Businessmen are always welcome.

**Telecommunications**—Telephone service is available in the capital area and in Salalah. Telegraphic service is available but not reliable.

**Transportation**—Flights are available from Dhahran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Karachi, and Salalah to the new international airport at Seeb, some 10 miles west of Matrah and 20 miles west of Muscat. Taxis can be rented for the day, but beyond the Muscat-Matrah-Seeb axis, most roads are unpaved.



ports in 1971. Coconut palms, wheat, tobacco, and bananas are grown and cattle are raised in Dhofar. In other areas cereal and forage crops are grown.

All traditional sources of income were eclipsed after the discovery of oil in the interior near Fahud in 1964. Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd. (owned by Royal Dutch Shell, 85 percent; Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, 10 percent; and Partex, 5 percent) started production in August 1967. In 1973 Oman exported 107 million barrels, earning some \$177 million, and exported about the same amount in 1974, earning about \$700 million. Per capita income has risen from well under \$100 in 1967 to over \$1,000 in 1974.

Oman does not have the immense oil resources of some of its neighbors. Recent attempts to discover new fields have been disappointing and, at present production rates, the 2 billion barrels of proven reserves are not expected to last more than 20 years. Daily production is expected to increase from about 300,000 barrels at the end of 1974 to about 375,000 barrels by the end of 1975. Small quantities of asbestos, marble, and copper may prove commercially exploitable.

The government is undertaking development projects to create a viable standard of living in a post-oil economy. Large increases in fish and agricultural production are believed possible with the application of modern technology. To this end a major marine resource survey and land reclamation projects are being undertaken. A modern international airport at Seeb and a deepwater port at Matrah have been built, and a national road network is being built. Some of the largest budgetary outlays are going to provide the basic educational and health services necessary to strengthen the country's human resources.

After the quadrupling of oil revenues at the end of 1973, the government more than quadrupled its expenditures for both defense and devel-

opment and in early 1975 found itself in a deficit budget situation.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Under its previous ruler, Oman had only limited contacts with the outside world, including neighboring Arab states. Under a special treaty relationship, the United Kingdom has been closely involved in Oman's civil and military affairs. Since 1970 Sultan Qaboos has moved to establish ties with most Arab countries and traditional trading partners, such as Iran, India, and Pakistan. Oman does not have relations with the neighboring People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Communist countries which support Yemen, since they give assistance to the insurgency in Dhofar.

### U.S.-OMAN RELATIONS

The United States has maintained relations with the Sultanate since the early years of American independence. A treaty of friendship and navigation, one of the first agreements of its kind with an eastern state, was concluded between the United States and Muscat in 1833. This treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, signed at Salalah on December 20, 1958, and proclaimed in effect on June

11, 1960.

A U.S. Consulate was maintained at Muscat from 1880 until 1915. In recent years U.S. interests in Oman were handled by our Consulate General in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In 1972 our Ambassador in Kuwait was also accredited as the first American Ambassador to Oman, and an Embassy, headed by a resident Chargé d'Affaires, was opened. The first resident American Ambassador took up his post in Oman in July 1974. An Omani Embassy was opened in Washington in 1973.

American policy toward Oman is guided by basic principles which derive from our policies around the world: noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations; encouragement of regional cooperation for peace and progress; and support for friendly countries in their efforts to provide for their own security and development. The United States has a scholarship program and a Peace Corps program to assist Oman in the fields of health, education, and agriculture.

### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William D. Wolle  
Deputy Chief of Mission—David E. Zweifel

The address of the U.S. Embassy in Oman is P. O. Box 453, Muscat.

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### DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8070

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**APPENDIX I.K**

**QATAR  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1976. (Publication 7906).]



# background NOTES

## Qatar

department of state \* december 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: State of Qatar

### GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

The State of Qatar (pronounced "gutter") occupies the main peninsula jutting northward into the Persian Gulf from the eastern Saudi Arabian mainland. Al Dawhah, commonly known as Doha, is the capital and Qatar's leading commercial center.

The terrain is mainly flat and barren, covered with loose sand and gravel, and interspersed with occa-

sional limestone ridges. A negligible amount of land is forested.

Qatar has very little rainfall, and vegetation is scarce. The climate is hot most of the year reaching 120°F (49°C) in the summer with high humidity along the coast.

Most of the people are Arab in origin, but fewer than half of them are indigenous Qataris. The rest are Arab immigrants from Egypt, Iraq, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (for-

merly called the Trucial Shaikhdoms); a significant number of Palestinian refugees; and expatriates from Iran, India, and Pakistan. Qatar has a small community of Europeans. Most Qataris who do not live in Doha live in towns and villages along the coast where they have traditionally engaged in fishing, pearl diving, and coastal trading. Nomadic Bedouin tribes still roam the interior with their herds of camels, sheep, and goats, but this way of life is dying out because the government is encouraging the nomads to settle.

The Qataris are mainly Sunni Muslims of the Wahabi sect. Arabic is the predominant language. Education is compulsory and free in Qatar for children 6-16 years of age. The literacy rate, estimated at more than 25 percent, is rapidly increasing.

### PROFILE

#### Geography

AREA: About 4,000 sq. mi. (10,360 sq. km.; almost as large as Conn. and R.I. combined). CAPITAL: Doha (pop. about 100,000). OTHER TOWNS: Umm Said, Ruwais.

#### People

POPULATION: 165,000 (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: na. DENSITY: 41 per sq. mi. (16 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab 56%, Iranian 23%, Pakistani 7%, other 14%. RELIGION: Islam (98%). LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), some English and Farsi. LITERACY: More than 25%.

#### Government

TYPE: Traditional Emirate evolving toward constitutional Emirate. INDEPENDENCE: September 3, 1971. CONSTITUTION: None; however, a 1970 "Basic Law" includes a bill of rights and is practically equivalent to a constitution.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—Council of Ministers (Cabinet). *Legislative*—Advisory Council (has assumed only limited responsibility to date). *Judicial*—Independent.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. SUFFRAGE: No provisions established as yet.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: Fully centralized government.

FLAG: Maroon with a white serrated border on hoist side.

#### Economy

GNP: \$3.517 billion (1975). PER CAPITA GNP: More than \$11,000. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 12% (1973).

AGRICULTURE: *Land*—less than 1% cultivated. *Labor*—about 30% engaged in small-scale farming, grazing, and commercial fishing. *Products*—fruits, vegetables (most food is imported).

INDUSTRY: *Labor*—about 70% in industry and service sectors. *Products*—oil production and refining, fishing, cement and desalting plants.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Petroleum, fish.

TRADE: *Exports*—\$1.86 billion (1975): principally oil, nonoil exports and reexports (about \$25 million annually). *Imports*—\$402 million (1975 est.): industrial and consumer goods. *Partners*—Western Europe, Japan, US.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 riyal=US\$26.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Arab League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).


### HISTORY

Qatar has been inhabited for many centuries. A period of dominance over Qatar by the Khalifa family of Bahrain persisted until 1868 when, at the request of the Qatari nobles, the British conducted negotiations for the termination of the Bahraini claim except for the payment of tribute. The tribute ended with the occupation of Qatar by the Ottoman Turks in 1872.

When the Ottoman Turks evacuated the peninsula at the beginning of World War I, the British recognized as Ruler of Qatar Shaikh Abdullah ibn Jasim Al-Thani, whose family had been resident in Qatar for 200 years.

The treaty concluded in 1916 between the United Kingdom and Shaikh Abdullah was similar to those entered





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into by the British with other Persian Gulf principalities. Under it, the Ruler undertook not to dispose of any of his territory except to the United Kingdom and not to enter into relationships with any other foreign government without British consent. In return, the British promised to protect Qatar from all aggression by sea and to

lend its good offices in case of a land attack. A 1934 treaty extended more extensive British protection to Qatar.

In 1935 a 75-year oil concession was granted to the Qatar Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Co. High-quality oil was discovered in 1940 at Dukhan, on the western side of the peninsula. Exploitation was

delayed by World War II, however, and oil exports did not begin until 1949.

During the 1950's and 1960's gradually increasing oil income brought economic prosperity, rapid immigration, substantial social progress, and the beginnings of modern industry.

When the U.K. Government announced a policy decision in 1968



(reaffirmed in March 1971) to end the treaty relationships with the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms, Qatar joined the other eight states (the seven Trucial Shaikhdoms—the present United Arab Emirates—and Bahrain) under British protection in an effort to form a union of Arab emirates. By mid-1971, however, the nine shaikhdoms still had not been able to agree on terms of union, and the termination date (end of 1971) of the British treaty relationship was approaching. Accordingly, Qatar decided to seek independence as a separate entity. It became fully independent on September 3, 1971, as the State of Qatar.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Politically, Qatar is developing from a traditional society under the guidance of the Amir (Chief of State) toward modern constitutional government. Government departments gradually have developed to meet the requirements of social and economic progress.

In 1970, anticipating independence, Qatar promulgated a "Basic Law," including a bill of rights, practically equivalent to a constitution. It provides for a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and an Advisory Council whose members are to serve 3-year terms. The Council of Ministers, led by a Prime Minister (Head of Government), is appointed by the Amir. Its primary responsibility is to formulate public policy and direct the ministries. To date, the Advisory Council has very little real power. An electoral system has not been instituted and no specific provisions for suffrage have been established.

The Basic Law also provides for the concept of an independent judiciary.

The influx of numerous expatriate Arabs has begun to introduce progressive and nationalistic ideas into Qatar's heretofore traditionalist society, but there has been no evidence of political instability. Traditional values still predominate, and there are no organized political parties.

In February 1972 the Deputy Ruler and Prime Minister of Qatar, Shaikh Khalifa, deposed his cousin, Amir Ahmad, and assumed the position of Amir. This move, which had the sup-

port of the key members of their powerful family (the Al-Thani), took place without violence or subsequent signs of political unrest.

## Principal Government Officials

Amir; Acting Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani

### Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Suhaim bin Hamad Al-Thani

Communications and Transport—'Abdallah bin Nasir al-Suwaydi

Economy and Commerce—Nasir bin Khalid Al-Thani

Education—Vacant

Electricity and Water Resources—Qasim bin Muhammad Al-Thani

Industry and Agriculture—Faysal bin Sami Al-Thani

Justice—vacant

Interior—Khalid bin Hamid Al-Thani

Finance and Oil—Abdul Aziz bin Khalifa Al-Thani

Labor and Social Affairs—Ali bin Ahmad al-Ansari

Public Health—Khalid Muhammad Al-Thani

Public Works—Khalid bin 'Abdallah al-'Atiya

Defense—Maj. Gen. Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani

Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdullah Saleh Al-Mana

Ambassador to the U.N.—Jasmin Yousif Jamal

The State of Qatar maintains an Embassy in the United States at 800 New Hampshire Ave., NW., Washington, D.C. (tel. 202-338-0111).

## ECONOMY

Revenues from oil since 1949 have transformed Qatar's society and economy. Income from oil in 1975 amounted to about \$1.8 billion.

Doha, before the exploitation of oil, was a poverty-stricken village. Today it has become a relatively modern city with paved streets, electricity, modern buildings, and drinking water distilled from the sea. With the expansion of commercial activity, a chamber of commerce was established in 1963. Goods are imported directly into Doha and Umm Said instead of being shipped through other countries as was done in the past.

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Major development projects in progress include a steel mill, an enlarged \$7 million harbor at Doha, additional desalting plants, an enlarged fertilizer plant, and gas utilization projects. The construction of a second petrochemical plant, based on natural gas currently being flared, is also being considered. An earlier petrochemical project designed to produce ethylene is presently nearing completion.

Traditional occupations have included pearling, fishing, and nomadic herding. Pearling, now all but abandoned, was an important source of income in Qatari coastal villages until cultured pearls were developed by the Japanese. Qatar's commercial fishing



operations are being modernized. Agriculture under private ownership has been a government priority, and as a result, despite a limited potential, Qatar has become a substantial exporter of various fruits and vegetables to other gulf markets.

In mid-1976, the Government of Qatar assumed complete control of the Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC), a former subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company and le Francais des Petroles (23.75 percent jointly controlled by Mobil Oil and Standard Oil of New Jersey, and 5 percent by the Gulbenkian's Participations and Explorations Corp. The QPC had held concession rights for 36 years before its nationalization with compensation. Many of the consortium's former employees have been retained in the nationalized corporation, and the former participating companies in the consortium continue to lift and market Qatari crude in return for a management fee.

Shell of Qatar and the Government of Qatar announced in December 1976 final agreement for the complete nationalization of the Shell interests in Qatar. This agreement completes the process of nationalization with compensation of Qatar's hydrocarbon mineral resources. Since 1962, Shell has operated an offshore concession centered around Halul Island, some 60 miles east of Doha. Its Id al-Sharqi field entered commercial production in 1964 followed by the Magden-

Mezham field. Shell is discussing exploitation of a large nonassociated gas field (estimated reserves more than 1 trillion cu. ft., 28.3 trillion liters) with the Government of Qatar.

Qatar presently produces approximately 600,000 barrels of crude oil daily.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Qatar achieved full independence in an atmosphere of cooperation with the United Kingdom and friendship with its neighboring states. Most Arab states, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States were among the first countries to recognize Qatar, and Qatar promptly gained admittance to the United Nations and the Arab League. Qatar was an early member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

While pursuing a course of separate independence, Qatar continues to support the concept of eventually joining a larger grouping of Persian Gulf states.

#### U.S.-QATAR RELATIONS

When Qatar became independent, the already friendly informal relations between the United States and Qatar were improved by the formal establishment of diplomatic relations. Initially, the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait acted also as Ambassador to Qatar. An independent U.S. Embassy was opened

under a Chargé d'Affaires in March 1973. A resident U.S. Ambassador arrived in July 1974.

#### Principal U.S. Official

Ambassador—Robert P. Paganelli

The U.S. Embassy in Qatar is located at the capital city, Doha.

#### TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—May through mid-October is very hot in Qatar, and lightweight attire is recommended. From mid-October through April temperatures range from 45° to 80°F (4°-27°C) and spring and fall clothing is most comfortable. Traditional attitudes toward dress prevail, and although Western styles are perfectly acceptable, one should dress conservatively in public places.

*Health*—Visitors to Qatar should have valid smallpox and cholera immunizations.

*Telecommunications*—Allow two weeks for airmail delivery between the US and Qatar. Cable and telex lines to leading hotels and places of business are good. Telephone connections can be excellent depending on atmospheric conditions. Intercontinental calls are now received by a US satellite land station located near Doha.

*Transportation*—There are daily air connections from Doha to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Direct flights to Europe are available several times weekly.

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**APPENDIX I.L**

**SAUDI ARABIA  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

**[Washington, Department of State, January 1978. (Publication 7835).]**



# background notes

## Saudi Arabia

department of state \* january 1978

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

### PEOPLE

Saudi Arabia's population is about 5.6 million, according to preliminary results from the 1974 census. Although Saudi Arabia has vast uninhabited areas, some urban areas and oases have densities of 2,000 persons per square mile (770 per sq. km.).

Saudis are ethnically Arabs, with some admixture of non-Arab adherents of Islam (Turks, Iranians, Indonesians, Indians, and Africans) most of whom immigrated as pilgrims and reside in the Hijaz along the Red Sea coast. Many Arabs from other Arab states are employed in the kingdom. Until recently most of the people were nomadic or seminomadic; however, under the impact of rapid economic growth, urbanization has reduced this

proportion to about 20 percent.

Most Saudi Arabians are Sunni Muslims who observe the puritanical Wahhabi interpretation of the Hanbalite school. A small Shi'a Muslim minority resides in the Eastern Province along the Persian Gulf coast. Arabic is the official language, but English is widely known. The literacy rate is climbing rapidly but is still estimated at under 30 percent.

### HISTORY

The modern Saudi state was founded by the late King Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (known internationally as Ibn Saud—pronounced sah-ōd). In 1902 Abd al-Aziz recaptured Riyadh, the Saud dynasty's ancestral capital, from the rival Rashid family. Continuing his



conquests, Abd al-Aziz vanquished al-Hasa, the rest of Najd, and the Hijaz between 1913 and 1926. In 1932 these regions were unified as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The country's

### PROFILE

#### People

**POPULATION:** 5.6 million (1974 est.). **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE:** 3% (1974 est.). **DENSITY:** 7 per sq. mi. (2.7 per sq. km.). **ETHNIC GROUPS:** Primarily indigenous Arab tribes with admixture of peoples from other Arab and Muslim countries. **LANGUAGE:** Arabic. **LITERACY:** 30% (est.). **LIFE EXPECTANCY:** 45 yrs. (est.).

#### Geography

**AREA:** 873,000 sq. mi. (2,261,060 sq. km.); one-third the size of US. **CAPITAL:** Riyadh (pop. 660,000). **OTHER CITIES:** Jidda (560,000), Mecca (250,000), Medina (150,000), Taif (100,000), Dammam (100,000).

#### Government

**TYPE:** Monarchy. **UNIFICATION:** Sept.

**24, 1932. DATE OF CONSTITUTION:** None.

**BRANCHES:** *Executive*—King (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—none; consultative assemblies planned. *Judicial*—Islamic Courts of First Instance and Appeals.

**POLITICAL PARTIES:** None **ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS:** 13 Provinces.

**FLAG:** Green and white; bears the Muslim creed in Arabic script: "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God." Under the script is a horizontal sword in white.

#### Economy

**GDP:** \$49 billion (1976 est.). **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE:** 15.5%. **PER CAPITA GDP:** \$8,500.

**AGRICULTURE:** Land 40%, mostly

grazing; about 1% suitable for cultivation. **Labor** 75%. **Products**—dates, grains, vegetables, livestock.

**INDUSTRY:** **Labor** 10%. **Products**—petroleum and petroleum products, fertilizer, cement.

**NATURAL RESOURCES:** Petroleum, natural gas.


**TRADE:** **Exports**—\$35.6 billion (1976); principally petroleum. **Partners**—EEC 37%, Japan 15%, UK 8%, US 13% (1976). **Imports**—\$11 billion; transportation equipment, machinery, foodstuffs. **Partners**—US \$2.77 billion, Japan, FRG, UK (1976).

**OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE:** 3.52 Saudi riyals=US\$1.

**ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED:** \$8.8 billion (1967-76).

**MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:** UN and its specialized agencies, OPEC, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).





southern border with Yemen was settled by the 1934 Treaty of Taif which ended a brief border war between the two states. Boundaries with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait were established by a series of treaties negotiated in the 1920's. Two "Neutral Zones," one with Iraq and the other with Kuwait, were created at that time. The

Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone was formally partitioned in 1971. Agreement on the division of the Saudi-Iraqi Neutral Zone was reached in 1975. The border between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was agreed upon in 1974.

The most far-reaching event in the modern history of Saudi Arabia was

the discovery of oil in the 1930's. Large-scale production, however, did not begin until after World War II. When it did, the Government undertook rapid economic and social development. Oil wealth made possible deepwater ports, a railroad, roads, schools, hospitals, and improved facilities for Muslim pilgrims making the



annual *hajj*, or pilgrimage, to Mecca.

King Abd al-Aziz died in 1953 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Saud. The latter reigned for 11 years until 1964 when ill health and differences over policy matters brought about his abdication in favor of his next youngest brother Faisal. Faisal had already served his father as Foreign Minister, signing the U.N. Charter in 1945 on behalf of Saudi Arabia. Following a period of fiscal difficulties, King Saud was persuaded to delegate the direct conduct of Saudi Arabian Government affairs to Faisal in 1958. Except for a brief period when Saud regained control of affairs in 1960-62, Faisal continued to serve as Prime Minister even after being proclaimed King in 1964 by senior Royal Family members and religious leaders. In October 1962 Faisal outlined a broad reform program, with particular stress on economic development.

The mid-1960's were dominated by external pressures generated by Saudi-Egyptian differences over Yemen. When civil war broke out in September 1962 between Yemeni royalists and republicans, Egyptian forces entered Yemen to support the new republican government while Saudi Arabia backed the royalists. In early 1963 Egyptian aircraft attacked several southern Saudi towns. Mediation efforts by the United States, the United Nations, and various Arab governments were unsuccessful in bringing about disengagement by both parties. Tensions subsided only after military defeat by Israel in June 1967 compelled Egypt to withdraw its troops from Yemen.

Saudi forces did not participate in the 6-day Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. King Faisal attended the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference of September 1967 and agreed to provide annual subsidies totaling over \$140 million to Egypt and Jordan to help counter the adverse effects of the war on their economies.

Supporting the Arab cause during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia joined the Arab oil boycott of the United States and the Netherlands. As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Saudi Arabia joined with these countries in substantially raising oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973 war,

thereby dramatically increasing its monetary wealth and political power.

On March 25, 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by a discontented and unstable young relative, Prince Faisal bin Musa'id, who was subsequently executed after an extensive investigation which concluded that the assassination was the act of one individual. King Faisal was immediately succeeded by Crown Prince Khalid as King, and Prince Fahd was named Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister. The transition went very smoothly. King Khalid has empowered Crown Prince Fahd to oversee many aspects of the Government's international and domestic affairs.

## GEOGRAPHY

Saudi Arabia occupies about four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula—roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Boundaries are not fully defined in the south and southeast. From a range of mountains near the Red Sea, the land slopes gently eastward toward the Persian Gulf (called the Arabian Gulf in Saudi Arabia). The topography is mainly desert, including the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter), a vast expanse of sandy waste too arid to support life. There are no permanent rivers or bodies of water. Rainfall is erratic, averaging 2-4 inches (5-10 cm.) annually except in Asir, which averages 12-30 inches (30-75 cm.) of rain in the summer. During summer the heat is intense over much of the country, frequently exceeding 120°F (48°C) in the shade with high humidity along the coasts. In winter, temperatures sometimes drop below freezing in the central and northern areas, but snow and ice are uncommon.

Major regions include: the Hijaz, paralleling the Red Sea coast, where the two principal holy cities of Islam (Mecca and Medina), the commercial and diplomatic center of Jidda, and the summer capital of Taif are located; the Asir, a mountainous region along the southern Red Sea coast; Najd, the heartland of the country and site of the capital city; Riyadh, the Eastern Province (also called al-Hasa) bordering the Persian Gulf, containing the largest concentrated oil reserves in the

## TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Lightweight wash and wear clothing is essential for the hot (100-130°F), humid climate. Long, loose dresses with high collars and long sleeves are recommended for women.

*Customs*—Smallpox and cholera shots are required. Letter of financial responsibility from employer and a Saudi sponsor are required for a visa.

*Health*—Levels of community sanitation are low. Do not drink tap water.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone and telegraph service is erratic, but major projects are underway to improve communications.

*Transportation*—Many domestic and international flights are scheduled daily; taxis are available in all major cities.

world; and the Northern Frontiers, through which passes the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE).

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The central institution of Saudi Arabian Government is the monarchy. There is no formal Constitution in the Western sense; political parties and national elections are unknown. The authority of the monarchy is based on Islamic law (*Shari'a*) and on Arab tradition. The powers of the King are not defined but practically are limited by the fact that he must retain a consensus of the Saudi royal family, the religious leaders (*ulema*), the chiefs of the important tribes, the armed forces, and the bureaucracy. The responsible members of the royal family choose the King from among themselves with the sanction of the *ulema*.

Gradually, the Saudi Kings have developed a Central Government to assist them. Since 1953 a Council of Ministers appointed by the King and responsible to him has advised on the formulation of general policy and directed the activities of the growing bureaucracy. There are presently 20 members of the Council of Ministers. King Khalid himself is Prime Minister; Crown Prince Fahd is First Deputy Prime Minister and usually presides over Council of Minister meetings.



Other members of the royal family occupy the key posts of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense and Aviation, and the National Guard. Legislation is by royal decree and must be compatible with the *Shari'a*. Justice is administered according to the *Shari'a* by a system of religious courts whose judges (*qadis*) are appointed by the senior *ulema*. The King acts as the highest court of appeal and has the power of pardon. Access to the King and the right to petition him directly is a well-established tradition.

The kingdom is divided into 13 Provinces. The major Provinces, which include the principal urban centers and the economically important Eastern Province, are generally governed by royal princes or close relatives of the royal family. All Governors are appointed by the King. Provincial regulations formulated in 1963 provide for establishment of provincial councils. Larger urban areas have elected municipal councils.

Despite rapid economic progress, Saudi society remains strongly conservative and religious with a tribal orientation. The King's policy is to encourage gradual modernization without undermining the country's stability and Islamic heritage. A modernization program initiated in 1962 has produced such innovations as girls' schools, television, a labor code and social security system, and significant economic development. A growing number of younger Saudis educated abroad are returning and are being given important posts in the Government.

#### Principal Government Officials

King and Prime Minister—Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

First Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince—Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Second Deputy Prime Minister and Commander, National Guard—Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

#### Other Ministers

Defense and Aviation—Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Public Works and Housing—Mitab bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Municipal and Rural Affairs—Majid bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Interior—Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Foreign Affairs—Sa'ud bin Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud

Higher Education—Hasan bin Abdallah Al ash-Shaykh

Education—Abd al-Aziz Abdallah al-Khuwaytir

Finance and National Economy—Muhammad Aba al-Khayl

Health—Husayn Abd al-Razzaq al-Jaza'iri

Information—Muhammad Abdo Yamani

Justice—Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al ash-Shaykh

Labor and Social Affairs—Ibrahim bin Abdallah al-Anqari

Petroleum and Mineral Resources—Ahmad Zaki Yamani

Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts—Abd al-Wahhab Abd al-Wasi'

Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone—Alawi Darwish Kayyal

Agriculture and Water—Abd ar-Rahman bin Abd al-Aziz Al ash-Shaykh

Communications—Husayn al-Mansuri

Commerce—Sulaiman Abd al-Aziz al-Sulaim

Planning—Hisham Muhi al-Din Nazir

Industry and Electricity—Ghazi Abd ar-Rahman al-Qusaibi

Ministers of State—Muhammad Ibrahim Massud; Abdallah Muhammad al-Umran; Muhammad Abd al-Latif al-Mulhim

Director, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency—Abd al-Aziz Qurayshi

Ambassador to the U.S.—Ali Abdallah Alireza

Ambassador to the U.N.—Jamil Baroodiy

Saudi Arabia maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1520 18th St. NW., Washington, D.C. 20036 (tel. 202-483-2100).

#### ECONOMY

Saudi Arabia is the world's leading oil producer and exporter. Oil accounts for over 95 percent of the country's exports by value and is the main source of foreign exchange. More than 90 percent of Government revenues come from oil company royalties and taxes. Government policy aims at

diversifying the sources of national income and reducing the heavy dependency on oil for national prosperity and Government revenues. With proved reserves estimated at over 173 billion barrels—one quarter of all proved world reserves—Saudi Arabia can continue to expand its oil production after most other oil-producing states reach production peaks sometime in the 1980's.

Spurred by rapidly rising world demand, Saudi oil production has increased from under 3 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1969 to 9.2 million bpd in 1977, with productive capacity expected to reach 15 million bpd or more by the 1980's. Part of its oil output is shipped to the Mediterranean port of Sidon via TAPLINE, passing through Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Capacity of this line is 470,000 bpd. The bulk of Saudi oil exports move by tanker from the Eastern Province oil terminal of Ras Tanura.

Over 95 percent of this oil is produced by the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), originally a consortium of four U.S. oil companies. The Saudi Government now has a 60 percent interest in the ARAMCO concession and is involved in negotiations to buy out the rest. The Japanese-owned Arabian Oil Company and the Getty Oil Company (U.S.) hold concessions from Saudi Arabia in the former Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone and provide the rest of Saudi oil production. ENI/Phillips, an Italian-U.S. consortium, is exploring in the Empty Quarter. PETROMIN, the Saudi oil company, does not yet have any oil production of its own, but is a partner with several U.S. and French firms in exploring for oil along the Red Sea coast.

Since 1970 expansion of oil production and sharply rising oil prices have provided ample Government revenues and foreign exchange resources for development, defense, and aid to other Arab countries. The Government budget for the fiscal year beginning July 10, 1975, was \$31.5 billion, of which 15 percent was for defense and internal security. It should be noted, however, that in recent years the Government has not spent all allocated funds. On May 21, 1975, the Council of Ministers approved the kingdom's



second 5-year plan, for the period through 1980. The plan envisages an expenditure of about \$142 billion. Projects include gas gathering and treatment, petrochemical production, export refining, fertilizer production, manufacture of steel and aluminum, electricity, desalination, expansion of agriculture, housing, roads, telecommunications, education, and expanded medical care.

Private enterprise is encouraged and foreign investment, especially in joint ventures with Saudi Government and private capital, is welcome. A shortage of Saudi manpower at all levels is the principal obstacle to rapid development. As a consequence over a million non-Saudis are employed in the economy, and this figure is likely to rise.

In 1970 nearly half the population was engaged in agriculture, including herding sheep, goats, and camels. Traditionally, agriculture has been limited to a few oasis areas and to the relatively well-watered Asir highlands. Dates were the chief crop but are now being supplemented by wheat, corn, alfalfa, grapes, rice, and truck garden crops. Some fishing is done, especially for Persian Gulf shrimp which is exported. Still Saudi Arabia must import most of its food requirements. To increase agricultural productivity the Government financed construction of the Wadi Jizan Dam in southern Asir and irrigation projects at al-Hasa and Harad. A 5-million-gallon-per-day desalting/electrical generating plant near Jidda (built with U.S. Government cooperation) and several smaller plants in other towns provide sources of water to meet rapidly rising urban requirements.

In addition to production, refining, and marketing of oil, the modern industrial sector includes a urea plant in Dammam, a steel rolling mill in Jidda, cement plants, a detergent factory, and food processing plants. Future industrial growth is most likely in petrochemicals. Nonpetroleum minerals, including iron, gold, and copper, exist but are not yet exploited commercially.

Saudi Arabia enjoys a substantial surplus in its overall trade with other countries. Imports have increased rapidly, spurred by large increases in Government and consumer spending.

However, the rate of increase in imports has fallen far short of the rate of increase of revenues derived from oil exports. Saudi Arabian foreign exchange liquidity reserves increased from \$4.3 billion in 1973 to \$29 billion at the end of 1976 and will approach \$100 billion by 1980 if present trends continue. Management and productive investment of these surplus revenues, in the domestic economy and abroad, will increasingly pre-occupy Saudi Government planners. There is a high degree of fiscal stability, and confidence in the Saudi riyal (pegged to SDR's) is high.

All Muslims who can do so are obliged to make the *haji*, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca (birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and the holiest site in Islam), at least once in their lifetime. The November 1977 *haji* drew over 1,500,000 pilgrims. This influx creates a large service industry and generates considerable revenue in the cities of Jidda, Mecca, and Medina.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Basic Saudi foreign policy objectives are to maintain its security and paramount position in the Arabian Peninsula, to defend general Arab interests, to promote solidarity among Muslim governments, and to maintain cooperative relations with other oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with any Communist state and opposes the encroachment of Communist influences, particularly into the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It is cooperating with friendly neighboring states, including Iran, to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf region and to support the Yemen and Oman Governments against radical subversion. A charter member of the Arab League, the Saudi Government shares Arab enmity toward the State of Israel and insists that Israel must withdraw from all Arab territories, including East Jerusalem, occupied in June 1967. Saudi Arabia also seeks closer relations with Muslim communities in Asia and Africa; Jidda is the temporary headquarters of an Islamic Secretariat founded in 1969. Memberships in the 13-member Organization of Petroleum

#### READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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Exporting Countries (OPEC) and in a parallel Arab group (OAPEC) facilitate coordination of Saudi oil policies with other oil exporting governments. Saudi Arabia is a charter member of the United Nations and is active in many of its specialized agencies.

#### U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONS

U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia are considerable and growing. The value of U.S. investments, including 40 percent ownership of ARAMCO, is about \$2 billion. As the United States has become more dependent on foreign oil



supplies, it has imported increasing amounts from Saudi Arabia. By September 1977, Saudi Arabia was providing 19 percent of U.S. oil imports, and this figure is growing.

The continued availability of Saudi oil is important to the prosperity of the United States as well as to that of our European and Japanese allies. Saudi Arabia is the Arab world's largest customer for American products and services. Growing Saudi Arabia financial surpluses offer a potential source of investment capital, particularly for Saudi Arabian-American joint ventures. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's wealth and strategic geographical location make its friendship a valuable asset to the United States in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia's leaders have put considerable store in close and friendly relations with the United States. Since diplomatic relations were first established in 1940, they have turned increasingly to the United States for help in modernizing their country's military forces and in developing its resources. In recent years the United States has sold Saudi Arabia military aircraft, Hawk anti-aircraft defense missiles, military vehicles, and other equipment. A military training mission established at Dhahran in 1953 has provided training in the use of this equipment. A number of private American contractors provide support

for these Saudi defense programs. In other areas, U.S. Government agencies and private organizations have provided, on a reimbursable basis, technical assistance in geological mapping, seawater desalination, social security administration, census taking, public administration, and economic planning. Over 8,000 young Saudis were studying or receiving training in U.S. schools and colleges by late 1977.

U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations have been occasionally strained but not broken by differences over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Saudi Arabian leaders consider U.S. military and economic aid to Israel to be counter to their interests and have urged that the United States use its influence to effect an early Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. However, U.S.-Saudi ties continue to be close.

In June 1974 the two countries agreed to establish a Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. To implement the agreement, a reimbursable technical assistance agreement was signed in February 1975, and a permanent U.S. representation to the Commission was established in Riyadh. To provide back-up in Washington, an office of Saudi Arabian Affairs was organized in the Treasury Department, Washington, D.C. Treasury has primary action responsibility on Joint Commission matters for the U.S. Government. Cooperation between the

two countries is growing in the fields of manpower and education, agriculture, science and technology, transportation, and industrialization under Commission auspices.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—John C. West  
 Counselor of Embassy, Deputy Chief of Mission—Marshall W. Wiley  
 Counselor for Economic/Commercial Affairs—Marion Gordon Daniels  
 Counselor for Political Affairs—H. Eugene Bovis  
 Counselor for Consular Affairs—Robert W. Chase  
 Commercial Attaché—Joseph O. Eblan  
 Country Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Jon W. Stewart (res. in Riyadh)  
 Defense Attaché—Col. Walter P. Hayes  
 Consul General, Dhahran—Robert J. Bushnell  
 Embassy Liaison Officer, Riyadh—Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.  
 Director, U.S. Representation to the Joint Economic Commission—John P. Hummon

The U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia is located on Palestine Road, Ruwais, Jidda. The Riyadh office can be reached by calling 65394 or 65395. The Consulate General is located a short distance from Dhahran International Airport.

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**APPENDIX I.M**

**SYRIA  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, January 1977. (Publication 7761).]



background  
NOTES

## Syria

department of state \* january 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Syrian Arab Republic

## PEOPLE

Ethnic Syrians are of Semitic stock. The population is 87 percent Muslim, including about 150,000 Kurds and 100,000 Druze; and 13 percent Christian, including about 120,000 Armenians. The Jewish community in Syria has dwindled in recent years to approximately 4,500.

Arabic is the official language. Many of the better educated Syrians speak French or English.

Although the density for the country as a whole is approximately 109

persons per square mile (42 per sq. km.), the majority of the people are concentrated along the coastal plain in the west, a fertile strip between the coastal mountains and the desert, and in the Euphrates River Valley.

The Mediterranean port of Tartus is growing in importance.

Education is free and compulsory from ages 6 to 11. Schooling consists of six years of primary education followed by a 3-year general or vocational training period and a 3-year academic or vocational program. The second 3-year period of academic



## PROFILE

## People

POPULATION: 7.8 million (1975 est.). URBAN: 50% (1976). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3.3% (1975). DENSITY: 109 per sq. mi. (42 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Arab (90%), Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, and Turks (10%). RELIGIONS: Sunni Muslim (70%), other Muslim sects (16%), Christians of various sects (13%), and some Jews and Azidis. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), French (widely understood), Kurdish, Armenian, English (in larger cities). LITERACY: 41%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 54 yrs.

## Geography

AREA: 71,500 sq. mi. (185,184 sq. km.); compares in size with N. Dak. CAPITAL: Greater Damascus (pop. 2 million, 1976). OTHER CITIES: Damascus City (936,567), Aleppo (710,636), Hims (314,744).

## Government

TYPE: Republic, under socialist military regimes, since March 1963. INDEPENDENCE: April 17, 1946. CONSTITUTION: March 12, 1973.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State, 7 yr. term), Prime Minister (Head of Gov't.). *Legislative*—People's Council. *Judicial*—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party, Syrian Arab Socialist Party, Arab Socialist Union, Unionist Socialist Party, and Communist Party. National Front Cabinet formed in 1972, dominated by Ba'ath Party. SUFFRAGE: Universal at age 18. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 13 Provinces and city of Damascus (administered as a separate unit). MILITARY MANPOWER: 177,500 plus 100,000 reserves (1975).

FLAG: Comprised of a red band (top), a white band (center), and a black band (bottom). A golden eagle is located in the center of the white band.

## Economy

GDP: \$5 billion (1975 at current prices). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 12%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$560 (in 1975 prices). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 8.8%. PERCENTAGE OF INFLATION OVER PAST FIVE YEARS: 13%.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 65% (includes pasture and forests). *Labor* 51%. *Products*—cotton, wheat, barley, tobacco,

sugar beets, sheep and goats, grapes, tomatoes.

INDUSTRY: *Labor* 15%. *Products*—textiles, cement, glass, petroleum, food processing, soap, phosphates.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, iron ore, rock salt, phosphate, oil and natural gas.

TRADE: *Exports*—\$942 million (1975: cotton, fruits and vegetables, oil, wool, tobacco, textiles, phosphates). *Partners*—EEC (48%), Arab States (9%), Communist bloc (22%), Other (21%). *Imports*—\$1.4 billion (1975): food, fuel, machinery and transp. equipment, textiles, metal and metal products, chemicals, and fertilizers. *Partners*—EEC (33%), Arab States (9%), Communist Bloc (17%), Other (41%).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 3.90 Syrian Pounds=US\$1.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: *Total* (all sources) \$1.7 billion (1974). *US only* (1977)—AID (total \$80 million—\$78 million in loans; \$2 million in grants); PL-480 (\$10 million in loans, \$0.2 million in grants).

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: United Nations and most of its specialized agencies—INTELSAT, Arab League.




training is required for university admission. University-level training is expanding rapidly. The Syrian Government encourages students to study abroad, but discourages the emigration of educated people.

Syria's cultural and artistic achievements and contributions to the ancient world had early origins. Archeologists have discovered in and around the ancient city of Ebla extensive writings

and evidence of a brilliant culture rivaling those of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Later, Syrian scholars and artists contributed significantly to Hellenistic and Roman thought and culture. For example, Zeno of Sidon founded the Epicurean school, Antiochus of Ascalon had Cicero as one of his pupils at Athens, and the writings of Posidonius of Apamea influenced Livy and Plutarch.

Syrians were among the earliest Christians, and they later made contributions to Arabic history and literature and especially to Arabian music.

Syrian handicrafts are famous throughout the world, and although such activity is declining in the face of modern products and methods of production, it still employs thousands of people.



## GEOGRAPHY

The most prominent topographic features in Syria are the Anti-Lebanon and Ansariyah Mountains, which parallel the Mediterranean Sea from Israel to the Turkish border; the Euphrates River valley, which traverses the country from the north to the southeast; the Jabal al-Druze Mountains in the south; and the semidesert plateau in

the southeast. The eastern side of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains is dotted with valley oases, the largest of which is the site of Damascus, the capital.

The climate is comparable to that of Phoenix, Arizona. The summer days are dry and hot, with mean maximum temperatures above 80°F (27°C). From December to March the weather is quite cold, although temperatures usually stay above freezing. Precipita-

tion, about 30 inches (76 cm.) annually along the coast, decreases to less than 10 inches (25.4 cm.) in the eastern desert area. The rainy season generally lasts from November to April.

## HISTORY

Recently, archeologists have demonstrated that Syria was the center of



one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Around the newly excavated city of Ebla in northern Syria, a great Semitic empire spread from the Red Sea north to Turkey and east to Mesopotamia from 2500 to 2400 B.C. The city alone during that time had a population estimated at 260,000, and the vast number of tablets found there promise to yield a great deal of information about this previously unknown civilization.

After the time of Ebla, Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Aramaeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines, and in part, Crusaders. It finally came under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Syria is also significant in the history of the Christian Church—Paul established the first organized Christian church at Antioch, the city from which he left on many of his missionary journeys.

Damascus was settled about 2500 B.C., the same time that Ebla was flourishing, and is today one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It came under Muslim rule in A.D. 636. Immediately thereafter, the power and prestige of the city reached its peak, and it became the capital of the Omayyad Empire, which extended from Spain to India from 661 to 750 A.D., when the Abbasid caliphate was established at Baghdad, Iraq.

Damascus became a provincial capital of the Mameluke Empire around 1260. It was largely destroyed in 1400 by Tamerlane, the Mongol conqueror, who removed many of its craftsmen to Samarkand. Rebuilt, it continued to serve as a capital until 1516. In 1517 it fell under Ottoman rule, where it remained, except for a brief occupation by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from 1832-40, for the next 400 years.

#### French Occupation

An independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established in 1920 under King Faysal, of the Hashemite family, later to become King of Iraq. His rule of a few months came to an end with the battle of Maysalun between Syrian Arab forces of King Faysal and regular French forces, after which French forces occupied the country in accord-

ance with a League of Nations mandate.

With the fall of France in 1940, Syria came under the control of the Vichy Government until British and Free French forces occupied the country in July 1941.

Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups, however, forced the French to evacuate their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been formed during the mandate.

#### Independence - 1970

Although rapid economic development followed the declaration of independence on April 17, 1946, the Syrian political scene has been marked by a series of upheavals. After the overthrow of President Adib Shishakli in 1954, successive army shakeups brought Arab nationalist and Socialist elements to power.

Syria's political instability during these years after the 1954 coup, the parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership in the wake of the Suez crisis of 1956 created support in Syria for union with Egypt. Following their merger into the United Arab Republic

on February 1, 1958, all Syrian political parties ceased overt activities.

The union was not a success, however, and Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic, following a military coup d'etat on September 28, 1961, reestablishing itself as an independent state—the Syrian Arab Republic. The next 18 months were unstable ones in Syria, with various coups finally culminating on March 8, 1963, at which time leftist officers in the Syrian Army formed the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a mixture of military and civilian officials who controlled all executive and legislative authority. The coup had been carried out by members of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'ath Party), a previously clandestine political movement that had been active in Syria and other Arab countries since the late 1940's. The new cabinet was dominated by Ba'ath members.

The Ba'ath takeover in Syria followed on the heels of a Ba'ath coup in Iraq the previous month. The first step of the new government was to explore possible federation with Iraq (which was at this time controlled by members of the Iraqi branch of the Ba'ath Party) and Egypt. An agreement was concluded at Cairo, Egypt, on April 17, 1963, for a referendum on unity to be held in September 1963. However, serious disagreements among the parties soon developed, and the tripartite federation failed to materialize. Thereafter, the Ba'athist regime in Syria and Iraq began to work for bilateral unity. These plans foundered in November 1963 with the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime in Iraq.

In May 1964 President Amin Hafiz of the NCRC promulgated a provisional Constitution providing for a National Council of Revolution (NCR), an appointed legislature composed of representatives of "people's organizations" (labor, peasant, and professional unions), a Presidential Council (in which executive power was vested), and a Cabinet.

On February 23, 1966, a dissident group of army officers, acting in the name of Ba'ath Party, and favoring a more leftist policy, carried out a more successful coup d'etat, imprisoned President Hafiz, dissolved the Cabinet



Bab Sharki, gate in Old City wall which leads into "Street Called "Straight."



and the NCR, and abrogated the provisional Constitution. The leaders of the coup described it as a "rectification" of Ba'ath Party principles.

#### Recent Events

The current Ba'athist government of President Hafiz al-Asad came to power in November 1970 and has since maintained relative stability in the country.

In April 1971 Syria joined Egypt and Libya in a supranational Confederation of Arab Republics. The Confederation was approved by referendum in the three countries on September 1, 1971. It subsequently has lain dormant because of divisions among the participants.

In October 1973, Syria participated with Egypt in hostilities against Israel.

Since late 1975, the Asad regime has become increasingly preoccupied with and involved in efforts to resolve the civil war in neighboring Lebanon.

#### GOVERNMENT

In 1971 Hafiz al-Asad was elected President by a public referendum. In May 1971 he formed a National Progressive Front, led by his ruling Ba'ath Party, to broaden the base of his government and to give expression to a variety of political views.

On March 12, 1973, the Syrian electorate overwhelmingly approved a new permanent Constitution which had been drafted by the 173-member People's Council which had been appointed in 1971. The Constitution was followed by parliamentary elections. It gives wide powers to the President, who is elected for a 7-year term by universal suffrage: he has the right to appoint Ministers, to declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (once passed by the People's Assembly), to declare amnesty, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel, as well as the right to amend the Constitution.

In many ways, the permanent Constitution differs little from the provisional Constitution which had been in force in Syria since 1964. One important change is the omission of the statement that Islam is the religion of the State; however, Islamic jurisprudence is required to be the main source

of legislation and the Chief of State must be a Muslim.

The judicial system in Syria is an amalgam of Ottoman, French, and Islamic laws. There are three levels of courts in the Syrian system: Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeals, and the Court of Cassation. In addition, there are religious courts which handle questions of personal and family law.

Syria is divided administratively into 13 Provinces and Damascus, which is administered separately. Each Province is headed by a Governor, whose appointment is proposed by the Minister of Interior, approved by the Cabinet, and announced by executive decree. The Governor is assisted by a Provincial Council, three-fourths of whose members are freely elected and one-fourth are appointed by the Minister of the Interior and the Governor. The most recent provincial council elections were held in March 1976.

The current 36-member Syrian Cabinet, dominated by the Ba'ath Party, was appointed by President Asad in August 1976.

#### Principal Government Officials

President—Hafiz al-Asad

Prime Minister—Major General 'Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs—'Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs—Jamil Shayya

Deputy Prime Minister for Services—Fahmi al-Yusufi

Minister of Defense—Major General Mustafa 'Abd al-Qadir Talas

Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade—Muhammed al-Imadi

Minister of Finance—Sadiq al-Ayyoubi

Minister of Interior—Brigadier General Adnan Dabbagh

Minister of Information—Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad

Minister of State for Planning—George Horaniueh

Ambassador to the U.N.—Mowaffaq Allaf

Ambassador to the U.S.—Dr. Sabah Qabbani

The Syrian Embassy in the United States is located at 2215 Wyoming Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. (tel. 202-232-6313).

#### TRAVEL NOTES

*Clothing*—Damascus is a fashion-conscious city, although styles are somewhat conservative by American standards. In the summer, washable suits are useful. In winter, light-to-medium-weight wool clothes are suitable. Excessively revealing or tight-fitting attire is not suitable for street wear, particularly in the souk (market) areas.

*Health*—Many American- and European-trained doctors practice in Damascus. Most Damascus hospitals and clinics are equipped to handle emergency cases. However, the city is not well equipped for major surgery and long-term hospitalization.

Though Damascus is a healthful city by Middle East standards, precautions should be taken to guard against endemic diseases. Local dairy products are not considered safe, and local fresh milk should be boiled or pasteurized.

*Transportation*—Air service is available from Damascus to major European cities. The Syrian airlines serve all Arab capitals and also flies to principal Syrian cities. Schedules are sometimes erratic.

Transportation between cities in Syria and in neighboring countries can be arranged by private taxi or by air-conditioned buses. Taxis, distinguished by their red license plates, are frequently used by Americans. The charge depends on the particular trip but is not high by American standards.

Trains and buses compose additional modes of public transportation in Syria.

*Telecommunications*—The automatic dial telephone system used in Syria is fair. Some delays can be expected on long-distance calls, which can be placed to most cities in the area. Reception on international calls varies greatly.

Cable and wireless services are available to all points, but service is not wholly reliable.

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The Syrian Army traditionally has played a key role in the government. The lineup of factions within the army often has been the controlling element in the changes of government. Generally the army has been leftist in its political orientation. Over the years the Ba'ath Party has achieved considerable success in gaining supporters from within the army.



The Ba'ath platform is proclaimed succinctly in the party's slogan: "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism." The party is both socialistic—advocating state ownership of the means of industrial production and the redistribution of agricultural land—and revolutionary—dedicated to carrying a Socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world. Its founder and philosophical leader is Michel 'Aflaq, a Syrian Christian who was removed by the February 23, 1966 coup d'état. The party also has attracted supporters of all faiths in other Arab countries, especially Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Since assuming power in 1970, the Asad government has steered Syria along a pragmatic and more stable course. Internally, the regime has embarked on ambitious development programs and achieved a relaxation of domestic tensions.

Military expenditures, reflecting the continuing tension between Syria and Israel and the need to support Syria's forces in Lebanon, have been large, accounting for over one-half of the country's budget. The economic impact of the Lebanese crisis on the Syrian civilian sector has created additional problems, but the Asad regime has managed to cope with them successfully.

## ECONOMY

Since the 1973 war, the Syrian economy has expanded rapidly, thanks to generous grants and loans from oil-producing Arab states and Iran, higher prices for Syrian exports, and sounder economic planning. GDP increased 25 percent (in constant 1963 prices) from 1973 to 1975. Hidden inflation, however, has kept real growth at a lower figure. Economic development needs occasioned a sharp rise in imports, and Syria's trade balance fell deeper into deficit; however, the country maintains a healthy balance of payments resulting largely from sizable transfers from other Arab states.

Syria has sought to diversify its foreign markets and sources of capital and expertise, hitherto dominated by the Socialist countries. It now welcomes American enterprise in certain capacities in developing key sectors of

the economy, including petroleum, phosphates and other minerals, textiles, and agriculture. American firms are finding a promising market in Syria, especially in petroleum equipment and services, irrigation and agricultural technology, vehicles, and a wide variety of nonelectrical equipment and machinery.

## Agriculture and Livestock

With irregular rainfall and limited irrigation, agricultural production is subject to severe fluctuations. Cereals and cotton are the principal crops, but fruit and vegetable production is also significant. Cattle, sheep, and poultry production accounted for 35 percent of agricultural production in 1975. The agricultural sector contributed 16 percent of GDP in 1975, but accounted, directly or indirectly, for over one-half of employment. The continuing, though relatively diminishing, importance of Syrian agriculture is reflected in its contribution to export earnings: 33 percent in 1974, as contrasted with 66 percent in 1970-72. The principal imports are sugar, meat, fruits and vegetables, and in drought years, cereals. From 1966 to 1970, agricultural imports accounted for 40 percent of total imports, but this declined with good crop yields in 1974 and 1975.

Approximately 85 percent of Syria's investment in agriculture during 1971-75 was for massive development of the Euphrates Basin. So far, the Euphrates Dam and pilot farm

have been completed, including one of the main irrigation channels. Designed to double the amount of land now under irrigation and provide a major source of electric power, the Euphrates development program, when completed, should help Syria regain its former position as a major food exporter in the Middle East and diminish fluctuations in production.

## Industry

Syria is also striving to increase industrial production, whose share in the national income had already increased from 16.8 percent in 1968-69 to 20.3 percent in 1970-74. Industrial investment is being concentrated heavily in energy and fuels. Agreements were reached in 1974-75 with foreign suppliers to construct paper, flour-milling, glass, iron and steel-bar, and pipe factories, in addition to four new sugar factories and plants for phosphates, fertilizers, and cement—many of which are being built with import-substitution and production for regional markets in mind.

The industrial investments of Syria's third Five-Year Plan (1971-76) have already begun to bear fruit, although the projects contracted for during the years of heaviest expenditure, 1974-75, have yet to be completed. Syria's 1974 cement-production capacity will double by 1978, eliminating imports which cost \$23 million in 1974. The new fertilizer plant will produce three times the quantity of Syria's 1974 fertilizer im-



Downtown Damascus



## READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse views in unofficial publications.

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ports, which also were valued at \$23 million.

### Trade

The value of Syrian exports has increased significantly in recent years (from \$195 million in 1971 to \$942 million in 1975). Imports followed the same pattern, increasing from \$438 million in 1971 to \$1.7 billion in 1975.

Principal Syrian exports include cotton, cereals (wheat and barley), crude petroleum, textiles, wool, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, and phosphates. These exports flow principally to the European Economic Community (48 percent), Communist nations (22 percent), and other Arab countries (9 percent).

Principal Syrian imports include food, fuels, machinery and transportation equipment, and textiles. Principal sources of supply are the EEC (33 percent); Eastern Europe, China, and the U.S.S.R. (17 percent); the Arab Common Market and other Arab coun-

tries (9 percent).

U.S. exports to Syria followed a steady upward trend in the same period, going from \$20.7 million in 1973 to \$127.8 million in 1975, when they constituted 8.6 percent of Syria's total imports. In the first nine months of 1976, U.S. exports exceeded \$200 million. U.S. exports have consisted largely of wheat, rice, cigarettes, autos and other vehicles (including parts), and nonelectrical machinery.

Syrian exports to the U.S. have also risen markedly, from \$2.3 million in 1974 to \$7.4 million in 1975. This trade consisted mostly of tobacco, skins, and hides.

In mid-1976, the level of U.S.-Syrian trade was well ahead of the comparable level of 1975. The outlook for further gains in U.S.-Syrian economic and commercial activity is distinctly favorable.

### Petroleum

Syria obtains revenue from crude production and refining and from

transit charges on oil flowing to East Mediterranean ports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These sources contributed about \$750 million in 1975 to GNP (15 percent), which is equivalent to 30 percent of the Syrian budget.

Production began in 1968 with 1 million metric tons, rising to 6.2 million in 1971 and 9.5 million in 1975. The 1976 production target is 11 million metric tons, but declining known reserves at the end of 1975 indicate this may be difficult to achieve. Existing wells should produce about 10 million metric tons per year until 1980. The government places very high priority on exploration and is keenly interested in obtaining foreign, and especially American, expertise in this field.

It is difficult to assess the utility of the costly additions to Syria's refining capacity. The Syrian-Iraqi oil agreement has expired, and political disagreements have resulted in a complete stoppage of Iraqi crude sent to Hims and Baniyas. To keep the refineries operating, Syria has had to import light crude from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia at world market prices. Syria's refining revenues have declined considerably as a result, and estimates of future returns from the refinery investments are risky. Similarly, future oil transit revenues from the Iraqi (INOC) pipeline, and from TAPLINE, transporting Saudi crude, are conjectural, since Iraqi transshipments have been suspended since March 1976, and TAPLINE has not been used since before the beginning of the year.

In the petroleum sector as a whole, revenues cannot be expected to increase unless there are new discoveries or further increases in world oil prices.

### Economic Development

The Syrian Government launched its third five-year plan in 1971. Since then, GNP growth has increased significantly, particularly during 1974-75. In 1970-73, real growth was 7.3 percent per year as compared with the 1965-1970 average of 5.5 percent. Comparable real growth rates in 1974 and 1975 were estimated at 12 percent, but the economic dislocations created by the October 1973 war and



high inflation have not yet been fully assessed.

The third five-year plan allocated 35 percent of development expenditures to agriculture, 34 percent to industry (manufacturing and extractive), 12 percent to transportation and communications, and 18 percent to other sectors including public utilities, housing, services, and internal trade. It included major investments in hydroelectric and irrigation projects, with special emphasis on training Syrian nationals in oil exploration.

The fourth five-year (1976-80) plan has yet to be promulgated. It is likely to provide, however, for developing a more balanced and self-sufficient agricultural and industrial economy, with particular emphasis on the rural sector. Nutrition and Syria's transportation network may also be accorded higher priority, along with measures aimed at improving public administration and increasing domestic tax revenues.

Continued Syrian economic growth may be expected as the governmental investments in the various sectors mentioned above begin to bear fruit. The rate of growth will depend on the availability of funds from foreign donors and on Syria's ability to borrow abroad. These combined revenues must be sufficient to meet payments on a large foreign debt recently assumed, as well as to provide funds for continued investment in both the commodity-producing and service sectors.

#### Transportation and Communications

Syria's transportation system is concentrated in the western part of the country and runs generally in a north-south direction. The 4,300 miles (6,920 km.) of asphalt-covered roads and an additional 700 miles (1,126 km.) of other surfaced roads are the most important means of transport, and the government is devoting considerable resources to improving and expanding them. The government also owns and operates some 940 miles (1,513 km.) of railroad track, including a 465-mile (748 km.) stretch recently completed with Soviet help from Latakia via Aleppo to Al Qamishli, near the Iraqi border in the northeast. The Euphrates River, although navigable by small craft for its entire length in Syria, is not a significant transport artery. Syria's

principal ports of Latakia, Baniyas and Tartus are being expanded and modernized. Tartus is the main port of export for Syrian phosphates and crude oil. Baniyas, the site of a refinery under construction, had been a major tanker terminal for oil transhipped by pipeline from northern Iraq and is presently receiving Syria's crude oil imports.

A new international airport is in operation at Damascus. Syria's national air carrier serves the nation's major cities and operates extensively abroad in Asia, Europe, and North Africa.

Syria has fairly good international and domestic communications services. Three major dailies are published in Damascus under government and Ba'ath Party auspices. Radio and television facilities are government-owned.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Consistent elements in the foreign policies pursued by successive Syrian governments have been the recovery of territory occupied by Israel since 1967, support for the rights of the Palestinians, Arab unity, and strict nonalignment. Syria is an active member of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies and the Arab League.


Syrian participation in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war helped it to

assume a more influential political and military position in inter-Arab affairs, instilled most Syrians with pride, and strengthened the credibility of the Asad regime. Strains subsequently appeared in Syrian relations with Egypt and certain other Arab states, following the Sinai II disengagement agreement in 1975 and in connection with Syria's efforts to resolve the difficult situation in Lebanon throughout much of 1976, but these differences appear to have been substantially resolved at the Arab summit meetings in Riyadh and Cairo in October 1976. Syrian-Jordanian relations warmed appreciably in 1975-76, but Syrian-Iraqi ties remain strained due to competition between the Ba'athist regimes in Damascus and Baghdad, Iraqi unhappiness over Syria's intervention in Lebanon, and divergent attitudes toward efforts aimed at a peaceful, negotiated solution of the Arab conflict with Israel.

Although Syria maintains generally harmonious relations with the Soviet Union, its relations with the West have shown marked improvement since the 1973 war. Active diplomatic and commercial ties currently exist between Syria and most of Western Europe.

#### Arab-Israeli Dispute

Syria was an active participant in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in Israel's occupation of the



Bab Khasane, gate of Old City wall, containing the windows from which St. Paul was lowered in a basket to escape pursuers.



Golan Heights and the city of Qunaytirah. Following that war, Syria refused to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel and did not accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.

Following the October 1973 war, which left Israel in occupation of additional Syrian territory, Syria accepted Security Council Resolution 338, which embodied an implicit acceptance of 242. Subsequently, as the result of Secretary Kissinger's mediation efforts in May 1974, a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement was reached that enabled Syria to recover the territory lost in the October war and part of the Golan Heights that had been occupied by Israel since 1967. Since that time, the Asad regime has made clear its willingness to accept a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, so long as all Arab territory occupied in 1967 is returned and the rights of the Palestinians are respected.

### U.S.-SYRIA RELATIONS

Formal diplomatic relations between Syria and the United States—which the Syrians had severed in June 1967—were restored in June 1974, on the occasion of President Nixon's visit to Damascus. Since that time, U.S.-Syrian relations have thawed considerably, particularly in economic and commercial fields.

After a lapse of 9 years, the U.S. resumed economic assistance to Syria in fiscal year 1975. Our aid program is designed to support Syria's developmental efforts, particularly in agriculture and transportation. In addition, it seeks, through modest language training and participant programs, to stimulate wider knowledge of English and a closer association of Syrian professionals and potential leaders with American institutions and methods, and with Americans generally.

In August 1976, Syria became eligi-

ble for investment insurance and guarantees granted by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC coverage, which acts to encourage private U.S. investment abroad, should contribute to expanded American economic cooperation with Syria.

### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Richard W. Murphy  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Robert H. Pelletreau  
Political Officer—James R. Hooper  
Econ/Commercial Officer—Patrick N. Theros  
Consular Officer—Donald S. Sutter  
Administrative Officer—Lawrence J. Robert  
U.S. AID Representative—Gordon B. Ramsey  
Public Affairs Officer—Kenton Keith  
The American Embassy is located at Chare (Ave.) al-Mansour, Abu Rummanih, Damascus, Syria (Tel. 332315).

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**APPENDIX I.N**

**TURKEY  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, January 1976. (Publication 7850).]



# background NOTES

## Turkey

department of state \* january 1976

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Turkey

### GEOGRAPHY

Turkey lies partially in Europe and partially in Asia, sharing common borders with Greece and Bulgaria on the northwest, the U.S.S.R. and Iran on the east, and Iraq and Syria on the south. The Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, known collectively as the Turkish Straits, connect the Black and the Mediterranean Seas.

The coastal areas enjoy sufficient rainfall to support considerable vegetation. A variety of crops, ranging from tea in the northeast to tobacco in the west and cotton in the south, is grown on those relatively narrow coastal plains. The coastal regions, particularly in the south and west, enjoy mild winters.

Inland, wheat is the principal crop grown on much of the rolling terrain of the western regions of the

Anatolian Plateau. This plateau generally becomes more mountainous and less productive toward the east.

Winters are quite severe in eastern Turkey but only moderately so in the western Anatolian Plateau. To the southeast, the terrain has a mean elevation of 3,000 feet above sea level and is treeless, sparsely populated, and crisscrossed by mountain chains. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers rise in eastern Turkey and flow southward to the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Syria. The largest all-Turkish river is the Kizil Irmak, which flows northward east of Ankara to the Black Sea.

### PROFILE

#### Geography

AREA: 296,000 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex. and La. combined). CAPITAL: Ankara (pop. 2.57 million). OTHER CITIES: Istanbul (3.86 million), Izmir (1.66 million), Adana (1 million).

#### People

POPULATION: 40 million (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2.5% (1975). DENSITY: 125 per sq. mi. ETHNIC GROUPS: 90% Turk, 7% Kurd. RELIGIONS: Islam (98%), Christian, Jewish. LANGUAGES: Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic. LITERACY: 55%.

#### Government

TYPE: Parliamentary democracy. INDEPENDENCE: 1923. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: October 25, 1961.

BRANCHES: Executive—President (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government). Legislative—bicameral Parliament (Grand National Assembly) includes 450-member National Assembly and 184-member Senate. Judicial—Court of Cassation, Council of State.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Justice (JP), Republican People's (RPP), National Salvation (NSP), others. SUFFRAGE: Universal

over 21. POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: 67 Provinces.

FLAG: White crescent and star on a red field.

#### Economy

GNP: \$35.9 billion (1975 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 7%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$893. PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 6%.

AGRICULTURE: Land 35%. Labor 68%. Products—cotton, tobacco, cereals, sugar beets, fruit, nuts.

INDUSTRY: Labor 16%. Products—textiles, food processing, mining.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, chromite, copper, boron, oil.

TRADE: Exports—\$1.532 billion (1974): cotton, tobacco, fruit, nuts, livestock products, textiles. Partners—FRG 21%, US 12%, Switzerland 9%, Italy 6%. Imports—\$3.777 billion (1974): machinery, transport equipment, metals, mineral fuels, fertilizers, chemicals. Partners—FRG 19%, US 12%, UK 11%, Italy 11%.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 15 Turkish lira=US\$1.

US AID RECEIVED (FY 1946-FY 1974): Economic \$2.7 billion; military \$3.9 billion.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN and its specialized agencies, CENTO, associate member of EC, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

### PEOPLE


Urban areas have experienced tremendous growth since 1950 as a result of the movement of villagers to the cities. Squatter dwellings can be seen around the city peripheries, posing a constant challenge to the municipalities to provide essential services.

About 65 percent of the populace are villagers. Population is more dense along the coastal regions and in the western half of the country than it is in the east and southeast. The largest city is Istanbul.

Most Turkish Moslems belong to the Sunni sect. The state recognizes no established religion and is secular in form. There is no legal discrimination against the non-Islamic minorities, which consist mainly of small groups of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.

The Kurds, who number about 3 million, constitute an ethnic and linguistic minority, although not a religious one. They live in poor, remote sections of the east and southeast, areas which have not kept pace







with the economic and social development of most of Turkey.

## HISTORY

The Republic of Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal (later named Ataturk) in 1923 after the collapse of the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire. The Empire, which at the peak of its influence controlled vast stretches of North Africa, southeastern Europe, and western Asia, had failed to keep pace with the social and technological developments of Europe in the 19th century. The rise of nationalism was a centrifugal force which impelled several nations of the Empire to seek their independence, leading to its progressive fragmentation. This process reached its culmination in the disastrous Ottoman participation as one of Germany's allies in World War I. Defeated, shorn of much of its former territory, partially occupied by forces of the victorious European states, the Ottoman structure was repudiated by Turkish nationalists who rallied under the leadership of Ataturk. After a bitter war against invading Greek forces, the nationalists expelled them from Anatolia. The sultanate and caliphate, the temporal and religious ruling institutions of the old Empire, were abolished, and Turkey became a Republic.

The new Republic turned its back on the imperial ambitions and traditions of the Empire and concentrated on modernizing and Westernizing the ethnically Turkish core of the old Empire—Anatolia and Thrace. The series of social, political, linguistic, and economic reforms and attitudes introduced by Ataturk before his death in 1938 forms the ideological basis of modern Turkey. Referred to as Ataturkism, its meaning, continued validity, and applicability are the subject of frequent discussion and debate in Turkey's political life.

Turkey did not participate in World War II until shortly before its end, but this brief belligerency facilitated its status as a charter member of the United Nations. The difficulties faced by Greece in quelling a Communist rebellion and demands by the Soviet Union, shortly after the end of World War II, for Turkey's cession of some of

its eastern territory and for military bases in the Turkish Straits, led to the declaration of the Truman doctrine in 1947. Large-scale U.S. military and economic aid began at this time. Turkey's contribution of a highly effective brigade to the U.N. forces during the Korean conflict was tangible evidence of its determination to help prevent Communist aggression, and recognition of this led to Turkey's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

The one-party rule (Republican People's Party—RPP) established by Ataturk in 1923 lasted until the 1950 elections, when the Democrat Party came to power. From 1950 until May 1960 the Democrat Party ruled, with Celal Bayar as President and Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister. Economic difficulties and internal political tensions culminated in a military coup d'état on May 27, 1960. The Committee of National Union (CNU) governed while a new Constitution was written, a referendum was held to approve it, and elections carried out. A return to civilian government came with the convening of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) on October 25, 1961.

In the elections of October 1961, no party won a dominant position; however, the RPP was the dominant party in the coalition governments from 1961 to early 1965. In the October 1965 general elections the Justice Party (JP) came to power alone and remained in power until the elections of October 1969, when it was returned with a reduced percentage of the popular vote but with a sizable majority of National Assembly seats.

Disruptions of public order began in 1968 and progressively increased over the next 3 years as extremists of the left, an aberration of the elitist trend in Turkish politics, took to the streets in opposition to the populist government. A countermovement of extremists on the right emerged; clashes between left and right became more frequent, and more than a score of student-aged youths lost their lives.

In March 1971 the apparent inability of the JP government to bring a halt to the continuing incidents of violence in Turkey's large cities and the dissatisfaction of the Turkish military at the

## TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—Clothing and shoe needs in Turkey are about the same as for Washington, DC. However, Ankara winters are more severe, with more snowfall; and Adana has a climate similar to Charleston, SC.

*Health*—Public health standards in the larger centers are generally on a par with those in the US, but care must be taken in rural areas. In general, tap water is potable in Istanbul and Ankara. Turkish law requires that at least one pharmacy be open in a given neighborhood at all times.

*Telecommunications*—Telephone and telegraph services, domestic and international, are generally dependable. During peak hours circuits are often overloaded and delays ensue.

*Transportation*—More than 20 scheduled airlines connect Turkey with all parts of the world. Istanbul and Ankara are the primary international airports. Turkish Airlines and Turkish state railways serve many points within Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.

Buses and share cabs (dolmus), although somewhat crowded, provide satisfactory local transportation. Taxis are readily available. Main roads are fairly good in the large centers; secondary roads are generally adequate.

failure of the JP government to pursue reforms with the speed and vigor deemed by the military as necessary led to a political crisis. The senior military officers called for the replacement of the JP government by one which could attain these objectives.

A new Prime Minister, Nihat Erim, was designated by the President in March 1971 to establish a reform, nonparty government composed of independents and members of the GNA from the three largest political parties.

Nihat Erim resigned as Prime Minister in May 1972, but "above party" governments continued, first under the premiership of Ferit Melen (May 1972-April 1973) and then Naim Talu (April 1973-October 1973).

National elections held in October 1973 were won by the Republican People's Party, led by Bulent Ecevit who became premier of a coalition consisting of the RPP and the rightist



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the GNA or, within 10 days, returns the law with the reasons for his veto. Laws vetoed by the President may be reenacted by the GNA; presidential promulgation is then required within 10 days.

The President designates a Prime Minister, usually the leader of the political party or coalition of parties which can command a majority of votes in the National Assembly. The Prime Minister, as Head of Government, administers the government's general policies. Working with him is the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) whose members are selected by the Prime Minister from the GNA or from among private citizens qualified to be elected to the GNA.

The GNA is a bicameral parliament composed of the National Assembly and the Senate of the Republic. National Assembly members are directly elected to 4-year terms. The Senate has 150 members popularly elected to 6-year terms, 19 life members from the former CNU, 15 members designated by the President, and former Presidents of the Republic. The GNA has the usual parliamentary powers of enacting, amending, and repealing laws. Bills are first debated in the National Assembly, and a mixed committee decides questions on which the two houses cannot agree. The power of interpellation is vested exclusively in the National Assembly.

The Court of Cassation sits at the apex of Turkey's regular judicial system and serves as a court of last instance in most cases. The Council of State has a similar function in the administrative court system. The Constitutional Court, added to the judicial system by the 1961 Constitution, reviews, on appeal, the constitutionality of laws and, when necessary, hears cases against the President and other senior officials.

Each of the 67 Provinces is headed by a provincial governor appointed by the central government.

### Principal Government Officials

President—Fahri Koruturk

Prime Minister—Suleyman Demirel

### Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil

National Salvation Party (NSP). In September 1974 Prime Minister Ecevit resigned because of differences with the NSP, and an interim government under Dr. Sadi Irmak (Independent Senator) took over until April 1975, when President of the Justice Party and former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel headed a coalition consisting of the JP, NSP, and several other smaller conservative parties.

## GOVERNMENT

Turkey is a parliamentary democracy operating under a Constitution approved by referendum on July 9, 1961, and put into full operation in October.

The President is chosen by the Grand National Assembly from among its members for a single 7-year term. He promulgates the laws enacted by



National Defense—Ferit Melen  
 Interior—Oguzhan Asilturk  
 Finance—Yilmaz Ergenekon  
 Justice—Ismail Muftuoglu  
 President, Republican Senate—Tekin Ariburun  
 President, National Assembly—Kemal Guven  
 Chief, Turkish General Staff—Gen. Semih Sancar  
 Ambassador to the U.S.—Melih Esenbel  
 Ambassador to the U.N.—Ilter Turkmen

Turkey maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 1606 23d St., NW., Washington, D.C. 20008, and Consulates General in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.

### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Turkey's body politic is divided into a majority, which is conservative and frequently traditional in outlook, and a sizable minority, which seeks more rapid implementation of the secular, Westernizing, statist philosophy propounded by Ataturk. This fundamental dichotomy underlies the party structure within which a populist party and an elitist party have been most prominent since 1950 and helps to explain the recurrent political difficulties which Turkey has experienced since 1950.

#### Political Parties

Turkey has two major parties, three others with sufficient strength to form parliamentary groups, and several minor political parties.

The populist Justice Party, founded in 1961 and currently headed by Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, inherited much of the political support enjoyed by the Democrat Party, which was overthrown in the 1960 military coup and subsequently banned. The JP places great emphasis on private capital participation in the development process. It has considerable support from among Turkey's rural majority, as well as from business and artisan groups.

The Republican People's Party, headed by Bulent Ecevit, has basically adhered to the paternalistic approach

to Turkey's economy which Ataturk originated, but since 1965 it has advocated an even greater role for the state through its espousal of a "left-of-center" philosophy. This party commands a high degree of support from among the urban population, civil servants, military officers, and others who regard it as the repository of Ataturk's traditions.

Another political group, originally called the National Order Party, was organized by a group of conservatives following the 1969 elections. This conservative, religious party was banned in May 1971 following the Constitutional Court ruling that it had been attempting to make use of religion for political purposes. It regrouped in 1973 under the name of National Salvation Party, again led by conservative Necmettin Erbakan, and was the third strongest party in the 1973 elections.

The Republican Reliance Party, led by Turhan Feyzioglu, was a centrist grouping which broke with the RPP in 1967. In 1969 it won a sufficient number of seats to make it a recognized parliamentary group, but then it steadily lost support.

In December 1970 a group of dissident JP deputies, led by former Speaker of the National Assembly Ferruh Bozbeyli, formed the Democratic Party. This party is generally viewed as a rallying point for the more conservative former JP members.

In July 1971 the Turkish Labor Party, the only noteworthy Socialist party in the country, was banned by a ruling of the Constitutional Court. It had received less than 3 percent of the popular vote in general elections. The other minor parties generally range from the center to the right of the political spectrum, an orientation less important on occasion than the ethnic, sectarian, or regional identifications of certain of these groupings.

All parties recognize the importance of economic development, although they differ on the best means for its achievement. The nation is united on the need to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus dispute acceptable to the Turkish community on the island, as well as on the necessity to use whatever measures might be required to

forestall an imposed, unacceptable solution. Turkey's participation in NATO is supported by all parties, except the now-banned Turkish Labor Party.

As of January 1976 the political parties held the following number of seats in the Grand National Assembly:

#### Senate

Justice Party	78 seats
Republican People's Party	60 seats
National Salvation Party	5 seats
Republican Reliance Party	4 seats
Nationalist Action Party	1 seat
Democratic Party	0
Turkish Unity Party	0
Independents	2 seats
Vacancies	0
Presidential Appointees	15 seats
"Life Senators"	19 seats
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>184 seats</b>

#### National Assembly

Justice Party	159 seats
Republican People's Party	189 seats
National Salvation Party	48 seats
Republican Reliance Party	10 seats
Nationalist Action Party	3 seats
Democratic Party	24 seats
Turkish Unity Party	1 seat
Independents	14 seats
Vacancies	2 seats
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>450 seats</b>

### ECONOMY

The economy is largely agricultural (mainly cotton, tobacco, and grains). About two-thirds of the labor force is engaged in farming and related occupations. Government-owned or controlled enterprises account for about half of the aggregate industrial output of the public and private sectors.

The 1960's were the longest period of sustained and rapid economic growth in Turkey's history. The 1950's witnessed inflation and a series of balance-of-payments crises. At the end of 1969 inflation and balance-of-payments problems reemerged. In August 1970 the government undertook a major economic stabilization and reform program. The Turkish lira underwent a 40 percent devaluation, to 15 per U.S. dollar. Currency gains from the devaluation have been used to strengthen official reserves. Export expansion was also accorded high priority.



Turkey continues to be dependent in part on external assistance for economic development and to help meet its debt obligations. The OECD has provided about \$3.4 billion from 1963 through 1973 in financial assistance and debt relief. The IMF and the European Monetary Agreement, a lending agency composed of a number of European countries, also have assisted Turkey with standby arrangements and short-term credits.

Turkey signed an agreement of association with the European Communities in 1963. In mid-1971 Turkey entered the second, or "transitional," stage of its association with the European Economic Community (Common Market), which provides free entry of Turkish industrial exports to the Common Market, improved access for agricultural goods, and up to \$195 million in credit for investment in industrial projects. In turn, Turkey's tariffs will be progressively reduced or curtailed for the Common Market's products over a 30-year period.

With an annual per capita income of about \$893 at the current exchange rate, Turkey is attempting to narrow the gap between its economy and the thriving West European economies. Economic development with financial stability is a major domestic policy. Turkey's central economic problem is the need for increased foreign exchange earnings to match the growing cost of the imports required for development. In addition, much of the industrial sector is still devoted to assembly rather than basic manufacture and is dependent on high-cost imports.

Turkey is in the process of stimulating the expansion of exports in order to earn the foreign exchange necessary to import the capital investment items and raw materials required to sustain a high rate of growth. It also recognizes that high-cost, protective industry must undergo major adjustment if it is to be competitive as Turkey moves toward full membership in the EC.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Turkey is a member of NATO, which it joined in 1952 and which is still its major foreign alliance. It is also

an important regional member of CENTO, which has its headquarters at Ankara. Turkey has been an effective proponent of collective security within the U.N. framework, and it participates in a number of U.N. specialized agencies.

Since World War II Turkey has expended about 30 percent of its annual budget for defense. It jealously guards its frontiers and places special emphasis on modernizing its armed forces. The provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1936, implemented and enforced by Turkey according to the convention, regulate the use of the Turkish Straits. The prominence of Turkey's security problems has resulted in its international alliances and has contributed to its eagerness to fulfill its NATO military commitments; increasing Soviet naval activity in the eastern Mediterranean underscores the continuing importance of the southeastern flank of NATO.

During the past few years Turkey has taken steps to normalize its daily relations with the Soviet Union. In August 1971 Turkey and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations. The Republic of China then suspended relations with Turkey.

#### U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS

Turkish-American friendship dates to the late 18th century and was first officially sealed in a treaty of 1830. During World War II there was a flow of some lend-lease materials to Turkey, but the present close relationship really began with the agreement of July 12, 1947, which implemented the Truman doctrine. The United States is trying to assist Turkey in moving toward greater economic and military self-reliance. As part of the cooperative efforts toward that end, the U.S. has lent and granted Turkey about \$3 billion in economic and \$4 billion in military assistance.

Several thousand U.S. military personnel and their dependents are stationed in Turkey. They staff several communications/electronics facilities, a major air base at Incirlik near Adana, and a number of smaller facilities scattered throughout the country. Two NATO headquarters near Izmir also have sizable U.S. contingents.

#### Cyprus

U.S.-Turkish relations have been severely tested since July 1974, when Turkey evoked the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee for Cyprus and sent troops there to protect the Turkish Cypriot community following the overthrow of the Cyprus Government by mainland Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard. The ensuing civil war on Cyprus led to Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island, and efforts in 1974 and 1975 to find a peaceful solution through negotiation have proved unavailing.

An obstacle to progress on Cyprus was Turkey's stated reluctance to negotiate on the issue while a U.S. arms embargo against her remained in effect. This embargo had been imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress on February 5, 1975, for Turkey's unauthorized use of U.S.-furnished military equipment during the July-August 1974 Cyprus operation. Legislation partially lifting the embargo was passed by Congress in October 1975, but during the period it was in effect the U.S. gave Turkey no military aid, sold no arms, and did not even permit the delivery of equipment already paid for.

#### Military Relations

Turkish resentment toward what was viewed as an unjust act resulted, on July 25, 1975, in Turkey's taking over U.S. bases and declaring invalid the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), the basis of U.S. military presence in Turkey. As of July 26, primary operations at U.S. bases ceased. Negotiations between the United States and Turkey for a new DCA began in October 1975, after the partial lifting of the embargo, and are still continuing. As of this writing, no U.S. military or intelligence operations in Turkey have been resumed.

#### Opium

Turkey is one of seven countries permitted to export opium, in accordance with international agreements, to meet the world's legitimate medical requirements for opium-based drugs such as morphine and codeine. (India is the world's largest legal exporter; Turkey ranks second with about 20



percent of the market.) Opium-poppy cultivation has existed in Turkey for centuries, and it is an important part of the livelihood for thousands of Turkish villagers in the western Anatolian Plateau. In addition to the cash return for the opium gum, the byproducts of poppy products are important to the farmer as the seeds are used for oil and flavoring and the stalks used for fuel and fodder.

In the past a significant portion of the opium has been diverted at the farm from legal production and smuggled out of Turkey to France and other countries where it was processed into heroin. The impact of drug abuse, particularly of heroin, in the United States has led to U.S. efforts to obtain the cooperation of other countries in suppressing trafficking in narcotic substances. In 1971 Prime Minister Erim announced that opium-poppy cultivation in Turkey would be banned effective after the 1972 harvest. (According to Turkish law, farmers must be given 1 year's notice before prohibition can take place.)

In 1973, for the first time in many years, there were no opium poppies cultivated in Turkey. Concurrently, there were significant increases in the price of illicit opium and morphine base to European traffickers. Both the quantity and the quality of heroin reaching the eastern United States

from Europe dropped sharply.

On July 1, 1974, the Turkish Government rescinded the ban on opium-poppy cultivation. This continues to be a matter of serious concern to the United States because of the possibility of potential diversion into illegal channels.

Several positive developments have occurred since the rescission. The Government of Turkey banned the lancing of poppy pods and authorized harvesting only through the collection of the entire pod, a process known as the straw process and one which is far less conducive to illicit trafficking. Under this procedure no opium is produced; rather, morphine is extracted directly from the pod in a large and elaborate chemical plant.

The Turkish Government has requested international assistance in the development of its control program. The U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs has sent teams of experts to consult with the Turks on organizing their production and control activities.

Turkey has instituted extensive controls recommended by the U.N. and the U.S. It has assigned 75 teams to inspect the poppy fields. U.N. and U.S. experts have made frequent visits to the poppy area and are pleased with the control measures in force. No evidence of poppy pod incision has been found.

#### **Principal U.S. Officials**

Ambassador—William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Deputy Chief of Mission—Donald C. Bergus  
Chief, Joint U.S. Military Mission—Maj. Gen. William C. Wolfe

#### **Counselors**

Political Affairs—George A. McFarland, Jr.  
Economic Affairs—Albert V. Nyren  
Mutual Security Affairs—Paul F. Gardner  
Administrative Affairs—J. Harlan Southerland  
Public Affairs Officer (USIS)—Gilbert F. Austin  
Army Attaché—Col. Frederick T. Barrett  
Navy Attaché—Capt. Robert E. Vaughn  
Defense and Air Attaché—Col. Harold L. James

#### **Consuls General**

Istanbul—Howard P. Mace  
Izmir—James P. Moffett  
Adana—Ralph T. Jones

The U.S. Embassy is located at 110 Ataturk Blvd., Ankara. The Consulate General in Istanbul is at 147 Mesrutiyet Caddesi.

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**APPENDIX I.O**

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

[Washington, Department of State, December 1977. (Publication 7901).]



background  
NOTESUnited Arab  
Emirates

department of state \* december 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: United Arab Emirates

## PEOPLE


The seven Emirates in the United Arab Emirates are: Abu Dhabi, pop. 270,000; Dubai 250,000; Sharjah 110,000; Ras al-Khaimah 60,000; Fujairah 28,000; Ajman 24,000; and Umm al-Qaiwain 18,000. Immigration has rapidly increased population since 1968, especially in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Most of the people are Arabs belonging to the Sunni sect of Islam. Iranians, Baluchis, and Indians are the principal minority groups and reside along the coast. Bedouins inhabit the barren stretches between settlements.

The literacy rate is low, but with new educational facilities it is advancing rapidly.

## HISTORY

European and Arab pirates roamed the Trucial Coast area from the 17th century into the 19th century, hence the former label "Pirate Coast." Early successful British expeditions against the pirates led to further campaigns against their headquarters at Ras al-Khaimah and other harbors along the southwest coast in 1819. The next year a General Treaty of Peace was signed to which all the principal shaikhs of the coast adhered. Intermittent piracy continued until 1835, when the shaikhs agreed not to engage, under any circumstances, in hostilities at sea. In 1853 they signed a treaty with the United Kingdom under which the coastal shaikhs agreed to a



"perpetual maritime truce." It was enforced by the United Kingdom, and disputes between shaikhs were referred to the British for settlement.

## PROFILE

## People

**POPULATION:** 760,000 (1977 est.). **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE:** 8% (1977). **DENSITY:** 24 per sq. mi. (9 per sq. km.). **ETHNIC GROUPS:** Arab 22%, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian. **RELIGIONS:** Moslem 90%; Hindu and Christian. **LANGUAGES:** Arabic (official), Persian and English widely spoken, Hindu, Urdu. **LITERACY:** 25% (est.).

## Geography

**AREA:** About 32,000 sq. mi. (82,880 sq. km.); compares in size with Maine. **CAPITAL:** Abu Dhabi (pop. 210,000). **OTHER CITIES:** Dubai, Sharjah.

## Government

**TYPE:** Federation of Emirates. **INDEPENDENCE:** December 2, 1971.

**DATE OF PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION:** December 2, 1971.

**BRANCHES:** *Executive*—7-member Supreme Council of Rulers which elects President and Vice President. *Legislative*—40-Member National Consultative Council. *Judicial*—Secular legal codes being introduced; Islamic law very influential.

**POLITICAL PARTIES:** None. **SUFFRAGE:** None. **ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS:** 7 largely self-governing city-states.

**FLAG:** A vertical red stripe on the staff side and three horizontal stripes—green, white, and black—from top to bottom on the right.

## Economy

**GNP:** \$14 billion (1977). **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE:** 19% (1976-77). **PER**

**CAPITA INCOME:** \$18,500 (1977 est.).

**AGRICULTURE:** *Land*—about 5% pasture, less than 3% cultivated (most food is imported). *Labor*—10%. *Products*—vegetables, meat, dates.

**INDUSTRY:** *Labor*—65%. *Products*—fish, light manufactures, petroleum, construction.

**NATURAL RESOURCES:** Oil.


**TRADE:** *Exports*—petroleum, pearls, fish. *Partners*—European Economic Community, Japan, US. *Imports*—\$3.6 billion (1976); machinery, consumer goods, food. *Partners*—Western Europe, Japan, US.

**OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE:** 1 dirham=US\$0.26.

**US ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED:** None.

**MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:** UN, Arab League, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).





NOTE: Spellings in the text differ from those on the map: Ras al-Khaimah—Ra's al-Khaymah, Umm al-Qaiwain—Umm al-Qaywayn, Sharjah—Ash Shāriqah, Fujairah—Al Fujayrah, Abu Dhabi—Abū Ḍaby, and Dubai—Dubayy.

Primarily as a reaction to the ambitions of other European countries, the United Kingdom and the Trucial States established closer bonds in an 1892 treaty, similar to those entered into by the British with other Persian Gulf principalities. Under it the shaikhs agreed not to dispose of any territory except to the United Kingdom and not to enter into relationships with any foreign government other than the United Kingdom without British consent. The British promised to protect the Trucial Coast from all aggression by sea and to lend its good offices in case of land attack.

In 1955 the United Kingdom effectively intervened on the side of Abu Dhabi in the latter's dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis and other territory to the south of the Trucial States. Control over the Oasis is now shared between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Oman. In 1974 the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) Government reached agreement with Saudi Arabia, settling the old Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute.

In 1968 the U.K. Government announced a policy decision, reaffirmed in March 1971, to end the

treaty relationships with the Gulf shaikhdoms. The seven Trucial Shaikhdoms joined the other two states (Bahrain and Qatar) under British protection in an effort to form a union of Arab emirates. By mid-1971, however, the nine shaikhdoms still had not been able to agree on terms of union, and the termination date of the British treaty relationship was approaching (end of 1971). Bahrain and Qatar then became independent as separate entities in August and September, respectively. The British protective treaty with the Trucial Shaikhdoms ended on December 1, and they became fully independent. On December 2, 1971, six of them entered into a union, the United Arab Emirates. The seventh, Ras al-Khaimah, joined the union some weeks later.

## GEOGRAPHY

The United Arab Emirates is located in the eastern Arabian Peninsula, bounded on the north by the Persian Gulf. Formerly known as the Trucial Shaikhdoms, Trucial States, Trucial Coast, and Trucial Oman, the

Emirates include Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.

A barren, flat, island-dotted coast extends eastward from Khor al-Udayd (south of the boundary with Qatar) for about 400 miles (644 km.). Inland, the coastal plain gradually gives way to rolling sand dunes that extend southward, eventually emerging into the great, virtually uninhabited wasteland of the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia. At its eastern end the coast includes the western Hajar Mountains. The seven Emirates are connected by good paved roads.

The area has a hot and dry desert climate, where temperatures in the shade reach 120°F (49°C). In the eastern mountains, however, the climate is cooler with enough rainfall—about 15 inches (38 cm.) annual—to permit some cultivation.

## GOVERNMENT

Administratively, the U.A.E. is divided into the seven Emirates, each with its own ruler.

The pace at which local government in each of the Emirates is evolving from traditional to modern patterns is set primarily by the wealth, population, and economic and social progress of each. Under the 1971 Constitution considerable reserved powers remain to each Emirate, including control over mineral rights, taxation, and police powers. In this milieu, the growth of federal powers has been slow but persistent.

The Constitution established the positions of President (Chief of State) and Vice President, each serving 5-year terms; a Council of Ministers (Cabinet) led by a Prime Minister (Head of Government); a Supreme Council of Rulers; and a 40-Member National Assembly, a consultative body with weighted representation. Members are appointed by the rulers.

A federal Supreme Court was established by the Constitution.

### Principal Government Officials

#### Supreme Council

President, Ruler of Abu Dhabi—Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan



Vice President, Ruler of Dubai—  
Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum  
Prime Minister—Shaikh Maktum bin  
Rashid al-Maktum  
Ruler of Sharjah—Shaikh Sultan bin  
Mohammad al-Qasimi  
Ruler of Ajman—Shaikh Rashid bin  
Humaid al-Nu'aimi  
Ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain—Shaikh  
Ahmad bin Rashid al-Mu'alla  
Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah—Shaikh Saqr  
bin Muhammad al-Qasimi  
Ruler of Fujairah—Shaikh Hamad bin  
Muhammed al-Sharqi

#### Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Ahmad Khalifa  
al-Suwaidi  
Petroleum and Mineral Resources—Dr.  
Mana Sa'id al-Utayba  
Finance and Industry—Shaikh Hamdan  
bin Rashid al-Maktum  
Defense—Shaikh Muhammad bin  
Rashid al-Maktum  
Economy and Trade—Shaikh Sultan  
bin Ahmad al-Mu'alla  
Public Works and Housing—  
Muhammad Khalifa al-Kindi  
Information and Culture—Shaikh  
Ahmad bin Hamid al-Nahayan  
Planning—Sa'id Ghubash  
Electricity and Water—Thani bin Isa  
bin Harib  
Agriculture and Fisheries—Sa'id al-  
Raqbani

Ambassador to the U.S.—Hamad  
Rahman al-Madfah  
Ambassador to the U.N.—Ali  
Humaidan

The United Arab Emirates main-  
tains an Embassy in the United States  
at 600 New Hampshire Ave. NW.,  
Suite 740, Washington, D.C. 20037  
(tel. 202-338-6500).

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The distribution of power among  
the Emirates is reflected in the alloca-  
tion of positions in its federal govern-  
ment. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi,  
whose Emirate is the wealthiest and  
rivals Dubai in population, was named  
President of the U.A.E.; his chief  
adviser was selected as the Foreign  
Minister. The Shaikh of Dubai, which  
is the commercial center of the Trucial  
Coast and a rapidly growing oil  
producer, was named Vice President,

and his son was designated Prime  
Minister.

The Trucial Oman Scouts, long the  
symbol of public order on the coast  
and commanded by British officers,  
were turned over to the U.A.E. as its  
Defense Force. However, until 1976,  
the larger Emirates, notably Abu  
Dhabi, maintained relatively substan-  
tial defense establishments. In 1976  
the various Emirate defense forces  
were brought under a unified com-  
mand. The ability of the U.A.E. to  
maintain political order was tested  
successfully in early 1971 when the  
Defense Force joined local security  
forces in Sharjah in putting down a  
coup d'etat attempt in which the  
Ruler of Sharjah was assassinated.

Since achieving its independence in  
1971, the U.A.E. has begun to  
strengthen its federal institutions.  
Although each Emirate still retains  
substantial autonomy, the power of  
the central government is gradually  
becoming more firmly established. A  
basic concept in the U.A.E. develop-  
ment as a federal system is that a  
significant percentage of each  
Emirate's revenues will be devoted to  
the U.A.E. central budget. The budget  
will include provision for economic  
and social development throughout the  
United Arab Emirates. To date, only  
Abu Dhabi has made significant contri-  
butions to the federal budget.

The U.A.E. has no political parties.  
Arab nationalist feeling is developing,  
and there is growing sentiment,  
particularly among urban youth, in  
favor of liberalization of government  
and accelerated economic develop-  
ment. The great influx of wealth and  
modern technology in the Emirates  
has added to the "growing pains" of  
rapid modernization. Workers from  
neighboring states are flooding in and  
adding the strain of a large foreign  
population to the other problems of  
development.

#### ECONOMY

Prior to 1958 the rulers of the  
Trucial Coast had a combined annual  
income of about \$1.7 million, mainly  
from oil exploration rights and British  
Government grants. The economy was  
based on subsistence agriculture, sheep  
and goat herding, fishing, and trade.

#### TRAVEL NOTES

*Climate and Clothing*—May through  
mid-October is very hot, and summer  
attire is recommended. From mid-  
October through April, temperatures  
range from 45°-80°F (7°-27°C) and  
spring and fall clothing is best.

*Customs*—A visa is required to enter the  
UAE. Visitors should have valid yellow  
fever, smallpox, and cholera immuniza-  
tions. *Health requirements change.*  
*Travelers should check the most current*  
*information.*

*Health*—Visitors should exercise normal  
care regarding what they eat or drink.  
Several well-trained doctors practice in  
the UAE.

*Telecommunications*—A modern tele-  
phone system links the seven Emirates.  
International telephone and telex com-  
munications are good.

*Transportation*—There are four interna-  
tional airports in the UAE with sched-  
uled flights.

Only Dubai, with its relatively good  
harbor, had attained a degree of  
prosperity, serving as an entrepôt and  
commercial center for the entire area.

Oil strikes in Abu Dhabi in  
1958-60 heralded a decisive change.  
Petroleum exports began in 1962, and  
Abu Dhabi has emerged as the  
wealthiest of the seven shaiikhdoms. Its  
oil reserves are known to be extensive,  
and in 1976 its oil income was over  
\$6.5 billion.

With oil output averaging 1.6  
million barrels a day (b/d) by the end  
of 1976, Abu Dhabi is now consider-  
ing the implementation of a 3-year  
\$8.7 billion development program for  
infrastructural and industrial develop-  
ment. Central to the plan will be the  
large petroleum-related projects at  
Jebel Dhanna, including a 120,000 b/d  
refinery, gas gathering and liquefaction  
facilities, and fertilizer and plastic  
plants.

In mid-1971, oil was found in  
commercial quantities off the shore of  
Dubai by the Dubai Petroleum Co. By  
the end of 1974, production exceeded  
250,000 barrels daily. In 1974 the  
Emirate of Sharjah announced that  
offshore oil had been discovered in  
commercial quantities. Production at



the end of that year was about 60,000 b/d. Oil explorations are continuing in the other Emirates, but commercial quantities of oil have not yet been discovered. Further drilling in the area of earlier oil-shows in Ras al-Khaimah is expected to reveal exploitable deposits.

Several companies presently hold oil-producing concessions in the United Arab Emirates. "Participation" and nationalization negotiations which eventually will affect the ownership of all these concessions are now underway.

Lack of water places a severe limit on agricultural development possibilities, but Abu Dhabi is fostering arid land agriculture research. Substantial market-gardening activity takes place in Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, which are blessed with more water than the other Emirates.

Exports from the U.A.E., except for some transshipments from Dubai, consist almost entirely of crude oil and result in a substantial balance-of-trade surplus which finances imports.

#### FOREIGN BUSINESS INFORMATION

For information on foreign economic trends, commercial development, production, trade regulations, and tariff rates, contact the Bureau of International Commerce, US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230. This information is also available from any of the Department of Commerce district offices located throughout the US.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

The U.A.E. began in an atmosphere of general acceptance by, and friendly

relations with, the world community. It joined the United Nations and the Arab League and was immediately recognized by the United Kingdom, most Arab states and other neighbors, the United States, many Western countries, and Japan.

Since independence it has managed to settle its longstanding dispute with Iran over the Gulf Median Line and the Buraimi Oasis dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. This latter agreement has opened the way for the normalization of Saudi-U.A.E. relations.

The substantial development assistance from the U.A.E. has increased the country's stature and popularity among the recipient African and Asian states.

#### U.S.-U.A.E. RELATIONS

For some years the United States enjoyed friendly informal relations with the Trucial Shaikhdoms, a relationship which was built on important and mutually advantageous private U.S. contacts in the area. In anticipation of the termination of the British protective treaty relationships with the Persian Gulf States, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and most Arab neighbors, urged the creation of the largest possible federation of the Gulf States. Upon federation, the United States promptly recognized the U.A.E. and agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations.

In 1974 the United States sent a resident Ambassador to the U.A.E.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Francois M. Dickman

Deputy Chief of Mission—Brooks Wrampelmeier

Economic/Commercial Officers—Daniel Dolan, Peter Carrico, Henry Miller-Jones

The mailing address for the U.S. Embassy is Box 4009, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Embassy office in Dubai, P.O. Box 5343, which is headed by Economic/Commercial Officer Charles G. Currier.

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☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 1977 O-261-124 (2417)

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**APPENDIX I.P**

**(NORTH) YEMEN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

**[Washington, Department of State, June 1977. (Publication 8170).]**



background  
NOTES

## (North) Yemen

department of state \* june 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: Yemen Arab Republic

## PEOPLE

Yemenis are almost equally divided between two principal Islamic religious groups: the Zaidi community of the Shi'a sect, found in the northern, central, and eastern portions of Yemen, and the Shafa'i community of the Sunni sect in the south and southwest.

About 10 percent of the population is urban. Unlike other people of the peninsula, who are nomads or seminomads, Yemenis are almost entirely sedentary and live in the small villages and towns scattered throughout the highlands and the Tihama. They are mainly of Semitic origin, although pronounced Negroid strains are present in the Tihama coastal strip.

## HISTORY

Yemen is known to be one of the oldest centers of civilization in the Near East although its early history is obscure. Its territory was once part of the ancient Kingdom of Sheba, a prosperous trade link between Africa and India. In its pre-Islamic period, well-developed Christian and Jewish societies evolved in various parts of the country. Yemen played an important role in the formative years of Islam. The Turks maintained varying degrees of control over Yemen from the 16th century onward, and the last full Turkish occupation was from 1872 to 1918.

The Hamid al-Din dynasty, which

ruled Yemen from the time of Turkish withdrawal in 1918 until the 1962 revolution, traced its origins to Imam (King) al-Hadi Yahya, who is believed to have reigned toward the close of the 9th century. In 1911 the Turks recognized a descendant of this line, the Imam Yahya, as the temporal and spiritual ruler of the Zaidis in the highlands. The Imam was nominally allied with Turkey against the British during World War I.

When Turkish military forces withdrew, the Imam was left in control of Yemen. He attempted to strengthen his control over the area left him by the Turks. He laid theoretical claim to Aden (a British Crown Colony), other British protectorates in South Arabia

## PROFILE

## People

POPULATION: 6.4 million (1975). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 3%. DENSITY: 0 per sq. mi. (30 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Mostly Arab, some Negroid. RELIGION: Islam (Shi'a and Sunni). LANGUAGE: Arabic. LITERACY: 22% of men, .05% of women. LIFE EXPECTANCY: 38 yrs.

## Geography

AREA: 75,000 sq. mi. (195,000 sq. km.); about the size of Neb. CAPITAL: Sana (pop. 130,000). OTHER CITIES: Hodeida, Taiz.

## Government

TYPE: Republican. INDEPENDENCE: 1918. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: 1971 (amended 1974).

BRANCHES: *Executive*—4-member Command Council with a Chairman (Chief of State), Cabinet with a Prime Minister (Head of Government). *Legislative*—none. *Judicial*—religious and civil courts, administered by Ministry of Justice.

POLITICAL PARTIES: None. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 10 Provinces; each divided into several districts.

FLAG: Three horizontal bands—red, white, and black—with a green star in the center.

## Economy

GNP: \$1 billion (1976 est.). PER CAPITA INCOME: \$ca.180.

AGRICULTURE: *Land* 42%. *Labor* 73%. *Products*—wheat, sorghum, cattle, sheep, qat (amphetamine leaf), cotton, fruits.

INDUSTRY: *Products*—consumer goods, construction materials.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Traces of copper, sulfur, coal, and quartz (undeveloped); no oil yet found.

TRADE: *Exports*—\$11.1 million (FY 1976): cotton (50%), coffee (15%), hides and skins (16%). *Partners*—PRC (50%), Arab world (24%), E.E.C. (20%). *Imports*—\$377.7 million (FY 1976): foodstuffs (43%), manufactures (18%), machinery and transportation equipment (17%), chemicals, fuel, lubricants, tobacco. *Partners*—Japan (14%), Arab world (13%), Australia (8%), E.E.C. (24%), COMECON (2%), US (1%), PRC (8%).

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: YRL (riyal) 1=U.S.\$0.22.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: US only—\$72.0 million in grants (1946-76); \$16 million (FY 1976): Total promised Arab aid—over \$1 billion.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League.



(now People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), and the Hadramaut (an area east of Aden). In 1915 the Imam's son, Prince Ahmad, established the family's control over the Tihama. A dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Asir area to the north of Yemen was settled in 1934 by a Yemeni-Saudi treaty of friendship recognizing incorporation of the Asir into Saudi Arabia. By the treaty of Sana of 1934 the Imam agreed to the status quo of the Yemen-Aden Protectorate border.

combat the deposed Imam Badr, who had fled to the north where, with the help of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, he raised royalist forces to oppose the newly formed republic.

Fighting between republicans and royalists continued until mid-1963 when, with U.S. assistance, a disengagement agreement was negotiated between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and a U.N. truce observation mission was sent to Yemen. However, disagreement over implementation brought a renewal of hostilities later that year. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Nasser of Egypt reached renewed agreement in principle for a Yemen settlement in 1964 and again in 1965, but the agreements were not implemented. However, after the Arab summit conference in August 1967, Egyptian troops were withdrawn.

Almost at once the Egyptian-supported regime of President Abdullah al-Sallal was ousted, and moderate republican leaders rallied to the defense of Sana against a final royalist siege of the city. By 1968 the siege was broken, and republican leaders began a long, but eventually successful, effort of reconciliation with royalist tribes and their Saudi supporters. Final Saudi recognition of the republic occurred in mid-summer 1970, when royalist leaders accepted integration under the republican regime.

Internal dissension led in June 1974 to the replacement of the civilian President by a largely military command council.

Yemen is located in the south western corner of the Arabian Peninsula, just north of the passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Its neighbors are Saudi Arabia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The Tihama, a hot, sandy semi-desert strip about 40 miles (64 km.) wide, separates the Red Sea coast from the generally well-watered mountainous area of the interior. The mountains, which are heavily terraced for agriculture, reach heights of 12,000 feet (3,658 m.) above sea level in some places. The normally abundant rainfall



and agreeable mountain climate make it one of the most important agricultural areas of the Arabian Peninsula.

Sana, at over 7,000 feet (2,134 m.) above sea level in the center of the country, is both the capital and principal city. Taiz, at 4,600 feet (1,402 m.) above sea level, is the principal city of the southern part of the country. Hodeida, at the center of the Red Sea coastal strip, is the principal port.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

The republican government in Sana is headed by a 4-member Command Council. The Council functions as a policymaking body and appoints a Prime Minister, who in turn chooses a Cabinet which varies in size. The Prime Minister functions essentially as an administrative official, coordinating the activities of the ministries. The Prime Minister and Cabinet are responsible to the Command Council.

Under the Constitution of 1971 the first nationwide elections took place. An Assembly of 159 Members was elected as the new legislative body. The Assembly subsequently elected a Republican Council, which in turn, appointed the Prime Minister, whose Cabinet submitted itself for a vote of confidence to the Assembly.

In June 1974 the Constitution was temporarily suspended, and the country was ruled by the Command Council and an appointed Prime Minister and Cabinet. In November 1974 the Constitution, restored in a somewhat modified form, strengthened the role of the Command Council.

The system accommodates regional and tribal factors and has buttressed a moderate and pragmatic leadership which also enjoys the support of the military. The government has sought to develop the financial and administrative institutions required for development, but its lack of a revenue base has limited its success in this endeavor.

Essentially a tribal society, Yemen has no political parties in the modern sense of the word. In many parts of the country, the government rules by giving sanctions to the natural and traditional local leaders.

The legal system in Yemen is based largely on tribal and Islamic law. The

tribes have their own system of regulations and proscriptions; violations are settled according to tribal custom in tribal courts. Islamic law (*sharia*) is administered by Islamic judges who rely on the government for execution of their judgments. In addition to the *sharia* courts are government-administered civil courts.

Since the founding of the Yemen Arab Republic, the Chief of State appoints and pays judges and administers the courts through the Ministry of Justice.

For administrative purposes Yemen is divided into 10 Provinces: Taiz, Ibb, and Al Bayda in the south; Marib in the east; Hodeida along the Red Sea coast; Sana, Dhamar, and Mahwit in the center of the interior; and Hajja and Sa'dah in the northwest and northeast respectively. Each Province is further subdivided into several Districts.

## Principal Government Officials

President, Chairman of the Command Council—Col. Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamdi

Prime Minister—Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani

Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs—Muhammad Ahmad al-Junayd

## Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Abdallah al-Asnaj  
Labor, Social Affairs, and Youth—Ahmad Qasim Dahmash

Finance—Muhammad al-Junayd

Justice—Ali al-Saman

Communications—Husayn Ghaffari

Development—Muhammad Salim al-Basindwa

Agriculture—Muhammed al-Wajih

Ambassador to U.N.—M o h a m e d Sallam

Ambassador to the U.S.—Yahya al-Mutawakel

The Yemen Arab Republic maintains an Embassy in the U.S. at 600 New Hampshire Ave. NW., Suite 860, Washington, D.C. 20037 (tel. 202-965-4760).

## TRAVEL NOTES

Sana has a small but modern international airport, and flights are available from Jidda, Cairo, and Damascus. A visa is required for US citizens and may be obtained at the YAR Mission to the United Nations (211 East 43rd St., New York, NY 10017) or at the Embassy in Washington. Smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, typhoid, and gamma globulin shots are recommended. Customs controls prohibit liquor. Sana, Taiz, and Hodeida have a few small hotels offering minimal comfort. There are no railroads, but taxis can be rented by the day for regional travel; major roads are paved. The First National City Bank has opened an office in Sana and will exchange hard currencies and travelers checks.

## ECONOMY

Although its climate and topography permit a wide variety of crops, Yemen, once self-sufficient in food, has now become dependent on food imports. The disruptions of civil war (in 1965-66) and a prolonged drought (until 1973) dealt a severe blow to its previously prosperous agriculture. Coffee production, formerly Yemen's main export and principal source of foreign exchange, has fallen. (Mocha, a once-thriving Yemeni port, has lent its name as a synonym for coffee.)

The low level of domestic output of building materials and foodstuffs and the lack of raw materials, machinery equipment, and hardware production make Yemen dependent on imports for essential needs. Trade deficits are made up by remittances from Yemenis working abroad (over one million in Saudi Arabia alone) and foreign aid.

Industrial development is still in its early stages, mainly in cement, textiles, and basic consumer goods.

In 1966 an Egyptian team carried out explorations for minerals; traces of copper, sulfur, coal, and quartz were found. The U.S. Geological Survey is actively involved in North Yemen, but no minerals for export other than rock salt have been developed.

The Soviet Union and the P.R.C. have provided large-scale assistance to Yemen, beginning in the mid-1950's at the time of the Imamate. Among the



most important projects undertaken by Communist powers are construction of a modern port at Hodeida, paved roads from Hodeida to Sana and from Hodeida to Taiz, and a civil airfield and large weaving mill at Sana. Scholarships for study in the Communist countries have been granted to several hundred Yemeni youth.

Saudi Arabia has in recent years become Yemen's principal aid donor, with both direct financial assistance (over \$100 million in 1974) and project aid. Other significant current donors are Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, the P.R.C., the Soviet Union, the World Bank, the U.N. Development Program, Iraq, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States.

In addition to surplus food provided at various times for famine relief under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), the United States has constructed a road from the southern border and the port of Mocha through Taiz to Sana, installed a public water system at Taiz, and undertaken a series of rural development projects. The U.S. AID program, terminated in 1967, was renewed in 1972 with the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Imams of Yemen sought to maintain their country in an almost complete state of isolation until after World War II. Under the influence of Crown Prince Badr, large Soviet and P.R.C. aid missions were established in Yemen in 1958 and 1959, but since the 1970 rapprochement with Saudi

Arabia, Communist aid has declined.

Following the September 1962 revolution, the Yemen Arab Republic became closely allied with and heavily dependent on Egypt, which supplied troops to help defend the new republic. The Saudis feared that the republican government posed a threat to Saudi Arabia's southern border, and supported the royalists, enabling them to achieve some military success in northern Yemen.

After the Egyptian evacuation in 1967 and the subsequent royalist failure to topple the republican regime, Saudi-Yemeni differences were overcome, and relations were established. Both governments today face a challenge from the extreme left-wing factions of the government in Southern Yemen. Although Sana and Aden each espouse the goal of a "Greater Yemen" state, relations between the two governments are badly strained by political and ideological differences.

#### U.S.-YEMEN RELATIONS

The United States initially established diplomatic relations with Yemen under the terms of an agreement concluded in 1946. A resident Legation, later elevated to Embassy status, was opened on March 16, 1959. The United States recognized the Yemen Arab Republic on December 19, 1962. On June 6, 1967, during the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Y.A.R. severed diplomatic relations with the United States, and all American officials were withdrawn.

During 1969 and 1970, however, the Yemenis indicated a strong desire to resume relations, and the United States responded in a limited fashion.

On April 29, 1970, a U.S. Interests Section was opened in the Italian Embassy at Sana. Following a visit by Secretary of State Rogers in 1972, full diplomatic relations were reestablished between the two countries.

In addition to the AID program, the United States had about 50 Peace Corps volunteers in Yemen at the end of 1976 engaged in agricultural development, irrigation, nursing, and teaching English. USIA operates an English-language institute in Sana.

#### Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Thomas J. Scotes  
Deputy Chief of Mission—David M. Ransom

The address of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen is P.O. Box 1088, Sana, Yemen Arab Republic.

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**APPENDIX I.Q**

**(SOUTH) YEMEN  
BACKGROUND NOTES**

**[Washington, Department of State, January 1977. (Publication 8368).]**



background  
NOTES

## (South) Yemen

department of state \* january 1977

OFFICIAL NAME: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

## GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (also known as Southern Yemen) lies on the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by the Yemen Arab Republic on the northwest, Saudi Arabia on the northeast (border in dispute), Oman on the east, and the Gulf of Aden on the south. Southern Yemen consists of the

city of Aden (formerly a British Crown Colony) and a less developed interior area which the British called the Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates. It also includes the 1,400-square-mile (3,626 sq. km.) Island of Socotra in the Gulf of Aden and the Island of Perim in the Red Sea.

The coastal areas are sandy and flat; the interior is mountainous. The climate is extraordinarily hot, with sum-

mer temperatures exceeding 130°F (55°C). Average rainfall is less than 3 inches (7.62 cm.) annually.

Most of the people are subsistence farmers or nomadic herders. Trade, formerly a major occupation in Aden, has dwindled to almost nothing compared with preindependence levels.

Almost all Southern Yemenis are Muslims of Arab origin; the Shafai school of Sunni Islam is dominant. Since independence, resident minority groups have virtually all departed. Arabic is the official language, with English widely understood. In the Mahra area (the extreme east) several non-Arabic languages are spoken. The population is deeply divided by tribe and region.

The school system in Aden is free for students up to 14 years of age. In the interior the prevalent form of education remains the traditional Muslim schooling for boys, although modern education is increasing.

## PROFILE

## Geography

AREA: 112,000 sq. mi. (290,078 sq. km., about the size of Wis. and Mich. combined). CAPITAL: Aden (pop. 225,000). OTHER CITIES: Al Mukalla (45,000), Say'un (20,000).

## People

POPULATION: 1.3 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 2%-3% (1976). DENSITY: 11 per sq. mi. (4.4 per sq. km.). ETHNIC GROUPS: Predominantly Arab. RELIGION: Islam. LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), English, Mahri. LITERACY: 10%-20%. LIFE EXPECTANCY: na.

## Government

TYPE: Socialist republic. INDEPENDENCE: November 30, 1967. DATE OF CONSTITUTION: Draft Constitution promulgated in 1970.

BRANCHES: Executive—3-man Presidential Council, led by a Chairman. Legislative—101-member Supreme Council. Judicial—Supreme Court.

POLITICAL PARTIES: National Front and three other left-wing groups. SUFFRAGE: Universal over 18. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS: 6 Governorates.

FLAG: Red, white, and black horizontally striped banner with a red star on a blue triangular field on the staff side.

## Economy

GNP: \$150 million (1973 est.). ANNUAL GROWTH RATE: 0%. PER CAPITA INCOME: \$110 (1973). PER CAPITA GROWTH RATE: 0%.

AGRICULTURE: Land 0.3% cultivated. Labor 70%-80%. Products—sorghum, millet, wheat, cotton, qat, coffee.

INDUSTRY: Labor 2%-3%. Products—refined oil products (72% of industrial products), salt, fish meal, cloth.

TRADE: Exports and re-exports—\$102 million (1972): petroleum products 77%, textiles 5%, cotton 4%. Partners—UK 13%, Yemen Arab Republic 11%, South Africa 11%, Australia 10%, Japan 9% (estimates). Imports—\$180 million (1974): crude oil 37%, foodstuffs 16%, manufactured goods 29%. Partners—Iran 13%, Kuwait 12%, Japan 11%, Iraq 10%, UK 8%.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 1 Yemen dinar (YD)=US\$2.90.

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: Total—\$21 million (1972 est.). US only—none.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UN, Arab League, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Development Association (IDA).

## HISTORY

Between 1200 B.C. and the sixth century A.D., what is now the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was part of the Minaean, Sabaean, or Himyarite kingdoms. The Himyarites were conquered in 525 A.D. by Christian Ethiopians, who in turn were conquered by the Persians 50 years later. Islam was introduced in the seventh century, but the highland regions did not fall under the rule of Islamic religious leaders until the ninth. The coastal area later came under the control of Egyptians and Turks.

Aden was a small fishing port when







it was captured by the British in 1839, but it became an important coaling station as the use of steampowered ships increased. After the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Aden became important as a trading city as well. It was ruled as a part of British India until 1937, when it was made a Crown Colony directly under the colonial office.

To protect their foothold in Aden the British found it necessary to establish their authority in the hinterland. Eventually, through a number of protection treaties, Britain extended its influence eastward into the area known historically as the Hadramawt.

Later, 15 of the 16 Western Protectorate states, one of the four states of the Eastern Protectorate, and Aden Colony joined to form the Federation of South Arabia.

British efforts to prepare South Arabia for full independence by 1968 (as agreed in a treaty signed in 1959) were complicated by two major factors. One was the enormous difference between the busy modern port at Aden, with its large foreign population and strong trade union movement, and the poor, tradition-oriented, agriculturally based, small shaikhdoms and sultanates of the Protectorates. The second factor was the rising tide of Arab nationalism.

Opposition developed into open terrorism in 1965 with two rival nationalist groups—the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF)—competing for control. FLOSY was then associated with the sizable Egyptian presence in the Yemen Arab Republic, immediately to the northwest.

In the face of rising violence in 1967, the British began pulling out their troops from sections of Aden, the capital at al-Ittihad, and the Protectorate States. Federal rule collapsed, and NLF elements seized control in the vacated areas, often after bloody fighting with FLOSY, which had been badly weakened by the withdrawal of the Egyptians from the Yemen Arab Republic after Egypt's catastrophic defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel.

The British, having announced their intention of dealing with any indigenous group capable of forming a new

government, met at Geneva with the NLF. Following these negotiations, South Arabia, including Aden, was declared independent on November 30, 1967, and was renamed the People's Republic of Southern Yemen.

The new government was replaced on June 22, 1969, by the radical wing of the NLF. Southern Yemen changed its name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on December 1, 1970.

In August 1971 a still more radical NLF group achieved power, and Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Haytham lost his party and government positions. He was replaced by the Secretary General of the National Front (NF), 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il (of the pro-Soviet wing of the NF), who now shares power with Salim Rubayya 'Ali.

#### GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Southern Yemen is governed by a three-man Presidential Council and a Council of Ministers. The Chairman of the Presidential Council is Chief of State, and the Prime Minister is Head of Government. The National Front (NF), Southern Yemen's dominant party, is organized on the basis of cells throughout the country.

The most powerful instrument of the NF is the Executive Committee, a relatively small group of about 10 government and party leaders. Its power is derived from the larger General Command, which usually consists of 40 members elected by the NF's provincial representatives, who meet in the Congress of the National Front. The General Command also selects the members of the Presidential Council.

Legislative authority under the 1970 Constitution is vested in the People's Supreme Council of 101 members. (The first Council was appointed.) NF members comprise a majority of the Supreme Council, but other parties—the Communist and Baathi—are also represented. A certain number of other people unaffiliated with any party (i.e., women's groups, trade unions, and the military) also serve in the Supreme Council. The government nominated by the Presidential Council is presumably responsible to the Supreme Council.

#### READING LIST

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material currently being published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse the specific views in unofficial publications as representing the position of the U.S. Government.

*Aden and South Arabia.* London: Central Office of Information, 1966.

American University. *Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

*Development Plan, 1965-1970.* Aden: Government Printer, 1965.

Holden, David. *Farewell to Arabia.* London: 1967.

Ingrams, Harold. *Arabia and the Isles.* London: Murray, 1952.

Ingrams, Harold. *The Yemen.* London: Murray, 1963.

Southern Yemen inherited a modern legal system in Aden from the British. For Yemeni citizens there are lower courts through which appeals can be made to a Court of Appeal. In the area of the former Protectorate the traditional system of justice based on *sharia* (Islamic law) and tribal custom prevails.

Administratively, Southern Yemen is divided into six Governorates, each headed by a Governor appointed by the NF. The Governorates are closely controlled by the central government. They are subdivided into districts, which are also administered by officials appointed from Aden.

#### Principal Government Officials

##### Presidential Council:

Chairman—Salim Rubayya Ali  
Prime Minister—'Ali Nasir Muhammad (al-Hassani)

NF Secretary General—'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il

Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform—Muhammad Sulayman Nasir

Minister of Defense—'Ali Nasir Muhammad (al-Hassani)

Minister of Economy and Industry—'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali Nashir



Minister of Finance—Fadl Muhsin Abdallah  
 Minister of Foreign Affairs—Muhammad Salih Muti' (al-Yafa'i)  
 Minister of Interior—Salih Muslih  
 Minister of Planning—'Ali Salim al-Baydh  
 Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs—Abdallah al-Khamiri  
 Ambassador to the U.N.—Abdallah Salih al-Ashtal

### ECONOMY

The economy of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has been overwhelmingly concentrated at the port city of Aden. Following independence, the city's economy and the country's revenues were dealt a heavy blow both by the loss of the tourist trade and income from the former British military base and by the decline of bunkering and related services due to closure of the Suez Canal. GNP declined by at least 20 percent from 1966 to 1968, stagnated between 1968-70, declined in 1971, and is believed now to be less than \$140 million.

Cereal crops, tobacco, qat (a mildly narcotic plant), and cotton are grown in Southern Yemen. Animal husbandry and small-scale fishing are also major occupations.

In 1965 Aden was one of the world's largest oil bunkering ports, but by late 1967, after the Suez Canal closed, this activity declined drastically and has not resumed, despite the reopening of the canal in 1975. Port improvements are being made under World Bank auspices.

The only large-scale industrial complex is the British Petroleum refinery built in Little Aden in 1954; although it operates at less than half capacity, the refinery is still the greatest source of government income.

Light industry, also concentrated in Aden, specializes in goods for the local market.

In an effort to move its expenditures closer to its income, the government has slashed the size and salaries of the civil service. Foreign aid, largely from Socialist countries, has underwritten a small development program. The World Bank is committed to the development of port facilities and some roadbuilding. West Germany has a small aid program, and Saudi Arabia is known to have provided cash aid since 1975. The economy has been affected adversely by widespread nationalization of foreign firms and by the "workers' uprisings," a tactic used by President Salim Rubayya 'Ali to foment "revolution from below" by encouraging workers to seize and operate the businesses which employ them.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

Southern Yemen has been recognized by major countries, East and West, as well as by such Arab countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The government announced that it would follow a policy of nonalignment in world affairs. The Governments of Southern Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic (Y.A.R.) declared in 1972 that they consider the two countries to be one nation, which should be united in the future. However, no progress toward unification has been achieved and there are major differences between them in both policy and type of government.

The Southern Yemeni policy of undermining conservative Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula created serious tensions until about 1975. This led to brief but costly clashes with Saudi Arabian forces north of Southern Yemen in November 1969 and March 1973. Southern Yemen was the only Arab state to vote against admitting new Arab states in the Gulf area to the United Nations and the Arab League. It has become closely aligned with the

more radical *fedayeen* groups (such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—PFLP) on the question of the Arab-Israeli struggle. It disavowed all responsibility, however, for a PFLP attack on an Israeli tanker in the Bab el-Mandeb Straits near Southern Yemen in June 1971.

Although Southern Yemen receives economic aid from both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, its ties are closer to the U.S.S.R., and it depends exclusively on the Soviets, East Germany, and Cuba for aid in strengthening its military security apparatus. Southern Yemen actively supported an insurgency in Dhofar, the southern province of its eastern neighbor, Oman.

Beginning in 1975, Southern Yemen sought to improve relations with its more conservative neighbors. By early 1976, coincidental with the end of the Dhofar insurgency, it appeared to have ceased actively supporting the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). In May it agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. However, the regime appears to be fully committed to communism as an internal political ideology.

### U.S. POLICY

On December 7, 1967, the United States recognized the new republic and elevated its consulate general at Aden to Embassy status.

The Southern Yemen Government, however, viewed the United States with deepening antagonism, apparently because of the close U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and what Southern Yemen regards as a pro-Israel U.S. policy. On October 24, 1969, Southern Yemen formally broke diplomatic relations with the United States and expelled the diplomatic mission. The United Kingdom now acts as protecting power for the United States in Southern Yemen.

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


## APPENDIX II


### MAPS

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| C. Sovereignty Issues in the Persian Gulf Area ..... | In following pocket |











# Sovereignty Issues in the Persian Gulf Area

June 1973

- Demarcated boundary: determined by treaty and laid out on the ground by pillars or other physical means
- - - Delimited boundary: determined by treaty or otherwise and defined in written or verbal terms
- Undefined boundary: no bilateral agreement. All boundaries declared unilaterally are in this category

- Town
- Well
- △ Boundary terminus
- Oilfield

